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This PhD paper investigates a) the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on 
earnings quality, b) the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection 
on audit quality, c) the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings 
quality and d) the cost of capital and the changes of audit quality and earnings quality 
influencing on it due to financial crisis of 2008 in publicly listed firms in advanced 
countries as per level of investor protection. The sample is categorized into three 
clusters. Cluster 1 is referred as outsider economies with strong outsider protection 
and legal enforcement and clusters 2 and 3 are referred as insider economies with 
better and weaker legal enforcement systems respectively. Using linear regression 
analysis, 137.091 firm-years observations are analyzed, the earnings quality is 
examined by using 10 different measures (conservatism, value relevance, accruals 
quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, loss avoidance analysis and 
earnings smoothness), the audit quality is examined by using 6 different measures 
(audit fees, modified audit report opinion, auditor switch, status of audit firm, 
existence of audit committee and demand for auditing), the investor protection is 
examined by using 8 different metrics adopted from World Economic Forum 
(property rights, judicial independence, transparency of government policymaking, 
strength of auditing and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate boards, protection 
of minority shareholders' interests, strength of investor protection and legal rights 
index), and the cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by 
Palea (2007) and under PEG ratio method introduced by Easton (2004) is examined. 
The results are mixed among clusters and research periods. Specifically, first, the 
results show that during the financial crisis, earnings quality is decreased. However, 
this deterioration on earnings quality appears to be more severe in clusters 2 and 3 
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which are characterized by medium and weak shareholder protection. Particularly, for 
all clusters, the study shows that in an attempt to cope with recession, managers have 
an incentive to choose more aggressive conservatism, lower the earnings 
predictability and book more accruals. Countries in clusters 2 and 3 report more 
relevant financial numbers and follow artificial smoothing during the financial crisis 
while the countries in cluster 1 are to some conflicting. Second, the results show that 
all measures of audit quality is positively associated with most of institutional factors 
of investor protection in all clusters except audit fees which is not correlated with 
none of investor protection indexes. Third, against of expectations, it is found that 
audit quality is lower during financial crisis in all clusters and in most of audit quality 
measures. Fourth, the findings indicate that audit quality is higher (lower) in firms 
with strong (weak) investor protection and legal enforcement during financial crisis in 
all clusters except from audit fees. Fifth, it is reported that earnings quality is stronger 
(weaker) in countries with strong (weak) investor protection in all clusters in pre and 
crisis period. Sixth, the results confirm the findings of vast majority of previous 
literature that higher (lower) audit quality implies higher (lower) earnings quality in 
all clusters, irrespective of the financial crisis. Seventh, this PhD paper indicates that 
higher (lower) audit quality implies higher (lower) earnings quality in countries with 
high (low) investor protection in all clusters, irrespective of the financial crisis. 
Eighth, the results show that the financial crisis of 2008 has had positive impact on 
the cost of equity capital for all clusters and the cost of debt for clusters 1 and 2. The 
cost of equity is negatively associated with firms that are audited by Big Four auditors 
and have an audit committee in all clusters, and with firms that switch auditors in 
cluster 2. Firms that are audited by Big Four auditors in cluster 1, firms with a 
modified audit report in cluster 2 and firms that have an audit committee in cluster 3 
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have a negative association with the cost of debt. This study also shows that the 
association between earnings quality attributes and cost of capital is significantly 
negative before and during the crisis. Overall, the findings offer crucial insights to 
post crisis management, auditors, regulators and accounting standard setters in 
stabilizing investors’ confidence and enhancing firm growth after the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
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In the last decade, there is an extensive attention from researchers to 
investigate the determinants and consequences of earnings management. However, 
they pay more attention on examining the earnings manipulation due to the incentives 
of managers individually and pay little attention in the economic environment of the 
firm. With other words, they claimed that the managers incentives are influenced 
mostly because of a poor cash position; obsolete inventory, receivable that are not 
collectible; unrealistic revenue and profit expectations; meet analyst’s expectations; 
restrictive loan covenants that the company is violating (Harfenist, 2005). However, 
the financial crisis of 2008 proved that it influences the managers’ incentives to 
produce financial reports that may paint an overly positive picture of a firm’s business 
activities and financial position due to the existence of bankruptcy or delisting. Hence, 
although there are some evidence that economic downturn influence the earning 
management during the recent financial crisis (e.g. Filip and Raffournier, 2012; 
Kousenidis et al, 2013; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013), the purpose of this thesis is to 
enhance previous literature in the scope of exploration of the impact of financial 
crisis on the quality of earnings on listed firms of advanced countries worldwide. 
In accounting and finance literature, several papers have investigated the 
managers’ incentives for earnings manipulation. Particularly, Iatridis and Kadorinis 
(2009) investigated the firms’ financial motives for earnings management. They 
concluded that firms with low profitability and high leverage measures; firms that are 
in equity and capital need and are close to debt covenant violation; firms that tend to 
improve their financial numbers and subsequently reinforce their compensation and 
meet and/or exceed financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are likely to use earnings 
management. Likewise, according to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), the use of 
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discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms 
where the CEO’s potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of 
stock and option holdings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al (1999) and 
Burgstahler and Eames (2003) and Ayers et al (2006) provided evidence that firms 
manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses.  
Except from firm’s attributes which proceed earnings manipulation, there are 
particular events which may create incentives to manage earnings. Johnson (1999), 
Conrad et al (2002), Agarwal et al (2007), Jenkins et al (2009), Strobl (2013), Li et al 
(2013) examined how earnings management varies over the business cycle. Johnson 
(1999) documented that earnings are more persistent when growth rates are high (i.e. 
in an expansion) and production is high (e.g. in an credit crunch period) than when the 
growth rates are low (i.e. in a recession) and the production is low (i.e. in a 
reliquification period) respectively. Similarly, Jenkins et al (2009) demonstrated that 
the earnings management is sensitive to the business cycle. With other words, 
conservatism and value relevance of current earnings are higher during economic 
contractions. Furthermore, according to Strobl (2013), during flourishing periods, 
firms have incentives to manage earnings upwards while in recession period, the 
overall performance of a firm declines and at this time managers usually have 
incentives to manage earnings downwards to conceal earnings in order to save for 
future needs. Li et al (2013) also found that economic cyclical fluctuations, as the 
basic economic operation in the macro economy, can exert a direct influence on the 
earnings persistence of firms by affecting firm fundamentals as well as earnings 
management. Therefore, earnings persistence significantly declines when the 
economic climate worsens. Additionally, Agarwal et al (2007) provided evidence 
about banks’ earnings management behavior under three distinct economic 
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environments: a) high-growth with asset price bubble economy (1985-1990), b) 
stagnant growth with financial distress economy (1991-1996), and c) severe recession 
with credit crunch economy (1997-1999).  Their results indicated that banks used 
security gains as a means to manage earnings throughout all three periods while banks 
used loan loss provisions to manage earnings during the first two periods. 
 
Further, the recent financial crisis that started in the USA in 2007 has had 
severe effects on every aspect of every economy globally regardless of their distance 
or openness (Bedford, 2008). However, the level and the depth of these effects 
diversified among markets and countries which were transmitted through different 
channels. Based on Bedford (2008), international financial leverage is one of the 
affecting channels that include debt and equity which in turn are the factors that 
directly affect cost of capital. It is obvious that cost of capital plays an effective role 
in business decisions and therefore is one of the main factors affected by financial 
crisis in every market. Hence, another area that this thesis offers insights is how 
the financial crisis of 2008 influences the cost of capital on listed firms of 
advanced countries worldwide. 
The first attempt of exploration the impact of the global financial crisis on the 
cost of capital comes from Mokhova (2011). She indicated that financial crisis that 
broke out in 2008 has had a big negative influence on the world economy. A lot of 
firms close to bankruptcy and financial performances hardly decreased. Regarding to 
cost of capital, the main consequences were lower return of investment, less liquidity, 
reevaluation of risks, difficulty to find long term loans and another financial 
resources, higher spreads, low availability of credit, new gearing and need of state 
guarantee. Thus, Mokhova (2011) concluded that the financial crisis of 2008 had great 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
17 
 
influence on the cost of capital from the side of cost of equity and from the side of 
cost of debt.  
Moreover, in previous literature, several papers have investigated the factors 
that influence the cost of capital. Particularly, the relationship between earnings 
quality and cost of capital has been examined thoroughly. Affleck-Graves et al (2002) 
found that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity 
capital. Bhattacharya et al (2003) resulted that an increase in overall earnings opacity 
has a positive effect in the cost of equity. Although, Francis et al (2004) found that 
seven attributes of earnings (accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, 
value relevance, timeliness and conservatism) are significantly associated with cost of 
equity capital, however, McInnis (2010) found no such pattern examining the 
association between earnings smoothness and cost of equity. In addition, Francis et al 
(2005) showed that firms with lower accruals quality have significantly larger 
earnings-price ratios relative to their industry peers. Chan et al (2009) supported that 
ex ante conservatism is associated with lower costs of equity, whereas ex post 
conservatism is associated with higher costs of equity capital. Moreover, Valipour and 
Moradbeygi (2011) found a negative and meaningful relationship between debt and 
earnings quality. 
 Another factor that influences the cost of capital is audit quality. According to 
Slovin et al (1990) and Datar et al (1991), auditing plays a key role in every 
organization, since a) the errors are located and the true and fair information about the 
business is available, b) frauds are discovered which increase the moral values of the 
staff, c) efficiency improves, d) the auditing accounts increase the credit standing of 
any firm and help the sole traders their business is going on properly, e) the investors’ 
rights are protected, and f) creditors are protected. Thus, consistent with Khurana and 
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Raman (2004), Mansi et al (2004) and Pittman and Fortin (2004), there is negative 
association between audit quality and cost of capital. Particularly, Khurana and 
Raman (2004) found that firms that are audited by Big 4 is associated with a lower ex 
ante cost of equity capital in the U.S. but not in Australia, Canada, or the U.K. 
Similarly, Mansi et al (2004), Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Causholli and Knechel 
(2012) suggested that firms that use a Big 4 auditor have a lower cost of debt. The 
findings of Dhaliwal et al (2008) show that nonaudit fees are directly related to the 
cost of debt for investment-grade issuers and audit fees has no affect on the cost of 
debt for non-investment-grade firms. In addition, Fernado et al (2010) concluded that 
auditor size, auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure are negatively 
associated with small client firm’s cost of equity capital. Chen et al (2011) claimed 
that the effects of Big 8 auditors on cost of equity capital are no consistent across 
SOEs and NSOEs. Particularly, cost of equity capital is significantly lower for NOSEs 
audited by Top 8 auditors than for NSOEs audited by non-Top 8 auditors, but not for 
SOEs audited by Top 8 and non-Top 8 auditors. 
 
As it is explained above, given the austerity of the global financial crisis of 
2008, there have been few papers that examined its effects on the financial reporting 
in general. However, it is surprisingly that there is no clearly evidence to its effects on 
the audit quality. More specifically, many economists have tried to pinpoint the role 
of auditors during the financial crisis of 2008 due to reduce information asymmetry 
(Knechel and Willekens, 2006). Other papers illustrated the effects of different 
aspects of audit quality on audit risk which in turn implies an increase of audit quality 
in periods of financial downturns. For instance, Bell et al (2001) and Hogan and 
Wilkins (2008) found that there is a positive relationship between audit fees and audit 
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risk. Hudaib and Cooke (2005) and Lin and Liu (2010) indicated that higher business 
risk leads to higher auditor turnover. Finally, Aldamen et al (2012) claimed that the 
presence of audit committee and audit committee characteristics is associated with 
lower information asymmetry and lower audit risk. 
Considerably, the role of auditing in influencing earnings management during 
the financial crisis of 2008 is lacking except from the findings of Iatridis and Dimitras 
(2013) who found that firms that are audited by a Big 4 auditor are likely to exhibit 
lower discretionary accruals and higher value relevance irrespective of the crisis 
period. In the same vein, Johl et al (2007) and Chia et al (2011) examined the effects 
of Asian financial crisis on the association between earnings quality and auditing. 
Their results shown that Big auditors firms are able to significantly constrain the 
earnings management.  
Further, recent researches suggested that strong investor protection, strong 
legal enforcement, and a common law legal system are vital determinants of a high 
quality financial statement numbers and high audit quality. Based on the findings of 
Guenther and Young (2000), Bushman and Smith (2001), Leuz et al (2003), Shen and 
Chih (2005), Burgstahler et al (2006), Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), Cahan et al 
(2008) and Houque et al (2012) earnings quality is higher in countries with strong 
investor protection and legal enforcement regimes. Similarly, the results from 
Newman et al (2005) and Jaggi and Low (2011) confirmed their expectations that 
higher investor protection is associated with higher audit quality.  
Thus, this thesis, also, examines the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 
and investor protection on audit quality and then the joint effect of audit quality 
and investor protection on earnings quality on listed firms of advanced countries 
worldwide. 
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Consequently, this paper makes several contributions to the current literature. 
First, the effect of financial crisis of 2008 on earnings quality is examined. 
Specifically, it is expected that earnings management is increased or earnings quality 
is decreased during the financial crisis of 2008. Based on the findings of previous 
literature (Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; Ahmed et al, 2008; Wanrganegara and Vionita, 
2010; Chia et al, 2011; Choi et al, 2011; Lu, 2012; Filip and Raffournier, 2012; Habib 
et al, 2013; Strobl, 2013; Vladu, 2013; Kousenidis et al, 2013; Habib et al, 2013; 
Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013), it is expected that a) the degree of conservatism in years 
of financial crisis of 2008 is significantly higher than the degree of conservatism in 
the years before the financial crisis of 2008, b) the value relevance of earnings is 
decreased during the financial crisis of 2008, c) the degree of accruals quality during 
the financial crisis of 2008 is significantly lower, d) the degree of value earnings 
persistence in years of financial crisis of 2008 is significantly lower, e) the earnings 
predictability will be lower during the financial crisis of 2008, f) upwards earnings 
management would be replaced by downwards earnings management in those ex-ante 
small losses firms so that the discontinuity around zero should be no longer existed in 
the earnings distribution during the financial crisis of 2008 and g) smoothing of 
reported earnings is lower during the financial crisis of 2008. 
Second, it is investigated the cost of capital and the changes of audit quality 
and earnings management influencing on it due to financial crisis of 2008. Thus, 
based on the findings of previous literature (Easley and O’ Hara, 2004; Francis et al, 
2004; Francis et al, 2005; King, 2009; Fernando et al, 2010; Chen et al, 2011; 
Mokhova, 2011; Valipour and Moradbeygi, 2011) it is expected that the financial 
crisis of 2008 increased the cost of capital, and regarding the affect of audit quality on 
cost of capital, it is expected a negative sign. In addition, it is expected a statistically 
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negatively reliable association between each earnings quality attribute considered 
individually and measures of the cost of capital. 
Third, it is analyzed the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor 
protection on audit quality. In detail, based on the results of Choi et al (2008) and 
Leuz et al (2003), it is expected that audit quality is positively associated with 
investor protection. Further, based on the findings of Houston et al (1999), Be’dard 
and Johnstone (2004), Hudaib and Cooke (2005), Lin and Liu (2010), Xu et al (2011) 
and Aldamen et al (2012), it is expected that audit quality is higher during financial 
crisis. Consequently, in accordance of the findings of previous expectations, it is 
expected that audit quality is higher in firms with strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement during financial crisis. Moreover, it is analyzed the joint effect of 
investor protection and audit quality on earnings quality in pre and crisis period. 
Particularly, based on the findings of Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), Cahan et al 
(2008) and Houque et al (2012), it is expected that there is significant positive 
association between earnings quality and investor protection, irrespective of the 
financial crisis. Correspondingly, based on the results of Becker et al (1998), Francis 
et al (1999), Balsam et al (2003) and Caramanis and Lennox (2008), it is expected 
that there is significant positive association between earnings quality and audit 
quality, irrespective of the financial crisis. Again, in accordance of the findings of 
previous expectations, it is expected that the joint effect of investor protection and 
audit quality is positively associated with earnings quality, irrespective of the 
financial crisis. 
 
The choice of advanced countries has several advantages. First, the market 
capitalization of developed countries through the examined period amount almost 
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55% globally. Thus, the results are much closer to the reality in relation with other 
papers that used a representative sample which makes the findings questionable. 
Second, advanced countries have been severely affected during the financial crisis of 
2008. Hence, it is expected a diversification of the impact of financial crisis of 2008 
on earnings management before and during the crisis period through examining 
sample. Third, consistent with Filip and Raffournier (2012), most cited papers of all 
time conducted at a single country level which makes the results questionable. 
Consequently, this paper faces this geographical closeness of results by using 18 
largest economies of the world and thus, provides stronger evidence. Fourth, it is the 
first attempt to analyze the research questions in the examining sample by 
categorizing the sample countries into 3 clusters depending on the level of investor 
protection: cluster 1 with strong shareholder protection and legal enforcement, cluster 
2 with better legal enforcement systems and cluster 3 with weak investor protection 
and legal enforcement systems (Leuz, 2010). Fifth, this thesis uses countries that are 
complied with International Accounting Standards (IAS) until 2005 due to succeed a 
convergence on comparability of examining variables. Sixth, another advantage of 
conducting this thesis is that earnings management is measured by using 10 different 
approaches of earnings quality. More specifically, ex post and ex ante conservatism, 
value relevance, three accrual quality measures, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, loss avoidance analysis and earnings smoothness are used as 
measurements of earnings quality. The sample is count on 137.091 firm-years 
observations and come from all advanced countries, as they are classified by 
International Monetary Fund.  
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This study provides evidence that the impact of financial crisis of 2008 on 
earnings quality diversifies among clusters. The findings indicate that, in general, the 
earnings quality decreases during the financial crisis. It means that earnings 
manipulation is increased during the financial crisis of 2008 which reflects an 
opposite sign from previous literature. Specifically, for all clusters, the results imply 
that in an attempt to cope with recession, managers have an incentive to choose 
more aggressive conservatism and more transitory earnings during financial 
crisis. Moreover, countries in clusters 2 and 3 report more relevant financial 
numbers during financial crisis while the countries in cluster 1 are to some 
conflicting. This thesis also shows that firms in all clusters book more accruals to 
depress earnings during financial crisis. Additionally, the findings demonstrate that 
countries in all clusters demonstrate lower level of earnings predictability during the 
financial crisis. Furthermore, countries in cluster 1 follow real smoothing which in 
turn increase earnings quality while countries in Cluster 2 and 3 follow artificial 
smoothing which in turn decrease the quality of earnings during the financial crisis. 
Similarly, the findings of this thesis indicate that the different characteristics 
of three clusters lead to differences in the effects of global financial crisis of 2008, 
audit and earnings quality on cost of capital. In general, the results imply that the 
financial crisis of 2008 has positive association with a) cost of equity capital for all 
clusters, and b) cost of debt for clusters 1 and 2. Concerning the cost of equity capital, 
when it is measured by using the constant growth Gordon model introduced by Palea 
(2007), is negatively associated with firms that audited by Big Four auditors in 
clusters 1 and 2, and when it is measured by using the PEG approach introduced by 
Easton (2004), is negatively associated with firms that audited by Big Four auditors 
and have an audit committee in all clusters, and firms that switch auditor in cluster 2. 
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Further, firms that audited by Big Four auditors and audit fees in cluster 1, firms with 
a modified audit report in cluster 2 and firms that have an audit committee in cluster 3 
have a negative association with cost of debt capital. Regarding the association 
between earnings quality attributes individually and cost of capital, is significant and 
with a negative sign in almost all measures of earnings quality and in all clusters in 
pre and crisis period.   
Finally, against all odds, the results show that audit quality is negatively 
affected during financial crisis. Moreover, consistent with previous literature, investor 
protection have a positive impact on audit quality in all clusters except from audit fees 
which is not correlated with none of the investor protection indexes. In the same vein, 
the findings indicate that there is positive influence of investor protection and 
financial crisis on audit quality jointly. Further, examining the joint effect of investor 
protection and audit quality on earnings quality, the results are mixed among clusters 
and research periods. However, in general, investor protection and auditing have a 
joint role in the production of higher quality earnings numbers in pre and crisis 
period. The effects of the interaction terms of investor protection and financial crisis, 
and investor protection and auditing on audit quality and earnings quality respectively 
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1.1. Research question, sub-questions  
In general, this PhD thesis will use and answer the following main question:  
How has been the earnings quality in the advanced countries influenced by 
the financial crisis of 2008? 
 To answer this question, this thesis makes use of different sub-questions: 
1. What is earnings quality and which methods have been developed to detect 
the earnings quality attributes? 
2. What is audit quality and which methods have been developed to detect it? 
3. What is investor protection and which methods have been developed to 
detect it? 
4. What is cost of equity and which methods have been developed to detect it? 
5. What is financial crisis? 
6. Which are the roots of the financial crisis of 2008? 
7. Which are the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008? 
8. What can be learned from prior research on this thesis? 
9. What is a proper design for this research? 
10. What are the results of the empirical research of this thesis? 
 
1.2.Structure 
The remaining of this PhD thesis is organized as follows. The chapter 2 
explains different definitions of earnings quality and investigates seven different 
earnings quality proxies, its determinants (investor protection and audit quality) and 
its consequences (cost of equity capital and cost of debt). In chapter 3 is explained 
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the recession of 2008. In chapter 4 is an extensive literature review. This helps with 
developing hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the sample, research method and 
hypotheses. This is the first step in the empirical research. Chapter 6 gives the results 
of the empirical study. That is the last step of the research. Finally, the PhD thesis 
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2. Earnings quality, audit quality, investor protection and cost of capital 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on different research approaches. Thus, if we want to 
research whether earnings quality is changed during the financial crisis of 2008 and 
how determinants and consequences have an impact on it during the financial crisis of 
2008, we need to have a method to measure them.  
The most comprehensive and representative paper understanding the earnings 
quality came from Dechow et al (2010). Thus, mainly, based on the findings of their 
almanac of earnings quality, this chapter is about the meaning of the word of earnings 
quality. Some definitions from previous research and standard setters will be 
described. Second, there will be analysis about the earnings quality proxies. Third, 
audit quality and investor protection will be examined as determinants of earnings 
quality. Finally, cost of equity (cost of debt and cost of equity capital) will be 
described as a consequence of quality of earnings. Hence, after this chapter the 
following sub-questions is answered: 
1. What is earnings quality and which methods have been developed to detect 
the earnings quality attributes? 
2. What is audit quality and which methods have been developed to detect it? 
3. What is investor protection and which methods have been developed to 
detect it? 
4. What is cost of equity and which methods have been developed to detect it? 
 
2.2. Definitions of earnings quality 
There are plenty of definitions of earnings quality but there is no agreed upon 
definition in the global literature. Teets (2002, p. 335) stated that “some consider 
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quality of earnings to encompass the underlying economic performance of a firm, as 
well as the accounting standards that report on that underlying phenomenon; others 
consider quality of earnings to refer only to how well accounting earnings convey 
information about the underlying phenomenon”.  
Gissel et al (2005) defined earnings quality as an important aspect of 
evaluating a firm’s financial health, as the ability of reported earnings to reflect and 
predict the firm’s true and future earnings, and as the stability, persistence, and lack of 
variability in reported earnings.  
Chan et al (2001) defined the quality of earnings as the degree to which 
reported earnings indicate operating fundamental of an entity. This measure of quality 
is interested on the ability of reported earnings to predict future performance of entity. 
According to Hodge (2003), earnings quality is the extent to which net income 
reported on the income statement differs from true earnings. Schipper and Vincent 
(2003) defined earnings quality as the extent to which reported earnings faithfully 
represent Hicksian income, which corresponds to the amount that can be consumed 
during a period, while leaving the firms equally well off at the beginning and the end 
of the period. Schipper and Vincent (2003) considered three earnings quality 
constructs: persistence, predictive ability and the time series variances of earnings as 
measures of earnings quality
1
.  
Following Black (1980), Beaver (1998), Ohlson and Zhang (1998) and 
Dechow and Schrand (2004), Li (2011) defined earnings quality as the closeness of 
reported earnings to “permanent earnings”.  
Another definition approach comes from Healy and Wahlen (1999) who 
defined earning management as the alteration of firm’s reported economic 
                                                          
1
 The time series variance of earnings quality is: 1) the relations among cash, accruals and income, 2) 
the correspondence to relevance, reliability and comparability, and 3) the effects of implementation 
decisions.  
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performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence 
contractual outcomes.  
Comiskey and Mulford (2000) defined earnings as high quality if the 
contemporaneous cash flows are greater (less) than the recognized revenues or gains 
(expenses or losses), and low quality if the associated cash flows are less than (greater 
than) the recognized revenues or gains (expenses or losses).  
Dechow and Dichev (2002) defined earnings quality in terms of the relation 
between accruals and cash flows. Their definition does not distinguish among the 
various factors that influence this relation but some approaches to defining earnings 
quality do. They claimed that firms with high accruals quality will have high earnings 
persistence, which refers to high earnings quality. 
Earnings is of good quality if it has high accruals quality or less absolute 
abnormal accruals and high earnings response coefficient (Balsam et al, 2003; Francis 
et al, 2003; Myers et al, 2003). 
Earnings is of good quality if it is high persistent and if it is a good indicator 
of future earnings, which refers to substantial earnings (Penman and Zhang, 2002; 
Richardson, 2003). 
Earnings quality is defined as the extent to which a firm’s past earnings is 
associated with its future cash flows and refers to high predictive ability of earnings 
(Bricker et al, 1995; Mikhail et al, 2003). 
Lang et al (2003) mentioned that earnings is viewed to be high quality if it is 
characterized by less evidence of earnings management, more timely recognition of 
bad news, and a higher association with share price.  
Beneish and Vargus (2002) claimed that earnings quality is the likelihood that 
a firm can sustain current earnings in the future. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
30 
 
High earnings quality is in the sense that earnings is less likely to distort firms’ 
underlying economic performance (DeFond et al, 2007; Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
Barragato and Markelevich (2008) defined high-quality earnings as an 
earnings stream more closely associated with future cash flows from operations. Their 
definition is consistent with the view that financial reporting should provide 
information that is useful in assessing the amounts, timing and uncertainties of 
prospective cash inflows.  
Dechow et al (2010) defined the earnings quality as relevant of the 
fundamental earnings reported to the decision context of users. In this context the 
earnings quality is how earnings information is indispensible to markets participants 
in making decisions of resources allocation in the capital markets. 
Li (2011) defined earnings quality as the ability of earnings to reflect company 
permanent earnings. 
Srinidhi et al (2011) described earnings quality as the ability of current 
reported earnings to reflect the future cash flow and earnings. In this context earnings 
quality refers to how best current reported earnings can predict future performance of 
entity. 
Finally, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2015) defined earnings quality as the average 
reduction of the market’s uncertainty about the terminal value due to the earnings 
report in period 1, formally: 
EQ = E Var x  −  Var x  m1    (1) 
A greater EQ implies higher earnings quality. They exploited a convenient feature of 
belief revisions of random variables with normal distributions that the conditional 
variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑥  𝑚1  is independent of the realized earnings 𝑚1. Therefore, EQ can be 
expressed as: 
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EQ =  
Cov  x ,m1  
2
Var  m1  
                     (2) 
Under this definition earnings quality is an ex ante measure of the information content 
of reported earnings which is equivalent to ex ante informativeness in Marinovic 
(2013) and captures the essence of the definition in Francis et al (2006). 
 
According to Li (2011), earnings quality varies for three reasons. First, 
earnings quality represents a function of a firm’s business model and economic 
situation. Second, earnings quality appears estimation errors. It means that firms, 
which have more accrual estimation errors, have lower persistence in earnings. Third, 
there could be intentional distortions due to earnings manipulation. It means that firms 
lower the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows since managers have 
the intention to manipulate reported earnings due to capital market pressure or 
compensation contract. 
 
There are plenty of papers that examined earnings quality (Bernstein and 
Siegel, 1979; Siegel, 1982; Lev, 1983; Kellogg, 1984; Dhaliwal et al, 1991; Jones, 
1991; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Alford et al, 1993; Teoh and Wong, 1993; Krishnan, 
1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; DeAngelo et al, 1994; Hayn, 1995; Dechow et 
al, 1995; Sloan, 1996; Wild, 1996; Basu, 1997; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Becker 
et al, 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Han and Wang, 1998; Baginski et al, 
1999; Francis et al, 1999; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Barth et al, 1999; Degeorge et 
al, 1999; Guether and Young, 2000; Graham et al, 2000; Hung, 2000; Graham and 
King, 2000; Morck et al, 2000; Ball et al, 2000; Ali and Huang, 2000; Lobo and 
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Zhou, 2001; Chan et al, 2001; Heninger, 2001; Fairfield and Whisenant, 2001; Ho et 
al, 2001; Chen et al, 2001; Frankel et al, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002; Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002; Kinney and Libby, 2002; Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Penman and 
Zhang, 2002; Bauman and Bauman, 2002; Affleck-Graves et al, 2002; Johnson et al, 
2002; Klein, 2002; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002; Krishnan, 2003; Leuz et al, 2003; Myers et 
al, 2003; Cornell and Landsman, 2003; Balsam et al, 2003; Chen et al, 2003; Shrieves 
and Dahl, 2003; Chung et al, 2003; Bauwhede et al, 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; 
Xie et al, 2003; Mitchell et al, 2003; Gul et al, 2003; Bhattacharya et al, 2003;  
Francis et al, 2003; Krishnan, 2003a; Fairfield et al, 2003; Mikhail et al, 2003; Nelson 
et al, 2003; Watts, 2003b; Watts, 2003a; Hodge, 2003; Raghunandan et al, 2003; 
Butler et al, 2004; Francis et al, 2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Ashley and 
Yang, 2004; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Kang, 2004; Francis et al, 2004; Haw et al, 
2004; Wysocki, 2004; Zhou and Elder, 2004; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Choi et al, 
2004; Van der Zahn and Tower, 2004; Be’dard et al, 2004; Ferguson et al, 2004; 
Abbott et al, 2004; Aboody et al, 2005; Anctil and Chamberlain, 2005; Webster and 
Thornton, 2005; Abdelghany, 2005; Sen, 2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Gosh and 
Moon, 2005; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Saleh and Ahmed, 2005; Davis-Friday 
and Gordon, 2005; Eng et al, 2005; Kothari et al, 2005; Chen et al, 2005; Shen and 
Chih, 2005; Li and Lin, 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Vafeas, 2005; Francis et al, 
2005; Richardson et al, 2005; Ghosh et al, 2005; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Dechow 
and Ge, 2005; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Davis-Friday et al, 2006; Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2006; Ecker et al, 2006; Yee, 2006; Niu, 2006; Wang, 2006; Lin et 
al, 2006; Burgstahler et al, 2006; Platikanova, 2006; Burgstahler et al, 2006; Boonlert-
U-Thai et al, 2006; Lee et al, 2006; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006; Antle et al, 2006; 
Davidson III et al, 2006; Gul et al, 2006; Jenkins et al, 2006; Kothari et al, 2006; 
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Desai et al, 2006; Piot and Janin, 2007; DeFond et al, 2007; Chia et al, 2007; Hribar 
and Nichols, 2007; Cheng et al, 2007; Piot and Janin, 2007; Soderstrom and Sun, 
2007; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007; Johl et al, 2007; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; 
Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Qin, 2007; Chen et al, 2007; Fan-fah et al, 2008; 
Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Doyle et al, 2007; Chih et al, 2008; Cahan et al, 
2008; Jiang et al, 2008; Francis et al, 2008a; Barth et al, 2008; Huang et al, 2008; 
Sepe and Spiceland, 2008; Lo, 2008; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Francis et al, 2008; 
Guo et al, 2008; Francis and Wang, 2008; Ahmed et al, 2008; Herrmann et al, 2008; 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Chen et al, 2008; Jayaraman, 2008; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008; Cheng et al, 2008; Siregar and Utama, 2008; Caramanis and 
Lennox, 2008; Dichev and Tang, 2008; Barragato and Markelevich, 2008; Kamel and 
Elbanna, 2009; Katz, 2009; Francis and Yu, 2009; Ayers et al, 2009; Chang et al, 
2009; Jiang and Anandarajan, 2009; Mitra et al, 2009; Prawitt et al, 2009; Cahan et al, 
2009; Hussainey, 2009; Gong et al, 2009; Lara et al, 2009; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; 
Lin et al, 2009; Chan et al, 2009; Chang et al, 2009; Frankel and Litov, 2009; Gul et 
al, 2009; Beisland, 2009; Kim and Qi, 2010; Rodriguez-Perez and Van Hemmen, 
2010; Warganegara and Vionita, 2010; Vichitatsarawong et al, 2010; Stubben, 2010; 
McInnis, 2010; Givoly et al, 2010; Rusmin, 2010; Dechow et al, 2010; Chang and 
Sun, 2010; Labelle et al, 2010; Iliev, 2010; Iyengar et al, 2010; Jordan et al, 2010; 
Han et al, 2010; Guan and Pourjalali, 2010; Kwag and Stephens, 2010; Kamel and 
Elbanna, 2010; Gaio, 2010; Ahn and Kwon, 2010; Amar and Abaoub, 2010; Yunos et 
al, 2010; Chen et al, 2011; Skinner and Soltes, 2011; Sun et al, 2011; Mashruwala and 
Mashruwala, 2011; Boulton et al, 2011; Li, 2011; Louis and Sun, 2011; 
Kanagaretnam et al, 2011; Siagian and Tresnaningsih, 2011; Ahmad-Zaluki et al, 
2011; Choi et al, 2011; Kabir et al, 2011; Gerayli et al, 2011; Kramer et al, 2011; 
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Alali, 2011; Valipour and Moradbeygi, 2011; Skinner and Soltes, 2011; Panahiam and 
Aminossadati, 2011; Lee and Swenson, 2011; Lu, 2012; Filip and Raffournier, 2012; 
Blaylock et al, 2012; Kim et al, 2012; Bhattacharya et al, 2012; Roychowdhury and 
Sletten, 2012; Jungeun et al, 2012; Gerakos, 2012; Houqe et al, 2012; Moraes da 
Costa et al, 2012; Iatridis, 2012; Hamdan et al, 2012; Gorgan et al, 2012; Hajizadeh 
and Rahimi, 2012; Reyad, 2012; Marinovic, 2013; Yung et al, 2013; Bhattacharya et 
al, 2013; Ahmed, 2013; Ismail et al, 2013; Nelson and Devi, 2013; Beneish et al, 
2013; Huang and Wang, 2013; Ebaid, 2013; Demerjian et al, 2013; Dichev et al, 
2013; Cheng et al, 2013a; Linck et al, 2013; Vladu, 2013; Kousenidis et al, 2013; 
Habib et al, 2013; Francis et al, 2013; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013; Lee and Lee, 2013; 
Bepari et al, 2013; Yasar, 2013; Alves, 2013; Hamdan et al, 2013; Chandrasegaram et 
al, 2013; Artiach and Clarkson, 2013; Hasanzade et al, 2013; Sun et al, 2014; Perotti 
and Wagenhofer, 2014; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; Ames et al, 2014; Brown 
et al, 2014; Asthana, 2014; Salleh and Haat, 2014; Badolato et al, 2014; Sirait and 
Siregar, 2014; Soliman and Ragab, 2014; Gajevszky, 2014; Lyimo, 2014; Ismail et al, 
2015; Shubita, 2015; Ji et al, 2015; Ahmed, 2015; Muttakin et al, 2015; Christensen et 
al, 2015; Hashim and Devi, 2015; Lee et al, 2015; Al-Dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Li, 
2015; Khalifa and Othman, 2015; Vichitsarawong and Pornupatham, 2015; Ayemere 
and Elijah, 2015; Nakashima and Ziebart, 2015). Some of them are examined in 
literature review (Section 4) which are summarized in Appendix A. 
 
2.3. Earnings quality attributes 
Using various definitions for earnings quality, researchers have developed 
several models, which were used for very narrow and specific purposes. Over the 
years, researchers have devised various measures of earnings quality to represent 
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decision usefulness in specific decision contexts. These measures, however, have 
become proxies for earnings quality in generic sense. Many researches divided 
earnings quality into three major categories: accounting based attributes, which are 
persistence, predictability, quality of accruals, volatility, investment-based 
earnings quality measure, smoothness and earnings quality assessment and 
market based measures, which are value relevance, timeliness loss recognition, 
earnings response coefficients and conservatism, and returns based representation 
of earnings quality.  
As we mentioned above, Schipper and Vincent (2003) discussed empirical 
measures used in academic research to assess earnings quality and relates these 
measures both to decision usefulness and to the economics-based definition of 
earnings developed by Hicks (1939). They considered that earnings quality constructs 
derived from 1) the time-series properties of earnings, 2) selected qualitative 
characteristics in the FASB’s Conceptual Framework, 3) the relations among income, 
cash, and accruals, and 4) implementation decisions. 
Bhattacharya et al (2003) developed a new measure of earnings quality by 
combining earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings smoothing: the 
earnings opacity. Using 58.653 firm-year observations from 34 countries for the 
period 1985-1998, they documented that, after controlling for other influences, an 
increase in overall opacity in a country is linked to an economically significant 
increase in the cost of equity and an economically significant decrease in trading in 
the stock market of that country. 
Further, Gissel et al (2005) summarized eight models for measuring earnings 
quality from 1) Center for Financial Research and Analysis, 2) Empirical Research 
Partners, 3) Ford equity Research, 4) Lev-Thiagarajan, 5) Merill Lynch, 6) Raymond 
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James and Associates, 7) S&P Core Earnings, and 8) UBS (David Bianco). While the 
criteria used in these measures of earnings quality, they indicated that none of them 
provide a comprehensive view of it. Thus, they proposed an Earnings Quality 
Assessment that provides an independent measure of the quality of a company’s 
reported earnings. This model uses 20 criteria that impact earnings quality and is more 
comprehensive than others models presented, considering revenue and expense items, 
as well as one-time items, accounting changes, acquisitions, and discontinued 
operations. This model also assesses the stability of a company, which leads to a more 
understanding of its future potential.     
Li (2011) observed that to capture earnings quality, there are three approaches. 
The first approach uses properties of observed accounting numbers. The measures 
based on this approach include the level of accruals by Sloan (1996), the estimation 
error in accruals by Dechow and Dichev (2002), and the volatility of earnings. The 
second approach highlights the association between earnings and stock returns, which 
assumes market efficiency and extracts information about future earnings from stock 
prices (e.g. Basu, 1997; Collins et al, 1997; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Ecker et al, 
2006). Finally, the third approach emphasizes the management perspective which may 
provide incremental information content to the measures that are based on historical 
accounting numbers or the information set of outside equity investors.  
Considering all above, for the purpose of this research, seven measures of 
earnings quality are examined: conservatism, value relevance, accruals quality, 
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2.3.1. Earnings conservatism 
The most extreme definition of conservatism came from Bliss (1924) by using 
a motto: “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses”. This adage is interpreted as 
representing “the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to 
recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses” (Basu, 1997, p. 
7). It means that the greater the difference in degree of verification required for gains 
versus losses, the greater the conservatism. Thus, it is an issue of verifiability of 
conservatism. Based on this interpretation, Watts (2003a, 2003b) defined earnings 
conservatism as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus 
losses.  
In the UK, concept of conservatism is examined in Statement of Standard 
Practice No. 2 “Disclosure of Accounting Policies”, where conservatism is described 
as revenue and profits are not anticipated, but are recognized by inclusion in the profit 
and loss account only when realized in the form either of cash or of other assets the 
ultimate cash realization of which can be assessed with reasonable certainty; 
provision is made for all known liabilities whether the amount of these is known with 
certainty or is a best estimate in the light of the information available.  
Beaver and Ryan (2000) characterized conservatism (or bias) as a persistent 
different difference between market value and book value that is distinct from 
temporary differences due to economic gains and losses that are recognized in book 
value gradually over time. 
According to market-based approach, Ball et al (2000) defined conservatism 
as the differential ability of accounting earnings to reflect economic losses (measured 
as negative stock returns) versus economic gains (measured as positive stock returns).   
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Lara and Mora (2004) detected two types of conservatism: earnings 
conservatism by Basu (1997) and balance sheet conservatism by Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995). As I mentioned above, according to Basu (1997), earnings conservatism is a 
timelier recognition of bad news in earnings relative to good news. Thus, earnings 
conservatism is conservatism that has effect on the income which, however, does not 
have a consistent effect on the earnings because there is always a correction in a later 
period. For instance, if the manager expects profits which will not be recorded in the 
financial statement in the first year, the profits will be understated in this year. 
However, in the next year the profits will be written down and thus, the profits will be 
overstated in the next year (Lara and Mora, 2004). Therefore, earnings conservatism 
is also called temporary conservatism.  
Balance sheet conservatism is a persistent understatement of book value of 
shareholders’ equity (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995). On contrary from earnings 
conservatism, balance sheet conservatism has a persistently effect on the balance 
sheet which means that assets will be valued lower and/or liabilities will be valued 
higher. Therefore, balance sheet conservatism is also called consistently conservatism.  
Watts (2003a, 2003b) gave three alternative explanations for conservatism: 
contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation and accounting regulation. “The 
contracting explanation implies that conservatism will exist even the absence of 
formal contractual use of financial statements” (Watts, 2003a, p. 207). According to 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), every contract has its own constraints and 
conservatism measures, such as the debt contract or/and the management 
compensation contract. Thus, because gains will be lower in a financial crisis, the 
manager will reduce conservatism in order to comply with a contract. 
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Ryan (2006) provided useful guidance for empiricists interested in measuring 
conditional conservatism and in interpreting associations of those measured with 
variables of interest. He claimed that conditional conservatism involves the more 
timely recognition of bad news than good news in earnings, as occurs with 
impairment accounting for many types of assets.  
Chan et al (2009) stated that there are two types of accounting conservatism: 
ex ante and ex post conservatism. Ex ante conservatism is accounting-based, balance 
sheet related, and unconditional or news independent. It reflects the understatement of 
book values of net assets and is unrelated to changes in future cash flows. On the 
other hand, ex post conservatism is market-based, earnings related, and conditional or 
news dependent.  
Finally, Shroff et al (2012) tested the conservatism and asymmetric timeliness 
hypothesis by using information on extreme events as a measure of good/bad news. 
Particularly, they used two approaches to test this conservatism and asymmetric 
timeliness hypothesis. First, they used extreme returns to identify good/bad news and 
found that negative extreme returns have a significantly higher explanatory power for 
current earnings changes than positive extreme returns. Second, they defined 
positive/negative special items reported in the annual income statement as good/bad 
news.  
 
Looking to the models of conservatism in the extant literature, there are plenty 
of approaches. First, Basu (1997) formulated conservatism which based on a 
regression of returns on earnings with an interactive dummy variable on returns to 
indicate whether the return was negative. The dummy variable D interacts with the 
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return variable R to proxy for bad news RD whilst the main effect on return (R) is a 
proxy for good news. Thus, the Basu’s (1997) regression model is as follows: 
Eit
Pit−1




Rit +  β2Dit + β3RDit +  εit    (3) 
where Eit  is annual earnings, Pit−1  is lagged market capitalization, Rit  is 
contemporaneous annual returns, Dit  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Rit  is negative 
and 0 otherwise, εit  is the error term. The value of β3  reflects the incremental 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared to good news, commonly referred as 
asymmetric timeliness or ex post conservatism. β
3
 is positive for conservative 
reporting because earnings reflect all the bad news but not the good news. 
Consequently, greater the degree of conservatism in reporting, the greater will be the 
value of β
3
. In other words, β
3
 captures the difference of timeliness of financial 
reports between bad news and good news which will be the conservatism level of the 
whole sample. Thus, higher (lower) values of 𝛃𝟑 imply less conservative earnings 
and higher (lower) quality of earnings. 
  
Following Basu (1997), Ball et al (2000) measured conservatism as the ratio of 
the slope coefficients on negative returns to the slope coefficients on positive returns 
in a reverse regression of earnings on returns. Thus, they incorporated conservative 
asymmetry in accounting income timeliness as follows: 
NIit =  β0 +  β1Rit + β2Dit +  β3RDit +  εit     (4) 
where NIit  is earnings yield estimated as accounting income scaled by economic 
income, and Rit , Dit , RDit  estimated as shown in equation (3). 
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Beaver and Ryan (2000) measured conservatism as downward bias in book 
value. They estimated this measure using fixed firm and time effects regression of 
book-to-market on current and lagged returns. Given that a return proxies for 
contemporaneous news, the return terms capture lags in book value. The firm 
intercepts capture biases. Hence, they used the opening ratio of book value of equity 
to market of equity
2
 (book-to-market ratio) to measure ex ante conservatism.  Higher 
(lower) values of 𝐁𝐨𝐨𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭𝐢𝐭 imply less conservative earnings and higher 
(lower) quality of earnings. 
Book to marketit =  
Book  value  of  firm it
Market  value  of  firm it
 (5) 
 
Another conservatism proxy came from Penman and Zhang’s (2002). They 
used information from the financial statements to develop two indices of the quality 
of earnings. The first index (C-score) scores the degree to which the firm applies 
conservative accounting. The second index (G-Score) scores the quality of earnings 
that results from the joint effect of conservatism and changes investment activity.  
They constructed C-Score based on the accounting treatment of three 
investments for which the accounting is relatively immune from managerial discretion 
after the expenditure has occurred: inventories, R&D and advertising. The accounting 
for these items follows mandates from accounting regulators or (in the case of LIFO) 
an accounting choice that management does not change from period to period. Thus: 
C − Scoreit =  
ERit
NOAit
 =  (INVit
res +  RDit
res +  ADVit
res ) NOAit  (6) 
                                                          
2
 If the ratio is above 1 then the stock is undervalued and if it is less than 1, the stock is overvalued. 
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where ERit  is the level of estimated reserves created by the conservatism, NOAit  is net 
operating assets estimated as the book value of operating assets minus operating 
liabilities, INVit
res  is inventory reserve estimated as the LIFO reserve reported in the 
financial statement footnotes, RDit
res  is R&D reserve estimated as the estimated 
amortized R&D assets that would have been on the balance sheet of R&D had not 
been expensed, ADVit
res  is advertising reserve estimates as the estimated brand assets 
created by advertising expenditures. Firms with larger C-Scores are more likely to 
have conservatively reported financial statement than firms with smaller C-Scores.  
Whereas the C-Score measures the effect of conservative accounting on the 
balance sheet, the Q-Score measures the effect of conservative accounting on earnings 
in the income statement. They computed Q-Score as follows: 
Q − Scoreit =  0.5 C − Scoreit −  C − Scoreit−1 +  0.5 C − Scoreit −
 Industry medianC − Scoreit      (7) 
The overall score can be interpreted as the unexpected C-Score where the 
expected C-Score is a simple average of last period’s C-Score and the median C-
Score for the industry. 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) used regressions based on accruals and cash 
flows to measure conservatism. They argued that the negative association between 
earnings and operating cash flows first documented by Dechow (1994) is less 
pronounced in bad news periods as a consequence of the asymmetric verification 
requirements to recognize good and bad news in earnings. Economics losses are likely 
to be recognized on a timely basis through unrealized accruals, while economic gains 
are recognized when realized and thus accounted for on a cash basis. Hence, to test 
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the asymmetry in accruals Ball and Shivakumar (2005) proposed the following 
model: 
Accrit =  β0 +  β1DCFOit +  β2CFOit +  β3CFOit DCFOit +  εit    (8) 
where Accrit  denotes annual total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary 
items minus cash flow from operations, CFOit  is cash flow from operations and 
DCFOit  is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the case of negative CFO and 0 otherwise. 
Accrit  and CFOit  are both scaled by average total assets. β2  is expected to be 
significantly negative showing the expected negative correlation between accruals and 
cash flows, and β
3
 is expected to be significantly positive in the presence of 
conditional conservatism, showing a positive contemporaneous association between 
cash flows and accruals in bad news periods, that is, that accrued losses are more 
likely in periods of negative cash flows. 
 
Based on Basu (1997) model, to estimate the timeliness with which accounting 
reflects both news and conservatism at the firm-year level, Khan and Watts (2007) 
specified that both the timeliness of good news (G-Score) each year and the 
incremental timeliness of bad news (C-Score) each year are linear functions of firm-
specific characteristics each year. The C-Score is computed as:  
G − Score =  β
1
= 𝜇0 +  μ1Sizeit +  μ2Μ/Βit +  μ3Levit   (9) 
C − Score =  β
3
= 𝜆0 + λ1Sizeit + λ2Μ/Βit +  λ3Levit   (10) 
where Sizeit  is the natural log of market value of equity, Μ/Βit  is the ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of equity at the end of the year and Levit  is leverage, 
defined as long debt plus short term debt deflated by market value of equity. 
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Equations (9) and (10) are not regression models. Instead, Khan and Watts (2007) 
substitute them into regression equation (3), to obtain equation (11) below. C-Score is 
the firm-year measure of conservatism or incremental bad news timeliness. The total 
bad news timeliness is the sum of G-Score and C-Score.  













Levit +  β2Dit +
 β
3
RDit  𝜆0 +  λ1Sizeit +  λ2
Μ
Β it
+  λ3Levit +  δ0Sizeit + δ1
Μ
Β it
+  δ3Levit +
  δ4Dit Sizeit +  δ5Dit
Μ
Β it
+  δ6Dit Levit + εit    (11) 
Callen et al (2010) constructed a conservatism ratio defined as the ratio of the 
current earnings shock to earnings news. The ratio measured how much of the total 
earnings shock is incorporated into current period unexpected earnings. Thus, for a 
given negative shock, the greater the conservatism ratio the more conservative is the 
firm because more of the total negative shock to current and future cash flows is 
recognized in the current financial statements. Thus, they measured conservatism ratio 
as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 =  
𝜂2,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡
      (12) 
where 𝜂2,𝑡  is the earnings surprise from the vector autoregressive system and 𝑁𝑒𝑡  is 
earnings news. 
Callen and Segal (2013) derived a model-based measure of the degree of 
conservatism at the firm-year level which is a function of the determinants of 
conditional conservatism. They developed the following nonlinear equation for the 
extreme conservatism firm:  
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𝐶 =  𝑐0 + 𝑐1 𝑟𝑡 −  𝐸𝑡−1 𝑟𝑡  +  𝑐2𝐷 ∗  𝑟𝑡 −  𝐸𝑡−1 𝑟𝑡  +  𝑁𝑟𝑡  (13) 
where 𝑁𝑒𝑡
𝐶  is earnings news, 𝐸𝑡−1 is the expectations operator for year t-1, 𝑁𝑟𝑡  is the 
shock to discount rates (expected future returns) over the lifetime of the firm, D 
equals to 1 when  𝑟𝑡 −  𝐸𝑡−1 𝑟𝑡  ≤ 0  and 0 otherwise, 𝑐1 =  𝜌𝛽1/ 1 −  𝜌𝛽2  and 
𝑐2 = (1 −  𝜌𝛽1 −  𝜌𝛽2)/ 1 −  𝜌𝛽2 , 𝑟𝑡  is the log of (one plus) cum dividend equity 
return assuming that returns are based on a conservative accounting system. 
 
There are plenty of papers that examined different aspects of earnings 
conservatism (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991; Krishnan, 1994; Basu, 1999; Poper and 
Walker, 1999; Bauman, 1999; Ahmed et al, 2000; Ball et al, 2000; Lubberink and 
Huijgen, 2001; Kwon et al, 2001; Penman and Zhang, 2002; Givoly and Hayn, 2002; 
Ahmed et al, 2002; Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b; Chung et al, 2003; Francis et al, 
2004; Beekes et al, 2004; Huijgen and Lubberink, 2005; Basu et al, 2005; Pae et al, 
2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Basu, 2005; Kwon, 2005; Gassen et al, 2006; Ding 
and Stolowy, 2006; Grambovas et al, 2006; Narayanamoorthy, 2006; Lobo and Zhou, 
2006; Ruddock et al, 2006; O’connell, 2006; Balkrishna et al, 2007; Dietrich et al, 
2007; Pae, 2007; Givoly et al; 2007; Qiang, 2007; Smith, 2007; Chen et al, 2007a; 
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Krishnan, 2007; Kung et al, 2008; LaFond and Watts, 
2008; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2008; Francis 
and Wang, 2008; Ball et al, 2008; Lai and Taylor, 2008; Zhang and Emanuel, 2008; 
Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Beatty et al, 2008; Chung and Wynn, 2008; Krishnan 
and Visvanathan, 2008; Herrmann et al, 2008; Lu and Sapra, 2009; Lara et al, 2009; 
Katz, 2009; Okoye and Akenbor, 2009; Gigler et al, 2009; Nichols et al, 2009; 
Pinnuck and Potter, 2009; Chan et al, 2009; Lara et al, 2009a; Jenkins et al, 2009; 
Chen et al, 2010; Heltzer, 2010; Wahab et al, 2010; Vichitsarawong et al, 2010; Shuto 
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and Takada, 2010; Nikolaev, 2010; Balsari et al, 2010; Warganegara and Vionita, 
2010; Hamberg and Novak, 2010; Bandyopadhayay et al, 2010; Pae and Thornton, 
2010; Kim and Pevzner, 2010; Cano-Rodriguez, 2010; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; 
Goh and Li, 2011; Patatoukas and Thomas, 2011; Mak et al, 2011; Kung et al, 2011; 
Ismail and Elbolok, 2011; Chandra, 2011; Sun and Liu, 2011; Tapia et al, 2011; Lim, 
2011; Bona-Sanchez, 2011; Zhu and Xia, 2011; Hsu et al, 2012; Ramalingegowda 
and Yu, 2012; Beatty et al, 2012; Xu et al, 2012; Iatridis, 2012; Hamdan et al, 2012; 
Hui et al, 2012; Ettredge et al, 2012; Fan and Zhang, 2012; Yunos et al, 2012; Xie et 
al, 2012; Ahmed and Henry, 2012; Sohn, 2012; Louis et al, 2012; Alam and Petruska, 
2012; Lawrence et al, 2013; Francis et al, 2013; Giner et al, 2013; Acar et al, 2013; 
Ball et al, 2013; Kim et al, 2013; Tan, 2013; Francis and Wu, 2013; Francis et al, 
2013a; Gao, 2013; Li, 2013; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013; Bertin and Moya, 2013; 
Leventis et al, 2013; Kootanaee and Nedaei, 2013; Liao et al, 2013; Wang, 2013; 
Ashton and Wang, 2013; Ball et al, 2013a; Artiach and Clarkson, 2013; Chen et al, 
2014; Haw et al, 2014; Kravet, 2014; Wakil, 2014; McNichols et al, 2014; Lara et al, 
2014; Kanagaretnam et al, 2014; Caskey and Peterson, 2014; Liu and Magnan; 2014; 
Lin, 2014; Lim et al, 2014; Salama and Putnam, 2015; Crawley, 2015; Crockett and 
Ali, 2015; Lee et al, 2015; Khalifa and Othman, 2015; Liu and Elayan, 2015; Smith, 
2015; Li, 2015; Heflin et al, 2015; Francis et al, 2015; Sultana, 2015; Khurana and 
Wang, 2015; Cheng et al, 2015; Sultana and Van der Zahn, 2015; Song, 2015; Andre 
et al, 2015). Some of them are examined in literature review (Section 4) which are 
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2.3.2. Value relevance 
Value relevance is based on the idea that accounting numbers should explain 
the information that is impounded in returns. Therefore, value relevance is the ability 
of one or more accounting numbers to explain variation in stock returns. It means that 
more relevant earnings explain greater variation in returns and therefore higher 
earnings quality. The most representative paper that examined the value relevance 
came from Beisland (2009). He offered a comprehensive study of the empirical value 
relevance literature. He defined value relevance as the ability of financial statement 
information to capture and summarize information that determines the firm’s value.  
Francis and Schipper (1999) offered four other comprehensive interpretations 
of value relevance. First, financial statement information influences stock prices by 
capturing intrinsic share values toward which stock prices drift. Second, financial 
statement is value relevance if it contains the variables used in a valuation model or 
assists in predicting those variables. Third and fourth interpretations are based on 
value relevance as indicated by a statistical association between financial information 
and prices or returns.  
Barth et al (2001a) stated that value relevance research examines the 
association between accounting amounts and equity market values. 
Finally, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2015) stated that value relevance captures the 
notion that earnings are of high quality if they are capable to explain the firm’s market 
price and/or market returns.  
 
There are different approaches of value relevance. Ohlson (1995) estimated 
the value relevance as the explanatory power (𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡
2 ) of the following regression model: 
Pit =  β0 + β1Eit +  β2BVit +  εit  (14) 
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where Pit  is stock price, Eit  is earnings per share,Eit =  
NI it − PD it
WANoCSO it
, NIit  is net income, 
PDit  is preferred dividends, WANoCSOit  is weighted average number of common 
shares outstanding, BVit  is book value per share, BVit =  
TSE it − PSE it
NoCSO it
, TSEit  is total 
shareholders’ equity, PSEit  is preferred stock equity, NoCSOit  is number of common 
shares outstanding, εit  is the error term. Higher (lower) values of 𝐑𝐢,𝐭
𝟐  imply lower 
(higher) value relevant earnings and therefore lower (higher) earnings quality. 
 
There are plenty of papers that examined different aspects of value relevance 
(Amir et al, 1993; Amir and Lev, 1996; Barth et al, 1996; Collins et al, 1997; Aboody 
and Lev, 1998; Ayers, 1998; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Brown et al, 1999; Hope, 
1999; Ali and Hwang, 2000; Graham et al, 2000; Graham and King, 2000; Cahan et 
al, 2000; Charitou et al, 2000; Niskanen et al, 2000; Mingyi, 2000; Hung, 2000; Chen 
et al, 2001a; Barth et al, 2001a; Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Ho et al, 2001; Hirschey 
et al, 2001; Tutticci, 2002; Monahan, 2002; Davis, 2002; Frank, 2002; Boone, 2002; 
Aboody et al, 2002; Ota, 2003; Khurana and Myung-Sun, 2003; Brown and 
Sivakumar, 2003; Chen and Zhang, 2003; Graham Jr et al, 2003; Bodnar et al, 2003; 
Cornell and Landsman, 2003; Wiedman and Marquardt, 2004; Dontoh et al, 2004; 
Christian and Jones, 2004; Francis et al, 2004; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Habib, 
2004; Anctil and Chamberlain, 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Hassel et al, 2005; 
Stoltzfus and Epps, 2005; Aksu, 2005; Davis-Friday and Gordon, 2005; Bartov et al, 
2005; Hand, 2005; El Shamy and Kayed, 2005; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2006; 
Hellstrom, 2006; Gul et al, 2006; Ahmed et al, 2006; Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 
2006; Brown et al, 2006; Gul et al, 2006; Feroz et al, 2006; Lapointe-Antunes et al, 
2006; Ragab and Omran, 2006; Davis-Friday et al, 2006; Goodwin and Ahmed, 2006; 
Choi, 2007; Pinto, 2007; Tan and Lim, 2007; Chee Yeow and Patricia Mui-Siang, 
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2007; Caylor et al, 2007; Cheng et al, 2007; Brimble and Hodgson, 2007; Boone and 
Raman, 2007; Gu, 2007; Jermakowicz et al, 2007; Shamki and Rahman, 2013; Bae 
and Jeong, 2007; Bettman, 2007; Horton, 2007; Negash, 2008; Chalmers et al, 2008; 
Dimitrov and Jain, 2008; Oswald, 2008; Kumar and Krishnan, 2008; Gjerde et al, 
2008; Thinggaard and Damkier, 2008; Hossain, 2008; Habib and Azim, 2008; 
Banghoj and Plenborg, 2008; Rahman and Mohd-Saleh, 2008; Lynn et al, 2008; Jifri 
and Citron, 2009; Banker et al, 2009; Gould and Rammal, 2009; Jamaluddin et al, 
2009; Aleksanyan, 2009; Kadri et al, 2009; Jenkins et al, 2009; Jiang and 
Anandarajan, 2009; Devalle et al, 2010; Ota, 2010; Kang and Zhao, 2010; Kadri et al, 
2010; Habib, 2010; Dobija and Klimczak, 2010; Song et al, 2010; Fang et al, 2010; 
Chan et al, 2011; Jing and Park, 2011; Gjerde et al, 2011; Dang et al, 2011; Jones and 
Smith, 2011; Papadatos and Bellas, 2011; Chalmers et al, 2011; Akbar et al, 2011; 
Alfaraih and Alanezi, 2011; Vafaei et al, 2011; Werner, 2011; Dainelli and Giunta, 
2011; Balachandran and Mohanram, 2011; Choi et al, 2011; De Klerk and De Villiers, 
2012; Zhou, 2012; AbuGhazaleh et al, 2012; Duran-Vazquez et al, 2012; Alexander et 
al, 2012; Srinivasan and Narasimhan, 2012; Tsalavoutas et al, 2012; Ferraro and 
Veltri, 2012a; Shamsuddin and Xiang, 2012; Ferraro and Veltri, 2012; Morais, 2012; 
Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Moraes da Costa et al, 2012; Lam et al, 2013; Cheng et al, 
2013; Lee and Lee, 2013; Jiang and Stark, 2013; Fiador, 2013; Garanina and 
Kormiltseva, 2013; Senthilnathan, 2013; Bepari et al, 2013; Papadatos and Makri, 
2013; Krishnan et al, 2013; Schiemann and Guenther, 2013; Balasundaram, 2013; 
Clacher et al, 2013; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013; Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou, 2014; 
Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014; Palea, 2014; Ji and Lu, 2014; Venter et al, 2014; Ciftci 
et al, 2014; Ahmed, 2015; Chen et al, 2015). Some of them are examined in literature 
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review (Section 4) Some of them are examined in literature review (Section 4) which 
are summarized in Appendix A. 
 
2.3.3. Accruals quality 
Xie (2001) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) mentioned that accruals can be 
divided into normal and abnormal accruals. Normal accruals are the adjusted due to 
the firm’s fundamental performance and abnormal accruals are due to earnings 
management in an imperfect accounting system, which is not related to the actual 
economic performance of firms. Abnormal accruals are divided into two groups: 
discretionary and non discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals is less persistent 
than other parts like cash flow operating and non discretionary accruals is less 
persistent because it is easy to write off. Furthermore, discretionary accruals are 
divided into signed and unsigned. 
 
There are different models that formulate accruals quality. The most 
representative models come from Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), 
Dechow et al (1995), Sloan (1996), Peasnell et al (2000), DeFond and Park (2001), 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), McNichols (2002) and Kothari et al (2005). 
The Healy model 
Healy (1985) was the first researcher that examined signed discretionary 
accruals. He assumed that discretionary accruals occur every period so that non 
discretionary accruals are the mean of total accruals scaled by lagged total assets from 
the estimated period. He used three groups as a sample: earnings with predicted 
upward earnings management (1
st





 groups). Then he compared the mean of total 
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accruals in the upward group with the mean of total accruals from separated 
downward group. The mean total accruals in the estimation period from represent non 
discretionary accruals: 
NDAit =  
ΣTA it
T
   (15) 
where NDAit  is non discretionary accruals, TAit  is scaled total accruals divided by 
previous year total assets and T is the number of year in the estimation period. 
 
The DeAngelo model 
The DeAngelo (1986) model assumed that last period total accruals (scaled by 
lagged total assets) are without earnings management so that non discretionary 
accruals for the current period is equal to the last period total accruals (scaled by 
lagged total assets), which is shown as follows: 
 NDAit =  TAit−1  (16) 
where NDAit  is non discretionary accruals and TAit−1 is scaled total accruals divided 
by previous year total assets. 
 
The Jones model 
Jones (1991) defined discretionary accruals as actual total reported accruals 
less expected normal accruals. Specifically, discretionary accruals are estimated as the 
residuals of the following regression equation:  





ΓREVit +  β3GPPEit +  εt   (17) 
where ΤΑ𝑖t  is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets in year t-1 (where accruals 
equal the year-to-year change in non-cash current assets minus current liabilities 
(excluding short-term debt and income taxes payable) minus depreciation), 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is 
total assets in year t-1 (or lagged total assets), 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the change in revenues scaled 
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by lagged total assets, 𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is gross property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged 
total assets and εit  is the error term. 
 
The Dechow et al model 
Dechow et al (1995) model is applied to remove the drawbacks from Jones 
(1991) model which based on the assumption that managers can manipulate revenue 
through accounts receivables which is easier than over the recognition of cash sales. 
Dechow et al (1995) estimated earnings quality by using the residuals of the following 
regression equation: 





(ΓREVit − ΓRECit )  +  β3GPPEit +  εt  (18) 
Where ΤΑ𝑖t  is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets in year t-1 (where accruals 
equal the year-to-year change in non-cash current assets minus current liabilities 
(excluding short-term debt and income taxes payable) minus depreciation), 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is 
total assets in year t-1 (or lagged total assets), 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the change in revenues scaled 
by lagged total assets, 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡  is account receivables scaled by lagged total assets, 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is gross property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets and εit  is 
the error term. 
 
The Sloan model 
Sloan (1996) measured accruals as follows: 
Accruals it




Average  Total  Assets it
−  
∆CL it
Average  Total  Assets it
−  
DEP it
Average  Total  Assets it
  (19) 
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where ∆CAit  is the change in non-cash current assets, given by the change in current 
assets less the change in cash, ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  is the change in current liabilities excluding 
short-term debt and taxes payable, given by the change in current liabilities minus the 
change in debt included in current liabilities and minus the change in income taxes 
payable, 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡  is depreciation and amortization, ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the change in inventories, 
∆𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the change in other current assets, ∆𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the change in accounts payable, 
∆𝑂𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  is the change in other current liabilities and 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the 
average of total assets. 
 
The Peasnell et al model 
 Peasnell et al (2000) developed and tested a new specification of abnormal 
accruals, labeled the “margin model”. The margin model appears to generate 
relatively better specified estimates of abnormal accruals when cash flow performance 
is extreme. The following equation is intended to capture the accrual recognition 
process before contamination by earnings management.  
 
WCAit =  ΔSTOCKit + ΔDEBTit −  ΔCREDITit + OTHERit =  REVCit −  COGSit −
 BDEit +  (CPSit −  CRCit ) + OTHERit = sm ∗ REVit −  cm ∗ CRCit +  OTHERit  
         (20) 
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where 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  is working capital accruals, 𝛥𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡  is change in stocks, 𝛥𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  is 
change in debtors net of bad debt allowance, 𝛥𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  is change in creditors, 
𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  includes all non-cash current assets other than stocks and trade debtors and 
all current liabilities other than creditors, 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡  is revenue from credit sales, 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡  
is cost of finished goods sold, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the bad debt expense, 𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is cash paid to 
suppliers, 𝐶𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡  is cash received from costumers, sm equals the gross margin on 
recorded sales and cm equals the gross cash contribution on cash collections from 
costumers. Thus, working capital is expressed as the sum of two contribution margins: 
the gross margin on sales and its cash flow analogue, the 8 margin on cash received 
(the “cash margin”). 
 Equation (20) is implemented empirically using the following OLS regression: 
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆0 +  𝜆1𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆2𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡      (21) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is total sales, 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡  is total sales minus the change in trade debtors, 𝜆0, 𝜆1, 
𝜆2  are regression coefficients and 𝜂𝑖𝑡  is the regression residual. The 𝜆1  coefficient 
represents an estimate of the sales margin and is predicted to be positive, while the 𝜆2 
coefficient represents an estimate of the cash margin and is predicted to be negative.  
 
The DeFond and Park model 
DeFond and Park (2001) measured signed abnormal accruals quality by using 
a linear expectation model, which uses a firm’s own year accruals in calculating the 
expectation benchmark. Expected accruals are based on a firm’s prior year ratio of 
current accruals to sales, and the prior year’s ratio of depreciation expense to gross 
property plant and equipment.  
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 Signed abnormal accruals are measured as the firm’s actual total accruals 
minus predicted total accruals. 
Abnormal Accrualsit =  Total Accrualsit −  Predicted Accrualsit   (22) 
Total Accrualsit
=  





  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
  +   𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =
 ∆ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑕𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 −
 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 −
 ∆ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 −
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 −  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡   
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where 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is sales, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1  is sales in year t-1, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is property plant and 
equipment, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1  is depreciation, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 is gross property plant 
and equipment in year t-1, 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is net income, 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 is 
extraordinary items, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is depreciation and 
amortization, 𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡  is change of deferred income, 
𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  is change of untaxed reserve, 
𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is change in other liabilities, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  is 
minority interest, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  is total current assets, 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑕𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  is cash and short term investments, 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑡  is current assets, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is total current 
liabilities, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is total amount of debt 
in current liabilities and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡  is proposed dividends. 
 
The Dechow and Dichev model 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) developed a measure of unsigned discretionary 
accruals quality and argue that the quality of accruals and earnings is decreasing in the 
magnitude of estimation error in accruals. This model used firm-specific regressions 
of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows 
from operations, as follows: 
WCAit =  β0 +  β1CFOit−1 +  β2CFOit +  β3CFOit+1  +  εit   (23) 
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑡 +  ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 =  𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡  – (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑡 +  ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 −  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
where 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  is working capital accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡  is cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
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year, ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the change in current assets, ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  is the change in current liabilities, 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑡  is the change in cash, ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡  is the change in debt in current liabilities, 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡   is net income before extraordinary items, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡  is depreciation and 
amortization expense and εit  is error term. 
After computing the Equation (23), to estimate accruals quality measure for 
each firm, Dechow and Dichev (2002) take the standard deviation of residuals as 
follows: 
AQit =  ζ(εit )  (24) 
 
The McNichols model 
 McNichols (2002) proposed a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, 
arguing that the changes in sales revenue and property, plant, and equipment are 
important in forming expectations about current accruals, over and above the effects 
of operating cash flows. She showed that applying variables form the Jones’ (1991) 
model and Dechow’s et al (1995) model into the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model significantly increases its explanatory power and thus reduces 
measurement error. Hence, the accrual estimation errors using a residual 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is 
measured by McNichols (2002) as follows: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡−1
















+  𝜀𝑖𝑡      (25) 
where 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  is total current accruals  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑡 +  ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
 ∆𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1  is total assets in year t-1, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡   is cash flow from 
operations, 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the change in total revenue between year t-1 and t, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is 
property, plant, and equipment, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  is total accruals (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑡 +
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 ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  ∆𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡) , 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  is current assets, 𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  is current liabilities, 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑡  is cash, 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  is debt in current liabilities, 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡  is taxes payable, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡  is 
depreciation and amortization expenses and εit  is error term. 
 
The Richardson model 
Richardson (2003) used an accrual quality measure which incorporates both 
operating and investing accruals. It is formulated as follows: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
         (26) 
where 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the earnings before extraordinary items, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡  is the cash flow 
from operations and 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the average of the book value of total assets 
during the year. 
 
The Ashbaugh et al model 
Ashbaugh et al (2003) used an extended version of the modified Jones model 




=  𝛽0  
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡−1
 +  𝛽1  
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉−𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶)𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡−1
 +  𝛽2  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡−1
 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡         (27) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶  is total accruals compute as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations and operating cash flows (Hribar and 
Collins, 2002), 𝑇𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is lagged total assets, 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉 is change in revenues, 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶 is 
change in receivables, PPE is property, plant and equipment, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡−1  is lagged 
return on assets calculated as net income before extraordinary items of prior period 
divided by lagged total assets and 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  is residuals. 
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 The Kothari et al model 
Kothari et al (2005) estimated the performance-matched Jones-model 
discretionary accrual as the difference between the Jones model discretionary accruals 
and the corresponding discretionary accrual for a performance-matched firm. Thus, 
they modified the Jones (1991) and Dechow et al (1995) accrual models including 
lagged ROA as follows: 
TAit =  β0 + β1  
1
A it −1
 +  β
2
 ΓREVit − ΓRECit + β3GPPEit + β3ROAit−1  +  εit  (28) 
where ΤΑ𝑖t  is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets in year t-1 (where accruals 
equal the year-to-year change in non-cash current assets minus current liabilities 
(excluding short-term debt and income taxes payable) minus depreciation), 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is 
total assets in year t-1 (or lagged total assets), 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is change in revenues scaled by 
lagged total assets, 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡  is account receivables scaled by lagged total assets,  
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is gross property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 
is return on assets in year t-1 and εit   is error term. 
 
 The Francis et al model 
Francis et al (2005) measured earnings quality using long-term quality of 
accruals. Long-term quality of accruals is measured by the standard deviation of 
abnormal accruals over a multi-year period. A high (low) standard deviation implies a 
low (high) long-term accruals quality. Thus, they developed the following model: 
TCAi,t =  β0,i + β1,iCFOi,t−1 + β2,iCFOi,t +  β3,iCFOi,t+1 + β4,iΔREVi,t +  β5,iPPEi,t +  vi,t         (29) 
where 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖 ,𝑡 +  𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 , 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝑇𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 , 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is net income 
before extraordinary items, 𝑇𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖 ,𝑡 +  𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 ,𝑡 −
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 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡  is change in current assets between year t-1 and 
year t, 𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡  is change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t, 𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕𝑖 ,𝑡  is 
change in cash between year t-1 and year t, 𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 ,𝑡  is change in debt in current 
liabilities between year t-1 and year t, 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑖 ,𝑡  is depreciation and amortization 
expense between year t-1 and year t, 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡  is change in revenues between year t-1 
and year t and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is gross value of PPE. 
 
Larger (lower) values of accruals quality proxies indicate lower (higher) accruals 
quality because less of the variation in current accruals is explained by operating 
cash flows realizations. Lower (higher) accruals quality implies a higher (lower) 
level of earnings quality. 
 
There are plenty of papers that examined different aspects of accruals quality 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry and Williams, 1994; Kang and 
Shivaramakrishnan, 1995; Healy, 1996; Teoh et al, 1998; Han and Wang, 1998; 
Becker et al, 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Kasznik, 1999; Francis and 
Krishnan, 1999; Healy and Whalen, 1999; Young, 1999; Francis et al, 1999; Hung, 
2000; McNichols, 2000; DeFond and Park, 2001; Chan et al, 2001; Fairfield and 
Whisenant, 2001; Heninger, 2001; Frankel et al, 2002; Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002; 
Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Hribar and Collins, 2002; Krishnan, 2003; Myers et al, 
2003; Chen et al, 2003; Balsam et al, 2003; Phillips et al, 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 
2003; Lee et al, 2003; Leuz et al, 2003; Myers et al, 2003; Johnson et al, 2002; Klein, 
2002; Xie et al, 2003; Francis et al, 2003; Bauwhede et al, 2003; Zhou and Elder, 
2004; Butler et al, 2004; Francis et al, 2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Wysocki, 
2004; Menon and Williams, 2004; Aboody et al, 2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
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Webster and Thornton, 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Chen et al, 2005; Burgstahler 
et al, 2006; Boonlert-U-Thai et al, 2006; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006; Antle et al, 
2006; Wang, 2006; Platikanova, 2006; Ball and Shivakumar, 2006; Niu, 2006; 
Bradbury et al, 2006; Wang, 2006; Geiger and North, 2006; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; 
Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006; Matoussi and Kolsi, 2006; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; 
Blouin et al, 2007; Figelman, 2007; Larcker et al, 2007; Ndubizu, 2007; Doyle et al, 
2007; Hribar and Nichols, 2007; Reed et al, 2007; Johl et al, 2007; Chia et al, 2007; 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Ahmed et al, 2008; Levi, 2008; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al, 2008; Gong et al, 2008; Raman and Shahrur, 2008; Trombley et al, 2008; 
Huang et al, 2008; Cohen et al, 2008; Barragato and Markelevich, 2008; Francis et al, 
2008; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Guo et al, 2008; Barth et al, 2008; Francis et al, 
2008a; Jiang et al, 2008; Francis and Wang, 2008; Chen et al, 2008; Core et al, 2008; 
Prawitt et al, 2009; Gray et al, 2009; Gong et al, 2009; Jiang and Anandarajan, 2009; 
Siagian and Mitra et al, 2009; Francis and Yu, 2009; Drake et al, 2009; Cheng and 
Reitenga, 2009; Demirkan and Platt, 2009; Lin et al, 2009; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; 
Chang et al, 2009; Han et al, 2010; Guan and Pourjalali, 2010; Rodriguez-Perez and 
Van Hemmen, 2010; Garcia-Teruel et al, 2010; Rusmin, 2010; Labelle et al, 2010; 
Stubben, 2010; Wang, 2010; Kent and Routledge, 2010; Dhaliwal et al, 2010; Kim 
and Qi, 2010; Alali, 2011; Ebaid, 2011; Tresnaningsih, 2011; Louis and Sun, 2011; 
Mashruwala and Mashruwala, 2011; Chen et al, 2011; Carver et al 2011; Hong and 
Andersen, 2011; Latiff, 2011; Choi and Pae, 2011; Baber et al, 2011; Mashruwala and 
Mashruwala, 2011; McInnis and Collins, 2011; Kabir et al, 2011; Valipour and 
Moradbeygi, 2011; Choi et al, 2011; Gerayli et al, 2011; Jungeun et al, 2012; Filip 
and Raffournier, 2012; Gorgan et al, 2012; Burnett et al, 2012; Bhattacharya et al, 
2012; Gerakos, 2012; Houqe et al, 2012; Li et al, 2012; Duran-Vazquez et al, 2012; 
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Ogneva, 2012; Demirkan et al, 2012; Cheng et al, 2012; Chichernea et al, 2012; Lobo 
et al, 2012; Mouselli et al, 2012; Aldamen and Duncan, 2013; Linck et al, 2013;  
Cheng et al, 2013a; Nelson and Devi, 2013; Ismail et al, 2013; Ahmed, 2013; 
Demerjian et al, 2013; Linck et al, 2013; Bhattacharya et al, 2013; Ittonen et al, 2013; 
Wiedman, 2013; Yung et al, 2013; Christensen et al, 2013; Habib et al, 2013; Yasar, 
2013; Alves, 2013; Chandrasegaram et al, 2013; Salleh and Haat, 2014; Soliman and 
Ragab, 2014; Gajevszky, 2014; Sun et al, 2014; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014; Ames 
et al, 2014; Sirait and Siregar, 2014; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; Mouselli et al, 
2014; Mey and de Klerk, 2015; Dey and Lim, 2015; Ittonen et al, 2015; Nakashima 
and Ziebart, 2015; Ismail et al, 2015; Ayemere and Elijah, 2015; Al-Dhamari and 
Ismail, 2015; Ji et al, 2015; Hashim and Devi, 2015; Muttakin et al, 2015). Some of 
them are examined in literature review (Section 4) which are summarized in 
Appendix A. 
 
2.3.4. Earnings persistence 
Persistence is the extent to which current period earnings are reflective of 
future periods as well as the current period. Thus, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2015) 
stated that earnings persistence measures the extent that current earnings persist, or 
recur, in the future. High persistence is regarded a desirable earnings attributes by 
investors, and therefore a proxy for high earnings quality, since it suggests stable 
sustainable and low-risk earnings process.  
 
The majority of the earnings persistence studies have employed a time-series 
model (Lev, 1983; Ali and Zarowin, 1992; Kormedi and Lipe, 1987; Lipe, 1990) such 
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as Auto-regressive, Integrated, Moving Average model to estimate a measure of 
earnings persistence.  
 Kormedi and Lipe (1987) used firm-level regressions of current earnings on 




=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖(𝑡−1)
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡                               (30) 
where Earnit   is net income before extraordinary items, Earni(t−1)  is net income 
before extraordinary items in year t-1 and εit   is the error term. 
 Kormedi and Lipe’s  (1987) measure of earnings persistence is based on the 
slope coefficient estimate (β
1
). Values of (β
1
) close to one (or greater than one) 
indicate highly persistent earnings while values close to zero imply highly transitory 
earnings. Persistent earnings are viewed as higher quality, while transitory earnings 
are viewed as lower quality.  
 Furthermore, it is trustworthy to mention that the basic components of 
equation 30 are earnings, operating cash flows and accruals. Earnings are calculated 
as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and accruals are 
measures as the difference between earnings and operating cash flows. All these 
variables are deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period. Thus, 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 is 
measured as follows: 
 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡                               (31) 
where Earnit   is net income before extraordinary, CFOit  is cash flow from operations 
and Accrualsit  is total accruals. 
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Higher (lower) values of persistence indicate lower (higher) level of earnings 
persistence and more transitory earnings. Higher (lower) earnings persistence 
implies a higher (lower) level of earnings quality. 
 
There are plenty of papers that examined different aspects of earnings 
persistence (Subramanyam and Wild, 1996; Baber et al, 1998; Baginski et al, 1999; 
Riahi-Belkaoui and Alnajjar, 2002; Donnelly, 2002; Fairfield et al, 2003; Koch and 
Sun, 2004; Ashley and Yang, 2004; Francis et al, 2004; Anctil and Chamberlain, 
2005; Hanlon, 2005; Richardson et al, 2005; Asthana and Zhang, 2006; Boonlert-U-
Thai et al, 2006; Dechow and Ge, 2006; Wang, 2006; Choi et al, 2007; Hendricks, 
2007; Kean and Wells, 2007; Houqe et al, 2012; Oei et al, 2008; Li, 2008; Krishnan 
and Parsons, 2008; Cahan et al, 2009; Doukakis, 2010; Atwood et al, 2010; Kang et 
al, 2012; Tang et al, 2012; Beaver et al, 2012; Blaylock et al, 2012; Filho and 
Machado, 2013; Dawar, 2014; Healy et al, 2014; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014; Chen 
et al, 2014a; Govendir and Wells, 2014; Ames et al, 2014; Dey and Lim, 2015; Hogan 
and Evans, 2015; Scutella et al, 2015; Hsu and Hu, 2015; Vichitsarawong and 
Pornupatham, 2015). Some of them are examined in literature review (Section 4) 
which are summarized in Appendix A. 
 
2.3.5. Earnings predictability 
Based on Ewert and Wagenhofer (2015), earnings predictability is generally 
viewed as a desirable attribute of earnings since it reduces the variability of forecasts 
of earnings. 
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Francis et al (2004) measure earnings predictability by using the square root of 
the estimated error variance from the earnings persistence. Hence, earnings 
predictability is measured using the square root of the error variance from Kormedi 
and Lipe’s (1987) model of earnings persistence as follows:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 =   𝜎2(𝜀 𝑖𝑡)         (32) 
where  Predit  is earnings predictability captured by the square root of the error 
variance from Kormedi and Lipe’s (1987) model of earnings persistence, σ2(ε it ) is  
the estimated error variance calculated from Kormedi and Lipe’s (1987) model of 
earnings persistence. 
 
Higher (lower) values of 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭 indicate a lower (higher) level of earnings 
predictability. More (lesser) predictable earnings are viewed as lower (higher) 
quality of earnings. 
 
There are plenty of papers that examined different aspects of earnings 
predictability (Barefield and Comiskey, 1975; Kochanek, 1975; Collins et al, 1984; 
Hughes and Ricks, 1987; Elliott and Philbrick, 1990; Das et al, 1998; Herzberg and 
Brown, 1999; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Affleck-Graves et al, 2002; Eames and 
Glover, 2003; Behn et al, 2008; Hussainey, 2009; Mintchik, 2009; Dichev and Tang, 
2009; Hassan et al, 2012; Schiemann and Gunther, 2013; Al-Dhamari and Ismail, 
2014; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014; Aobdia et al, 2014; Yosra and Fawsi, 2015). 
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2.3.6. Loss avoidance analysis 
According to Dechow et al (2010), another earnings quality metric is the 
avoidance of small losses and earnings decreases, which is used extensively in the 
research under many different terms, like small loss avoidance by Leuz et al (2003), 
loss avoidance by Bhattacharya et al (2003), frequency of small positive earnings 
Lang et al (2003) and managing towards positive earnings by Barth et al (2008). 
Burgsthaler and Dichev (1997), Leuz et al (2003), Lang et al (2003), 
Bhattacharya et al (2003), Burgstahler et al (2006) and Barth et al (2008) estimated 




   (33) 
where 𝑆𝑃𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡  is small positive income defined as  
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 between 0 and 1% and 𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡  
is small negative income defined as  
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 between 0 and -1%. 
 
Higher (lower) value of frequency of small profits compared to small losses the 
greater (lesser) is loss avoidance which in turn implies lower (higher) level of 
earnings quality. 
 
There are some papers that examined different aspects of loss avoidance 
analysis (Fielitz and Muller, 1983; Leuz et al, 2003; Burgstahler et al, 2006; Krishnan 
and Parsons, 2008; Chih et al, 2008; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Varan and 
Balsari, 2013). Some of them are examined in literature review (Section 4) which are 
summarized in Appendix A. 
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2.3.7. Earnings smoothness 
Earnings smoothness may be viewed as a desirable attribute of earnings 
quality if we believe that managers use the discretion available to them to smooth out 
the nonrecurring fluctuations rather than to misrepresent current and future 
performance and expectations (Trueman and Titman, 1988). Firms with smoother 
earnings should be easier to predict and should have a greater proportion of 
permanent rather than transitory components.  
Goel and Thakor (2003) stated that earnings smoothing can be either 
“artificial” or “real”. Real smoothing involves decisions that affect cash flows and 
dissipate firm value. In contrast, artificial smoothing does not affect cash flows. 
Further, real smoothing has costs that are obvious, whereas artificial smoothing has 
costs that are subtler, such as those related to loss of credibility or consumption of the 
manager’s time in such activities.  
 
Leuz et al (2003), Burgstahler et al (2006) and Bowen et al (2008) defined 
earnings smoothness as a country’s median ratio of firm-level standard deviation of 
operating earnings divided by the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations (both scaled by lagged total assets). Thus, earnings smoothness is 
measured as follows: 
𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑡 =  
𝜎 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡−1  
𝜎 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡−1  
             (34) 
where, Smoothit  is earning smoothness, 𝜎 is standard deviation, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡  is operating 
cash flows and 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡  is net income before extraordinary items. 
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Higher (lower) values of 𝐒𝐦𝐨𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐭indicate lower (higher) earnings smoothness. 
Thus, lower (higher) earnings smoothness implies lower (higher) earnings 
quality. 
 
There are plenty of papers that examined different aspects of earnings 
smoothness (Shrieves and Dahl, 2003; Bhattacharya et al, 2003; Francis et al, 2004; 
Koh, 2005; Burgstahler et al, 2006; Boonlert-U-Thai et al, 2006; Tucker and Zarowin, 
2006; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007; Cahan et al, 2008; Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2008; Jayaraman, 2008; Chih et al, 2008; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; 
Barth et al, 2008; McInnis, 2010; Kanagaretnam et al, 2011; Habib et al, 2011; Ngo 
and Varela, 2012; Habib and Jiang, 2012; Rusmin et al, 2012; Yang et al, 2012; 
Hamdan et al, 2012; Filip and Raffournier, 2012; Vladu, 2013; Jung et al, 2013; Welc, 
2014; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014; Ames et al, 2014; Brown et al, 2014; Khalil and 
Simon, 2014; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2015; Shubita, 2015; Di and Marciukaityte, 
2015). Some of them are examined in literature review (Section 4) which are 
summarized in Appendix A. 
 
2.4. Audit quality 
Sutton (1993), Abdel Ghany (2012) and Hussein and MohdHanefah (2013) 
claimed that there is no agreement among researchers about a specific definition of 
audit quality. The most representative definition of audit quality came from DeAngelo 
(1981). She noted that the audit quality is generally defined as the joint probability of 
detecting and reporting financial statement errors. Based on this definition, auditor 
quality is perceived as a function of the auditor’s competence (ability to discover 
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material misstatements and accounting system breeches) and independence (ability to 
report material misstatements and accounting system breeches).  
Regarding the measurement of audit quality, there is no consensus among 
researchers. This view is supported by Reisch (2000), Iskandar et al (2010) and Abdel 
Ghany (2012) who argued that consensus has not been reached on how audit quality 
should be measured.  Kilgore (2007) stated that there are two approaches to measure 
audit quality: (a) direct approach based on assumption on that reporting of contract 
breaches and the probability of discovery will be reflected in features of the audit such 
as abuses and errors made by auditors; and (b) an indirect approach by looking at 
correlates of audit quality. Therefore, according to Abdel Ghany (2012), majorities of 
previous studies that have attempted to measure audit quality have used indirect 
approach to measure audit quality, and more specifically, have used surrogates of 
audit quality since audit market participants are generally unable to observe audit 
quality directly. 
The most representative measures of audit quality are as follows: 
Auditor fees 
Audit fees are defined as the amounts of fees charged by the auditor for an 
audit process performed for the accounts of a firm. It is based on the contract between 
auditor and auditee in accordance with time spent on the audit process, the service 
required and the number of staff needed for the audit process (El-Gammal, 2012). 
According to El-Gammal (2012) and Hassan and Naser (2013), audit fees is 
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Modified audit report opinion 
Audit report opinion is a formal opinion issued by either an internal auditor or 
an independent external auditor as a result of an internal or external audit or 
evaluation performed on a legal firm.  There are four common types of auditor’s 
reports, each one presenting a different situation encountered during the auditor’s 
evaluation: unqualified opinion, qualified opinion, adverse opinion and disclaimer of 
opinion.  
Thus, following Elder et al (2009), audit report opinion is a dummy variable 
that equals to 0 for a standard unqualified opinion and 1 for any of the other three 
types of audit report opinions.   
 
Auditor swith 
Auditor switch involves corporate management decision to change or retain 
the auditor and the choice of quality differentiated audit firms associated with changes 
in firm characteristics over time (Joher et al, 2000). 
  Consistent with previous literature (Chow and Rice, 1982; Williams, 1988; 
Joher et al, 2000; Knechel et al, 2008; Lin and Liu, 2010; Chadegani et al, 2011), 
auditor switch is defined as a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firms switch auditor 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Auditor status firm 
Audit status firm is usually measured based on the firm’s assets, market share 
and the number of employees. 
Following previous research (Palmrose, 1988; Heninger, 2001), audit status 
firm is expressed as a dummy variable equals to 0 if the audit firm is among from Big 
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Four auditors (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PriceWaterHouseCooper, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG) and 0 otherwise. 
 
Audit committee characteristics 
Audit committee is the most important board sub-committee due to its specific 
role of protecting the interest of shareholders in relation to financial oversight and 
control (Mallin, 2007).  
Based on Aldamen et al (2012), there are three basic audit committee 
characteristics: the existence, the independence and the expertise of audit committee. 
The existence of audit committee is expressed as a dummy variable equals to 1 
if the firm have an audit committee and 0 otherwise. 
The audit committee independence is calculated as the percentage of 
independent board on the audit committee as stipulated by the firm. 
The expertise of audit committee is proxied as the percentage of audit 
committee members with managerial experience. 
 
Demand for auditing 
Francis et al (2003) used the term of demand of auditing as an enforcement 
mechanism to enhance investor protection. They measured the demand for auditing in 
two ways. First, demand is measured using an estimate of country-level spending on 
auditing services. A second measure of the demand for auditing is based on the 
market share in a country held by the elite international Big audit firms. Specifically, 
the demand for auditing is calculated as the sum of square root of total assets of each 
Big Four and non-Big Four audit client, divided by the sum of square root of total 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
72 
 
assets of all firms. A higher Big Four or non-Big Four market share indicates greater 
demand for high quality auditing within a country. 
 
2.5. Investor protection 
The most representative papers of investor protection came from La Porta et al 
(1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2006). They used different approaches of investor 
protection: disclosure requirements index, liability standard index, supervision 
characteristics index, rule-making power index, investigative powers index, orders 
index, criminal index, public enforcement index, external cap/GDP, Domestic 
firms/pop, IPOs, block premia, access to equity, ownership concentration, liquidity, 
antidirector rights, efficiency of the judiciary, log GDP per capital, legal origin and 
investor protection index, one share – one vote, proxy by mail allowed, shares not 
blocked before meeting, cumulative voting or proportional representation, oppressed 
minorities mechanism, preemptive rights, percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, mandatory dividend, restrictions for going into 
reorganization, no automatic stay on secured assets, secured creditors first, 
management does not stay, creditors rights, legal reserve, efficiency of judiciary 
system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, repudiation of contracts by 
government, accounting standards, ownership, GNP and GNP per Gini coefficient, 
efficiency of judiciary and Tobin’s q index.  
 
However, considering investor protection by La Porta et al (1997; 1998; 1999; 
2000; 2002; 2006), Spamann (2010) found significant differences between common 
law and code law countries with respect of the “The antidirector right index”. For this 
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reason, Houque et al (2012) used updated investor protection measures form World 
Economic Forum database. Some of them are as follows:  
 Property rights: how strong is the protection rights, including financial 
assets. 
 Judicial independence: to what extent is the judiciary independent from 
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms. 
 Transparency of government policymaking: to what extent firms are clearly 
informed by the government of changes in policies and regulations. 
 Strength of auditing and reporting standards: how strong is financial 
auditing and reporting standards regarding financial performance. 
 Efficacy of corporate boards: who strong is the supervision of investors and 
boards on management decisions. 
 Protection of minority shareholders’ interests: how strong is the protection 
of interests of minority shareholders. 
 Strength of investor protection: how strong is the investor protection. 
 Legal rights index: how strong is the legal rights of investors. 
 
2.6. Cost of equity capital 
There are three major methods to measure cost of equity capital. The industry 
method came from Gebhardt et al (2001), the PEG ratio method suggested by Easton 
(2004), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s model (2005) and constant growth model 
introduced by Palea (2007).  
Gebhardt et al (2001) imposed that a firms’ return on asset reverts to the 
industry level return on asset beyond the forecast horizon. From the side of Easton 
(2004), the PEG ratio method imposes the assumption of zero growth in abnormal 
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earnings beyond the forecast horizon. The limitation of the first measurement of cost 
of equity is that it is consistently and predictably related to various risk measures 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2005).  
 According to Gebhardt et al (2001), cost of equity (𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆)  is measured as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑡 =  𝐵𝑡 +  
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖 −  𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆)𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1
(1 +  𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆)𝑖
 ∞𝑖=1    (35) 
where 𝑃𝑡  is stock price per share, 𝐵𝑡 is book value of equity per share, 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆  is 
estimated ex ante cost of equity capital, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖 is return on book equity for period 
t+1. Although the above equation requires an infinite series of earnings forecasts, it 
can be operationalized by conversion into the following finite-horizon form with a 
“terminal value”: 




𝑖=1 𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 + 
𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+10− 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆
𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (1+ 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 )10
𝐵𝑡+9   (36) 
where FROE is forecasted return on asset. 
 According to Easton (2004), PEG ratio approach is estimated as the square 
root of the inverse of the price-earnings-growth ratio as follows: 
𝑟𝑃𝐸𝐺 =   
𝑒𝑝𝑠 𝑡+2− 𝑒𝑝𝑠 𝑡+1  
𝑃𝑡
      (37) 
where 𝑟𝑃𝐸𝐺  is the estimated cost of equity under the PEG ratio approach, 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1 is the 
one-year ahead realized earnings per share,𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+2  is the two-year ahead realized 
earnings per share,𝑃𝑡  is the fiscal year-end price per share. 
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 The use of PEG ratio has some implications. First, it is the most robust 
measure of cost of equity capital in many countries, although Botosan and Plumlee 
(2005) concluded that it does so in the U.S. setting. Second, the PEG ratio requires 
that 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+2 > 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1 > 0. It results in retaining only firms for which earnings are 
consistently growing. Thus it sacrifices the power of the tests and may results in an 
unrepresentative sample. 
 The third estimate of cost of equity model is come from Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005). They implied that cost of equity capital is a function of the dividend 
yield, the earnings yield and a long-term earnings growth rate. Thus, the formula for 
the implied cost of equity capital-based on the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s model 
(2005) are as follows: 
𝑟𝑒 = 𝐴 +   𝐴2 +  
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
 𝑔2 −  (𝛾 − 1)      (38) 
where 𝑟𝑒  is cost of equity capital,𝐴 =  
1
2
 𝛾 − 1 + (
𝑑𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
) , 𝛾  is long term earnings 
growth rate, 𝑑𝑝𝑠1 is dividend per share in year 1, 𝑃0  is current share price, 𝑒𝑝𝑠1 is 
expected earnings per share in year 1,𝑔2= ∆𝑒𝑝𝑠 2
𝑒𝑝𝑠 1
.  
 Palea (2007) introduced the constant growth Gordon model as a proxy of the 
cost of equity capital which is formulated as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1)
𝑃𝑡
                (39) 
where 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1) is the median of the expected earnings per share given by financial 
analysts for period t+1, 𝑃𝑡  is the share price in period t and is computed as an average 
of prices reported 15 days before and one month after the end of the period.    
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2.7. Cost of debt 
Cost of debt is defined as the effective rate that a firm pays on its current debt. 
Like cost of equity capital, there is no consensus about how cost of debt is formulated. 
Jiang (2008) used two proxies for a firm’s cost of debt: credit ratings and initial bond 
yield spread. Credit ratings represent the rating agencies’ assessment of a firm’s credit 
worthiness and can affect a firm’s access to bank loans, bonds, and commercial paper 
markets. Asquith et al (2005) reported that debt ratings are the second most frequently 
used measure in bank loan contracts that have performance pricing measures. Initial 
bond yield spread (i.e., the corporate bond yields at the issuance date minus the 
Treasury bond yields with comparable maturity) represents the risk premium that 
firms must pay to borrow money in the bond market and is a direct measure of a 
firm’s incremental cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998; Shi, 2003). Consequently, based on 
Jiang (2008), these two proxies of cost of debt are formulated as follows: 
𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡+1 =  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡+1 −  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 , where  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  is firm i’s 
Standard & Poor’s senior debt rating in year t. Standard & Poor’s rates a firm’s debt 
from AAA (indicating a strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal) to D 
(indicating actual default). Jiang (2008) translated ratings letters into ratings numbers 
with a smaller number indicating a better rating. Thus a negative 𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡+1 
corresponds to a rating upgrade and a positive 𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡+1 corresponds to a rating 
downgrade.  
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond 
that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the Treasury bond yield with similar maturity. 
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 To formulate the cost of debt, Francis et al (2005) used the ratio of interest 




Under this investigation of earnings quality, audit quality, cost of capital and 
investor protection, we can conclude the following: 
 In general, according to Ecker et al (2006), the choice of the best earnings 
quality measure will be a function of, among other things, the nature of the research 
question addressed, the assumptions necessary to support the chosen research design, 
and available data. However, based upon the evidence that there are plenty of metrics 
of each of earnings quality attributes, and to assess the robustness of the results of this 
study, the above earnings quality attributes will be used. 
 Earnings quality is defined as an important aspect of evaluating a firm’s 
financial health, as the ability of reported earnings to reflect and predict the firm’s 
true and future earnings, and as the stability, persistence, and lack of variability in 
reported earnings (Gissel et al, 2005). 
 There are seven main attributes of earnings quality: conservatism, value 
relevance, accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, loss 
avoidance analysis and earnings smoothness. 
 Conservatism is the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of 
verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses 
(Basu, 1997). 
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 Value relevance is defined as the ability of financial statement information to 
capture and summarize information that determines the firm’s value (Beisland, 2009). 
 Accruals quality, which refers the extent to which accruals shift or adjust the 
recognition of cash flows over time. Xie (2001) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
mentioned that accruals can be divided into normal and abnormal accruals. Further, 
abnormal accruals are divided into two groups: discretionary and non discretionary 
accruals. 
 Earnings persistence is the extent to which an innovation in the earnings series 
causes investors to revise their future earnings expectations.  
 Earnings predictability is the ability of earnings to predict itself. According to 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2015), earnings predictability is generally viewed as a 
desirable attribute of earnings since it reduces the variability of forecasts of earnings. 
 Burgsthaler and Dichev (1997) defined loss avoidance analysis as the 
frequency of small profits compared to small losses. 
 Earnings smoothness is referred to the use of accruals to smooth earnings. 
Goel and Thakor (2003) stated that earnings smoothing can be either “artificial” or 
“real”. 
 DeAngelo (1981) noted that the audit quality is generally defined as the joint 
probability of detecting and reporting financial statement errors.  
   Kilgore (2007) stated that there are two approaches to measure audit quality: 
(a) direct approach based on assumption on that reporting of contract breaches and the 
probability of discovery will be reflected in features of the audit such as abuses and 
errors made by auditors; and (b) an indirect approach by looking at correlates of audit 
quality.  
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 The most representative measures of audit quality by using the indirect 
approach are: auditor fees, modified audit report opinion, auditor switch, auditor 
status firm, audit committee characteristics and demand for auditing. 
 The main exponent of the concept of investor protection is La Porta et al 
(1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2006). They used different approaches of investor 
protection, like disclosure requirements index, liability standard index, antidirector 
rights, efficiency of the judiciary, legal origin and investor protection index, 
efficiency of judiciary system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, 
efficiency of judiciary and Tobin’s q index. However, the investor protection indices 
by La Porta et al (1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2006) have been challenged by 
Spamann (2010). For this reason, Houque et al (2012) used updated investor 
protection measures form World Economic Forum database, like property rights, 
judicial independence, transparency of government policymaking, strength of auditing 
and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate boards, protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests, strength of investor protection and legal rights index. 
 Cost of capital is divided into cost of equity capital and cost of debt. Cost of 
equity capital is defined as the return a firm theoretically pays to its equity investors 
to compensate for the risk they undertake by investing their capital. Cost of debt is 
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3. The financial crisis of 2008 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will give an overview of financial crisis of 2008. First the roots 
and then the consequences of financial crisis of 2008 are analyzed. Thus, after this 
chapter sub-question can be answered:  
5. What is financial crisis? 
6. Which are the roots of the financial crisis of 2008? 
7. Which are the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008? 
 
3.2. Definition of financial crisis 
It is worldwide known that financial crisis is a situation in which the value of 
financial institutions or assets drops rapidly. A financial crisis is often associated with 
a panic or a run on the banks, in which investors sell off assets or withdraw money 
from savings accounts with the expectation that the value of those assets will drop if 
they remain at a financial institution. Further a financial crisis can come as a result of 
institutions or assets being overvalued, and can be exacerbated by investor behavior. 
A rapid string of sell offs can further result in lower asset prices or more savings 
withdrawals. If left unchecked, the crisis can cause the economy to go into a recession 
or depression.  
 
3.3. The causes of financial crisis of 2008 
All researchers and economists admit that the financial crisis of 2008 was the 
most severe since the great depression of the 1930s. According to Reinhart and 
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Rogoff (2009), the financial crisis of 2008 affected major financial centers across the 
entire world and generated a collapse of international trade more severe than any 
since 1930s, and a broader economic recession that involved all regions of the globe. 
As all crises, the financial crisis of 2008 has some causes and consequences. 
Considering the analyze of the roots of the financial crisis of 2008, the most 
representative papers came from Schwartz (2009), Foster and Magdoff (2009), 
Acharya et al (2009) and Claessens et al (2010). 
Schwartz (2009) concludes that there were at least three factors exercised 
significant influences on the emergence of the financial crisis of 2008. The first 
factor is relative with the expansive monetary policy. She claims that the cornerstone 
of financial crisis of 2008 was the asset price bubble of the housing price boom. It has 
become a cliché to refer to an asset boom as a mania. Every ordinary folk became an 
avid buyer of whatever object has become the target of desire. This asset boom was 
subvened by expansive monetary policy that lowers interest rates and induces 
borrowing beyond prudent bounds to acquire the asset.  The second factor is relative 
with the adoption of financial innovations, such as securitization, derivatives, and 
auction-rate securities before markets became aware of the flaws in the design of 
these instruments. The basic problem in each of them was the difficulty of 
determining their “true” price. The derivatives industry made mortgage lending 
problems worse; shifting risk that is the basic property of derivatives in directions that 
became so complex that neither the designer nor the buyer of these instruments 
apparently understood the risks they imposed and implicated derivative owners in 
risky contingencies they did not realize they assume. This lead to recycling purchase 
of these financial instruments by creating the known toxic derivatives. The third 
factor of financial crisis of 2008 is the collapse of the market for some financial 
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instruments, such as the auction rate security, a long-term instrument for which the 
interest rate is reset periodically at auctions. Normally, these auctions are secured. 
However, in 2007 outstanding auction rate securities amounted to $330 billion. The 
banks experienced credit losses and mortgage writedowns as a result of the subprime 
mortgage market collapse, and became less willing to commit their own money to 
keep auctions from failing. Next year these fears became reality. Led investors 
withdraw their funds from the auction securities market by leading the rate of 
borrowing costs to rise sharply after failed auctions. The auction security markets 
became chaotic with different rates resulting for identical auction rate securities.  
Foster and Magdoff (2009) mentioned four causes of financial crisis of 2008: 
a) the household bubble, b) the explosion of debt and speculation, c) monopoly-
finance capital, and d) the financilization of capitalism. 
Examining the causes and remedies of financial crisis of 2008, Acharya et al 
(2009) found that the fundamental cause of the financial crisis of 2008 was the 
combination of a credit boom and housing bubble. However, they claimed that the 
combination of leverage of the fact that financial firms close not to transfer the credit 
risk is the root cause of the financial crisis of 2008. In their research, Acharya et al 
(2009) quoted 11 systematic risk causes of financial crisis of 2008:  
1. Loan origination. Subprime loans were unwittingly structured as hybrid 
Adjusted-Rate Mortgage was such a way that they would systemically default or 
refinance around the reset dates. 
2. Securitization of loans. Growth in market for and quality of subprime loans 
depended on securitization, leading to lenders having no skin in the game and 
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financial institutions ignored a securitization business model of credit risk transfer and 
held on to large amounts of Asset-Backed Securities. 
3. Leverage game. Banks created off-balance-sheet conduits to increase their 
leverage ratios; deregulation allowed broker-dealers to do the same. 
4. Rating agencies. No built-in accountability, making it possible to 
inappropriately sanction AAA ratings of Asset-Backed Securities’s way down the 
chain of securitization. 
5. Governance. Similar governance across investment and commercial banks 
allowed Asset-Backed Securities desks to essentially write a huge volume of out-of-
the-money puts on systematic events. 
6. Fair-value accounting. In illiquid and disorderly markets, fair-value 
accounting might cause feedback effects that increase overall risk of the system. 
7. OTC derivatives. Bilaterally et collateral and margin requirements in Over-
The-Counter trading did not take account of the counterparty risk externality that each 
trade imposes on the rest of the system, allowing systematically important exposures 
to be built up without sufficient capital to mitigate associated risks. 
8. Short selling.  
9. Explicit guarantees. Because some institutions have government guarantees, 
they were subject to moral hazard.  
10. Implicit guarantees. The Too-Big-To-Fail Large Complex Financial 
Institutions leaded to a similar moral hazard problem.  
11. Unregulated managed funds. These funds act as financial intermediaries but 
were subject to bank like runs, causing instability in the system.   
Further, Claessens et al (2010) quoted 8 roots of the financial crisis of 2008: 1) 
asset price bubbles, 2) credit booms, 3) marginal loans and systematic risk, 4) 
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regulation and supervision, 5) increased opaqueness, 6) financial integration and 
interconnectedness, 7) the role of leverage, and 8) the central role of households. 
 
3.4. The consequences of financial crisis of 2008 
After identifying the roots of financial crisis of 2008, the consequences of 
financial crisis of 2008 should be examined. Researchers argued that the financial 
crisis of 2008 became truly global through two main mechanisms: a) the sudden risk 
in risk aversion since all markets are highly integrated at the global level, and b) the 
sudden drop of demand through the global supply chain (Claessens et al, 2010; 
Longstaff, 2010; Gros and Alcidi, 2010). 
Foster and Magdoff (2009), Poole (2010), Claessens et al (2010), Campello et 
al (2010), McKibbin and Stoeckel (2010), Helleiner (2011) and Furcen and 
Mourougane (2012) claimed that the financial crisis of 2008 impact on growth 
(expressed by real GDP). Figure 1 represents the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 
on the growth of world developed economies. Specifically, we identify that the global 
advanced real economies have been negatively affected due to financial crisis of 
2008. The real GDP is decreased from 4.29% in 2007 to 1.26 in 2008. However, the 
decrease of annual GDP growth was more intense during 2009 (-2.75%). Similarly, 
Figure 2 presents a decline of annual GDP growth of seventeen examining countries 
in 2008. France (-0.10%), Italy (-1.20%), Greece (-0.20%), Ireland (-3.00%), UK (-
1.00%), Sweden (-0.60%), and Denmark (-0.80%) presents negative GDP growth rate 
in 2008 and all countries except from Australia (1.40%) present negative GDP growth 
rate in 2009.   
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However, the fall in real GDP is not the only measure for a cross-country 
comparison of the real world impact of the crisis. As it is well known, real GDP refers 
to the amount of goods and services produced in a given economy and have a little 
meaning for the wider public whose lives are affected much more by the amount of 
money that can be spent on consumption and by job stability. Thus fluctuations in 
consumption, unemployment and debt indicators represent a better measure of the 
impact of the financial crisis of 2008 than changes in real GDP. 
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 here) 
Figures 3 and 4 represent the impact of financial crisis of 2008 on total 
consumption which is the sum of private consumption and general government 
consumption. The total consumption is decreased for every advanced economy in the 
world after the financial crisis of 2008 except from Luxemburg, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Switzerland, and Singapore. Specifically, according to Figure 3, the total consumption 
of world developed economies has been declined from $33091622 to $32124959 
millions. Further, Figure 3 presents a rate of up to 10% reduction of total consumption 
in UK, South Korea, Australia, Sweden and Iceland from 2008 to 2009. Similarly, the 
decline of total consumption is more evident in Figure 4 which appears the examining 
countries. Specifically, the total consumption of all examining countries, except from 
Switzerland, is declined during the period 2008-2009.      
(Insert Figures 3 and 4 here) 
Figures 5 and 6 indicate the increase of unemployment rate by almost 2 
percentage points in developed countries during the period 2008-2009. Further, they 
show that USA, Spain, Ireland, Estonia and Iceland faced the most severe increase of 
the unemployment rate by 3.50%, 6.70%, 5.80%, 8.30%, and 4.20% respectively.  
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(Insert Figures 5 and 6 here) 
From Figures 7 and 8, we can point out that the central government debt in 
advanced economies during the financial crisis of 2008 was increased significantly 
(from 52.18% in 2008 to 61.78% in 2009). USA, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland, Japan, UK, South Korea, Switzerland, Singapore, and Ireland 
presented up to 10 percent increase in their debts during the financial crisis of 2008. 
(Insert Figures 7 and 8 here) 
Chowdhry and Goyal (2000) claimed that the two most visible defining 
characteristics of a country that experiences a financial crisis are a large drop in the 
value of its currency and a large drop in its traded equity prices. In fact, based on 
Figures 9 to 10, all examining developed countries appeared a currency devaluation 
and a decline in stock market exchange indexes. Particularly, Danish krone was 
devaluated by 7.73%, Euro by 7.73%, Australian dollar by 15.43%, British pound by 
12.13%, Norwegian krone by 13.08%, Swedish krona by 11.84%, and Swiss franc by 
5.67% during the financial crisis of 2008. Furthermore, the stock markets in all 
examining countries plunged as the global financial crisis was transmitted from U.S in 
all over the world. Consequently, stock exchanges in Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom was decreased by 
20.72%, 36.14%, 33.35%, 24.90%, 30.38%, 20.61%, 18.22%, 37.05%, 44.93%, 
26.79%, 29.77%, 30.06%, 29.98%, 21.89%, 22.14%, 13.25%, and 17.55% 
respectively.     
(Insert Figures 9 and 10 here) 
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Under this investigation of financial crisis of 2008, we can conclude the 
following: 
 The financial crisis of 2008 was caused by a combination of asset price 
bubbles and a credit bubble that led to excessive leverage.  
 Claessens et al (2010), Longstaff (2010) and Gros and Alcidi (2010) argued 
that the financial crisis of 2008 became truly global through two main mechanisms: a) 
the sudden risk in risk aversion since all markets are highly integrated at the global 
level, and b) the sudden drop of demand through the global supply chain. 
 The main consequences of financial crisis of 2008 were a) a decline of annual 
GDP growth, annual total consumption, stock exchange indexes and foreign 
currencies, and b) an increase of unemployment rate and central government debt in 
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4. Literature review 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will give an overview on research that has been done in the past. 
Prior research can contribute to building hypotheses for this research. This chapter is 
divided into different paragraphs. First, earnings quality attributes under financial 
crisis of 2008 are analyzed. Second, investor protection and audit quality are 
described as earnings quality determinants. After that, earnings quality consequences 
(cost of equity capital and cost of debt) are explained. Thus, after this chapter sub-
question can be answered: What can be learned from prior research on this thesis? 
For brevity, a whole list of the most important prior literature examining earnings 
quality is summarized in Appendix A. 
 
4.2. Earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008 
The Global Financial Crisis is quite new and therefore there are not many 
researches to examine the effects and the consequences of earnings quality before, 
during and after for this period. However, there are some papers and articles that 
investigate other crises as exogenous shocks, such as Persian Gulf crisis of 1990, 
Mexican currency crisis of 1994, Asia crisis of 1997. 
Kellogg (1984) concluded that in securities litigation, buyers’ lawsuits against 
auditors and firms outnumber sellers’ lawsuits by a ratio of 13 to 1. From this 
perspective, managers have a very good reason to apply conservatism during the 
financial crisis since the expected litigation costs of overstatement are higher than 
those of understatement. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
89 
 
Han and Wang (1998) investigated whether firms that expect increases in 
earnings resulting from sudden product price increases use accounting accruals to 
reduce earnings and, thus, political sensitivity. Using 76 firms under the 1990 Persian 
Gulf crisis, they found that oil firms that expected to profit from the crisis used 
accruals to reduce their reported quarterly earnings during the Gulf crisis.  
Graham et al (2000) addressed whether the financial turmoil surrounding the 
devaluation of the baht affected the value relevance of Thai accounting information. 
The results indicated a decline in the value relevance of Thai book values and 
earnings following the devaluation. 
In the same notion, like Graham et al (2000), Graham and King (2000) 
investigated the relation between stock prices and accounting earnings and book 
values in six Asian countries: Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan and Thailand. They found that, in Thailand, in 1997, the devaluation of the 
Thai Baht led to a decline in the value of relevance of earnings and an increase in the 
value of relevance of the book value. The initial recognition of exchange rate losses 
and the subsequent recognition of exchange rate variation gains, when rates dropped 
and then recovered, can explain changes in the value relevance of accounting 
information after the devaluation. 
In parallel way, Ho et al (2001) studied the value relevance of accounting 
earnings, book value of equity, and cash flows from operations for Korean firms 
during the 1995-1998 period. They concluded that value relevance of accounting 
earnings for Korean firms significantly declines from the pre-crisis (1995-1996) to the 
in-crisis (1997-1998) period. Moreover, they found that the declining importance of 
earnings is not replaced by the increasing value relevance of book value of equity 
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during the same period and cash flows from operations become more value relevant in 
the 1997-1998 period. 
Shrieves and Dahl (2003) investigated utilization of discretionary accounting 
practices in the context of international bank regulation under the Asia financial 
distress. Using a sample of 607 pooled time series and cross-sectional observations, 
they found that Japanese banks’ lending was capital constrained, and that banks set 
gains on securities sales and loan-loss provisions in such a way as to smooth reported 
income and replenish regulatory capital.   
Saleh and Ahmed (2005) examined discretionary accruals in distressed firms 
that have undertaken debt contract renegotiations during Malaysian financial crisis. 
Using Jones’ model (1991) and Dechow et al model (1995), they observed that the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals is statistically significantly negative during the 
year of renegotiations with lenders.  
Eng et al (2005) supported evidence about the predictive value of earnings, 
operating cash flows and accruals in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
for the period 1994-1996 (pre-crisis period), 1997 – 1998 (crisis period) and 1999-
2001 (post-crisis period), and the impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 on the 
predictive power of the accounting performance measures. They found that the 
accounting measures have explanatory power for 1-year ahead cash flows which 
indicated that investors may have undervalued the accounting measures in the pre- 
and post-crisis periods, and overvalued the measures during the crisis period.  
Davis-Friday and Gordon (2005) used a sample of Mexican firms traded on 
the Mexican Stock Exchange during the period 1992-1997 to investigate whether the 
relation between the firms’ stock prices and their book values, earnings, and cash 
flows changes during the 1994 Mexican currency crisis. The results showed that the 
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value relevance of book value did not significantly change during the crisis period, 
while its incremental explanatory power increased. On contrary, the value relevance 
of earnings and explanatory power significantly decreased during the crisis.  
Similarly with Graham et al (2000), Graham and King (2000) and Ho et al 
(2001), Davis-Friday et al (2006) investigated the value relevance of earnings in four 
Asian countries, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand in the period 
surrounding the Asian financial crisis. Their results indicated that the value relevance 
of earnings in Indonesia and Thailand was significantly reduced during the Asian 
financial crisis while the value relevance of book value increased. In Malaysia, the 
value relevance of both earnings and book value decreased during the crisis. In Korea, 
neither book value nor earnings was significantly impacted by the crisis. Finally, they 
found that accounting systems affect the extent of changes in the value relevance of 
book value resulting from the crisis. 
Chia et al (2007) tested the effect of the choice of the auditors in constraining 
earnings management within a rule-based reporting framework during the Asian 
Financial crisis. Using the iterative seemingly unrelated regression methodology to 
bypass in decomposing of the total accruals into two parts (non discretionary accruals 
and discretionary accruals) because of the anticipated severe cross-equation 
correlation, 383 firm-observations of service-oriented listed companies in Singapore 
are analyzed. The results show that service-oriented companies engage in income 
decreasing earnings management during the crisis period and only the Big-6 firms are 
able to significantly constrain the earnings management of managers of such 
companies. 
Using, again, the Asian financial crisis, Ahmed et al (2008) examined how a 
stock market prices earnings components around economic downturns. Using 139 
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firms from 5 industries in 1998 and 1999, they resulted that negative discretionary 
accruals for debt renegotiating firms are associated with higher market values of 
equity and are not related to the firms’ future earnings.  
Herrmann et al (2008) analyzed the differences in conservatism between firms 
audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors during the financial crisis and post-crisis 
periods in Thailand. The findings indicated a significant increase in conservatism 
following the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, they found that there is no significant 
difference in conservatism between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in the post-crisis 
period while both Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients reported more conservative 
earnings. 
Vichitatsarawong et al (2010) also provided empirical evidence on earnings 
quality under Asian financial crisis. As Hermann et al (2008), Vichitatsarawong et al 
(2010) used 1500 firms as a sample from the same countries. They investigated the 
period from 1995 until 2004 by using Basu model. They concluded that all the 
measures that were taken probably worked since conservatism in the pre-crisis period 
was higher than during the crisis and after the crisis. However, they found that 
conservatism was lower during the financial crisis than after the crisis and lower than 
before the crisis.  
Another paper that examined the earnings quality under financial crisis came 
from Warganegara and Vionita (2010). They investigated the extent of conservatism 
in publicly listed Indonesian companies prior to and following the Asian financial 
crisis by using a modified Basu’s (1997) reverse regression equation. Using 250 firm-
year observations from IDX database as a sample, they found that the level of 
conservatism was not improved after the Asian financial crisis. Before the financial 
crisis, accounting earnings did not exhibit conservatism, share returns did not lead 
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earnings, and there was alignment in the timing of revenue and expense recognition 
under the matching rule. On contrary, during the financial crisis, share returns led 
earnings, and accounting processes were able to capture the economic reality faced by 
the sample firms.  
Choi et al (2011) empirically analyzed whether and how the information 
values of reported earnings and their components changed around the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-1998. Using 10.406 firm-years from nine Asian countries from 1995 to 
2000, they revealed the following: a) the crisis led to significant decline in the value 
relevance of discretionary accruals but had no significant impact on the value 
relevance of non-discretionary earnings components such as operating cash flows and 
non-discretionary accruals, b) the decrease in the value relevance of discretionary 
accruals during the crisis was more severe fro firms in countries with weak 
institutions than for those in countries with strong institutions, and c) the value 
relevance of discretionary accruals declined to a greater extent for firms with high 
information asymmetries than for firms with low information asymmetries. 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al (2011) examined earnings management during Malaysian 
IPOs during Asian crisis. Consistent with other IPO studies, the Dechow et al (1995) 
model is used to proxy earnings management. Using 254 IPO companies during the 
period 1990 to 2000, their outcome supported that income increasing earnings 
management during IPOs occurs primarily during the Asian crisis. 
Jungeun et al (2012) provided insight into the changes in chaebol (Korean 
business group) firms’ earnings management methods triggered by Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. Using two models to estimate accrual based earnings management 
(Dechow et al model, 1995; Kothari et al model, 2005) and 5.963 firm-year 
observations from 1992 to 2009, their results showed that chaebol firms have 
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significantly decreased accrual-based earnings management after the financial crisis 
of Asian compared to non-chaebol firms. 
Filip and Raffournier (2012) examined the impact of the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis on the earnings management of EU listed firms. Using 8.266 firm-year 
observations for the four-year period 2006-2009, they found that there is a significant 
decrease of income smoothing and an improvement of accruals quality in the crisis 
period. This trend was confirmed in most of the 16 countries under review. 
Lu (2012) tested the relationship of earnings quality, risk-taking and firm 
value. They hypothesized that a firm with lower earnings quality, which represents 
lower financial reporting quality, has higher degree of risk-taking. Using 5.655 firm-
year observations from 2001 to 2010, their results verified their hypothesis and this 
phenomenon is especially significant after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Moraes da Costa et al (2012) provided evidence about the impact of financial 
crises occurred in Brazil on the value relevance of book value and earnings. Using 
3.849 firm-year observations from Brazilian listed companies from 1997 till 2010, 
they found that financial crises affected the value relevance of book value positively 
and the value relevance of earnings negatively, similarly to other countries like 
Thailand and Mexico. 
Gorgan et al (2012) aimed to analyze the extent to which financial reporting is 
involved in financial crisis and, on the other hand to outline the changes produced by 
the crisis in the quality of financial information reported by companies (measured by 
discretionary accruals). Using 90 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009, they 
found that earnings management by discretionary accruals for big European 
companies declined during the economic crisis of 2008. 
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Vladu (2013) examined whether the listed companies in Spain behave 
differently in bad economic times versus good economic times. Using 1.044 firm-year 
observations for period from 2005 to 2012, she found that earnings smoothness is 
decreased during the financial crisis of 2008.  
Bepari et al (2013) studied the incremental value relevance of cash flow from 
operations given book value and earnings between the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis and the pre-crisis period. Using 4.885 firm-year observations from 2004 to 
2009, they found that cash flow from operations has value relevance incremental to 
book value and earnings. Their findings also suggested that earnings has greater 
relative and incremental information content than cash flow from operations in the 
Australian market. The value relevance of earnings has increased and that of cash 
flow from operations has decreased during the global financial crisis compared to pre-
crisis period. 
Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) investigated how the economic crisis affects the 
scope for earnings manipulation and the value relevance of reported financial 
numbers for Portuguese, Irish, Italian, Greek and Spanish listed companies that are 
audited by a big 4 auditor. Using 66 Portuguese, 48 Irish, 273 Italian, 245 Greek and 
157 Spanish non-financial firms from 2005 to 2011, they found that Portugal, Italy, 
and Greece tend to engage more in earnings management in their effort to improve 
their lower profitability and liquidity during the financial crisis of 2008, while Ireland 
exhibits less evidence of earnings manipulation and the finding for Spain are to some 
extent conflicting.   
Similarly, using the financial crisis of 2008, Francis et al (2013) provided 
empirical evidence on whether and to what extent conservative accounting affects 
shareholder value. Using 6.326 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009, they found 
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that there is significantly positive and economically meaningful relation between 
conservatism and firm stock performance during the financial crisis.  Moreover, they 
stated that firms with a higher degree of conservative accounting prior to the crisis 
experienced significantly less losses in the stock market compared to firms with a 
lower degree of conservatism accounting. Finally, the findings indicated that the 
identified relation between conservatism and stock returns is conditional on the 
degree of information asymmetry of firms.  
Kousenidis et al (2013) examined whether and to what extent the financial 
crisis of 2008 in European Union had an impact on the quality of the reported 
earnings of listed firms in countries with weak fiscal sustainability. The results 
showed that on average earnings quality has improved during the financial crisis.     
Another paper come from Habib et al (2013) who investigated the managerial 
earnings management practices of financial distressed firms and whether these 
practices changed during the financial crisis of 2008. By using discretionary accruals 
and 767 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2001, they found that managers of 
distressed firms engage more in income-decreasing earnings management practices 
compared to their healthy firm counterparts.  
 
4.3. Earnings quality, audit quality and investor protection  
4.3.1.  Earnings quality and investor protection 
Investor protection can be seen as an important element of earnings 
management (Leuz et al, 2003). Leuz et al (2003) examined the pervasiveness of 
earnings management across 31 countries between 1990 and 1999. Using 70.955 
firm-year observations, they found a link between corporate governance and the 
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quality of reported earnings, and complemented prior finance research that treats the 
quality of corporate reporting as exogenous.  
Guether and Young (2000) investigated how cross-country differences in 
financial accounting standards affect the relation between financial accounting 
earnings and real economic value-relevant events that underlie those earnings. Based 
on previous research and economic theory, because of differences in legal protection 
for external shareholders, and differences in the degree of tax conformity in their 
sample countries, they found that accounting earnings in the UK and the US will be 
more closely related to underlying economic activity than will accounting earnings in 
France and Germany.  
Likewise Guenther and Young (2000), Morck et al (2000) tested the value 
relevance among countries. Using 3.572 firm-year observations among 7 countries 
over the period 1991-1995, they found that stock process impound less firm-specific 
information in countries with lower investor protection. In those countries, stock 
prices may not fully impound information about future benefits of the firm. It means 
that the association of stock prices with earnings would be positively related to the 
earnings quality since high quality of earnings reflects the firm’s future benefits. In 
overall, the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality 
would be less positive when countries have low investor protection. 
Ball et al (2000) studied the effect of international institutional factors on 
properties of accounting earnings. Using 40.359 firm-year observations from seven 
countries over the period 1985-1995, they documented that there is difference 
between common and code law counties in relation to the manner of resolving 
information asymmetry between managers and potential users of accounting income, 
including debt and equity investors, employees, suppliers and customers. They, also, 
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claimed that code law directly links accounting income to current payouts to 
employees, managers, shareholders and government. Finally, they showed that 
common-law accounting income accounting does indeed exhibit significantly greater 
timeliness than code-law accounting income, but that this is due to greater sensitivity 
to economic losses (income conservatism). 
Hung (2000) examined the association between accounting standards and 
value relevance of financial statements. Using 17743 firm-year observations of 
industrial companies in 21 countries from 1991 to 1997, she found that the use of 
accrual accounting (versus cash accounting) negatively affects the value relevance of 
financial statements in countries with weak shareholder protection, which does not 
exist in countries with strong shareholder protection. Further, she indicated that 
shareholder protection improves the effectiveness of accrual accounting. 
Fan and Wong (2002) hypothesized that the threat of expropriation by 
controlling owners in East Asian corporations lowers the credibility of accounting 
earnings and hence the stock price informativeness of those earnings. Using 1.350 
firms from seven East Asia countries for the period 1991-1995, they showed that the 
value relevance of earnings is negatively associated with ownership concentration. 
They provided two explanations for their findings. First, the entrenchment effect of 
ownership concentration reduces the credibility of reported earnings and consequently 
reduces their information content. Second high ownership concentration hinders 
information flows to the public resulting in low earnings informativeness. 
Haw et al (2004) provided evidence of the role of both legal and extra-legal 
institutions in limiting the income management induced by the detachment of control 
rights from the cash flow rights of ultimate owners. Using 25.210 firm-year 
observations from 9 East Asian and 13 Western European countries, they showed that 
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(a) income management that is induced by the wedge between control rights and cash 
flow rights is significantly limited in countries with high statutory protection of 
minority rights (proxied by legal tradition, minority rights protection, the efficiency of 
the judicial system, or disclosure standards) and effective extra-legal institutions 
(proxied by the effectiveness of competition laws, diffusion of the press, and tax 
compliance), and (b) a common law tradition and an efficient judicial system subsume 
the effects of the other legal institutions, and that a high rate of tax compliance 
subsumes the effects of the other extra-legal institutions in curbing insider income 
management.  
Extended the research of Haw et al (2004), Wysocki’s (2004) paper focused 
on the empirical validity of their earnings management proxy (as captured by absolute 
total discretionary accruals scaled by total assets) and on their claims of casual link 
between tax compliance and earnings management. Using data from 28 countries, he 
found that their earnings management proxy exhibits no meaningful association with 
previously validated country-level measures of earnings management and accounting 
quality. Moreover, he suggested a reverse-casual link between earnings management 
and tax compliance where better investor protection laws and accounting standards 
can mitigate earnings management and potentially increase tax compliance. 
Shen and Chih (2005) tested the association between investor protection and 
earnings management in bank industry. Using 70.955 firm-year observations for the 
fiscal years 1993-1999 across 48 countries, they found that stronger protection of 
investors and greater transparency in accounting disclosure can reduce banks’ 
incentives to manage earnings. Thus, greater and stronger investor protection leads to 
higher earnings quality in banking sector.  
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Burgstahler et al (2006) studied how capital market pressures and institutional 
structures shape firms’ incentives to report earnings that properly reflect their 
economic performance. Using 378.122 firm-year observations over the fiscal years 
1997 to 2003 across 13 European countries, they concluded that private firs exhibit 
higher levels of earnings management and those strong legal systems are associated 
with less earnings management in private and public firms.  
Boonlert-U-Thai et al (2006) explored the relationship between cross-country 
differences in the quality of reported earnings (accruals quality, earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness) and investor protection (antidirector 
rights, efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, corruption index, ratio of the 
stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross domestic product, ratio of the 
number of domestic firms to the population, ratio of the number of initial public 
offerings to equity to the population and ownership concentration). Using 57.610 
firm-year observations drawn from 31 countries for the fiscal years 1994 to 2003, they 
found that a) less earnings smoothness appears to be found in countries whose 
institutional characteristics are strong, b) high accruals quality and high predictive 
ability of earnings appear to be found in countries whose institutional characteristics 
are weak and c) earnings persistence is no correlated with institutional characteristics 
except that countries with low ownership concentration appear to have high earnings 
persistence. 
DeFond et al (2007) examined the information content of more than 50.000 
annual earnings announcements in 26 countries over the period of 1995-2002, where 
information content is measured as the abnormal return variance around an annual 
earnings announcement. They found that strong investor protection institutions 
engendering financial reporting environments that have high-quality earnings, equal 
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access to earnings information by all investors, and more frequent reporting, the net 
effect of which is to increase the information content of annual earnings 
announcements.  
Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) investigated the impact of investor 
protection and national culture on earnings management of a sample of 30 countries. 
They argued that earnings management is relatively high in countries with high 
uncertainty avoidance scores which are associated with earnings discretion but not 
with earnings smoothing. 
Using firm-level data from 44 countries for 1993 to 2002, Cahan et al (2008) 
studied whether the underlying motive for earnings management differs between high 
and low investor protection countries. Their results showed that earnings management 
informativeness is more positively associated with income smoothing in countries 
with strong investor protection than it is in countries with weak investor protection. It 
means that managers in weak investor protection countries are more likely to use 
income smoothing for opportunistic reasons while managers in strong protection 
countries are more likely to use income smoothing to convey their private information 
about future earnings.  
Using three measures of earnings management (earnings smoothing, earnings 
aggressiveness, and earnings losses and decreases avoidance), Chih et al (2008) 
explored whether the corporate social responsibility related features of 1.653 
corporations in 46 countries had a positive or negative effect on the quality of 
earnings during the 1993-2002 period. They found that a firm with corporate social 
responsibility in mind tends not to smooth earnings, and displays less interest in 
avoiding earnings losses and decreases, which in turn prone to engage in more 
earnings aggressiveness in a country with strong legal enforcement.  
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Lara et al (2009) predicted that firms with stronger corporate governance 
(measured by external governance, CEO involvement, board composition, board 
effectiveness) exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Using 9.152 firm-
year observations for the period 1992 through 2003, they found that strong 
governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting 
conservatism.  
Jiang and Anandarajan (2009) tested the effect of shareholder rights on the 
quality of reported earnings (measured by discretionary accruals). Using 5.658 firm-
year observations over the period 1998-2002, they found that stronger shareholder 
rights are associated with higher earnings quality.  
Cahan et al (2009) examined whether the association between the returns-
earnings association and earnings quality is related to investor rights protection and 
the information environment in an international setting. Using 4.238 firms from 13 
countries over the period 1993 to 2003, they showed that the returns-earnings 
association is more positively associated with earnings persistence and the earnings-
future cash flows relation when a country has high investor rights protection, 
measured by anti-director rights and legal enforcement.  
Han et al (2010) hypothesized and tested whether the degrees to which 
managers exercise earnings discretion relates to their value system, like culture, as 
well the institutional features, like legal environment, of their country. Using 96.409 
firm-year observations for the period from 1992 to 2003 in 32 countries, they found 
that individualism (uncertainty avoidance) is positively (negatively) related to the 
magnitude of earnings discretion. Further, they concluded that the positive association 
between individualism and discretionary accruals is particularly pronounced in strong 
investor protection regimes, while the average negative association between 
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uncertainty avoidance and discretionary accruals becomes positive in strong investor 
protection regimes. 
Guan and Pourjalali (2010) investigated the effect of cultural values and 
disclosure and earnings management scores on earnings management in 27 countries. 
Using 66.847 firm-year observations for the 15-year period 1987-2001, they found 
that debt-to-equity ratio (total assets) affects the earnings management upwards 
(downwards). Further, they indicated that uncertainty avoidance affects the direction 
of earnings management downwards. Finally, their findings showed that the higher 
the values of individualism, power distance, and masculinity, the higher the 
magnitude of earnings management.  
Using 104.348 firm-year observations from 46 countries for the years 2000-
2007, Houqe et al (2012) studied the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption and investor 
protection on the earnings quality. Their findings showed that earnings quality 
increases for mandatory IFRS adoption when a country’s investor protection regime 
provides stronger protection. These findings are consistent with the argument that 
cross-country differences in accounting quality are likely to remain after mandatory 
IFRS adoption where there is poor investor protection (e.g. Soderstrom and Sun, 
2007).    
 
4.3.2. Earnings quality and audit quality 
There are extensive literature that examine the impact of different aspects of 
auditing on earnings management. However, most of them converge in a common 
assumption that audit quality constrains the earnings management. For the purpose of 
this research, six measures of audit quality will be examined in relation with earnings 
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quality (audit fees, audit report opinion, auditor switch, audit firm size, audit 
committee existence and demand for auditing). 
 
4.3.2.1. Earnings quality and audit firm size  
Many studies used audit firm size as a proxy of audit quality to examine the 
impact of auditor size on earnings management. While Big X auditors are generally 
considered to provide higher audit quality than non-Big X auditors, it is questioned 
whether this audit quality influence earnings management. Hence, based on Teoh and 
Wong (1993), Becker et al (1998), Francis et al (1999), Bauwhede et al (2003), 
Krishnan (2003), Chung et al (2003), Zhou and Elder (2004), Chen et al (2005), Lee 
et al (2006), Chia et al (2007), Johl et al (2007), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2008), Hussainey (2009), Jordan et al (2010), Kabir et al (2011), Gerayli et al (2011), 
Hajizadeh and Rahimi (2012), Iatridis (2012), Hamdan et al (2012), Iatridis and 
Dimitras (2013), Lee and Lee, (2013) and Soliman and Ragab (2014), auditor size is 
significantly associated with earnings management.  
Specifically, Teoh and Wong (1993) examined whether the earnings response 
coefficient differs between Big Eight and non-Big Eight audited firms. Using 15.480 
firm-year observations during the period 1981-1988, they provided evidence that the 
earnings response coefficients of Big 8 clients are statistically significantly higher 
than for non-Big 8 clients.   
Becker et al (1998) investigated the relation between audit quality and 
earnings management captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a 
cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) model. Using 10.937 firm-year 
observations from 1989 to 1992, they resulted that the discretionary accruals of firms 
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with non-Big 6 auditors are higher than the discretionary accruals of firms with Big 6 
auditors.  
Francis et al (1999) studied if the likelihood of hiring a Big 6 auditor is 
increasing in the firm’s endogenous propensity to generate accruals. Using a sample 
of NASDAQ firms over the period 1975-1994 they showed that high accrual firms are 
more likely to hire a Big 6 auditor, but report lower amounts of estimated 
discretionary accruals.  
Bauwhede et al (2003) explored the impact of audit quality, measured by audit 
firm size, on earnings management, measured by discretionary accruals. Using 136 
firm-year observations in period 1991-1997, they found that audit quality act as 
constraints on income-decreasing earnings management. Specifically, they observed 
that  having a Big 6 auditor constraints a firm’s attempt to increase as well as decrease 
earnings. 
Chung et al (2003) hypothesized that Big Six audit clients use more 
conservative accounting than non-Big Six audit clients when the clients are 
performing poorly (as reflected in stock prices). By regressing excess earnings to 
price ratios on excess stock returns and other variables, they claimed that Big Six 
auditors influence their clients to adopt more conservative accounting procedures than 
non-Big Six auditors only when the clients’ financial performance is worse than 
expected.  
Krishnan (2003) examined whether there is a linkage between audit quality 
and pricing of discretionary accruals. Using 18.568 firm-year observations 
representing 4.098 firms from 1989 to 1998, they indicated that clients of Big 6 
auditors report lower amount of discretionary accrual than clients of non-Big 6 
auditors and the association between stock returns and discretionary accruals is 
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greater for firms audited by Big 6 auditors than for firms audited by non-Big 6 
auditors.  
Zhou and Elder (2004) tested the relationship between audit quality as 
measured by audit firm size and earnings management as measured by discretionary 
current accruals for companies making seasoned equity offerings. Using 2.453 firm-
year observations of seasoned equity offerings between 1991 and 1999, they 
concluded that Big 5 auditors are associated with lower earnings management in the 
years before, during, and subsequent to the seasoned equity offerings.  
Chen et al (2005) analyzed the relationship between audit quality as measured 
by auditor size and earnings management as measured by unexpected accruals for 
Taiwan IPO firms. Using 367 new issues between 1999 and 2002 from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal database, they found that Big 5 auditors are related to less earnings 
management in the IPO year in Taiwan.  
Lee et al (2006) studied the relation between the accuracy and bias of earnings 
forecasts provided in Australian initial public offerings prospectuses and auditor size. 
Using 220 firms between 1991 and 1998, they indicated that forecasts associated with 
Big 6 auditors are more accurate than those for which a Non-Big 6 auditor is used. 
They also found significantly less optimistic bias for forecasts with Big 6 auditors.   
Chia et al (2007) tested the effect of the choice of auditors in constraining 
earnings management within a rule-based reporting framework during the Asian 
financial crisis. Using 383 firm-year observations for the fiscal years of 1995-1998, 
their results implied that high quality auditing by Big-6 auditing firms acts as 
effective deterrent to earnings management of their clients, which in turn will enhance 
the quality of their reported earnings.   
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Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) investigated audit quality in private 
firms across different European countries. Using 64.831 firm-year observations from 
1998 to 2002, they concluded that privately held firms engage less in earnings 
management when they have a Big 4 auditor compared to a non-Big 4 auditor.  
In similar vein, Hussainey (2009) addressed the impact of audit quality, 
measured by financial statements audited by the Big Four accounting firms, on the 
investors’ ability to predict future earnings for profitable and unprofitable firms. 
Using 4.417 firm-year observations (3.736 profitable firms and 681 unprofitable 
firms) for the period 1996-2002, they found that there is positive relation between 
earnings predictability and audit quality.  
Jordan et al (2010) investigated whether audit quality, as proxied by auditor 
size, in the U.S. constrains earnings management to effect user reference points in 
EPS. Using 1.251 firm-year observations with 631 and 620 of these audited by Big 
Four and non-Big Four audit firms respectively, they suggested that audit quality 
significantly restricts management’s attempts at rounding up earnings per share as 
clients of Big 4 firms show no major signs of this manipulative behavior while non-
Big 4 auditees appear to round up the first digital position right of the decimal point in 
earnings per share across zero to increase the digit immediately left of the decimal 
point by one.  
Kabir et al (2011) studied the association between Big 4 affiliated auditors and 
accruals quality in Bangladesh. Using 382 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2003, 
they found that the association between Big 4 affiliates and accruals quality in 
Bangladesh depends on measures of accruals quality and accruals models used. 
However, in general, they stated that Big 4 affiliates do not have a positive impact on 
accruals quality of their clients in Bangladesh.  
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Gerayli et al (2011) provided empirical evidence on the impact of audit quality 
on discretionary accruals, as a measure of earnings management, in Iranian listed 
firms. Based on a sample of 90 non-financial Iranian listed firms from 2004 to 2009, 
their results revealed that discretionary accruals are negatively related to auditor size.  
Hajizadeh and Rahimi (2012) investigated the relationship between audit firm 
size and information content of earnings. Using data of listed firms in Tehran Stock 
Exchange from 2005 to 2009, they showed that there is positively significant 
relationship between audit firm size and information content of earnings so that audit 
quality increases the level of information content of earnings.  
The study of Iatridis (2012) focused on firms that audited by a Big auditor and 
examined the differentiation in the earnings management potential and the level of 
conservatism. Using firms from emerging common-law South Africa and code-law 
Brazil, he implied that firms audited by a big auditor are likely to exhibit lower 
discretionary accruals and higher conservatism.  
Hamdan et al (2012) tested the impact of audit firm size on the enhancement 
of the level of accounting conservatism. Using 39 firms of the industrial sector listed 
on Amman Stock Exchange for the period 2001-2006, they indicated that the size of 
the auditing firm has an impact on improving the accounting conservatism.  
Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) investigated how the economic crisis affects the 
scope for earnings manipulation and the value relevance of reported financial 
numbers for companies that are audited by a Big Four auditor. Using Portuguese, 
Irish, Italian, Greek and Spanish listed firms, they implied that, under a severe 
economic crisis, firms may resort to earnings management in order to protect their 
financial position, performance and prospects and to mitigate the adverse effects of 
financial distress, even when audited by a Big 4 auditor.  
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Lee and Lee (2013) studied the association between audit quality (measured 
by audit firm size) and value relevance of representative accounting measures, such as 
earnings and book value of equity. Using 5.589 firm-year observations from 1996 to 
200, they found that, in the Taiwan capital market, in general, the earnings and book 
value of equity audited by Big 4 auditors explain more variations in stock return than 
those audited by non-Big 4 auditors. Specifically, they observed that both earnings 
and book value audited by Big 4 audit firms are generally more relevant than those 
audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. 
Soliman and Ragab (2014) examined the association between audit quality 
(measured by audit firm size) and earnings management (measured by discretionary 
accruals). Using the top 50 most active-traded companies listed in the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange over the period 2007-2010, they concluded that audit quality have 
significant negative association with discretionary accruals. 
On contrary, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006), Piot and Janin (2007) and Yasar 
(2013) found no relationship between audit size and earnings quality. Particularly, 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) studied the effects of audit firm size on earnings 
management within Europe. Using 17.394 firm-year observations from France, 
Germany and the UK for the period 1992-2000, they claimed that a stricter audit 
environment reduces the magnitude of earnings management, irrespective of the type 
of auditor and there is no affect of international Big 4 auditor on earnings 
management.   
Examining the effect of audit firm size on earnings management in France, 
Piot and Janin (2007) concluded that the presence of a Big 5 auditor makes no 
difference regarding earnings management activities.  
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Finally, Yasar (2013) tested the effect of audit quality, measured by audit firm 
size, on earnings management, measured by discretionary accruals, by focusing on 
Turkish case. Using 290 firm-year observations from manufacturing industry listed on 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange for the years 2003-2007 of which 130 firm-year 
observations are audited by Big Four auditors and 160 audited by non-Big Four 
auditors, they showed that audit firm size does not have an impact on discretionary 
accruals. In particular, there is no difference in audit quality between Big 4 and non-
Big 4 auditors for restriction of earnings management in Turkey.  
 
4.3.2.2. Earnings quality and audit report opinion  
Francis and Krishnan (1999), Chen et al (2001), Butler et al (2004), Johl et al 
(2007), Chen et al (2011), Gajevszky (2014) and Vichitsarawong and Pornupatham 
(2015) analyzed the relation between modified audit opinion and earnings 
management.  
Francis and Krishnan (1999) tested if high-accrual firms in the United States 
are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and 
going concern problems. Using 2.792 firm-year observations from US Stock 
Exchange, they found that auditors of high-accrual firms are more likely to issue 
modified opinions for asset realization uncertainties and for going concern problems.  
Chen et al (2001) addressed the relationship between earnings management 
induced by profitability regulation and modified audit opinions. Using annual reports 
published by listed companies from 1995 to 1997, they found that asymmetric 
profitability requirements exacerbate managers’ propensity to engage in earnings 
management, which in turn is positively associated with receiving modified audit 
opinions. 
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Butler et al (2004) examined whether certain modified audit opinions are 
associated with abnormal accruals, as a proxy for earnings management. Using 
147.926 firm-year observations for the period from 1980 to 1999, they indicated that 
the documented relation between modified opinions and abnormal accruals rests with 
firms that have going-concern opinions. In addition, they showed no evidence to 
support inferences in previous research that firms receiving modified audit opinions 
manage earnings more than those receiving clean opinions.  
Johl et al (2007) aimed to examine auditor reporting behavior in the presence 
of aggressive earnings management in the context of the Asian Economic Crisis as it 
affected Malaysia. They showed that Big Five auditors in Malaysia appear to qualify 
more frequently than their non-Big Five counterparts when high levels of abnormal 
accruals are present.  
Chen et al (2011) examined the effects of audit quality, measured by a 
modified opinion, on earnings management, measured by discretionary accruals, for 
two groups of Chinese firms: state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned 
enterprises. Using 3.310 firm-year observations over the years 2001 to 2004, they 
found that non-state-owned enterprises exhibit greater reduction in earnings 
management relative to state-owned enterprises when they both employ high quality 
auditors. 
Gajevszky (2014) analyzed the relation between modified audit opinion and 
discretionary accruals in the case of Romania listed entities. Using 60 firms listed on 
the Bucharest Stock Exchange in 2012, she indicated that firms of which audit 
opinions are qualified manage the discretionary accruals more negative and 
unqualified audit opinions. 
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Finally, Vichitsarawong and Pornupatham (2015) studied the association 
between audit opinion and earnings persistence of listed companies in Thailand from 
2004 to 2008. Using 1.791 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2008, they found that 
firms with a qualified opinion or a disclaimer have lower earnings persistence than 
firms receiving an unqualified opinion with an emphasis of matter. However, they 
revealed that there is no difference in earnings persistence between firms receiving a 
qualification and a disclaimer. 
 
4.3.2.3. Earnings quality and audit fees 
Audit fees is another measure of audit quality that influence earnings 
management (Frankel et al, 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Antle et al, 2006; Li 
and Lin, 2005; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Mitra et al, 2009; Alali, 2011; Hamdan et al, 
2012; Lee et al, 2015). Especially, Frankel et al (2002) examined whether auditor fees 
are associated with earnings management and he market reaction to the disclosure of 
auditor fees. Using 3.074 firms from February 5, 2001 to June 15, 2001, they found a 
positive association between non-audit fees and the magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals and a negative association between audit fees and the 
magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals.  
Based on the economic theory of auditor independence of DeAngelo (1981), 
Chung and Kallapur (2003) tested the association of client fees and of nonaudit fees 
divided by the audit firm’s U.S. revenues as measure of client importance and Jones’ 
model (1991) abnormal accruals. Using 1.778 firm-year observations between 
February 5 and June 30, 2001, they resulted no significant relationship between 
discretionary accruals and audit fees or nonaudit fees.   
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Antle et al (2006) investigated the relations among audit fees, non-audit fees 
and abnormal accruals through estimating a simultaneous set of equations. Using 
2.294 and 1.570 firm-year observations from UK and US respectively for a period 
1994-2000, they documented that there is a significant positive and robust effect of 
audit fees on abnormal accruals in both US and UK.  
Li and Lin (2005) addressed the relationship between audit quality, measured 
by audit and non-audit fees, and earnings management, measured by earnings 
restatements. Using 351 publicly-held corporations that restated their reported 
earnings for the fiscal year 2000, they concluded that total fees and audit fees are 
positively associated with earnings restatements and there is no statistically significant 
relationship between earnings restatements and non-audit fees.  
Srinidhi and Gul (2007) examined linkages between the audit and non-audit 
fess and accrual quality, measured by the Francis et al (2005) modification of Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) measure. Using 4.282 firm-year observations (1.709 in 2000 and 
2.573 in 2001), they showed that accruals quality has a significant negative 
association with the magnitude of non-audit fees but a significant positive association 
with audit fees. It means that higher audit fees reflect higher audit effort and better 
judgments about the propriety of accruals. 
Mitra et al (2009) provided empirical evidence about the association between 
expected and unexpected audit fees and reported earnings quality for a sample of 
1.142 firms (6.852 firm-year observations) over a period from 2000 to 2005. They 
indicated that both expected and unexpected audit fees are positively associated with 
an increase in earnings quality, as indicated by the reduction of both absolute and 
signed discretionary accrual adjustments. 
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Alali (2011) investigated the relationship between discretionary accruals and 
audit fees and whether this relationship is affected by the chief financial officer’s 
compensation structure. Using 36.218 firm-year observations covering the period 
2000-2006, they found that there is positive association between discretionary 
accruals and audit fees.  
Hamdan et al (2012) tested the impact of auditing fees on the enhancement of 
the level of accounting conservatism. Using 39 firms of the industrial sector listed on 
Amman Stock Exchange for the period 2001-2006, they showed that the amount of 
auditing fees have no role in improving accounting conservatism in financial 
statements since the relationship between the fees and the book-to-market ratio and 
abnormal accruals is positive and not statistically significant.  
Lee et al (2015) studied the impact of conditional conservatism on audit fees. 
Using a sample of firm-year observations over the period of 2004-2009, they provided 
evidence consistent with conditional conservatism and firms’ commitment to such 
conservatism reducing their audit fees.  
 
4.3.2.4. Earnings quality and audit rotation 
Krishnan (1994) examined the auditor’s opinion formulation process for 
switching and non-switching clients in the year prior to the switch. Specifically, he 
examined the possibility that auditor switches are triggered not by the receipt of 
qualified opinions, but by auditors use of conservative judgments for some clients. 
Using 2.989 firm-year observations for 1986 and 1987, he supported the hypothesis 
that threshold values for switches are significantly lower (more conservative) than 
those for non-switches.  
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DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) analyzed the association between auditor 
changes and discretionary accruals. In a sample of auditor change firms, they found 
that discretionary accruals are income decreasing in the last year of auditor’s service 
whereas the discretionary accruals are found to be insignificant in the first year of the 
new auditor’s service.  
Johnson et al (2002) tested the relationship between auditor tenure and 
earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals). They found that relative 
to medium audit-firm tenures of four to eight years, short audit –firm tenures of two to 
three are associated with lower-quality financial reports. On contrary, they found no 
evidence of reduced financial-reporting quality for longer audit-firm tenures of nine 
or more years. 
Myers et al (2003) documented evidence on the relation between auditor 
tenure and earnings quality using the dispersion and sign of both absolute Jones 
model abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals as proxies of earnings quality. 
Using 42.302 firm-year observations from 1988 to 2000, their results suggested that 
longer auditor tenure, on average, resulted in auditors placing greater constraints on 
extreme management decisions in the reporting of financial performance.  
Carcello and Nagy (2004) examined the relation between audit firm tenure and 
fraudulent financial reporting. Comparing 265 firms cited for fraudulent reporting 
from 1990 through 2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the 
available population of non-fraud firms, they found that fraudulent financial reporting 
is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. With 
other words, they claimed that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse 
effects on audit quality. 
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Examining if long auditor tenure impairs earnings quality by using 3.103 firm-
year observations during 1990-2001, Chen et al (2008) suggested that there is a 
significantly negative relation between audit partner tenure and absolute discretionary 
accruals.  
Davidson III et al (2006) reexamined prior research in earnings management 
that surround auditor changes and extend prior work by examining earnings 
management and auditor changes while controlling for prior audit opinion. Using 
1.330 auditor changes over the period 1993-1997, they found that, on average, 
earnings management does not increase following auditor changes.  
Lin et al (2009) addressed how investors respond to audit quality and auditor 
switch in the Chinese context. Using 1.284 firm-year observations during 2001-2004, 
they indicated that the quality of an audit and switching to a larger auditor have a 
positive (negative) impact on earnings response coefficients for firms with positive 
(negative) abnormal earnings. On contrary, they showed that switching to a smaller 
auditor has a negative (positive) impact on earnings response coefficients for firms 
with positive (negative) abnormal earnings.   
Finally, Kramer et al (2011) investigated the relationship between audit firm 
tenure and audit firm rotation, and conservatism as an attribute of earnings quality. 
Using 11.643 firm-year observations from the North America Industrial Annual 
database for the period 1980-2006, their findings indicated that conservatism in 
reported earnings increases after the rotation of the audit firm and conservatism in 
reported earnings decreases as the tenure of the audit firm lengthens. 
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4.3.2.5. Earnings quality and audit committee existence 
Few papers considered that there is a significant relationship between the 
existence of audit committee and earnings management (Wild, 1996; Klein, 2002; Xie 
et al, 2003; Mitchell et al, 2004; Van der Zahn and Tower, 2004; Yang and Krishnan, 
2005; Vafeas, 2005; Lin et al, 2006; Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; 
Alves, 2013; Hamdan et al, 2013; Chandrasegaram et al, 2013; Badolato et al, 2014; 
Salleh and Haat, 2014; Ayemere and Elijah, 2015). Wild (1996) provided empirical 
evidence on the association between audit committee formation and the quality of 
accounting earnings.  Their results showed a significant increase in the market’s 
reaction to earnings reports subsequent to the formulation of the audit committee.  
Klein (2002) tested whether audit committee are related with earnings 
management by the firm. Using 687 firm-year observations for the cross-sectional 
accrual model tests and 683 firm-year observations for the time-series accrual model 
tests, she found that there is a negative association between audit committee 
independence and earnings manipulation.  
Xie et al (2003) examined the role of the board of directors, the audit 
committee and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Using 
282 firm-year observations from the S&P 500 index for the years 1992, 1994 and 
1996, they concluded that board and audit committee activity and their members’ 
financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of 
managers to engage in earnings management.  
Mitchell et al (2003) gave insights about the link between audit committees 
and earnings management. Using 485 firm-year observations from Singapore’s 
publicly traded firms during the 2000-2001 calendar period, they found that firms 
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with a higher proportion of independent audit committee members are more effective 
at constraining earnings management. 
Choi et al (2004) addressed the relationship between the characteristics of 
audit committees – independence, competency and activity – and earnings 
management. Using data from the Korean Stock Exchange during the period 2000-
2001, they found that the independence and competency of the audit committee are 
associated with the earnings management of a firm. Specifically, the committee 
members’ shareholders are positively associated with earnings management, while the 
presence of professors or the employees of financial institutions on the committee is 
negatively associated with earnings management. On contrary, they stated that the 
activity measure of the committee is not significantly related to earnings management. 
Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) investigated the link between audit 
committees and earnings management providing a more comprehensive simultaneous 
analysis of the influence of audit committee features using a sample of 485 firm-year 
observations from Singapore’s publicly traded firms during the 2000-2001 calendar 
period. They indicated that firms with a higher proportion of independent audit 
committee members are more effective at constraining earnings management. In 
addition, firms with audit committees that are more diligent and/or lack the presence 
of independent directors serving simultaneously on a substantial number of board and 
committees are more effective at constraining earnings management.  
Yang and Krishnan (2005) examined whether audit committees with certain 
characteristics curb managers’ ability to engage in quarterly earnings management. 
Using 896 firm-year observations for the years 1996-2000, they found that a) the 
number of outside directorships held by audit committee directors is negatively 
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associated with earnings management behavior, b) stock ownership by independent 
audit committee directors is positively associated with earnings management, and c) 
the average tenure of audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly 
earnings management suggesting a possible effect of experience with the firm and its 
accounting. 
Using data on 252 U.S. firms between 1994 and 2000 to study the relationship 
between audit committees and boards of directors with financial reporting quality, 
Vafeas (2005) concluded that measures of audit committee and board structure are 
related to earnings quality in a manner that is generally consistent with the predictions 
of agency theory.  
Lin et al (2006) examined the association between the characteristics of audit 
committees (size, independence, financial expertise, activity, and stock ownership) 
and earnings restatement. Using 212 firms for the fiscal year 2000, the results 
indicated a negative association between the size of audit committees and the 
occurrence of earnings restatement. The remaining four audit committee 
characteristics were not found to have a significant impact on the quality of reported 
earnings. 
Jaggi and Leung (2007) tested whether the establishment of audit committees 
by Hong Kong firms would constrain earnings management, especially in firms with 
family-dominated corporate boards. Using 523 firm-year observations for the period 
of 1999-2000, they showed that overall audit committees play a significant role in 
constraining earnings management even in the business environment of higher 
ownership concentration. 
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Baxter and Cotter (2009) studied whether audit committees are associated with 
improved earnings quality for a sample of Australian listed companies prior to the 
introduction of mandatory audit committee requirements in 2003. Using two measures 
of earnings quality, Jones’ (1991) and Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) models, their 
results indicated that formation of an audit committee reduces intentional earnings 
management but not accrual estimation errors.  
Alves (2013) aimed to examine the combined effect of audit committee 
existence and external audit on earnings management. Using 33 non-financial listed 
Portuguese firms-year from 2003 to 2009, they showed that there is a positive 
relationship between both audit committee existence and external audit and 
discretionary accruals.  
Hamdan et al (2013) tested the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management. Using 50 industrial companies listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange ASE from 2004-2009, they found that there was an 
influence of some standard characteristics of audit committee on earnings quality. 
Chandrasegaram et al (2013) addressed the impact of audit committee 
characteristics (measured by audit committee meetings, size of audit committee and 
independence of the audit committee) on earnings management (measured by 
discretionary accruals) in Malaysian public listed companies. Using 153 public listed 
companies on Bursa Malaysia, extracted from both year 2011 annual reports, they 
revealed that audit committee characteristics are not negatively related to the 
magnitude of earnings management.  
Badolato et al (2014) investigated the joint effects of audit committee financial 
expertise and status on earnings management. Using 29.074 firm-year observations 
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from 2001 through 2008, they suggested that the presence of both relative audit 
committee status and financial expertise deters management from committing 
irregularities.  
Salleh and Haat (2014) examined the effectiveness of audit committee 
(measured by size, independence, expertise, frequency of meetings and activity 
disclosure) in constraining earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals) 
after the revised MCCG among listed firms on Bursa Malaysia. Using 280 companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2009, they found that audit committees play an important 
and effective role in reducing earnings management after the revision of MCCG. 
Finally, Ayemere and Elijah (2015) postulated that audit committee attributes 
can impact significantly, constraining accrual-based distortion of financial reporting 
credibility and thus improve the quality of financial reporting. Using 453 firm-year 
observations for the year ended 2006 to 2013, they found that audit committee 
characteristic have a constraining effect on earnings management. Specifically, audit 
committee financial expertise, audit committee size, audit committee independence 
and diligence showed an inverse and significant relationship with earnings 
management. 
 
4.3.2.6. Earnings quality and demand for auditing  
The association between disclosure of accounting information and demand for 
auditing is examined from Francis et al (2003). Using data from 31 countries, they 
documented that national accounting standards are more timely (accrual-based) and 
transparent in common law countries, which is consistent with a greater role played 
by the public disclosure of accrual-based accounting information in corporate 
governance in these countries.    
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4.3.3. Audit quality and investor protection  
Papers that examined the fluctuation of audit quality in different investor 
protection regimes is quietly limited. First, Newman et al (2005) extended investor 
protection models to focus explicitly on the detection of insider expropriation by self-
interested auditors operating in a competitive audit market. They showed that markets 
with relatively greater auditor penalties for audit failures and greater insider penalties 
for detected resource diversion have larger total investment levels, a higher proportion 
of the firm held by outsiders, higher audit effort, higher audit fees, and higher 
expected payoffs for both auditors and insiders.  
In a similar vein, Jaggi and Low (2011) examined the joint effect of investor 
protection an securities regulation by splitting the sample of firms from 17 countries 
worldwide intro groups of high and low investor protection. Their results confirmed 
their expectations that high investor protection is associated with higher audit fees, 
irrespective of the strictness of securities regulations. 
 
4.3.4.  Earnings quality, audit quality and investor protection 
The joint effect of investor protection and audit quality on earnings 
management is studied by Francis et al (2003), Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006),  
Francis and Wang (2008) and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008). Francis et al 
(2003) examined if variations in legal systems affect accounting and auditing. Using 
data from 31 countries, they found that civil law countries have weak investor 
protection laws and therefore have less timely (accrual-based) and transparent 
accounting and less demand for auditing as an enforcement mechanism than common 
law countries (which have stronger investor protection). 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) investigated the effects of national audit 
environment differences on earnings management. Using data for the period 1992-
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2000 from listed firms in three EU countries with clearly distinct audit environment 
(France, Germany and the UK), their results provided evidence that the magnitude of 
earnings management is not uniform and that a stricter audit environment can reduce 
the magnitude of earnings management, irrespective of the type of auditor. In 
particular, their results suggested that firms in countries with flexible audit quality 
regimes report significantly higher absolute values of discretionary accruals compared 
to firms in countries with strict audit quality regimes. 
Furthermore, Francis and Wang (2008) tested the association of a country’s 
investor protection with the earnings quality (the magnitude of abnormal accruals, the 
likelihood of reporting losses, and earnings conservatism) for a large sample of firms 
from 42 countries from 1994 to 2004 (57.966 firm-year observations). At issue, they 
issued if earnings quality is jointly affected by the investor protection regime where a 
firm is located and the firm’s choice of a Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditor. Their results 
suggested that stricter investor protection per se does not lead to increased earnings 
quality. Minutely, the effect of investor protection is mediated through the incentives 
of auditors, and that stricter investment protection regimes lead to higher quality 
earnings only for firms with Big 4 auditors.   
Finally, analyzing audit quality in private firms across different European 
countries from 1998 to 2002 (64.831 firm-year observations), Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008) found that private firms domiciled in countries with a stronger 
investor protection engage less in earnings management. In addition, their results 
suggested that audit quality and investor protection are substitutes in constraining 
earnings management in private firms, in the sense that the Big 4 audit quality effect 
attenuates when investor protection is stronger. 
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4.4. Earnings quality, cost of capital and audit quality  
4.4.1. Cost of capital and earnings quality 
Conversely, there are papers that examined whether the earnings quality is 
associated with cost of capital, there are also some literature that examined the effect 
of financial crisis or economic turmoil or economic recession on earnings quality and 
cost of capital separately. However, there is a lack of consistent evidence in the 
accounting literature on the effect of an exogenous shock, like financial crisis of 2008, 
on the relationship between earnings quality and cost of capital. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and DeAngelo et al (1994) addressed whether 
the debt covenant violation influence earnings management. The results indicated that 
in the years of debt covenant violation, managers use earnings management to 
convinced creditors to show a good financial picture of firm. 
Affleck-Graves et al (2002) explored the relation between earnings 
predictability and bid-ask spread, measure of cost of equity. The findings suggested 
that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity capital 
than comparable firms with more predictable earnings streams, ceteris paribus.  
Aboody et al (2005) examined the association between earnings quality 
(measured by abnormal accruals) and cost of capital. Using 989.530 firm-year 
observations from 1985 to 2003, they found evidence consistent with pricing of the 
earnings quality factor and insiders trading more profitably in firms with higher 
exposure to that factor. 
Bhattacharya et al (2003) related three country level dimensions of reported 
accounting earnings (earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings 
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smoothing) to country level cost of capital measures. The results indicated that an 
increase in overall earnings opacity in a country is linked to an economically 
significant increase in the cost of equity. 
Francis et al (2004) examined the relation between the cost of equity capital 
and seven attributes of earnings: accruals quality, persistence, predictability, 
smoothness, value relevance, timeliness and conservatism. Using cross sectional 
regression test, cost of equity is significantly associated with each of earnings 
attributes. However, using conditional tests, ex ante cost of equity is no longer 
associated with smoothness, timeliness and conservatism; predictability is inversely 
associated with the cost of equity; and accruals quality, persistence and value 
relevance continue to be strongly positively associated with the cost of equity. 
Moreover, from the side of realized returns, they concluded that earnings quality has 
the largest cost of capital effect of all of the earnings attributes, and persistence has 
statistically positive but smaller effects. 
Francis et al (2005) investigated the relationship between accruals quality and 
the costs of debt and equity capital. Using a large sample for 32-year period (1970-
2001), they found that firms with poorer accruals quality have higher ratios of interest 
expense to interest-bearing debt and lower debt ratings than firm with better accruals 
quality. Similarly, in terms of the cost of equity, they showed that firms with lower 
accruals quality have significantly larger earnings-price ratios relative to their industry 
peers.  
Similarly with Affleck-Graves et al (2002), Jayaraman (2008) provided 
empirical evidence on the association between cost of equity capital, measured by 
bid-ask spreads, with earnings quality, measured by earnings smoothness. The results 
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indicated that bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading are higher both 
when earnings are smoother than cash flows and also when earnings are more volatile 
than cash flows. 
Chan et al (2009) supported evidence about the linkage between different 
dimensions of accounting conservatism (ex ante and ex post conservatism) and the 
cost of equity capital. Using UK non-financial firms during the period 1987-1999, 
they found that ex ante conservatism is associated with higher quality of accounting 
information and lower costs of equity, whereas ex post conservatism is associated 
with lower quality of accounting information and higher costs of equity capital.  
Chang et al (2009) studied the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on 
market-based measures of earnings quality and cost of capital. Using 8.480 firm-year 
observations from 1999 to 2005, they found that in the post-SOX period, the market’s 
perception of earnings quality has improved, while the firms’ cost of equity capital 
has decreased.  
McInnis (2010) examined the link between cost of capital and earnings 
smoothness. Whilst the projected target prices of Value Line analysts (Brav et al, 
2005; Francis et al, 2005) indicated there is a negative relation between imputed cost 
of capital and earnings smoothness, he found no such pattern. He resulted that there is 
no relation between earnings smoothness and average stock returns over the period 
from 01/01/1975 to 31/12/2006. He offered evidence that the inverse relation between 
earnings smoothness and implied cost of capital results primarily from optimistic bias 
in analysts’ long-term earnings projections. 
Kim and Qi (2010) explored whether and earnings quality, measured as 
accrual quality, affects the cost of equity. For period of time from 1970 to 2006, they 
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suggested that accrual quality contributes to the cost of equity capital and that is 
pricing effect is associated with fundamental risk.  
Using discretionary accruals, Rodriguez-Perez and Van Hemmen (2010) 
investigated the relationship between debt and earnings management. Consistent with 
the transparency hypothesis, they found that for less-diversified firms, debt reduces 
positive discretionary accruals, whereas in relatively more-diversified firms the 
impact of debt becomes positive. Moreover, the results indicated that marginal 
increases in debt provide incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, and 
diversification provides the needed context for this accounting practice to be possible. 
Ghosh and Moon (2010) established linkages between debt financing and the 
quality of earnings (measured by accruals quality). Using 8.240 firm-year 
observations from 1992 to 2004, they documented a non-monotonic relation between 
debt and earnings quality. They suggested that firms that rely heavily on debt 
financing might be willing to bear higher costs of borrowing from lower earnings 
quality because the benefits from avoiding potential debt covenant violations exceed 
the higher borrowing costs. 
Liu et al (2010) examined whether firms manage earnings before issuing 
bonds to achieve a lower cost of borrowing. Using 2.839 firm-year observations from 
1970 to 2004, they found significant income-increasing earnings management prior to 
bond offerings. They also found that manage earnings upward issue debt at a lower 
cost.  
Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011) studied the relationship between corporate 
debt financing and earnings quality and the dominance of positive influence of debt or 
negative influence of debt on earnings quality. Testing 81 firms listed in Tehran Stock 
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Exchange during the years 2005-2009, they found that there is negative and 
meaningful relationship between debt and earnings quality. 
Artiach and Clarkson (2014) sought insights into the economic consequences 
of accounting conservatism by examining the relation between conservatism and cost 
of equity capital. Using 3.138 firm-year observations from the period 1985-2000, they 
found an inverse relation between conservatism and the cost of equity capital, but 
further, that this relation is diminished for firms with low information asymmetry 
environments. 
Khalifa and Othman (2015) tested the economic consequences of accounting 
conservatism by examining the relationship between conservatism and cost of equity 
capital. Using 1.287 firm-year observations over the four year period 2004-2007, they 
found that a negative association between conditional conservatism and the cost of 
equity capital.   
Finally, Li (2015) examined the contracting benefits of accounting 
conservatism on international debt and equity markets. Using 140.774 firm-year 
observations covering 31 countries and 16 years from 1991 to 2006, he showed that 
firms domiciled in countries with more conservative financial reporting systems have 
significantly lower cost of debt and equity capital. 
 
4.4.2. Cost of capital and audit quality 
It is widely accepted that auditing plays a key role in the presence of moral 
hazard and information asymmetry by asserting investors that the financial statements 
prepared by managers are credible and genuinely (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Titman 
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and Trueman, 1986; Slovin et al, 1990; Datar et al, 1991). Specifically, without 
auditing, investors will be skeptical of the financial information that are published 
which, in turn, lead them to refuse to invest or to demand a high rate of return to 
balance the risk of potential expropriation of their capital by managers. Consequently, 
the higher the audit quality, the lower the cost of equity (Khurana and Raman, 2004; 
Mansi et al, 2004; Pittman and Fortin, 2004). 
Previous literature, generally examined the association between audit quality 
and cost of capital. Researchers found that Big 4 audits are of higher quality than non-
Big 4 audits. For instance, Teoh and Wong (1993) concluded that clients of Big 4 
auditors have higher ERCs than clients of non-Big 4 auditors, whereas Becker et al 
(1998) and Francis et al (1999) claimed that use of Big 4 auditor is associated with 
smaller discretionary accruals. Based on and expanding these research, Khurana and 
Raman (2004), Mansi et al (2004), and Pittman and Fortin (2004) documented that the 
use of Big 4 auditor (high audit quality) have a lower cost of capital than other firms.  
Specifically, utilizing an estimable proxy for financial reporting credibility – 
the ex ante cost of equity capital – to examine whether Big 4 auditors are perceived as 
providing higher quality audits (relative to non-Big 4 auditors) in the U.S. and in the 
less litigious (but economically similar) environments in other Anglo-American 
countries during the 1990-99 period, Khurana and Raman (2004) found that a Big 4 
audit is associated with a lower ex ante cost of equity capital for auditees in the U.S. 
but not in Australia, Canada, or the U.K. They suggested that it is litigation exposure 
rather than brand name reputation protection that drives perceived audit quality. 
Mansi et al (2004) examined the relation between auditor quality and the cost 
of debt financing for firms with a fiscal year ending between January 1974 and March 
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1998. They concluded that a) auditor quality and tenure are negatively and 
significantly related to the cost of debt financing, b) the relation between auditor 
characteristics and the cost of debt is most pronounced in firms with debt that is 
noninvestment grade, and c) both the insurance and information role of audits are 
economically significant to the cost of debt.     
Consistent with Mansi et al (2004), Pittman and Fortin (2004) investigated the 
impact of auditor choice on debt pricing in firms’ early public years when they 
particularly rely on obtaining external financing despite experiencing serious 
information problems. Using SEC-registered initial public offerings from 1977 to 
1988, they found that choosing a Big Six auditor decreasingly affects firms’ interest 
rates over time and the economic value of auditor reputation declines with age as 
borrowers gradually shift toward depending on their own reputations to moderate 
costly information asymmetry. Overall, they suggested that firms that use a Big 4 
auditor have a lower cost of debt. 
Causholli and Knechel (2012) extended previous research by Pittman and 
Fortin (2004) by considering how auditor quality relates to the capital cycle and 
industry of the firm. Using a sample of U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1986 
to 1998, they observed that firms that are young at the time of an IPO pay higher 
interest rates and auditor quality plays a significant role in lowering the cost of debt 
financing.  
Using a sample of 560 new debt issues from 2001 to 2003, Dhaliwal et al 
(2008) examined the relation between audit, nonaudit, and total auditor fees and 
firms’ cost of debt.  They found evidence that nonaudit fees are directly related to the 
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cost of debt for investment-grade issuers. On contrary, they found no evidence that 
auditors fees directly affect the cost of debt for non-investment-grade firms. 
Fernado et al (2010) investigated the impact of certain audit quality attributes, 
namely auditor size, auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure on client firm’s 
cost of equity capital. Using data from 1990 to 2004, they claimed that whilst auditor 
size, auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure are negatively associated with 
the client firm’s cost of equity capital, this effect is limited only to small client firms.  
Chen et al (2011) explored the effect of audit quality on cost of equity capital 
for two groups of Chinese firms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned 
enterprises (NSOEs). They indicated that this effect is not uniform across SOEs and 
NSOEs. Particularly, cost of equity capital is significantly lower for NOSEs audited 
by Top 8 auditors than for NSOEs audited by non-Top 8 auditors, but not for SOEs 
audited by Top 8 and non-Top 8 auditors. 
Karjalainen (2011) investigated the value relevance of the perceived audit quality 
in terms of who audits in the pricing of debt capital for privately-held firms by 
examining a large sample of privately-held Finnish firms from 1999 to 2006. The 
results showed that privately-held firms audited by Big 4 auditors and those audited 
by more than one responsible auditor have a lower cost of debt capital than other 
firms. 
 
4.5. Earnings quality in Greece 
There are various papers that examined the earnings quality in Greece.  Leuz 
et al (2003) examined the relation between outside investor protection and earnings 
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management in 31 countries between 1990 and 1999 (Greece is one of them). They 
found that firms in low investor protection countries, such as Greece, a) exhibit 
greater negative correlation between changes in accruals and cash flows, b) earnings 
are smoother, c) exhibit some degree of loss avoidance, and d) the relative magnitude 
of accruals to the magnitude of operating cash flows is large. 
 Koumanakos et al (2005) investigated whether acquiring firms listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange, that completed mergers and acquisitions during the period 
2001-2003, tend to manipulate accounting earnings upward prior to the initiation and 
completion of the transaction. Using 407 firm year observations from 42 acquiring 
firms, their results provides weak evidence of biased accruals reported by managers in 
the year preceding the announcement and the completion of the deal.   
 Shen and Chih (2005) raised three issues related to the earnings management 
of banks across 48 countries (Greece is one of them), a) does earnings management of 
banks exist in all 48 countries?, b) what is the incentive of banks to manage earnings?, 
and c) why does earnings management vary across countries? Their results indicated 
that, for the first question, Greek banks are found to have managed their earnings. 
With respect for the second question, they show that the relationship between return 
and risk is negative for low earnings banks, such as Greek banks. Finally, as to the 
last question, countries, like Greece, with low investor protection do not manage to 
reduce banks’ incentives to manage earnings. 
 Boonlert-U-Thai et al (2006) attempted to explore the relationship between 
cross country differences in the quality of reported earnings and investor protection. 
Using 57.610 firm year observations from 31 countries (Greece is one of them) over 
the period 1996-2002, they found that Greece has the seventh highest average 
earnings persistence score, the fourth highest average earnings predictability and the 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
133 
 
lowest average earnings smoothness. Further, they found a significant positive 
relationship between investor protection and earnings quality. 
Carramanis and Lennox (2008) tested the effect of audit effort on earnings 
management. Using a unique database of hours worked by auditors on 9.738 audits in 
Greece between 1994 and 2002, they found that when audit hours are lower, a) 
abnormal accruals are more often positive than negative, b) positive abnormal 
accruals are larger, and c) companies are more likely to manage earnings upwards in 
order to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark.  
 Chih et al (2008) studied whether corporate social responsibility related 
features of 1.653 firms in 46 countries (Greece is one of them) on the earnings quality 
during the 1993-2002 period. They found that with a greater commitment to corporate 
social responsibility Greece is the second country with a higher extent of earnings 
smoothing and earnings aggressiveness. 
 Karampinis and Hevas (2009) examined the effect of the mandatory the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS upon the value relevance of earnings and book values 
using data from the Athens Stock Exchange that covered a period of two years before 
and two years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Thus, using 85 firms from 2003 
to 2006, they reported that the adoption of IFRS positively affected the value 
relevance of consolidated net income and book value although it had no effect on their 
unconsolidated counterparts and that consolidated accounting numbers are by far 
more value relevant than unconsolidated ones in both periods and, unexpectedly, this 
superiority is more pronounced after IFRS adoption. 
 Chalevas and Tzovas (2010) tested the effect of the mandatory adoption of 
corporate governance mechanisms on earnings manipulation, management 
effectiveness and firm’s financing. Using 176 firm year observations from Athens 
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Stock Exchange for the period 2000-2003, they found that the mandatory corporate 
governance mechanisms decrease firms’ weighted average cost of capital, increase 
firms’ financing and have no impact on firms’ effectiveness and earnings 
manipulation.  
 Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) investigated the effect of the transition from 
Greek GAAP to IFRS on the financial results of Greek listed firms. Specifically, they 
examined the degree of earnings management under IFRS and the value relevance of 
FRS based accounting numbers. Using 254 firms that are listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange from 2004 to 2006, they found that in the official period of implementation 
of IFRS, there is some evidence of earnings management which is reduced in the 
subsequent period. Specifically, their results suggest that a) the reported profitability 
figures are less smooth under IFRS than under Greek GAAP, b) the correlation 
between accruals and cash flows in 2004 to 2006 is negative, suggesting that under 
Greek GAAP there was greater earnings management, c) under IFRS, firms tend to 
report small profits less frequently and recognize large losses when they occur, and d) 
the IFRS based accounting numbers exhibit higher value relevance than these 
determined under Greek GAAP.    
 Doukakis (2010) examined the persistence of earnings and earnings 
components after the adoption of IFRS. Using 956 firm year observations from 
Athens Stock Exchange for the period 2002-2007, they found that IFRS measurement 
and reporting guidelines do not seem to improve the persistence of earnings and 
earnings components.    
Memis and Cetenak (2012) tested the relationship between earnings 
management-audit quality and earnings management-legal system quality by using 
1.507 firms’ observations from listed firms in private companies across different 8 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
135 
 
emerging countries (Greece is one of them). According to their results, there is no 
significant relationship between the discretionary accruals and audit quality for firms 
in Greece. 
Tsalavoutas et al (2012) explored the combined value relevance of book value 
of equity and net income before and after the mandatory transition to IFRS in Greece. 
Using 1.861 firm year observations from 2001 to 2008, they found no significant 
change in the explanatory power of value relevance regressions over the period. The 
coefficients on book value of equity and net income are positive and significant in 
both the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods. 
 Papadatos and Makri (2013) studied the value relevance of earnings and cash 
flows, after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Greece. Using a large sample for the 
period 2005 to 2010, their findings revealed that cash flows under IFRS do not 
contain incremental information as compared to the earnings under IFRS.   
 Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) investigated how economic crisis of 2008 affects 
the earnings management for companies from five European countries (Greece is one 
of them) that are audited by a Big 4 auditor. Using 245 Greek listed firms from 2005 
to 2011, they concluded that Greece tend to engage more in earnings management in 
their effort to improve their lower profitability and liquidity, and accommodate their 
higher debt and growth. Additionally, the reported financial numbers of Greek 
companies that are audited by a Big 4 auditor were found to be of higher quality 
before the crisis.   
Kousenidis et al (2013) examined whether and to what extent the recent crisis 
in the EU has an impact on the earnings quality of listed firms in 5 countries (Greece 
is one of them) with weak fiscal sustainability. They found that during the crisis, the 
change in most determinants of earnings quality favors higher earnings quality. 
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However, their results also suggest that in the case of firms that exhibit the biggest 
discretionary accruals over a single period, most of the earnings quality attributes 
signal a decrease in earnings quality. In overall, they showed that, on average, 
earnings quality has improved in the crisis period; however, in the presence of 
incentives for earnings management, earnings quality deteriorates. 
Tsipouridou and Spathis (2014) tested the relationship between audit opinions 
and earnings management for listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange. Using 1.479 
firm year observations from 2005 to 2011, they found that audit opinions are not 
related to earnings management.  
 
4.6. Summary 
Under this investigation of earnings quality under financial crisis and its 
determinants (audit quality and investor protection) and consequences (cost of 
capital), we can conclude the following: 
 Earnings quality was significantly lower in years of financial crisis of 2008.  
 There was a meaningful positive association between earnings quality and 
audit quality.  
 There was a meaningful positive association between earnings quality and 
investor protection. 
 There was a meaningful negative association between cost of equity capital 
and earnings quality. 
 There was a meaningful negative association between cost of debt and 
earnings quality. 
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5. Research methodology 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the research methodology that will be employed to examine 
earnings quality and its aspects during the recent financial crisis will be discussed. 
First, the research hypotheses will be developed based on insights gathered from 
previous literature. Specifically, it will be examined the following areas: a) the impact 
of financial crisis of 2008 on earnings quality, b) the impact of financial crisis of 2008 
on audit quality, c) the relationship between investor protection and audit quality 
under financial crisis of 2008, d) the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and 
investor protection on audit quality, e) the relationship between audit quality and 
earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008, f) the relationship between investor 
protection and earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008, g) the joint effect of 
audit quality and investor protection on earnings quality under financial crisis of 
2008, h) the impact of financial crisis of 2008 on cost of capital, i) the relationship 
between cost of capital and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008, j) the 
relationship between cost of capital and investor protection under financial crisis of 
2008 and k) the relationship between earnings quality and cost of capital. Second, the 
statistical methods and regression equations to be employed will be discussed. The 
focus is on quantitative statistical procedures since they are suitable for analysis of 
large data samples perform relatively well, and the estimation procedure is clear and 
can be observed (Goncharov, 2006). Finally, the selection procedure of the sample 
and the research period shall be quoted. Thus, this chapter answers the following sub-
question:  
What is a proper design for this research?  
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5.2. Research hypotheses  
5.2.1. Earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008 
5.2.1.1. Earnings conservatism under financial crisis of 2008 
Financial crisis is one factor that influences the extent of conservatism 
practiced by managers. According to Warganegara and Vionita (2010), in financial 
crisis or financial downturn
3
 investor pessimism is dominated and any good news was 
overlaid from bad news. Most of investors react to bad news by further reducing the 
firms’ access to capital. In an attempt to cope with these negative reactions, managers 
have an incentive to recognize more positive news than they normally would (Francis 
et al, 2013). In such a case, the manager will in fact choose more aggressive 
conservatism during the financial crisis.  
In parallel way, using conditional conservatism, Kousenidis et al (2013) 
studied effects of the European debt crisis on earnings quality. They found that lower 
level of earnings management in recession periods which is resulted from a higher 
demand for conservative earnings.   
Thus, based on Warganegara and Vionita (2010) and Kousenidis et al (2013), 
this study hypothesizes that the degree of conservatism during the financial crisis of 
2008 or financial downturn is significantly higher than the degree of conservatism in 
the years before the financial crisis of 2008 or downturn: 





                                                          
3
 Financial downturn is defined as the period when the dissolutions of business increase dramatically 
(Warganegara and Vionita, 2010). 
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5.2.1.2. Value relevance under financial crisis of 2008 
Evidence by Graham et al (2000), Graham and King (2000), Ho et al (2001), 
Davis-Friday et al (2006) and Davis-Friday and Gordon (2005) indicated that the 
value relevance of earnings and book value was affected during the crisis. The 
relevance of book value increased, as it is a proxy of the firms’ settlement value and 
the relevance of earnings became less relevant, as instability could affect their use to 
project future results.  
Kousenidis et al (2013) found that earnings management, measured by value 
relevance, decreases during the financial crisis. 
Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) reported that there is controversial impact of 
economic crisis on earnings manipulation and the value relevance of reported 
financial numbers for firms that are audited by a big 4 auditor. They found that Irish, 
Italian and Spanish firms report more value relevant financial numbers during the 
crisis while the findings for Portuguese and Greek firms are to some extent 
conflicting. 
Hence, based on previous literature, this study hypothesizes that the value 
relevance of earnings is decreased during the financial crisis of 2008: 
H2: The degree of value relevance during the financial crisis of 2008 is significantly 
lower.      
 
5.2.1.3. Accruals quality under financial crisis of 2008 
Evidences in previous research on earnings management suggested that it is 
used either on the good economic condition or in bad economic condition. The choice 
of manipulating the earnings management is based on investors’ perspectives. 
According to Iatridis (2010), there are a number of situations in which earnings 
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management is used: a) transferring earnings from “good” years to “bad” years, b) 
postponing income recognition to reduce the tax burden, c) the eagerness of 
companies to reveal positive results correlated with the trend of postponing negative 
results and d) options of managers entitled to stock options or bonus schemes to use 
discretionary accounting policies in order to increase their current or future 
compensation. 
Investigating the earnings manipulation by the financially distressed firms in 
New Zealand from 2008 to 2011, Habib et al (2013) found that financially distressed 
firms engage income-decreasing earnings management during the crisis.   
Moreover, Filip and Raffournier (2012) suggested an improvement of accruals 
quality during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. They argued that a) managers have less 
incentive to manipulate earnings in crisis periods due to a higher market tolerance for 
poor performance, b) litigation risk increases during crisis, which should dissuade 
insiders to engage in earnings management, and d) the change in the behavior of 
companies may also respond to higher demand for more timely earnings in troubled 
periods.   
Lu (2012) found that a firm with lower earnings quality (higher accruals 
quality) has higher degree of risk-taking which is more significant after the 2008 
financial crisis. 
Using a sample in Malaysia during 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Ahmed et al 
(2008) found that firms with potential debt renegotiations apply income decreasing 
management and the investors’ tolerance to poor financial performance is higher in 
the bad economic environment, so that firms book more accruals to depress earnings 
so as to improve performance after depression.  
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Choi et al (2011) analyzed the way the information value of reported revenues 
changed during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. By using the modified Jones’ 
(1991) model by Dechow et al (1995), they found a significant decline in the 
information value of discretionary earnings component during crisis, and no effect on 
the nondiscretionary components of earnings. The information value of discretionary 
components was more severe in countries with weaker institutions and for firms with 
higher information asymmetries.  
Based on previous papers, which investigate the evolution of accruals quality 
around some events with significant impact on subject firms (like financial crisis, 
financial scandals, etc.), this study hypothesizes that there is an impact of financial 
crisis of 2008 on accruals quality: 
H3: The degree of accruals quality during the financial crisis of 2008 is 
significantly low.                      
 
5.2.1.4. Earnings persistence under financial crisis of 2008 
According to Kormedi and Lipe (1987), the basic components of earnings 
persistence are accruals and cash flow from operations. Many papers analyzed them 
for the purpose of predicting future earnings and the results of Sloan (1996) indicated 
that earnings performance attributable to the accrual component of earnings exhibits 
lower persistence than earnings performance attributable to the cash flow component 
of earnings. So, the lower persistence of accruals compared to cash flows have 
consequences for the persistence of current earnings (Sloan, 1996; Chan et al, 2001).  
Thus, despite the fact of no existence of evidence how economic turbulences, 
like financial crisis, influence the earnings persistence, it is excepted high level of 
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persistence which in turn is translated as low level of earnings persistence during the 
financial crisis of 2008:  
 H4: The degree of value earnings persistence during the financial crisis of 2008 is 
significantly low.                 
 
5.2.1.5. Earnings predictability under financial crisis of 2008 
There is evidence that common stock returns are predictable and that they vary 
over the business cycle. Specifically, according to Bikker and Haaf (2002) and 
Albertazzi and Gamabacorta (2009) claimed that business cycles have significant 
impact on bank earnings. In recession period, profitability decreases and during 
booms it increases. Similarly, during financial crises profitability reduces and firms 
face higher earnings volatility. Hence, because of the existence of negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and earnings predictability (Dichev and Tang, 
2009), I expect a reduction of earnings predictability during the financial crisis of 
2008.  
Thus according to Lipe (1990), the earnings predictability will be lower during 
the financial crisis of 2008:  
H5: The degree of earnings predictability during the financial crisis of 2008 is 
significantly low.                           
 
5.2.1.6. Loss avoidance analysis under financial crisis of 2008 
The analysis that small positive earnings indicate earnings management is 
somewhat controversial and several researchers have questioned whether earnings 
management actually explains the kink of earnings. As I mentioned above, Strobl 
(2013) suggested that earnings management is prevalent in the good economic 
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condition than in the bad economic condition. Investors are more sensitive to bad 
financial performance in economic booms than in economic downturns (Conrad et al, 
2002). Thus, the capital market incentives weaken in bad economic conditions which 
push investors to expect quite a lot of firms would manage earnings which results in 
low quality of published reports and decreases the emphasis on these reports. 
Therefore, firms may have fewer motives to manage earnings in recession. 
However, as mentioned previously, according to Ahmed et al (2008), Chia et 
al (2007), Habib et al (2013), Jacob and Jorgensen (2007), the results were opposite 
during financial crisis. They found that during bad economic conditions, like financial 
crisis, those small losses firms who employ income-increasing management before 
may abandon reporting zero or small positive earnings because the poor stock market 
performance decreases the incentives from capital market, and they turn to employ 
income-decreasing management to save profits or try to give up earnings 
management. 
Therefore, based on previous literature, this research assumes that upwards 
earnings management would be replaced by downwards earnings management in 
those ex-ante small losses firms so that the discontinuity around zero should be no 
longer existed in the earnings distribution during the financial crisis of 2008. Thus, 
this study hypothesizes: 
 H6: The frequency of small profits compared to small losses is significantly lower 
during the financial crisis of 2008.               
 
5.2.1.7. Earnings smoothness under financial crisis of 2008 
According to Goel and Thakor (2003), earnings smoothness is a special case 
of earnings manipulation involving intertemporal smoothing of reported earnings 
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relative to economic earnings; it attempts to make earnings look less variable over 
time. There are two conflicting views on smooth earnings. One view reflects the idea 
that managers artificially smooth out relevant fluctuations. Based on this view, 
earnings smoothness indicates poor quality earnings which supports the hypothesis 
that management responds to a negative (positive) cash flow stream by increasing 
(decreasing) accruals (Barth et al, 2008).  
On the other side, managers follow real smoothing which involves decisions 
that affect cash flows and dissipate firm value. According to this point of view, 
management can achieve more useful earnings number. Real smoothing, in contract 
with artificial smoothing, indicates high quality of earnings (Francis et al, 2006). 
In general, Beidlerman (1973), Bannister and Newman (1996), Subramanyam 
(1996) and Goel and Thakor (2003) indicated that earnings smoothness is a technique 
in accounting to improve business economic performance during the period. Besides, 
managers smooth earnings for two main reasons: first, they are assumed to have 
higher precision and second, consistently positive earnings may raise the expectations 
of cash flows to investors, thereby increasing share prices (Francis et al, 2004). Based 
on this technique of earnings manipulation, managers are tricky enough to restate 
their accounting earnings through moving income from good year to bad year or 
moving expense from bad year to good year. Moreover, McInnis (2010) claimed that 
income smoothing is a technique to reallocate the net income in the short period, but 
in the long period, the performance of a firm is not improved and there is no extract 
return obtained by owners under this method.   
Assessing the impact of financial crisis on earnings smoothness, Vladu (2013) 
and Filip and Raffournier (2012) conducted in the literature documented an inverse 
relationship.  
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Filip and Raffournier (2012) stated that there is a significant decrease in 
income smoothing during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Similarly, Vladu (2013) 
documented that the smoothing behavior of Spanish listed firms changes in bad 
financial periods. Particularly, the income smoothing decreases in times of bad 
financial periods. 
Hence, based on previous literature, it is excepted that smoothing of reported 
earnings is lower during the financial crisis of 2008: 
H7: The degree of earnings smoothness during the financial crisis of 2008 is 
significantly low.             
 
The research hypotheses 1 to 7 (H1-H7) that are presented above are examined 
using the regression equation (40). Table 1 Panel A gives a full description of all the 
variables. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Panel A here) 
 




LOCit +  β7CORPROFITit +  β8CORPERFORit +  β9
LAGLOSSit +
 𝛽10MASH𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11CAPINT𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12CORPEFFIC𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11MCTR𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12MULTIN𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽13DIVIDYIELD𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14DEBT𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15R𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16DR𝑖𝑡 +  β17Rit DRit +  𝛽18BETA𝑖𝑡 +
 + β
19
𝛥𝑁𝐼it +  β20SICODEit + 𝛽21GDP𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽22MCAP𝑗𝑡 + β23HERFjt +  β24
CRISIS +
 εit               (40) 
 
Wherein: 
EQk,it  is a dimension of earnings quality attributes (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). 
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EQ1,it  is ex post conservatism estimated based on Basu (1997) which is further 
explained in section 2.3.1. (Equation 3), 
EQ2,it  is ex ante conservatism estimated based on Beaver and Ryan (2000) which is 
further explained in section 2.3.1. (Equation 5), 
EQ3,it  is value relevance estimated based on Ohlson (1995) which is further explained 
in section 2.3.2. (Equation 14), 
EQ4,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Dechow et al (1995) which is further 
explained in section 2.3.3. (Equation 18), 
EQ5,it  is accruals quality estimated based on McNichols (2002) which is further 
explained in section 2.3.3. (Equation 25), 
EQ6,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Kothari et al (2005) which is further 
explained in section 2.3.3. (Equation 28), 
EQ7,it  is earnings persistence estimated based on Kormedi and Lipe (1987) which is 
further explained in section 2.3.4. (Equation 30), 
EQ8,it  is earnings predictability estimated based on Francis et al (2004) which is 
further explained in section 2.3.5. (Equation 32), 
EQ9,it  is loss avoidance analysis estimated based on Burgstahler et al (2006) which is 
further explained in section 2.3.6. (Equation 33), 
EQ10,it  is earnings smoothness estimated based on Leuz et al (2003) which is further 
explained in section 2.3.7. (Equation 34), 
LEVERit  is financial leverage estimated as percentage of long term debt divided by 
percentage of common equity, 
TOBINQit  is defined as market capitalization plus total debt scaled by total assets 
(McConnel and Servaes, 1990), 
CORPSIZEit  is corporate size estimated as natural logarithm of total assets, 
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SVit  is sales volatility estimated as standard deviation of sales revenues scaled by total 
assets, 
CFOVit  is cash flow from operations volatility estimated as standard deviation of cash 
flow from operations scaled by total assets, 
LOCit  is length of operating cycle estimated as the sum of days inventory outstanding 
plus days sales outstanding minus days payable outstanding, 
CORPROFITit  is corporate profitability estimated as net income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets, 
CORPERFORit  is corporate performance estimated as operating cash flow divided by 
total assets, 
LAGLOSSit  is financial distress estimated as a dummy variable that takes 1 if firm 
reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise, 
MASHit  is market share estimated as sales divided by total industry sales, 
CAPINTit  is capital intensity estimated as depreciation, depletion and amortization 
expenses divided by sales, 
CORPEFFICit  is corporate efficiency estimated as sales divided by total assets,  
MCTRit  is marginal corporate tax rate estimated as corporate receipts minus 
deductions for labor costs, materials and depreciation of capital assets (called income 
taxes). MCTR is multiplied by 0 if the firm has neither current income tax expense 
nor positive pre-tax income; 0.5 if the firm has either current income tax expense or 
positive pre-tax income; and 1 if the firm has current income tax expense and positive 
pre-tax income, 
MULTINit  is corporate multinationality estimated as foreign profits divided by total 
profits, 
DIVIDYIELDit  is dividend yield obtained from DataStream, 
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DEBTit  is total debt divided by total assets,  
Rit  is the annual stock return,  
DRit  is a dummy variable that proxies for bad news. It takes 1 for negative returns and 
0 otherwise,  
Rit DRit  is the product of annual stock return and the proxy of bad news,  
BETAit  is the market beta coefficient obtained from DataStream,  
Γ𝑁𝐼it  is the change in net income before extraordinary items,  
SICODEit  is a dummy variable that takes 1 for the most frequent four digit SIC 
industrial code for each cluster and 0 otherwise, 
GDPjt  is economic development estimated as natural logarithm of gross domestic 
product per capita, 
MCAPjt  is financial development estimated as stock market capitalization divided by 
gross domestic product, 
HERFjt  is market concentration using Herfindahl – Hirschman index (measured by 
squaring the industry share of each firm competing in a market, and then summing the 
resulting numbers for each country), 
CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes 0 if an observation falls in the pre crisis period 
(2005-2007) and 1 if it falls in crisis period (2008-2012), 
εit  is the error term. 
 
5.2.2. The joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on 
audit quality 
Audit quality is considered to differ across different legal environments. As 
argued above, regarding of the effect of investor protection on audit quality cannot be 
a priori determined. Francis et al (2003) predicted that there is less spending on 
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auditing and less demand for Big 5 audits in civil law countries. Choi et al (2008) 
have argued that country-specific risk factors also play a significant role in 
determining audit risk and liability costs across countries, which also influence audit 
fees. Their findings, which are based on legal origin of each examining country, 
documented a positive association between audit fees and the legal regime of a 
country. In a similar vein, extending previous literature, Jaggi and Low (2011) argued 
that the institutional factors of investor protection and securities regulations have a 
significant impact on audit fees because they play an important role in determining 
litigation environment in a country, which, in turn, influence audit risk. On contrary, 
there is a counter-argument that auditing is negative associated with investor 
protection. Leuz et al (2003) claimed that auditing is lower in countries with high 
investor protection.  
Thus, based on these arguments and results, it is hypothesized as follows: 
H8: Audit quality is positively associated with investor protection.       
 
Auditors play a controversial role in the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Knechel and Willekens (2006) pointed out the importance of auditing in the modern 
capital markets to reduce information asymmetry. With other words, the crisis have 
been worse were it not for auditors.  
Hogan and Wilkins (2008) found that there is a positive relationship between 
audit fees and audit risk. Bell et al (2001) predicted that hourly audit fees and the 
number of audit hours are increasing in business risk. Houston et al (1999) and 
Be’dard and Johnstone (2004) documented that auditors increase their efforts and 
billing rates when corporate governance is weak and when earnings manipulation risk 
is relatively high.  
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Pratt and Stice (1994) claimed that one of causes of audit switch is the 
increase of litigation risk, which makes auditors more selective in their choice of 
clients. With other words, they predicted that during economic downturns, where 
litigation risk increases, the probability of audit switch will be increased. Hence, 
according to Scwartz and Menon (1985), auditor switching is influenced by financial 
distress, where there is a higher incidence of auditor switching among failing firms. 
Moreover, Eichenseher and Shields (1983) hypothesized that firms demand higher 
quality audits when they have long term debt contracts. Consequently, according to 
Hudaib and Cooke (2005) and Lin and Liu (2010), higher business risk during global 
financial crisis of 2008, leads to higher auditor turnover. 
Palmrose (1988) found that Big 5 auditors have lower litigation rates than non-
Big 5 auditors, which in turn provides high audit quality. Big 5 auditors, generally, 
have more resources, so they are more able to pay settlements of judgments 
(Heninger, 2001). Hence, higher business risk during economic downturn, leads to 
firms to hire more Big auditors than non-Big auditors. Thus, based on these 
arguments and results, it is hypothesized as follows: 
H9: Audit quality is higher during financial crisis.                  
 
As it is explained above, though the relationship between audit quality and 
investor protection and how audit quality is influenced during economic downturn, 
have received some attention in the literature, the joint effect of investor protection 
and global financial crisis of 2008 on audit quality has not been explored. Therefore, 
it is developed the following hypothesis: 
H10: Audit quality is higher in firms with strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement during financial crisis.                   
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The research hypotheses 8 to 10 (H8-H10) that are presented above are 
examined using the regression equation (41). This model uses the same variables as 
Beattie et al (2001), Chaari et al (2002), Geiger and Rama (2003), Ireland (2003), 
Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004), Hay et al (2006), Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt 
(2007), Srinidhi and Gul (2007), Hassan and Naser (2013) and Kikhia (2015). The 
regression model (41) run four times for each dimension of AQk,it . Table 1 Panel B 
gives a full description of all the variables. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Panel B here) 
 
𝐴𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽9𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽14𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖                                                                         (41) 
Wherein: 
𝐴𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡  is audit quality measured by four different proxies (k=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6):  
𝐴𝑄1,𝑖𝑡  is audit fees which is measured by the amount of audit fees which is further 
explained in section 2.4.,  
𝐴𝑄2,𝑖𝑡  is the modified audit report opinion which is expressed as a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if the audit opinion is qualified and 0 otherwise which is further explained 
in section 2.4., 
𝐴𝑄3,𝑖𝑡  is auditor switch which is expressed as a dummy variable that equals to 1 if 
firm switch to non-Big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise which is further explained in 
section 2.4., 
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𝐴𝑄4,𝑖𝑡  is the status of audit firm which is expressed as a dummy variable that equals 
to 1 if the firm is a Big Four (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PriceWaterHouseCooper, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG) and 0 otherwise which is further explained in section 2.4., 
𝐴𝑄5,𝑖𝑡  is the existence of audit committee which is expressed as a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if the firm has an audit committee and 0 otherwise which is further 
explained in section 2.4., 
𝐴𝑄6,𝑖𝑡  is the demand for auditing which is calculated as the sum of square root of total 
assets of each Big Four and non-Big Four audit client, divided by the sum of square 
root of total assets of all firms. A higher Big Four or non-Big Four market share 
indicates greater demand for high quality auditing within a country (Francis et al, 
2003). The demand for auditing is further explained in section 2.4., 
CRISISit  is a dummy variable for pre and crisis period measured as shown in Equation 
(40), 
Invprk,it  is the investor protection measured by eight different metrics adopted from 
World Economic Forum (WEF 2005-2012) (k=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8):  
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅1,𝑖𝑡  is property rights which is further explained in section 2.5., 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅2,𝑖𝑡  is judicial independence which is further explained in section 2.5., 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅3,𝑖𝑡  is transparency of government policymaking which is further explained in 
section 2.5., 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅4,𝑖𝑡  is strength of auditing and reporting standards which is further explained in 
section 2.5., 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅5,𝑖𝑡  is efficacy of corporate boards which is further explained in section 2.5., 
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𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅6,𝑖𝑡  is protection of minority shareholders’ interests which is further explained 
in section 2.5., 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅7,𝑖𝑡  is strength of investor protection which is further explained in section 2.5., 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅8,𝑖𝑡  is legal rights index which is further explained in section 2.5., 
CRISISit ∗ INVPRk,it  is the interaction effect of financial crisis of 2008 and 
investor protection on audit quality, 
CORPSIZEit  is corporate size measured as shown in Equation (40), 
RISKit  is risk measured by total liabilities divided by total assets, 
SICODEit  is a dummy variable for industrial classification measured as shown in 
Equation (40),  
PROFITit  is profitability measured as net income divided by sales, 
SOLVit  is solvency measured as equity divided by total liabilities, 
COMPLEXit  is corporate complexity measured as the sum of inventory and 
accounts receivable divided by total assets, 
ACCRUALit  is accruals measured as the change in non-assets less the change in 
non-debt liabilities where non-assets is defined as total assets less cash and short 
time investments and non-debt liabilities is defined as total liabilities less debt, 
FCFit  is free cash flow measured as income less total accruals divided by total 
assets, 
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IRISKit  is inherent risk which is associated with an increased risk of error in 
some parts of the financial statement which will requires more audit effort and 
measured as receivables divided by total assets, 
LEVERAGEit  is financial leverage estimated as total debt divided by total assets, 
BMit  is book-to-market ratio estimated as book value of equity divided by market 
value of equity, 
LOSSESit  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when net earnings are 
negative and 0 otherwise, 
εit  is the error term. 
 
5.2.3. The joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings 
quality 
Investor protection is another vital determinant of earnings quality (Guenther 
and Young, 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Leuz et al, 2003; Shen and Chih, 2005; 
Burgstahler et al, 2006; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007; Cahan et al, 2008; Houque 
et al, 2012). Guenther and Young (2000) claimed that there is strong association 
between financial accounting and actual economic events in countries with strong 
investor protection. Bushman and Smith (2001) revealed that the quality of 
accounting information rise in countries with strong investor protection. In a similar 
vein, Leuz et al (2003) found that countries with strong investor protection appeared 
low earnings management which in turn led to higher accounting quality. Following 
Leuz et al (2003), Shen and Chih (2005) showed that accounting disclosure (high 
investor protection) in banking industry reduce the incentive to manage earnings. 
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Burgstahler et al (2006), also, reported that for both private and public firms, earnings 
are less transparent in countries with weak legal systems. According to Nabar and 
Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), earnings management is not only related to investor 
protection but also to the culture of a country because national culture determines to a 
corporate governance systems. Cahan et al (2008) suggested that managers in weak 
investor protection countries are more likely to use income smoothing for 
opportunistic reasons while managers in strong investor protection countries are more 
likely to use income smoothing to convey their private information about earnings. 
Ultimately, Houque et al (2012) extended the above papers and highlighted the 
positive impact of investor protection on earnings quality. Thus, based on these 
arguments and results, it is hypothesized as follows: 
H11: There is significant positive association between earnings quality and investor 
protection, irrespective of the financial crisis.               
 
The role of auditing in ensuring the earnings quality has come under 
considerable scrutiny over the last three decades. Mainly, previous research showed 
that higher audit quality is associated with higher earnings quality (Becker et al, 1998; 
Francis et al, 1999; Balsam et al 2003; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Watts and Zimmerman (1983) and Becker et al (1998) claimed that 
auditing is a valuable form of monitoring used by firms to reduce agency costs which 
in turn reduces the misreporting of accounting information and increases the quality 
of earnings. Similarly, Francis and Krishnan (1999) and Maijoor and Vanstraelen 
(2006) showed that audit quality acts as a constraint on earnings management in 
general in the U.S.A. but not necessarily outside the U.S.A. 
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Specifically, Frankel et al (2002) indicated a negative association between 
audit fees and the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals. On contrary, Li and 
Lin (2005), Antle et al (2006), Srinidhi and Gul (2007) and Mitra et al (2009) 
documented that audit fees are positively associated with earnings management.  
Krishnan (2003) claimed that auditors of high-accrual firms are more likely to 
issue modified opinions. In similar vein, Butler et al (2004) found that audit modified 
opinion impacts positively earnings management. An counter-argument come from 
Gajevszky (2014), who indicated that firms of which audit opinions are qualified 
manage the discretionary accruals more negative. 
In a sample of auditor change, DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) found that 
discretionary accruals are income decreasing during the last year with the predecessor 
auditor and generally insignificant during the first year with the successor. In a similar 
vein, Chen et al (2008) indicated that there is no evidence that audit partner rotation 
improves earnings quality. On contrary, Kramer et al (2011) provided evidence that 
mandating audit firm rotation might have a positive impact on conservatism and thus 
on the quality of reported earnings. 
There is evidence that earnings quality of firms with Big X auditors are of 
higher quality (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Francis et al, 1999; Chung et al, 2003; Chia et 
al, 2007; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Hussainey, 2009; Hajizadeh and 
Rahimi, 2012; Iatridis, 2012; Hamdan et al, 2012; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013). On 
contrary, Becker et al (1998), Krishnan (2003), Zhou and Elder (2004) and Chen et al 
(2005) gave insights that the earnings quality of firms with non-Big Six auditors are 
higher than the earnings quality of firms with Big Six auditors. An counter-argument 
come from Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006), Hussainey (2009) and Yasar (2013), who 
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indicated that there is no relationship between audit firm size and earnings 
management. 
The role of audit committee existence is an integral part of audit quality in 
influencing the management behavior to manipulate the earnings. Stewart and Munro 
(2007) stated that the existence of audit committee leads to the decrease of audit risk 
of a firm. Consequently, as the audit risk is declining, the earnings disclosure will 
have better quality, compared to the firms with no audit committee. Wild (1996) 
showed that the informativeness of a firm’s earnings report increases after the 
formation of an audit committee. McMullen (1996) found that firms committing 
financial fraud are less likely to have audit committees. 
Thus, based on these arguments and results, it is hypothesized as follows: 
H12: There is significant positive association between earnings quality and audit 
quality, irrespective of the financial crisis.                
 
 The joint effect of investor protection and audit quality on earnings quality 
during economic downturn is not yet appointed. However, Maijoor and Vanstraelen 
(2006) suggested that firms in a country with a strict audit quality regime engage lees 
in earnings management compared to firms in a country with a more flexible audit 
regime. Moreover, Francis and Wang (2008) claimed that earnings quality increases 
for firms with Big 4 auditors when a country’s investor protection regime gives 
stronger protection to investor. In a similar vein, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2008) found that audit quality and investor protection are substitutes in constraining 
earnings management in private firms. Finally, Francis et al (2003) documented that 
the demand for auditing increases in civil law countries that have relatively more 
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timely and transparent accounting. Thus, based on these arguments and results, it is 
hypothesized as follows: 
H13: The joint effect of investor protection and audit quality is positively associated 
with earnings quality, irrespective of the financial crisis.                 
 
Based on previous literature, the research hypotheses 11 to 13 (H11-H13) that 
are presented above are examined using the regression equation (42). This model uses 
the same variables as Becker et al (1998), Krishnan (2003), Balsam et al (2003), Zhou 
and Elder (2004), Chen et al (2005), Lin et al (2006), Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006), 
Chia et al (2007), Caramanis and Lennox (2008), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2008), Baxter and Cotter (2009), Prawitt et al (2009), Gerayli et al (2011), Chen et al 
(2011), Iatridis (2012), Hamdan et al (2012), Hamdan et al (2013), Iatridis and 
Dimitras (2013), Yasar (2013), Soliman and Ragab (2014), Badolato et al (2014), 
Gajevszky (2014) and Salleh and Haat (2014). The following regression model run 
two times for each period of time and simultaneously five times for each dimension of 
EQk,it . Table 1 Panel C gives a full description of all the variables. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Panel C here) 
 
𝐸𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑅𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽11𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽16𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽17𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽18𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖                                                            (42) 
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EQk,it  is a dimension of earnings quality attributes (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
EQ1,it  is ex post conservatism estimated based on Basu (1997) as shown in Equation 
(40),  
𝐸𝑄2,𝑖𝑡  is ex ante conservatism estimated based on  Beaver and Ryan (2000) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ3,it  is value relevance estimated based on Ohlson (1995) as shown in Equation 
(40), 
EQ4,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Dechow et al (1995) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ5,it  is accruals quality estimated based on McNichols (2002) as shown in Equation 
(40), 
EQ6,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Kothari et al (2005) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ7,it  is earnings persistence estimated based on Kormedi and Lipe (1987) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ8,it  is earnings predictability estimated based on Francis et al (2004) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ9,it  is loss avoidance analysis estimated based on Burgstahler et al (2006) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ10,it  is earnings smoothness estimated based on Leuz et al (2003) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
𝐴𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡  is audit quality measured by four different proxies (k=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6):  
𝐴𝑄1,𝑖𝑡  is audit fees measured as shown in Equation (41),  
𝐴𝑄2,𝑖𝑡  is the modified audit report opinion measured as shown in Equation (41), 
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𝐴𝑄3,𝑖𝑡  is auditor switch measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄4,𝑖𝑡  is the status of audit firm measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄5,𝑖𝑡  is the existence of audit committee measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄6,𝑖𝑡  is the demand for auditing measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅k,𝑖𝑡  is the investor protection measured by eight different metrics adopted from 
World Economic Forum (WEF 2005-2012) (k=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8):  
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅1,𝑖𝑡  is property rights measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅2,𝑖𝑡  is judicial independence measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅3,𝑖𝑡  is transparency of government policymaking measured as shown in 
Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅4,𝑖𝑡  is strength of auditing and reporting standards measured as shown in 
Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅5,𝑖𝑡  is efficacy of corporate boards measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅6,𝑖𝑡  is protection of minority shareholders’ interests measured as shown in 
Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅7,𝑖𝑡  is strength of investor protection measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅8,𝑖𝑡  is legal rights index measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡  is the interaction effect of accrual quality and investor protection on 
earnings quality, 
ΓRAV𝑖𝑡  is the change in receivables scaled by total assets in previous year, 
PPE𝑖𝑡  is gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets in previous year, 
NI𝑖𝑡  is net income, 
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TA𝑖𝑡  is total accruals measured by income before extraordinary items minus operating 
cash flows, 
CURRENT𝑖𝑡  is current assets divided by current liabilities, 
SP𝑖𝑡  proxies for small profits. It takes 1 if net profit scaled by total assets is between 0 
and 0.01 and 0 otherwise, 
LL𝑖𝑡  proxies for timely loss recognition. It takes 1 if net profit scaled by total assets is 
less than -0.20 and 0 otherwise, 
CORPSIZEit  is corporate size measured as shown in Equation (40), 
CFOVit  is cash flow from operations volatility measured as shown in Equation (40), 
DEBTit  is total debt measured as shown in Equation (40),  
BETAit  is the market beta coefficient measured as shown in Equation (40),  
SICODEit  is a dummy variable for industrial classification measured as shown in 
Equation (40),  
LEVERit  is leverage ratio measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, 
ROAit  is return on assets measured by net income divided by total assets, 
ΓREVit  is the change in revenue (sale) scaled by total assets in previous year, 
εit  is the error term. 
 
5.2.4. Cost of equity capital and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008 
Dimson et al (2003) and Palliam (2005) claimed that the equity risk premium 
is the incremental return that shareholders require from holding risky equities rather 
than risk-free-securities. Thus, equity risk premium drives future equity returns and is 
the key determinant of the cost of equity capital. In the same notion, King (2009) 
stated that equity risk premium is important for understanding changes in cost of 
equity capital estimates.  
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As equity risk premium varies with time, depending on the information 
available at the moment, financial crisis had a great effect on it. The fall of markets in 
2008 led to decreasing of firms’ equities therefore their market capitalization which in 
turn increased equity risk premium caused by instability and as a result the cost of 
equity capital (Mokhova, 2011).  
In parallel, King (2009) found that the onset of financial crisis has rise equity 
beta which led to the increase of equity risk premium and therefore an increase of cost 
of equity capital.  
Consequently, based on previous literature, it is tested the following 
hypothesis: 
H14: Firms are likely to exhibit higher cost of equity in years of financial crisis of 
2008.  
 
 Wallace (1980) stated that auditing lessen the extent of investors price-protect 
their investments resulting in a reduced stock price which implies a higher cost of 
equity capital by playing three roles - monitoring, information and insurance.  
The first role of auditing suggests that auditing ensures better use of resources 
entrusted to the agent by the principal (Wallace, 1980). Thus, more effective 
monitoring should reflect a lower cost of equity capital. 
The second role of auditing based on information asymmetries. It is commonly 
accepted that higher audit quality results in better information quality (Teoh and 
Wong, 1993; Balsam et al, 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; Fernando et al, 2010) 
which in turn implies lower cost of equity capital (Botosan et al, 2004; Francis et al, 
2004). 
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Lastly, the effect of audit quality on cost of equity capital also varies with the 
insurance role played by audit firms (Wallace, 1980). The information risk is reduced 
because the audit firm provides another source of compensation in the event of failure 
of the firm (Menon and Williams, 1994).  
Based on Easley and O’ Hara (2004), Fernando et al (2010) and Chen et al 
(2011), it is stated the following hypothesis:  
H15: There is negative association between cost of equity capital and audit quality.  
 
Based on previous literature, the research hypotheses 14 and 15 (H14 and H15) 
that are presented above are examined using the regression equation (43). This model 
uses the same variables as Chow and Rice (1982), Krishnan (2003), Easton (2004), 
Francis et al (2005), Nasser et al (2006), Palea (2007), Johl et al (2007), Fernando et 
al (2010), McInnis (2010), Chen et al (2011) and Hassan and Naser (2013). The 
following regression model run two times for each dimension of 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝜅 ,𝑖𝑡  representing by constant growth model specified by Palea (2007) 
and PEG approach specified by Easton (2004) respectively. Table 1 Panel D gives a 
full description of all the variables. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Panel D here) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝜅 ,𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑁𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛽6𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡   +  𝛽7𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽12𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐴𝑄𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (43) 
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COSTOFEQUITYk,it  is a dimension of cost of equity (k= 1, 2) 
COSTOFEQUITY1,it   is measured by using the constant growth Gordon model 
introduced by Palea (2007) which is further explained in section 2.6. (Equation 39), 
COSTOFEQUITY2,it   is measured by using the PEG approach introduced by Easton 
(2004) which is further explained in section 2.6. (Equation 37), 
EGit   is corporate annual earnings growth per share,  
DPOit  is corporate dividends announced for the year scaled by earnings for the year 
available for dividends,  
DEBTit  is total debt measured as shown in Equation (40),  
LNMVit   is corporate natural log of market value of equity,  
BMit  is book-to-market ratio measured as shown in Equation (41), 
VOLUMEit   is trading volume divided by total shares outstanding,  
Betait  is the market beta coefficient measured as shown in Equation (40),  
𝐶𝐹𝑂it   is cash flow from operations divided by total assets,  
𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐸𝑉it   is natural log of debt to assets ratio,  
𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑀it   is natural log of book to market ratio,  
CORPSIZEit  is corporate size measured as shown in Equation (40), 
FIRMit  is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the firm is classified as small (market value 
of equity of firm is lower than the median market value of equity) and 0 if the firm is 
classified as large (market value of equity of firm is larger than the median market 
value of equity),   
SICODEit  is a dummy variable for industrial classification measured as shown in 
Equation (40),  
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AQk,it  is a dimension of audit quality (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
𝐴𝑄1,𝑖𝑡  is audit fees measured as shown in Equation (41),  
𝐴𝑄2,𝑖𝑡  is modified audit report measured as shown in Equation (41),   
𝐴𝑄3,𝑖𝑡  is auditor switch measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄4,𝑖𝑡  is the status of audit firm measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄5,𝑖𝑡  is the existence of audit committee measured as shown in Equation (41),   
CRISISit  is a dummy variable for pre and crisis period measured as shown in Equation 
(40), 
εit  is the error term. 
 
5.2.5. Cost of equity capital and earnings quality under financial crisis of 
2008 
Francis et al (2004) examined extensively the association between earnings 
quality attributes and implied cost of equity. They found a statistically reliable 
association between each earnings quality attribute considered individually and 
measures of the cost of equity capital. Moreover, they claimed that accounting-based 
earnings attributes (accruals quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness) have 
a greater effect on costs of equity capital than do market-based earnings attributes 
(value relevance, timeliness and conservatism).  
In the same notion, Bhattacharya et al (2003) found evidence of an association 
between country-level earnings quality measures including earnings aggressiveness, 
loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing, and country-level measures of total cost of 
equity capital.  
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Bhattacharya et al’s (2003) and Francis et al’s (2004) results are supported 
from Francis et al (2005) and Chan et al (2009). 
Specifically, Francis et al (2005) indicated that as the quality of accruals 
decrease, so too does the amount investors are willing to pay for a dollar of earnings, 
implying a higher cost of equity capital for firms with lower accruals quality. 
Chan et al (2009) claimed that ex ante (ex post) conservatism is associated 
with higher (lower) earnings quality and lower (higher) costs of equity capital. In 
other words, a more ex ante conservative firm is likely to provide more reliable 
information to equity investors for investment decisions which in turn lead to firm 
having lower cost of equity capital. On contrary, a more ex post conservative firm is 
likely to provide more susceptible to opportunistic management discretion which in 
turn lead to firm having higher cost of equity capital. 
In contrast to the results of Francis et al (2004), McInnis (2010) documented 
that there is no negative association between imputed cost of capital and earnings 
smoothness in U.S. stock market. He offered evidence that the inverse relation 
between earnings smoothness and implied cost of equity capital results primarily from 
optimistic bias in analysts’ long-term earnings projections.    
Consequently, based on the findings of Francis et al (2004), it is developed the 
following hypothesis: 
H16: There is a meaningful negative association between earnings quality and cost 
of equity.  
 
Based on previous literature, the research hypothesis 16 (H16) that is presented 
above is examined using the regression equation (44). The variables that are used in 
this model are the same as Kormedi and Lipe (1987), Ohlson (1995), Dechow et al 
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(1995), Basu (1997), Wald (1999), McNichols (2002), Leuz et al (2003), Francis et al 
(2004), Easton (2004), Francis et al (2005), Burgstahler et al (2006), Kothari et al 
(2005), Palea (2007), Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), Chan et al (2009), Fernando 
et al (2010), McInnis (2010), Chen et al (2011). Likewise, testing the equation (44), it 
run two times for each period of time and simultaneously two times for each 
dimension of 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝜅 ,𝑖𝑡  representing by constant growth model specified 
by Palea (2007) and PEG approach specified by Easton (2004) respectively. Table 1 
Panel E gives a full description of all the variables. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Panel E here) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝜅 ,𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝑂𝑁 − 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽10𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽13𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽14𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐸𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡       (44) 
  
Wherein: 
COSTOFEQUITYk,it  is a dimension of cost of equity (k= 1, 2) 
COSTOFEQUITY1,it   is measured by using the constant growth Gordon model 
introduced by Palea (2007) as shown in Equation (43), 
COSTOFEQUITY2,it   is measured by using the PEG approach introduced by Easton 
(2004) as shown in Equation (43), 
BETAit  is the market beta coefficient measured as shown in Equation (40),  
CORPSIZEit  is corporate size measured as shown in Equation (40), 
BMit  is book-to-market ratio measured as shown in Equation (41), 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
168 
 
LEVERAGEit  is financial leverage measured as shown in Equation (41),  
CFOVit  is cash flow from operations volatility measured as shown in Equation (40), 
SVit  is sales volatility measured as shown in Equation (40), 
NERit  is negative earnings realization estimated as a dummy variable that takes 1 if 
firm reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise,  
COLLATERALit  is collateral value or asset structure of assets estimated as the ratio of 
intangible assets  divided by total assets,  
NON − DEBTit  is non-debt tax shields estimated as the ratio of depreciation divided 
by total assets,  
GROWTHit  is growth estimated as the ratio of capital expenditures divided by total 
assets,  
UNIQUENESSit  is uniqueness estimated as the ratio of R&D divided by sales,  
SICODEit  is a dummy variable for industrial classification measured as shown in 
Equation (40),  
PROFITABILITYit  is profitability estimated by using the return on assets,  
LIQUIDITYit  is liquidity estimated by using the quick ratio,  
EQk,it  is a dimension of earnings quality attributes (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
EQ1,it  is ex post conservatism estimated based on Basu (1997) as shown in Equation 
(40),  
𝐸𝑄2,𝑖𝑡  is ex ante conservatism estimated based on  Beaver and Ryan (2000) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ3,it  is value relevance estimated based on Ohlson (1995) as shown in Equation 
(40), 
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EQ4,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Dechow et al (1995) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ5,it  is accruals quality estimated based on McNichols (2002) as shown in Equation 
(40), 
EQ6,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Kothari et al (2005) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ7,it  is earnings persistence estimated based on Kormedi and Lipe (1987) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ8,it  is earnings predictability estimated based on Francis et al (2004) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ9,it  is loss avoidance analysis estimated based on Burgstahler et al (2006) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ10,it  is earnings smoothness estimated based on Leuz et al (2003) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
εit  is the error term. 
 
5.2.6. Cost of debt and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008 
Except from the cost of equity, the cost of debt is the second component of the 
cost of capital (Francis et al, 2004). Likewise, the cost of debt was expected to 
increase in periods of financial crisis considering the increase in absolute rates on 
corporate bonds and the spread between Treasury and corporate bonds. Mokhova 
(2011) claimed that the recent world recession have impact on the availability of 
credit and as a result on the cost of debt capital.  
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 Consequently, based on previous literature, it is assumed the following 
hypothesis: 
H17: Firms are likely to exhibit higher cost of debt in years of financial crisis of 
2008.  
 
There is a debate how audit quality and cost of debt are associated. Fortin and 
Pittman (2007) were unable to find support for the value relevance of Big Four in the 
context of pricing of public debt issues of privately-held US firms. However, Pittman 
and Fortin (2004) stated that choosing a Big Six auditor which can reduce debt-related 
monitoring costs by enhancing the credibility of financial statements enables young 
firms to lower their interest rates. Moreover, Blackwell et al (1998) showed that 
auditing is relevant in decreasing the cost on bank debt of privately-held US firms. 
Likewise, Kim et al (2011) showed that auditing and Big Four are associated with 
decreased borrowing costs. Recently, Causholli and Knechel (2012) suggested that 
firms that are young at the time of an IPO pay higher interest rates and auditor quality 
plays a significant role in lowering the cost of debt financing. Additionally, 
Karjalainen (2011) found that the interest rate of debt capital for privately-held 
companies is inversely associated with perceived audit quality. On contrary, Dhaliwal 
et al (2008) provided support that non-audit fees are positively related to firms’ cost 
of debt, but only for investment-grade firms. 
Therefore, based on previous literature, it is hypothesized as follows: 
H18: There is negative association between cost of debt and audit quality.  
 
Based on previous literature, the research hypotheses 17 and 18 (H17 and H18) 
that are presented above are examined using the regression equation (45). This model 
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uses the same variables as Chow and Rice (1982), Krishnan (2003), Fortin and 
Pittman (2007), Francis et al (2005), Dhaliwal et al (2008), Karjalainen (2011), 
Causholli and Knechel (2012). Table 1 Panel F gives a full description of all the 
variables. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Panel F here) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6LN𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑁𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽9𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (45) 
  
Wherein: 
COSTOFDEBTit  is cost of debt measured by the ratio of interest expense in year t+1 to 
average interest bearing debt outstanding during years t and t+1 (See Francis et al, 
2005, p. 308), which is further explained in section 2.7., 
PROFITABILITYit  is profitability measured as shown in Equation (44), 
BMit  is book-to-market ratio measured as shown in Equation (41), 
LEVERAGEit  is financial leverage measured as shown in Equation (41),  
CORPSIZEit  is corporate size measured as shown in Equation (40), 
INTCOVit  is interest coverage estimated as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) divided by the interest expenses,  
LN𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸it  is the natural log of net income before extraordinary items,  
LNMVEit  is the natural log of market value of equity,  
COLLATERALit  is collateral value or asset structure of assets measured as shown in 
Equation (44), 
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NEGEQit  is the negative book equity which takes the value of 1 if the book value of 
equity is negative and 0 otherwise,  
SICODEit  is a dummy variable for industrial classification measured as shown in 
Equation (40),  
CRISKit  is the credit risk measured as the ratio of standard deviation of cash flow 
from operations to average of total assets during years t-1 and t, 
AQk,it  is a dimension of audit quality (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
𝐴𝑄1,𝑖𝑡  is audit fees measured as shown in Equation (41),  
𝐴𝑄2,𝑖𝑡  is modified audit report opinion measured as shown in Equation (41),   
𝐴𝑄3,𝑖𝑡  is auditor switch measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄4,𝑖𝑡  is the status of audit firm measured as shown in Equation (41), 
𝐴𝑄5,𝑖𝑡  is the existence of audit committee measured as shown in Equation (41),   
CRISISit  is a dummy variable for pre and crisis period as shown in Equation (40), 
εit  is the error term. 
 
5.2.7. Cost of debt and earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008 
 There is previous evidence that cost of debt has positive and negative effect on 
earnings quality. Even though there is negative relationship between earnings quality 
and cost of debt, Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011) showed that the relationship was 
positive (negative) at low (high) levels of debt. 
Moreover, consistent with Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), Francis et al 
(2005) showed that poorer accruals quality is associated with larger cost of debt.  
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On contrary, Fung and Goodwin (2013) found that short-term debt is 
positively associated with earnings management. In similar manner, Rodriguez-Perez 
and Van Hemmen (2010) concluded that marginal increase in debt provide incentives 
for managers to manipulate earnings, and diversification provides the needed context 
for this accounting practice to be possible. 
Thus, based on previous literature, it is expected that managers have 
incentives to hold information with high quality to reduce cost of debt: 
H19: There is a meaningful relationship between cost of debt and earnings quality.  
 
Based on previous literature, the research hypothesis 19 (H19) that is presented 
above is examined using the regression equation (46). The variables that are used in 
this model are the same as Kormedi and Lipe (1987), Dechow et al (1995), Ohlson 
(1995), Basu (1997), McNichols (2002), Leuz et al (2003), Francis et al (2004), 
Francis et al (2005), Burgstahler et al (2006), Kothari et al (2005), Roychowdhury and 
Watts (2007), Jiang (2008). The following regression equation run two times for each 
research period. Table 1 Panel G gives a full description of all the variables. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Panel G here) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 =
 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝛥𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽11𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐸𝑄𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (46) 
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COSTOFDEBTit  is cost of debt measured as shown in Equation (45),  
LEVERAGEit  is financial leverage measured as shown in Equation (41),  
CORPSIZEit  is corporate size measured as shown in Equation (40), 
PROFITABILITYit  is profitability measured as shown in Equation (44), 
INTCOVit  is interest coverage measured as shown in Equation (45),  
LN𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸it  is the natural log of net income before extraordinary items measured as 
shown in Equation (45),  
EPSit  is earnings per share before extraordinary items,  
𝛥EPSit  is the change in earnings per share before extraordinary items between year t 
and t-1, 
PROFITit  is a dummy variable that takes 1 if firm’s earnings per share before 
extraordinary items is greater than or equal to 0 and 0 otherwise,  
INCRit  is a dummy variable that takes 1 if firm’s earnings per share before 
extraordinary items in year t is greater than or equal to that of year t-1 and 0 
otherwise,  
𝐶𝐹𝑂it   is cash flow from operations measured as shown in Equation (43), 
RNDit  is R&D expense deflated by total assets,  
EQk,it  is a dimension of earnings quality attributes (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
EQ1,it  is ex post conservatism estimated based on Basu (1997) as shown in Equation 
(40),  
𝐸𝑄2,𝑖𝑡  is ex ante conservatism estimated based on  Beaver and Ryan (2000) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ3,it  is value relevance estimated based on Ohlson (1995) as shown in Equation 
(40), 
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EQ4,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Dechow et al (1995) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ5,it  is accruals quality estimated based on McNichols (2002) as shown in Equation 
(40), 
EQ6,it  is accruals quality estimated based on Kothari et al (2005) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ7,it  is earnings persistence estimated based on Kormedi and Lipe (1987) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ8,it  is earnings predictability estimated based on Francis et al (2004) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
EQ9,it  is loss avoidance analysis estimated based on Burgstahler et al (2006) as shown 
in Equation (40), 
EQ10,it  is earnings smoothness estimated based on Leuz et al (2003) as shown in 
Equation (40), 
εit  is the error term. 
 
5.3. Datasets  
For the purpose of this thesis, it is extracted as a sample all advanced 
countries
4
, as they are classified by International Monetary Fund, that have financial 
data to estimate all empirical models. All data are from the major national indices of 
above countries and collected from DataStream, the Euro Stat, WorldBank, World 
Economic Forum and Osiris databases for the fiscal years 2005-2012. Hence, the 
initial sample consists of 652.512 firm-years observations. 
                                                          
4
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States. 
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Based on several selection criteria a part of the data has to be excluded. First, 
from the initial sample, firms that have no applied International Accounting Standards 
until 2005, which is the first year of examining period, will be excluded from the 
sample due to succeed a convergence on comparability of examining variables. The 
reason of this exclusion is that the accounting amounts of firms that apply 
International Accounting Standards are of higher quality than firms that do not (Barth 
et al, 2008). Particularly, they claimed that firms applying International Accounting 
Standards have higher variance of the change in net income, less negative correlation 
between accruals and cash flows, higher frequency of large negative income, higher 
value relevance of net income and equity book value for share prices, higher ratios of 
the variances of change in net income and change in cash flow, lower frequency of 
small positive income and higher value relevance of net income for good news stock 
returns with each of these differences being more or little significant. Hence, after 
excluding firms that are publicly listed in Canada, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, New 
Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and United States, the initial sample is 
reduced to 391.576 firm-years observations. 
Second, following prior research (Barth et al, 1999; Leuz et al, 2003; 
Burgstahler et al, 2006; Booblert-U-Thai, 2006; Francis and Wang, 2008; Daske et al, 
2008; Houqe et al, 2012), financial institutions such as banks, insurance and real 
estate companies and other financial institutions excluded since they are problematic 
to compute the earnings quality attributes and decrease the homogeneity of the sample 
and the comparability of the results across countries. Another viewpoint of exclusion 
of financial institutions of the sample is because of their specific accounting 
requirements, which differ substantially from those of industrial and commercial 
companies and which prevent them from freely selecting the accounting standards 
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they apply (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al, 1999; Leuz et al, 2003; 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Francis and Wang, 2008; Daske et al, 2008). 
Therefore, the sample is further reduced to 282.776 firm-years observations. 
Third, firm-years observations for which data required to complete the 
regression models are missing need to be excluded. Single firm-years observations for 
which data are missing and that are part of the research periods can be excluded. This 
is necessary since the three phases in the research period need to be compared. 
Removing data of one firm in one of the research periods decreases the comparability 
of the event period phases. Thus, for further increase of comparability of the research 
period, firm data for which not all four years are available are excluded. Once data 
have been excluded since not for each research period are available or data fields are 
empty the sample is further reduced to 146.396 firm-years observations. 
The countries of the sample are classified into three clusters defined by Leuz 
(2010) and categorized into outsider economies with strong outsider protection and 
legal enforcement (cluster 1)
5
, insider economies with better legal enforcement 
systems (cluster 2)
6
 and insider economies with weaker legal enforcement systems 
(cluster 3)
7
. However, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Luxemburg, Malta, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia is be excluded from the sample since they were not 
classified by Leuz (2010). Consequently, the final sample is count on 137.091 
firm-years observations. 
Finally, to avoid outlier concern, the dependent and independent variables are 




 percentiles.  
Table 2 describes the sampling and data collection process. 
                                                          
5
 Cluster 1 includes Australia, Ireland and United Kingdom. 
6
 Cluster 2 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
7
 Cluster 3 includes Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
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(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
5.4. Determination of the pre and  financial crisis period 
Many researchers have used the financial crisis of 2008 as research period in 
their papers. However there is no consensus on the beginning of the recent global 
financial crisis among the countries. 
Brown and Davis (2008) and Barrell and Davis (2008) claimed that the 
financial crisis of 2008 started in August 2007 and reached a climax in the autumn of 
2008 with a wave of bank nationalizations across North America and Europe. 
However, they concluded that the financial crisis was lasted from 2007 to 2008.  
Foster and Magdoff (2009) claimed that the financial crisis of 2008 began 
somewhat inconspicuously in late summer 2007 with the failure of two Bear Sterns 
hedge funds, and then went from bad to worse over the following year despite 
countless attempts by governments to halt its progress.  
According to Poole (2010), the financial crisis of 2008 broke in mid-August 
2007, when the market suddenly cut off funding to several financial entities and ended 
December 2008 when markets gradually improved and credit conditions became more 
settled and credit began to flow again. 
McKibbin and Stoeckel (2010) used the period 2007 to 2008 as the period of 
the financial crisis hit. They claimed that the financial crisis of 2008 is defined as the 
bursting of the housing market bubble in late 2007, the ensuing collapse in the sub-
prime mortgage market and related financial markets and the subsequent collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008 which resulted in a sharp increase in risk premia around the 
world. 
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Acharya et al (2009), Schwartz (2009), Crotty (2009), Claessens et al (2010), 
Helleiner (2011) and Furcen and Mourougane (2012) argued that the first stage of the 
recent financial crisis is August of 2007 and ended in December of 2008. 
Examining the real effects of financial constraints on corporate policies under 
the financial crisis of 2008, Campello et al (2010) used August of 2007 as the start of 
financial crisis and December of 2008 as the ended of financial crisis. 
Similarly, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) used the period 2007 to 2008 to 
examine bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008. 
Thus, based on previous research and the analysis of the financial crisis of 
2008 in section 3, it can be stated that year 2008 can be considered the first year of the 
crisis in world developed countries since the real effects began to appear in year 2008. 
This point of view is strengthened by analyzing the Figures 1 to 10 which are further 
explained in section 3.4. 
Consequently, for the purpose of this thesis, the pre financial crisis period 
refers to the financial years 2005-2007 and the financial crisis period refers to the 
financial years 2008-2012. 
    
5.5. Requirements to use linear regression analysis 
Before employing linear regression analysis, the data set should be tested for 
normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity. According to Fox (1997) and  
Cohen et al (2013), regression cannot be used when one or more of the three 
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5.5.1. Normal distribution 
The first requirement to use linear regression is that the data should be 
normally distributed. Normal distribution can be checked either numerically or 
graphically. When checking graphically, whether the data have a normal distribution, 
P-P plot, and Box plot will be examined. P-P plot is a probability plot, which is a 
graphical method for comparing two probability distributions by plotting their 
quantities against each other. If there is normality, the plotted points should 
approximately lie on a straight line. Box plot is another useful visualization for 
viewing how the data are distributed. If there is normality, there is no appearance of 
outliers in Box plot. 
Numerically, Shapiro et al (1968) claimed that there are nine statistical 
procedures for evaluating the normality of a complete sample. The nine statistics are 
W (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965),  𝑏1  (standard third moment), 𝑏2  (standard fourth 
moment), KS (Kolmogorov-Smirnov), CM (Cramer-Von-Mises), WCM (weighed 
CM), D (modified KS), CS (chi-squared), and u (studentized range).  
For the purpose of this thesis, to secure approximation of data to normal 
distribution, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test) is used due to the large sample that 
is examined. The decision basis was to accept the null hypothesis that the data follow 
normal distribution if the probability of the KS test is more than 0,05. Only the 
continuous variables are examined except from dichotomous variables (dummy 
variables) which are not subject to the normal distribution.  
Consequently, from Table 3, it can be extracted that using KS test, the 
statistical value is high, and the probability is less than 0,05 for some of the 
examining continuous variables, which means that they are not close to their normal 
distribution. To overcome this problem, the natural logarithm for these variables was 
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considered. However, since the sample is extremely large, not distributing the data 
normally may not influence credibility of this thesis (Hamdan et al, 2012).    
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
5.5.2. Homoscedasticity 
Homoscedasticity exists when all variables have the same finite variance. The 
assumption of homoscedasticity is made in using linear regression since it simplifies 
the mathematical treatment. There are two tests to examine homoscedasticity 
(Goldfeld and Quandt, 1965). The first is parametric and use the F-statistic from 
Levene’s test and the second is nonparametric and uses the number of peaks in the 
ordered sequence of unsigned residuals. However, for brevity and for the purpose of 
this thesis, homoscedasticity is examined by examining the parametric Levene’s test. 
According to Martin and Bridgmon (2012), a Levene’s test verified the equality of 
variances in the samples (homogeneity of variance) (p>0,05). In detail, the null 
hypothesis for the parametric Levene’s test is that there is an equality of variance. If 
the p-value is below 0,05, the null hypothesis is rejected and it is assumed that there is 
no equality of variance (therefore, there is no homoscedasticity). On contrary, if it is 
above 0,05, the null hypothesis is accepted and therefore there is homoscedasticity. 
Consequently, Table 4 reports that the Levene’s tests in all regression models verified 
the equality of variances in the sample (homogeneity of variance (p>0,05).  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
5.5.3. Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more predictor 
variables in a multiple regression model are highly correlated, meaning that one can 
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be linearly predicted from the others with a non-trivial degree of accuracy. In the 
presence of multicollinearity, the estimate of one variable’s impact on the dependent 
variable while controlling for the others tends to be less precise than if predictors were 
uncorrelated with another. According to Chen et al (2010), if multicollinearity is 
present in the model the estimates of the regression coefficients can become unstable 
and standard errors of the coefficients can be inflated. To measure multicollinearity, 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) will be examined since it has a clear interpretation 
in terms of the effects of multicollinearity on the estimated variance of the i’th 
regression coefficient (O’Brien, 2007).  Unfortunately, there are many rules of thumb 
– most commonly the rule of 10 – associated with VIF is regarded by many 
practitioners as a sign of severe or serious multicollinearity. Therefore, the VIF of 10 
will be used which indicates that the variance of i’th regression coefficient is 10 times 
greater than it would have been if the i’th independent variable had been linearly 
independent of the other independent variable in the analysis. It means that the 
multicollinearity is present when VIF values are that lower than 10 and Tolerance is 
higher 0,1 (Chen et al, 2010). Table 5 shows that there is multicollinearity in all 
almost predictor variables. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
Consequently linear regression can be used to test hypotheses since all 
requirements (normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity) are met. 
 
5.6. Summary 
Consistent with previous literature, several papers examined the effect of bad 
economic situations or economic downturn or financial crisis on earnings 
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management, audit quality and cost of capital. Hence, this study investigated the 
impact of financial crisis of 2008 on earnings quality by measuring the level and sign 
of it by advanced countries worldwide over the period of 2005-2012. Further, the joint 
effect of global financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on audit quality and 
then the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings quality among 
three clusters based on the country classification of Leuz (2010) are analyzed. In the 
end, it is examined the cost of capital and the changes of audit quality and earnings 
quality influencing on it due to the financial crisis of 2008 on listed firms of advanced 
countries worldwide over the period of 2005-2012. 
The choice of advanced countries has several advantages. First, the market 
capitalization of developed countries through the examined period amount almost 
55% globally. Thus, the results are much closer to the reality in relation with other 
papers that used a representative sample which makes the findings questionable. 
Second, advanced countries have been severely affected during the financial crisis of 
2008. Hence, it is excepted a diversification of the impact of financial crisis of 2008 
on earnings quality, audit quality and cost of capital before and during the crisis 
period through examining sample. Third, consistent with Filip and Raffournier 
(2012), most cited papers of all time conducted at a single country level which makes 
the results questionable. Consequently, this paper faces this geographical closeness of 
results by using 18 largest economies of the world and thus, provide a stronger 
evidence. Moreover, it is the first attempt to analyze the impact of financial crisis of 
2008 on earnings management, audit quality and cost of capital in the examining 
sample by categorizing the sample countries into 3 clusters depending on the level of 
investor protection: cluster 1 with strong shareholder protection and legal 
enforcement, cluster 2 with better legal enforcement systems and cluster 3 with weak 
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investor protection and legal enforcement systems (Leuz, 2010). Finally, this thesis 
paper uses countries that are complied with International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
until 2005 due to succeed a convergence on comparability of examining variables. 
Thus, like Filip and Raffournier (2012), this study isolates the impact of financial 
crisis of 2008 on earnings management, audit quality and cost of capital while the 
other factors are hold constant. 
Another advantage of conducting this thesis is that earnings management is 
measured by using 10 different approaches of earnings quality. Prior literature has 
focused on cross-country differences in the earnings quality using some of them one 
aspect of earnings attributes and others two or more of them (e.g. Alford et al, 1993; 
Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball et al, 2003). Thus, this study cover this gap by using most 
of important earnings quality attributes, like ex post and ex ante conservatism, value 
relevance, three accrual quality measures, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, loss avoidance analysis and earnings smoothness. 
To conclude, this thesis focuses on the following examining areas: 
 10 different aspects of earnings quality are examined under financial crisis of 
2008 (ex post conservatism estimated by Basu (1997) model, ex ante 
conservatism estimated by Beaver and Ryan (2000) model, value relevance 
estimated by Ohlson (1995) model, accruals quality estimated by Dechow et 
al (1995), McNichols (2002) and Kothari et al (2005) models, earnings 
persistence estimated by Kormedi and Lipe (1987) model, earnings 
predictability estimated by Francis et al (2004) model, loss avoidance analysis 
estimated by Burgstahler et al (2006) model and earnings smoothness 
estimated by Leuz et al (2003) model). 
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 The joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection (measured 
by 8 different measures: property rights, judicial independence, transparency 
of government policymaking, strength of auditing and reporting standards, 
efficacy of corporate boards, protection of minority shareholders’ interests, 
strength of investor protection and legal rights index) on audit quality 
(measured by 6 different measures: audit fees, modified audit report opinion, 
auditor switch, status of audit firm, existence of audit committee and demand 
for auditing) is examined. 
 The joint effect of audit quality (measured by 6 different measures as 
explained in previous paragraph) and investor protection (measured by 8 
different measures as explained in previous paragraph) on earnings quality 
under financial crisis of 2008 (measured by 10 different measures as 
explained in previous paragraph) is examined.  
 The effect of earnings quality (measured by 10 different measures as 
explained in previous paragraph) on cost of equity capital (measured by 2 
different measures: constant growth Gordon model introduced by Palea 
(2007) and PEG approach introduced by Easton (2004)) and cost of debt 
(measured by the ratio of interest expense in year t+1 to average interest 
bearing debt outstanding during years t and t+1) under the financial crisis of 
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6. Empirical research findings 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the research results will be discussed. First, descriptive 
statistics will be analyzed. Second, it will be provided Pearson (Spearman-rank) 
correlation matrix among independent variables in all regression equations. Third, 
regression analysis are presented and finally, it will be summarized the findings of 
this thesis. Thus, this chapter answers the following sub-questions: 
Which is the effect of financial crisis of 2008 on earnings quality? 
Which is the effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on audit 
quality? 
Which is the effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings quality? 
Which is the effect of audit quality on cost of capital (cost of equity capital and cost 
of debt)? 
Which is the effect of earnings quality on cost of capital (cost of equity capital and 
cost of debt)? 
 
6.2. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis are given in Table 
6. Table 6 Panel A compares the continues variables among three clusters during pre 
and crisis period.  
The results of Table 6 Panel A reveals an increase in conservatism (ex post 
and ex ante) (EQ₁ and EQ₂ respectively) (from 0,06526 to 1,52752 and -0,00896 to -
0,00027 in cluster 1 respectively) (from 1,20480 to 1,94221 and 1,98117 to 2,15694 
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in cluster 2 respectively) (from 1,00224 to 1,81918 and 0,00124 to 0,00141 in cluster 
3 respectively), accruals quality (measured by Dechow et al (1995), McNichols 
(2002), and Kothari et al (2005)) (EQ4, EQ5 and EQ6 respectively) (from 4,80592 to 
1,84581, 4,05460 to 1,76553 and 1,95610 to 1,68369 in cluster 1 respectively) (from 
189,04120 to 37,06603, 189,05010 to 14,91213 and 42,72452 to 11,56243 in cluster 2 
respectively) (from 5,33738 to 2,27862, 5,33112 to 2,27062 and 2,32850 to 1,14606 
in cluster 3 respectively), earnings predictability (EQ₈) (from 0,61437 to 1,13903 in 
cluster 1) (from 0,72947 to 1,64340 in cluster 2) (from 0,99962 to 1,14289 in cluster 
3), loss avoidance (EQ₉) (from -0,28699 to -0,71969 in cluster 1)  (from -0,19944 to -
0,27808 in cluster 2) (from 0,01183 to -0,14650 in cluster 3), and a decrease in 
earnings persistence (EQ₇) (from 0,13481 to 0,07507 in cluster 1) (from 9,07381 to 
0,46587 in cluster 2) (from 1,35409 to 1,17300 in cluster 3), value relevance (EQ₃) 
(from 0,98406 to 0,93111 in cluster 1) (from 0,69830 to 0,06288 in cluster 2) (from 
0,79142 to 0,71751 in cluster 3), and earnings smoothness (EQ₁₀) (from 2,48379 to 
2,39597 in cluster 1) (from 0,57332 to 0,56297 in cluster 2) (from 1,19262 to 1,09653 
in cluster 3) during financial crisis of 2008. However, the affection of crisis on 
fluctuations of the earnings quality attributes among clusters differentiates due to the 
level of investor protection.  
There is a common premise that high earnings quality is more frequent in 
countries with high level of investor protection. According to Kinnunen and Koskela 
(2003), high investor protection countries restrict insiders’ profit appropriation which 
in turn reduces their incentives to manipulate earnings to conceal their profit diversion 
activities. The same results come from several other papers, like Leuz et al (2003), 
Haw et al (2004), Burgstahler et al (2006) and Nabar amd Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), 
who found that earnings management is negatively related to shareholder protection. 
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Hence, Table 6 Panel A shows that countries in cluster 1, which are characterized by 
high level shareholder protection and legal enforcement, appears lower conservatism 
(ex post and ex ante) (EQ₁ and EQ₂ respectively), higher value relevance (EQ3), 
lower accruals quality (based on Dechow et al (1995), McNichols (2002), and Kothari 
et al (2005)) (EQ4, EQ5 and EQ6 respectively), higher earnings persistence (EQ7), 
lower earnings predictability (EQ8), lower avoidance analysis (EQ9) and higher 
earnings smoothness (EQ10) rather than in the countries in clusters 2 and 3 in both of 
research periods.   
Consistent with King (2009) and Mokhova (2011), Table 6 Panel A shows that 
the mean of cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by Palea 
(2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁), the mean of cost of equity capital under PEG ratio 
method introduced by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2) and the mean of cost of 
debt (COSTOFDEBT) were increased during the crisis period for all clusters. 
However, the increase of cost of capital was more severe for countries in cluster 3, 
which are characterized by low level of investor protection. Particularly, for cluster 1 
the mean of cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by Palea 
(2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁) was increased from -1,87481 to -0,52436, the mean of 
cost of equity capital under PEG ratio method introduced by Easton (2004) 
(COSTOFEQUITY2) was increased from 0,17239 to 0,18398 and the mean of cost of 
debt (COSTOFDEBT) was increased from 0,47487 to 0,50014. In parallel, the mean 
of cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by Palea (2007) 
(COSTOFEQUITY₁) was increased from -4,55275 to -1,94485, the mean of cost of 
equity capital under PEG ratio method introduced by Easton (2004) 
(COSTOFEQUITY2) was increased from 0,18669 to 0,19549 and the mean of cost of 
debt (COSTOFDEBT) was increased from 0,00070 to 0,00094 for cluster 2. For 
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cluster 3 the mean of cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced 
by Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁) was increased from -30,47657 to -15,72832, 
the mean of of cost of equity capital under PEG ratio method introduced by Easton 
(2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2) was increased from 24,50089 to 30,18324 and the mean 
of cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) was increased from 0,00039 to 0,00047.  
Concerning how audit quality was changed in pre and crisis period, the results 
in Table 6 Panel A appear a decrease of audit quality in all clusters during financial 
crisis of 2008. Specifically, the mean of audit fees (AQ1) was decreased from 
20.734,65916 to 9.056,81467 in cluster 1, 50.931,66192 to 37.331,20995 in cluster 2 
and 16.334,14023 to 14.963,75347 in cluster 3. In the same vein, the mean of demand 
for auditing (AQ3) was decreased from 0,00008 to 0,00005 in cluster 1, 0,00030 to 
0,00002 in cluster 2 and 0,00045 to 0,00029 in cluster 3. Consistent with Francis et al 
(2003), clusters 2 and 3 appear higher audit quality since they exhibit higher means of 
audit fees (AQ1) and demand for auditing (AQ3) respectively.  
Regarding investor protection, there was ambiguity how financial crisis of 
2008 influence investor protection variables among clusters. Table 6 Panel A shows 
that clusters 1 and 2 are characterized by higher investor protection among clusters. In 
detail, cluster 1 appears stronger financial auditing and reporting standards regarding 
financial performance, stronger supervision of investors and boards on management 
decisions, stronger protection of interests of minority shareholders, stronger investor 
protection and stronger legal rights of investors (higher means of Invpr4, Invpr5, 
Invpr6, Invpr7 and Invpr8 respectively). In addition, cluster 2 appears stronger 
protection of property rights, higher judiciary independent from influences of 
members of government, citizens, or firms, and higher transparency of government 
policymaking (higher means of Invpr1, Invpr2 and  Invpr3 respectively).  In detail, the 
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means of property rights (INVPR1) (from 5,77274 to 5,85375), judicial independence 
(INVPR2) (from 5,99869 to 6,15217) and transparency of government policymaking 
(INVPR3) (from 4,86634 to 5,02282) were increased and the means of strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4) (from 6,06552 to 5,79376), efficacy of 
corporate boards (INVPR5) (from 5,59722 to 5,35311), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6) (from 5,63383 to 5,14363), strength of investor 
protection (INVPR7) (from 7,27741 to 7,14183) and legal rights index (INVPR8) 
(from 9,64044 to 9,30645) were decreased in cluster 1 during financial crisis of 2008. 
In addition, the means of transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3) and 
strength of investor protection (INVPR7) were increased and the means of all other 
investor protection proxies were decreased (from 6,43725 to 5,93722 for property 
rights (INVPR1), 6,33212 to 6,10527 for judicial independence (INVPR2), 6,05250 to 
5,58823 for strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4), 5,58364 to 
5,25543 for efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), 5,72227 to 5,06205 for protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) and 7,41644 to 6,95934 for legal rights 
index (INVPR8)) in cluster 2 during financial crisis of 2008. Finally, the means of 
property rights (INVPR1) (from 5,02097 to 4,43364), judicial independence (INVPR2) 
(from 3,998396 to 3,58529), strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4) 
(from 4,76290 to 4,37064), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) (from 4,16774 to 
3,95827) and protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) (from 4,51290 
to 4,05246) were decreased and the means of transparency of government 
policymaking (INVPR3) (from 3,56613 to 3,61896), strength of investor protection 
(INVPR7) (from 4,55806 to 4,84303) and legal rights index (INVPR8) (from 3,11290 
to 3,17283) were increased in cluster 3 during financial crisis of 2008. 
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Table 6 Panel A shows controversial changes of continous control variables 
among clusters during financial crisis of 2008. Specifically, cluster 1 exhibits lower 
means of financial leverage (LEVER), corporate size (CORPSIZE), corporate 
performance (CORPERFOR), market share (MASH), corporate efficiency 
(CORPEFFIC), corporate multinationality (MULTIN), dividend yield 
(DIVIDYIELD), annual stock return (R), the product of annual stock return and the 
proxy of bad news (R*DR), the change in net income (ΓNI), financial development 
(MCAP), market concentration using Herfindahl – Hirschman index (HERF), credit 
risk (CRISK), corporate dividends (DPO), corporate natural log of market value of 
equity (LNMV), trading volume (VOLUME), cash flow from operations (CFO), 
natural log of debt to assets ratio (LNLEV), collateral value or asset structure of assets 
(COLLATERAL), non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT), profitability 
(PROFITABILITY), interest coverage (INTCOV), natural log of net income before 
extraordinary items (LNNIBE), natural log of market value of equity (LNMVE), 
R&D expense  (RND), change in receivables (ΓRAV), net income (NI), total accruals 
(TA), return on assets (ROA), risk (RISK), profitability (PROFIT), solvency (SOLV), 
corporate complexity (COMPLEX), accruals (ACCRUAL) and inherent risk (IRISK), 
and higher means of TOBIN's Q (TOBINQ), sales volatility (SV), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV), length of operating cycle (LOC), corporate profitability 
(CORPROFIT), capital intensity (CAPINT), total debt (DEBT), the market beta 
coefficient (BETA), economic development (GDP), corporate annual earnings growth 
per share (EG), book-to-market ratio (BM), natural log of book to market ratio 
(LNBM), financial leverage (LEVERAGE), growth (GROWTH), uniqueness 
(UNIQUENESS), liquidity (LIQUIDITY), change in earnings per share (ΓEPS), 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE), current assets (Current), leverage (LEVER), 
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change in revenue (ΓREV) and free cash flow (FCF). In the same vein, cluster 2 
appears higher means of leverage (LEVER), sales volatility (SV), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV), length of operating cycle (LOC), corporate profitability 
(CORPROFIT), market share (MASH), capital intensity (CAPINT), corporate 
efficiency (CORPEFFIC), total debt (DEBT), the change in net income (ΓNI), 
economic development (GDP), market concentration using Herfindahl – Hirschman 
index (HERF), credit risk (CRISK), corporate dividends (DPO), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), natural log of debt to assets ratio (LNLEV), natural log of book to market ratio 
(LNBM), financial leverage (LEVERAGE), non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT), 
growth (GROWTH), uniqueness (UNIQUENESS), profitability (PROFITABILITY), 
interest coverage (INTCOV),  current assets (Current), return on assets (ROA) and 
inherent risk (IRISK), and lower means of TOBIN's Q (TOBINQ), corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), corporate performance (CORPERFOR), marginal corporate tax rate 
dummy variable (MCTR), corporate multinationality (MULTIN), dividend yield 
(DIVIDYIELD), annual stock return (R), the product of annual stock return and the 
proxy of bad news (R*DR), the market beta coefficient (BETA), financial 
development (MCAP), corporate annual earnings growth per share (EG), corporate 
natural log of market value of equity (LNMV), trading volume (VOLUME), cash 
flow from operations (CFO), collateral value or asset structure of assets 
(COLLATERAL), liquidity (LIQUIDITY), natural log of net income before 
extraordinary items (LNNIBE), natural log of market value of equity (LNMVE), 
change in earnings per share (ΓEPS), R&D expense  (RND), change in receivables 
(ΓRAV), property, plant, and equipment (PPE), net income (NI), total accruals (TA), 
leverage (LEVER), change in revenue (ΓREV), risk (RISK), profitability (PROFIT), 
solvency (SOLV)and corporate complexity (COMPLEX). Finally, cluster 3 appears 
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lower means of TOBIN's Q (TOBINQ), corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV), corporate profitability (CORPROFIT), corporate 
performance (CORPERFOR), capital intensity (CAPINT), corporate efficiency 
(CORPEFFIC), corporate multinationality (MULTIN), annual stock return (R), the 
product of annual stock return and the proxy of bad news (R*DR), the market beta 
coefficient (BETA), financial development (MCAP), credit risk (CRISK), corporate 
annual earnings growth per share (EG), corporate dividends (DPO), corporate natural 
log of market value of equity (LNMV), trading volume (VOLUME), cash flow from 
operations (CFO), collateral value or asset structure of assets (COLLATERAL), 
growth (GROWTH), profitability (PROFITABILITY), natural log of net income 
before extraordinary items (LNNIBE), natural log of market value of equity 
(LNMVE), R&D expense  (RND), change in receivables (ΓRAV), property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE), net income (NI), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), 
return on assets (ROA), change in revenue (ΓREV), solvency (SOLV), corporate 
complexity (COMPLEX), accruals (ACCRUAL) and inherent risk (IRISK), and 
higher means of leverage (LEVER), sales volatility (SV), length of operating cycle 
(LOC), market share (MASH), marginal corporate tax rate dummy variable (MCTR), 
dividend yield (DIVIDYIELD), total debt (DEBT), the change in net income (ΓNI), 
economic development (GDP), market concentration using Herfindahl – Hirschman 
index (HERF), book-to-market ratio (BM), natural log of debt to assets ratio 
(LNLEV), natural log of book to market ratio (LNBM), financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE), non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT), uniqueness (UNIQUENESS), 
liquidity (LIQUIDITY), interest coverage (INTCOV), change in earnings per share 
(ΓEPS), leverage (LEVER) and risk (RISK).  
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Table 6 Panel B compares the discrete variables among three clusters during 
pre and crisis period. The results suggest that all clusters present an increase of the 
frequency of the existence of audit committee (AQ5) in crisis period (from 19,88% to 
22.40% in cluster 1, 20,89% to 25,67% in cluster 2 and 12,05% to 15,46% in cluster 
3). However, the results for other discrete audit quality measures are questionable 
among clusters. Table 6 Panel B appears an increase of the frequency of the use of 
Big Four auditors (AQ4) from 54,70% to 56,50% in cluster 3 and a decrease from 
64,41% to 58,41% and from 75,15% to 71,19% in clusters 1 and 2 respectively. 
Additionally, there is an increase of the frequency of the appearance of a qualified 
audit opinion (AQ2) for clusters 1 and 3 (from 5,37% to 27,13% in cluster 1 and from 
0,81% to 0,98% in cluster 3) and a decrease for cluster 2 (from 3,23% to 2,93%). 
Finally, the results of Table 6 Panel B shows an increase of the frequency of the firms 
that switch auditors from pre to crisis period in clusters 1 and 2 (from 4,31% to 7,99% 
and from 1,98% to 13,76% respectively) and a decrease in cluster 3 (from 22,85% to 
18,79%). 
Finally, Table 6 Panel B compares the discrete control variables among 
clusters during pre and crisis period. The results are controversial. Specifically, the 
frequencies of industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), negative earnings 
realization (NER), timely loss recognition (LL), losses (LOSSES), financial distress 
(LAGLOSS) and proxy for a bad news (DR) in cluster 1, negative earnings realization 
(NER), small profits (SP), timely loss recognition (LL), losses (LOSSES) and 
financial distress (LAGLOSS) in cluster 2 and industrial classification (SICODE), 
negative earnings realization (NER), negative book equity (NEGEQ), small profits 
(SP), timely loss recognition (LL), losses (LOSSES), financial distress (LAGLOSS) 
and proxy for a bad news (DR) in cluster 3 were increased. On contrary, the 
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frequencies of classification of firm by market capitalization (FIRM), negative book 
equity (NEGEQ), profitability (INCR), profitability (PROFIT) and small profits (SP) 
in cluster 1, industrial classification (SICODE), negative book equity (NEGEQ), 
profitability (INCR), profitability (PROFIT) and proxy for a bad news (DR) in cluster 
2 and profitability (INCR) and profitability (PROFIT) in cluster 3 were decreased.     
(Insert Table 6 Panels A and B here) 
 
6.3. Correlation analysis 
Pearson correlation coefficients (not reported here) among all independent 
regression variables for each examining regression equation show diversity among the 
clusters. For brevity, we only outline the correlations among test variables that are 
negatively or positively correlated in all clusters. 
Concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 40, corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) is positively correlated with length of operating cycle (LOC), market 
share (MASH), marginal corporate tax rate dummy variable (MCTR) and proxy for a 
bad news dummy variable (DR), and negatively correlated with industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). 
Sales volatility (SV) is positively correlated with financial distress dummy variable 
(LAGLOSS) and negative correlated with crisis period (CRISIS). Cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV) is positively correlated with proxy for a bad news (DR) 
and economic development (GDP), and negatively correlated with financial 
development (MCAP) and market concentration using Herfindahl – Hirschman index 
(HERF). Length of operating cycle (LOC) is negatively correlated with financial 
distress dummy variable (LAGLOSS) and industrial classification (SICODE), and 
positively correlated with market share (MASH) and marginal corporate tax rate 
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dummy variable (MCTR). Financial distress dummy variable (LAGLOSS) is 
negatively correlated with market share (MASH), marginal corporate tax rate dummy 
variable (MCTR), annual stock return (R), the product of annual stock return and the 
proxy of bad news (R*DR) and financial development (MCAP), and positively 
correlated with proxy for a bad news (DR), crisis period (CRISIS) and the change in 
net income (ΓNI). Market share (MASH) is positively correlated with marginal 
corporate tax rate dummy variable (MCTR) and market concentration using 
Herfindahl – Hirschman index (HERF), and negatively correlated with industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE). Annual stock return (R) is negatively 
correlated with proxy for a bad news dummy variable (DR) and positively correlated 
with the product of annual stock return and the proxy of bad news (R*DR). Proxy for 
a bad news dummy variable (DR) is negatively correlated with the product of annual 
stock return and the proxy of bad news (R*DR) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE). Corporate efficiency (CORPEFFIC) is positively correlated with 
proxy for a bad news dummy variable (DR) and TOBIN's Q (TOBINQ). Crisis period 
dummy variable (CRISIS) is negatively correlated with the product of annual stock 
return and the proxy of bad news (R*DR) and financial development (MCAP), and 
positively correlated with economic development (GDP). In addition, there is positive 
correlation between the market beta coefficient (BETA) and economic development 
(GDP), and negative correlation between corporate profitability (CORPROFIT) and 
corporate performance (CORPERFOR), and between marginal corporate tax rate 
dummy variable (MCTR) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE).   
Concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 41, the results show 
that crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) is positively correlated with transparency 
of government policymaking (INVPR3), the interaction term of crisis period dummy 
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variable and investor protection (CRISIS*INVPRk) and losses dummy variable 
(LOSSES), and negatively correlated with strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6), corporate size (CORPSIZE), and inherent risk 
(IRISK) in all clusters. Property rights (INVPR1) is positively correlated with judicial 
independence (INVPR2), transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3), 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards 
(INVPR5) and protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6), and negatively 
correlated with strength of investor protection (INVPR7) in all clusters. Judicial 
independence (INVPR2) is positively correlated with transparency of government 
policymaking (INVPR3) and efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), and negatively 
correlated with industrial classification (SICODE) in all clusters. Transparency of 
government policymaking (INVPR3) is positively correlated with strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6), the interaction term of crisis period 
dummy variable and investor protection (CRISIS*INVPRk) and losses dummy 
variable (LOSSES), and negatively correlated with strength of investor protection 
(INVPR7) in all clusters. Strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4) is 
positively correlated with efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) and legal rights index (INVPR8), and 
negatively correlated with the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and 
investor protection (CRISIS*INVPRk) in all clusters. Efficacy of corporate boards 
(INVPR5) is positively correlated with protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(INVPR6) and negatively correlated with the interaction term of crisis period dummy 
variable and investor protection (CRISIS*INVPRk) in all clusters. Protection of 
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minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) is positively correlated with legal rights 
index (INVPR8) and negatively correlated with the interaction term of crisis period 
dummy variable and investor protection (CRISIS*INVPRk) in all clusters. Strength of 
investor protection (INVPR7) is positively correlated with the interaction term of 
crisis period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7) in 
all clusters. The interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and property rights 
(CRISIS*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of crisis period 
dummy variable and judicial independence (CRISIS*INVPR2), crisis period dummy 
variable and transparency of government policymaking (CRISIS*INVPR3), crisis 
period dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(CRISIS*INVPR4), crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(CRISIS*INVPR5), crisis period dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (CRISIS*INVPR6), crisis period dummy variable and strength 
of investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7), crisis period dummy variable and legal 
rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES), and negatively 
correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) in all clusters. The interaction term of crisis 
period dummy variable and judicial independence (CRISIS*INVPR2) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and transparency 
of government policymaking (CRISIS*INVPR3), crisis period dummy variable and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (CRISIS*INVPR4), crisis period dummy 
variable and efficacy of corporate boards (CRISIS*INVPR5), crisis period dummy 
variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (CRISIS*INVPR6), crisis 
period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7), crisis 
period dummy variable and legal rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) and losses dummy 
variable (LOSSES), and negatively correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) in all 
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clusters. The interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (CRISIS*INVPR3) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (CRISIS*INVPR4), crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of 
corporate boards (CRISIS*INVPR5), crisis period dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (CRISIS*INVPR6), crisis period dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7), crisis period dummy variable and 
legal rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES), and 
negatively correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in 
all clusters. The interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (CRISIS*INVPR4) is positively correlated with the 
interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(CRISIS*INVPR5), crisis period dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (CRISIS*INVPR6), crisis period dummy variable and strength 
of investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7), crisis period dummy variable and legal 
rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES), and negatively 
correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(CRISIS*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the interaction term of crisis period 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (CRISIS*INVPR6), 
crisis period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7), 
crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) and losses 
dummy variable (LOSSES), and negatively correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of crisis period 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (CRISIS*INVPR6) 
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is positively correlated with the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7), crisis period dummy variable and 
legal rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES), and 
negatively correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in 
all clusters. The interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (CRISIS*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the interaction 
term of crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) and 
negatively correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (CRISIS*INVPR8) is positively 
correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) and negatively correlated with corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) and inherent risk (IRISK) in all clusters. Corporate size (CORPSIZE) is 
positively correlated with accruals (ACCRUAL) and inherent risk (IRISK), and 
negatively correlated with industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all 
clusters. Risk (RISK) is positively correlated with financial leverage (LEVERAGE) in 
all clusters. Profitability (PROFIT) is negatively correlated with losses dummy 
variable (LOSSES) in all clusters. Corporate complexity (COMPLEX) is positively 
correlated with inherent risk (IRISK) in all clusters. 
Concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 42 in pre crisis 
period, the results reveal that audit fees (AQ1) is positively correlated with the 
interaction term of audit fees and investor protection (AQ1*INVPRk) in all clusters. 
Modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) is positively correlated with 
property rights (INVPR1), judicial independence (INVPR2), strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6), the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and investor protection (AQ2*INVPRk), auditor switch and strength of 
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investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor switch and legal rights index 
(AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with status of audit firm (AQ4) and the 
interaction terms of status of audit firm and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all 
clusters. Auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) is positively correlated with property 
rights (INVPR1), judicial independence (INVPR2), strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6), the interaction term of auditor switch and investor 
protection (AQ3*INVPRk) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), and 
negatively correlated with status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4), existence of 
audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee and investor 
protection (AQ5*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. AQ4 is 
positively correlated with existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), 
demand for auditing dummy variable (AQ6), the interaction terms of status of audit 
firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) 
and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable  and investor protection AQ2*INVPRk, 
auditor switch dummy variable and investor protection AQ3*INVPRk, timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. Existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) is 
positively correlated with demand for auditing dummy variable (AQ6), strength of 
investor protection (INVPR7), the interaction terms of strength of auditing and 
reporting standards and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), efficacy of corporate 
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boards and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), protection of minority shareholders' 
interests and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with property rights (INVPR1), judicial 
independence (INVPR2), transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3), 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6), the interaction term of auditor switch dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ3*INVPRk), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
Demand for auditing dummy variable (AQ6) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. Property rights 
(INVPR1) is positively correlated with judicial independence (INVPR2), transparency 
of government policymaking (INVPR3), strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6), the interaction terms of modified audit report 
opinion dummy variable and investor protection (AQ2*INVPRk) and auditor switch 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ3*INVPRk), and negatively correlated 
with strength of investor protection (INVPR7), the interaction terms of status of audit 
firm dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), existence of 
audit committee dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ5*INVPR4), existence of audit committee dummy variable and efficacy of 
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corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7)  and net income (NI) in all clusters. 
Judicial independence (INVPR2) is positively correlated with transparency of 
government policymaking (INVPR3), strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6) and the interaction terms of modified audit report 
opinion dummy variable and investor protection (AQ2*INVPRk), auditor switch 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ3*INVPRk), and negatively correlated 
with strength of investor protection (INVPR7), the interaction terms of existence of 
audit committee dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ5*INVPR4), existence of audit committee dummy variable and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7) and net income (NI) in all clusters. 
Transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3) is positively correlated with 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards 
(INVPR5) and protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6), and negatively 
correlated with strength of investor protection (INVPR7), the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPR7) and demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ6*INVPR8) in all clusters. Strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(INVPR4) is positively correlated with efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6), the interaction terms of 
judicial independence and investor protection (AQ2*INVPRk) and transparency of 
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government policymaking and investor protection (AQ3*INVPRk), and negatively 
correlated with the interaction term of existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) in all clusters. Efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) is positively 
correlated with protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) and 
interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ2*INVPRk), and negatively correlated with net income (NI) in all 
clusters. Protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) is positively 
correlated with modified audit report opinion dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ2*INVPRk) and auditor switch dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ3*INVPRk), and negatively correlated with the interaction term of existence of 
audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk) and net 
income (NI) in all clusters. Strength of investor protection (INVPR7) is positively 
correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7) in all clusters. Legal rights index 
(INVPR8) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ4*INVPR2), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8) and demand for 
auditing dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ6*INVPR2), and negatively 
correlated with the market beta coefficient (BETA) in all clusters. The interaction 
term of audit fees and property rights (AQ1*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the 
interaction term of audit fees and judicial independence (AQ1*INVPR2), audit fees 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ1*INVPR3), audit fees and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ1*INVPR4), audit fees and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ1*INVPR5), audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' 
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interests (AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor protection 
(AQ1*INVPR7) and audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of audit fees and judicial independence (AQ1*INVPR2) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ1*INVPR3), audit fees and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ1*INVPR4), audit fees and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ1*INVPR5), audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7) and 
audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
audit fees and transparency of government policymaking (AQ1*INVPR3) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ1*INVPR4), audit fees and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ1*INVPR5), audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7) and 
audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
audit fees and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ1*INVPR4) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ1*INVPR5), audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7) and 
audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
audit fees and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ1*INVPR5) is positively correlated 
with the interactions terms of audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor protection 
(AQ1*INVPR7) and audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
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(AQ1*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and 
strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7) and audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*INVPR8) in all clusters. The interaction term of audit fees and strength of 
investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the interaction term of 
audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and property rights (AQ2*INVPR1) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ2*INVPR2), modified audit report 
opinion dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*INVPR3), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*INVPR4), modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit report opinion dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor switch dummy variable and legal 
rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with the interaction term of 
status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all 
clusters. The interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and 
judicial independence (AQ2*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction 
terms of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ2*INVPR3), modified audit report opinion dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*INVPR4), modified 
audit report opinion dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
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(AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), auditor switch 
dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ3*INVPR2), auditor switch dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor switch 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with 
the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*INVPR3) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*INVPR4), 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), auditor switch 
dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ3*INVPR2), auditor switch dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor switch 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with 
the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standard (AQ2*INVPR4) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit 
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report opinion dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit report opinion dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor switch dummy variable and legal 
rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with the interaction term of 
status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all 
clusters. The interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), auditor switch 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor 
switch dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively 
correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of modified 
audit report opinion dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ2*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), 
auditor switch dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) 
and auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), and 
negatively correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
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modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ2*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), auditor switch 
dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ3*INVPR2), auditor switch dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor switch 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with 
the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8) is positively correlated with 
the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ3*INVPR2), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*INVPR7) and auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ3*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with the interaction term of status of audit 
firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable and property rights (AQ3*INVPR1) 
is positively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable 
and judicial independence (AQ3*INVPR2), auditor switch dummy variable and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*INVPR3), auditor switch dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*INVPR4), auditor 
switch dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), auditor 
switch dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ3*INVPR8) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), and negatively 
correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
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investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) 
in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable and judicial 
independence (AQ3*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
auditor switch dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ3*INVPR3), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ3*INVPR4), auditor switch dummy variable and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), auditor switch dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), 
and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy 
variable and onvestor protection (AQ4-*INVPRk), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch 
dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*INVPR3) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*INVPR4), auditor switch dummy 
variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), auditor switch dummy 
variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), auditor 
switch dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor 
switch dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) and timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms 
of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), 
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net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term 
of auditor switch dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ3*INVPR4) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), auditor switch 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), 
auditor switch dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), 
auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) and timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms 
of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), 
net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term 
of auditor switch dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy 
variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) and timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit 
firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), net income (NI) 
and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), 
and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy 
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variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable 
and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the 
interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ3*INVPR8), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms 
of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), 
net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term 
of auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) is positively 
correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), and negatively 
correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) 
in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
property rights (AQ4*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
status of audit firm dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ4*INVPR2), status 
of audit firm dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*INVPR3), status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ4*INVPR4), status of audit firm dummy variable and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status of audit firm dummy variable and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit 
firm dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), net income (NI) and 
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corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable 
and judicial independence (AQ4*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction 
terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ4*INVPR3), status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*INVPR4), status of audit firm dummy variable 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status of audit firm dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit 
firm dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*INVPR3) is positively correlated 
with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*INVPR4), status of audit firm dummy variable 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status of audit firm dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit 
firm dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), net income (NI) and 
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corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable 
and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*INVPR4) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status of audit firm dummy variable and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit 
firm dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit firm dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of 
audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
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(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit firm dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with audit committee dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction 
term of status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate 
size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of negatively 
correlated with audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status 
of audit firm dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and strength of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with timely loss recognition 
dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all 
clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
property rights (AQ5*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
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existence of audit committee dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ5*INVPR2), existence of audit committee dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*INVPR3), existence of audit committee dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*INVPR4), existence of 
audit committee dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength 
of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), 
and negatively correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction 
term of existence of audit committee dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ5*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ5*INVPR3), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*INVPR4), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
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existence of audit committee dummy variable and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ5*INVPR3) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ5*INVPR4), existence of audit committee dummy variable and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net 
income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*INVPR4) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ5*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
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(AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ5*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with timely loss recognition 
dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all 
clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8) is positively correlated with the interaction term of 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net 
income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
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(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and property rights (AQ6*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ6*INVPR2), demand for auditing dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ6*INVPR3), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4), demand for auditing 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and judicial 
independence (AQ6*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
demand for auditing dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ6*INVPR3), demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand 
for auditing dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) 
and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), 
timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing 
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dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*INVPR3) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand 
for auditing dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4) is positively correlated with the interaction 
terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ6*INVPR5), demand for auditing dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5) is positively correlated with 
the interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size 
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(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate 
size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7) is positively correlated 
with the interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ6*INVPR8) is positively correlated with net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. Change in receivables (ΓRAV) is positively correlated with 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE) in all clusters. Net income (NI) is positively 
correlated with corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. Total accruals (TA) is negatively 
correlated with corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. Small profits dummy 
variable (SP) is positively correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable 
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(LL) in all clusters. Timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) is positively 
correlated with total debt (DEBT) and the market beta coefficient (BETA) in all 
clusters. Corporate size (CORPSIZE) is negatively correlated with industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
Similarly, concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 42 in crisis 
period, the results reveal that audit fees (AQ1) is positively correlated with existence 
of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), demand for auditing dummy variable 
(AQ6), the interaction terms of audit fees and investor protection (AQ1*INVPRk), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk) 
and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA) 
and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. modified audit report 
opinion dummy variable (AQ2) is positively correlated with the interaction term of 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and investor protection (AQ2*INVPRk) 
and negatively correlated with status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and the 
interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. Auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) is positively 
correlated with the interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable andinvestor 
protection (AQ3*INVPRk), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) and negatively correlated with status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), demand for auditing dummy 
variable (AQ6), property rights (INVPR1), judicial independence (INVPR2), the 
interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
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(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. 
Status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) is positively correlated with existence of 
audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), demand for auditing dummy variable (AQ6), 
judicial independence (INVPR2), the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and investor protection (AQ2*INVPRk), auditor 
switch dummy variable and investor protection (AQ3*INVPRk), current assets 
(Current), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), cash flow from operations 
volatility (CFOV) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all 
clusters. Existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) is positively correlated 
with demand for auditing dummy variable (AQ6), the interaction terms of audit fees 
and investor protection (AQ1*INVPRk), status of audit firm dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4), the 
interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ3*INVPRk), total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), 
cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. Demand for auditing dummy variable (AQ6) is 
positively correlated with judicial independence (INVPR2), the interaction terms of 
audit fees and investor protection (AQ1*INVPRk), status of audit firm dummy 
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variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5), the interaction term of 
auditor switch dummy variable and investor protection (AQ3*INVPRk), total accruals 
(TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), the market beta coefficient 
(BETA) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
Property rights (INVPR1) is positively correlated with judicial independence 
(INVPR2), transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3), strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (INVPR4), protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(INVPR6), the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and 
property rights (AQ2*INVPR1), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*INVPR3), modified audit report 
opinion dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7) and cash 
flow from operations volatility (CFOV) in all clusters. Jjudicial independence 
(INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ5*INVPR2), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ5*INVPR2), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ6*INVPR2), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ6*INVPR3), demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand for auditing dummy variable 
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and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch 
dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*INVPR4), 
auditor switch dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), 
auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. Transparency of government 
policymaking (INVPR3) is positively correlated with strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (INVPR4), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) in all clusters. strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (INVPR4) is positively correlated with efficacy of corporate 
boards (INVPR5),  protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) and cash 
flow from operations volatility (CFOV), and negatively correlated with the interaction 
terms of existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and property rights 
(AQ6*INVPR1), demand for auditing dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ6*INVPR2), demand for auditing dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ6*INVPR3), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4), demand for auditing 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7) and 
demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8) in all 
clusters. Efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) is positively correlated with 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) and cash flow from operations 
volatility (CFOV), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of 
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audit committee dummy variable and property rights (AQ5*INVPR1), existence of 
audit committee dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ5*INVPR2), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8) and net income (NI) in all clusters. Protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) is positively correlated with cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV) in all clusters. Strength of investor protection (INVPR7) 
is positively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*INVPR4), status of 
audit firm dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status of 
audit firm dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ4*INVPR6) and status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*INVPR7), and negatively correlated with current assets (Current) and 
cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) in all clusters. Legal rights index 
(INVPR8) is negatively correlated with the market beta coefficient (BETA) in all 
clusters. The interaction term of audit fees and property rights (AQ1*INVPR1) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and judicial independence 
(AQ1*INVPR2), audit fees and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ1*INVPR3), audit fees and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ1*INVPR4), audit fees and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ1*INVPR5), audit 
fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and 
strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7), audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
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(AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total 
accruals (TA) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of audit fees and judicial independence (AQ1*INVPR2) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ1*INVPR3), audit fees and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ1*INVPR4), audit fees and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ1*INVPR5), audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7), audit 
fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA) and timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) in all clusters. The interaction term of audit fees and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ1*INVPR3) is positively correlated with the interaction 
terms of audit fees and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ1*INVPR4), 
audit fees and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ1*INVPR5), audit fees and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor 
protection (AQ1*INVPR7), audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8), existence 
of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand 
for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate 
size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA) and timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. The interaction term of audit fees and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ1*INVPR4) is positively correlated 
with the interaction terms of audit fees and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ1*INVPR5), audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
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(AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7), audit 
fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA) and timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) in all clusters. The interaction term of audit fees and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ1*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ1*INVPR6), audit fees 
and strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7), audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total 
accruals (TA) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of audit fees and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ1*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and 
strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7), audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total 
accruals (TA) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of audit fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*INVPR7) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total 
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accruals (TA) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*INVPR8) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with total accruals (TA) and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL)  
in all clusters. The interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable 
and property rights (AQ2*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the interaction terms 
of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ2*INVPR2), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ2*INVPR3), modified audit report opinion dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*INVPR4), modified 
audit report opinion dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), and negatively 
correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of modified 
audit report opinion dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ2*INVPR2) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*INVPR3), 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ2*INVPR4), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit report opinion dummy variable 
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and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), 
and negatively correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ2*INVPR3) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ2*INVPR4), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit report opinion dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), 
and negatively correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ2*INVPR4) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*INVPR5), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), and negatively 
correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The interaction term of modified 
audit report opinion dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*INVPR5) 
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is positively correlated with the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6), 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit report opinion dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ2*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with the interaction term of status of audit 
firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7), modified audit report opinion dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ2*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with the interaction 
term of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in 
all clusters. The interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ2*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the 
interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ2*INVPR8), and negatively correlated with the interaction term of status of 
audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of modified audit report opinion dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ2*INVPR8) is negatively correlated with the interaction term of status of 
audit firm dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable and property rights (AQ3*INVPR1) 
is positively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable 
and judicial independence (AQ3*INVPR2), auditor switch dummy variable and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*INVPR3), auditor switch dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*INVPR4), auditor 
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switch dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), auditor 
switch dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ3*INVPR8), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely loss recognition 
dummy variable (LL), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE), and negatively correlated with the 
interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ3*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch 
dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*INVPR3), 
auditor switch dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ3*INVPR4), auditor switch dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*INVPR5), auditor switch dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ3*INVPR8), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
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(CORPSIZE) in all clusters.The interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*INVPR3) is positively correlated 
with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ3*INVPR4), auditor switch dummy variable and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), auditor switch dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable 
and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*INVPR4) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5), auditor switch dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
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(CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6), auditor switch dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ3*INVPR8), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*INVPR6) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of auditor switch dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7), auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ3*INVPR8), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE), and negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable 
and strength of investor protection (AQ3*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the 
interaction term of auditor switch dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ3*INVPR8), total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely loss recognition 
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dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), and 
negatively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI), corporate size (CORPSIZE) and 
the market beta coefficient (BETA) in all clusters. The interaction term of auditor 
switch dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ3*INVPR8) is positively correlated 
with total accruals (TA), current assets (Current), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), and negatively 
correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ4*INVPRk), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all 
clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and property 
rights (AQ4*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of status of 
audit firm dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ4*INVPR2), status of audit 
firm dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*INVPR3), 
status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*INVPR4), status of audit firm dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*INVPR5), status of audit firm dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit firm dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), 
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and negatively correlated with current assets (Current), timely loss recognition 
dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all 
clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and judicial 
independence (AQ4*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
status of audit firm dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*INVPR3), status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ4*INVPR4), status of audit firm dummy variable and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status of audit firm dummy variable and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm 
dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit 
firm dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with current assets (Current), 
timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy 
variable and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*INVPR3) is positively 
correlated with the interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*INVPR4), status of audit firm 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status of audit firm 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*INVPR6), 
status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit firm dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ4*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
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(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with current assets (Current), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) 
and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction 
term of status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ4*INVPR4) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of status 
of audit firm dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*INVPR5), status 
of audit firm dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit firm dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ4*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with current assets (Current), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) 
and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction 
term of status of audit firm dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of status of audit 
firm dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ4*INVPR6), status of audit firm dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status of audit firm dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ4*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with current assets (Current), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) 
and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction 
term of status of audit firm dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' 
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interests (AQ4*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of status of 
audit firm dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7), status 
of audit firm dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ4*INVPR8), existence of 
audit committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with current assets (Current), 
timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ4*INVPR7) is positively correlated 
with the interaction terms of status of audit firm dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ4*INVPR8), existence of audit committee dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with current assets (Current), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of status of audit firm dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ4*INVPR8) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and investor protection (AQ5*INVPRk), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with current assets (Current), 
timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), cash flow from operations volatility 
(CFOV) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The 
interaction term of existence of audit committee dummy variable and property rights 
(AQ5*INVPR1) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and judicial independence (AQ5*INVPR2), existence of 
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audit committee dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ5*INVPR3), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*INVPR4), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and judicial independence 
(AQ5*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ5*INVPR3), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*INVPR4), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and 
legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial 
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classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ5*INVPR3) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ5*INVPR4), existence of audit committee dummy variable and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*INVPR6), existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net 
income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total 
accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) 
in all clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*INVPR4) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*INVPR6), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), 
cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit 
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committee dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*INVPR5) is 
positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit committee 
dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*INVPR6), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*INVPR7), existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights index 
(AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), 
cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7), 
existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net 
income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total 
accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) 
in all clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit committee dummy variable 
and strength of investor protection (AQ5*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the 
interaction term of existence of audit committee dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ5*INVPR8), demand for auditing dummy variable and investor protection 
(AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively 
correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), 
cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial classification dummy 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
242 
 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of existence of audit 
committee dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ5*INVPR8) is positively 
correlated with the interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and 
investor protection (AQ6*INVPRk), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), 
and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of 
demand for auditing dummy variable and property rights (AQ6*INVPR1) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and 
judicial independence (AQ6*INVPR2), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*INVPR3), demand for auditing 
dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4), 
demand for auditing dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ6*INVPR5), demand for auditing dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and judicial independence (AQ6*INVPR2) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ6*INVPR3), demand for auditing dummy variable and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4), demand for auditing 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand for 
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auditing dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ6*INVPR3) is positively correlated with the interaction 
terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ6*INVPR4), demand for auditing dummy variable and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand for auditing dummy variable and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy 
variable and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate 
size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*INVPR4) is positively 
correlated with the interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*INVPR5), demand for auditing dummy variable 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6), demand for 
auditing dummy variable and strength of investor protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand 
for auditing dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) 
and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), 
the market beta coefficient (BETA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and 
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industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction 
term of demand for auditing dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ6*INVPR5) is positively correlated with the interaction terms of demand for 
auditing dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ6*INVPR6), demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*INVPR6) is positively correlated with the 
interaction terms of demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPR7), demand for auditing dummy variable and legal rights 
index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and 
negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy 
variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
The interaction term of demand for auditing dummy variable and strength of investor 
protection (AQ6*INVPR7) is positively correlated with the interaction term of demand 
for auditing dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8), net income (NI) 
and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total accruals (TA), 
timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial classification dummy 
variable (SICODE) in all clusters. The interaction term of demand for auditing 
dummy variable and legal rights index (AQ6*INVPR8) is positively correlated with 
net income (NI) and corporate size (CORPSIZE), and negatively correlated with total 
accruals (TA), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and industrial 
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classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. Change in receivables 
(ΓRAV) is positively correlated with property, plant, and equipment (PPE) in all 
clusters. Net income (NI) is positively correlated with corporate size (CORPSIZE) 
and return on assets (ROA), and negatively correlated with timely loss recognition 
dummy variable (LL) in all clusters. Total accruals (TA) is negatively correlated with 
Corporate size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. Small profits dummy variable (SP) is 
positively correlated with timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) and corporate 
size (CORPSIZE) in all clusters. Corporate size (CORPSIZE) is positively correlated 
with cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and negatively correlated with 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. 
Concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 43, the results reveal 
that natural log of debt to assets ratio (LNLEV) is positively correlated with trading 
volume (VOLUME), corporate size (CORPSIZE), audit fees (AQ1), status of audit 
firm dummy variable (AQ4) and existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), 
and negatively correlated with natural log of debt to assets ratio (LNLEV), natural log 
of book to market ratio (LNBM), classification of firm by market capitalization 
dummy variable (FIRM), industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), auditor 
switch dummy variable (AQ3) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) in all 
clusters. Book-to-market ratio (BM) is positively correlated with natural log of book 
to market ratio (LNBM) and negatively correlated with natural log of debt to assets 
ratio (LNLEV) in all clusters. Trading volume (VOLUME) is positively correlated 
with corporate size (CORPSIZE), status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and 
existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), and negatively correlated with 
classification of firm by market capitalization dummy variable (FIRM) and crisis 
period dummy variable (CRISIS) in all clusters. Cash flow from operations (CFO) is 
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negatively correlated with natural log of debt to assets ratio (LNLEV) and modified 
audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) in all clusters. Natural log of debt to 
assets ratio (LNLEV) is positively correlated with natural log of book to market ratio 
(LNBM), classification of firm by market capitalization dummy variable (FIRM), 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), auditor switch dummy variable 
(AQ3) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS), and negatively correlated with 
corporate size (CORPSIZE) and status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) in all 
clusters. Natural log of book to market ratio (LNBM) is positively correlated with 
classification of firm by market capitalization dummy variable (FIRM), auditor switch 
dummy variable (AQ3) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS), and negatively 
correlated with corporate size (CORPSIZE) and status of audit firm dummy variable 
(AQ4) in all clusters. Corporate size (CORPSIZE) is positively correlated with audit 
fees (AQ1), status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and existence of audit 
committee dummy variable (AQ5), and negatively correlated with classification of 
firm by market capitalization dummy variable (FIRM), industrial classification 
dummy variable (SICODE), auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) and crisis period 
dummy variable (CRISIS) in all clusters. Classification of firm by market 
capitalization dummy variable (FIRM) is positively correlated with industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) and auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3), 
and negatively correlated with status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and 
existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) in all clusters. Industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) is positively correlated with auditor switch 
dummy variable (AQ3) and negatively correlated with status of audit firm dummy 
variable (AQ4) and existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) in all 
clusters. Status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) is positively correlated with 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
247 
 
existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) and negatively correlated with 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) and auditor switch dummy 
variable (AQ3) in all clusters. Audit fees (AQ1) is positively correlated with existence 
of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) in all clusters. Auditor switch dummy 
variable (AQ3) is negatively correlated with existence of audit committee dummy 
variable (AQ5) in all clusters. Existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) is 
positively correlated with crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) in all clusters. 
Concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 44 in pre crisis 
period, the results reveal that the market beta coefficient (BETA) is positively 
correlated with value relevance (EQ3) and negatively correlated with sales volatility 
(SV), accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) and accruals quality 
measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) in all clusters. Corporate size (CORPSIZE) is 
positively correlated with book-to-market ratio (BM), collateral value or asset 
structure of assets (COLLATERAL), non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT), profitability 
(PROFITABILITY) and loss avoidance (EQ9), and negatively correlated with 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in all clusters. Financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE) is positively correlated with negative earnings realization dummy 
variable (NER) and negatively correlated with profitability (PROFITABILITY) and 
loss avoidance (EQ9) in all clusters. Sales volatility (SV) is positively correlated with 
negative earnings realization dummy variable (NER) and ex post conservatism (EQ1), 
and negatively correlated with value relevance (EQ3) in all clusters. Negative earnings 
realization dummy variable (NER) is positively correlated with collateral value or 
asset structure of assets (COLLATERAL), non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT), 
uniqueness (UNIQUENESS) and ex post conservatism (EQ1), and negatively 
correlated with profitability (PROFITABILITY) in all clusters. Collateral value or 
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asset structure of assets (COLLATERAL) is positively correlated with profitability 
(PROFITABILITY) and ex post conservatism (EQ1) in all clusters. Non-debt tax 
shields (NON-DEBT) is positively correlated with growth (GROWTH) and earnings 
smoothness (EQ10) in all clusters. Profitability (PROFITABILITY) is positively 
correlated with loss avoidance (EQ9) in all clusters. Ex post conservatism (EQ1) is 
positively correlated with earnings persistence (EQ7) in all clusters. Value relevance 
(EQ3) is positively correlated with earnings persistence (EQ7) and negatively 
correlated with accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) and accruals 
quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) in all clusters. Accruals quality 
measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) is positively correlated with accruals quality 
measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) in all clusters. Accruals quality measured by 
Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) is negatively correlated with earnings smoothness (EQ10) in 
all clusters. Earnings predictability (EQ8) is negatively correlated with earnings 
smoothness (EQ10) in all clusters. 
Similarly, concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 44 in crisis 
period, the results reveal that the market beta coefficient (BETA) is positively 
correlated with value relevance (EQ3) and negatively correlated with corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) and ex post conservatism (EQ1) in all clusters. Corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) is positively correlated with collateral value or asset structure of assets 
(COLLATERAL), non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT) and earnings predictability 
(EQ8), and negatively correlated with industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) in all clusters. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is positively correlated 
with non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT) and growth (GROWTH) in all clusters. Cash 
flow from operations volatility (CFOV) is positively correlated with negative earnings 
realization dummy variable (NER) and accruals quality measured by Kothari et al 
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(2005) (EQ6) in all clusters. Sales volatility (SV) is positively correlated with negative 
earnings realization dummy variable (NER) and growth (GROWTH), and negatively 
correlated with earnings persistence (EQ7) and earnings smoothness (EQ10) in all 
clusters. Negative earnings realization dummy variable (NER) is positively correlated 
with collateral value or asset structure of assets (COLLATERAL), non-debt tax 
shields (NON-DEBT), uniqueness (UNIQUENESS), liquidity (LIQUIDITY) and 
accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6), and negatively correlated 
with loss avoidance (EQ9) in all clusters. Non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT) is 
positively correlated with growth (GROWTH) in all clusters. Value relevance (EQ3) 
is positively correlated with earnings smoothness (EQ10) in all clusters. Accruals 
quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) is positively correlated with accruals 
quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) and accruals quality measured by 
Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6), and negatively correlated with earnings smoothness (EQ10) 
in all clusters. Accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) is positively 
correlated with accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) and 
negatively correlated with earnings persistence (EQ7) and earnings smoothness (EQ10) 
in all clusters. 
Concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 45, the results reveal 
that corporate size (CORPSIZE) is positively correlated with natural log of net 
income before extraordinary items (LNNIBE), natural log of market value of equity 
(LNMVE), collateral value or asset structure of assets (COLLATERAL), credit risk 
(CRISK), audit fees (AQ1), status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and existence 
of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), and negatively correlated with industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE), auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) and 
crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) in all clusters. Natural log of net income 
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before extraordinary items (LNNIBE) is positively correlated with natural log of 
market value of equity (LNMVE), collateral value or asset structure of assets 
(COLLATERAL), credit risk (CRISK), audit fees (AQ1), status of audit firm dummy 
variable (AQ4) and existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5), and 
negatively correlated with negative book equity dummy variable (NEGEQ), industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE), auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) and 
crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) in all clusters. natural log of market value of 
equity (LNMVE) is positively correlated with credit risk (CRISK), audit fees (AQ1), 
status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and existence of audit committee dummy 
variable (AQ5), and negatively correlated with negative book equity dummy variable 
(NEGEQ), industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), auditor switch 
dummy variable (AQ3) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) in all clusters. 
Negative book equity dummy variable (NEGEQ) is positively correlated with auditor 
switch dummy variable (AQ3) and negatively correlated with credit risk (CRISK), 
status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and existence of audit committee dummy 
variable (AQ5) in all clusters. Industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) is 
positively correlated with auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) and negatively 
correlated with status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and existence of audit 
committee dummy variable (AQ5) in all clusters. Credit risk (CRISK) is positively 
correlated with status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and existence of audit 
committee dummy variable (AQ5), and negatively correlated with modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) and auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) in all 
clusters. Status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) is positively correlated with 
existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) and negatively correlated with 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) and auditor switch dummy 
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variable (AQ3) in all clusters. Audit fees (AQ1) is positively correlated with existence 
of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) in all clusters. Auditor switch dummy 
variable (AQ3) is negatively correlated with existence of audit committee dummy 
variable (AQ5) in all clusters. Existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) is 
positively correlated with crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) in all clusters. 
Concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 46 in pre crisis 
period, the results reveal that financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is negatively 
correlated with loss avoidance (EQ9) in all clusters. Corporate size (CORPSIZE) is 
positively correlated with natural log of net income before extraordinary items 
(LNNIBE), cash flow from operations (CFO), R&D expense (RND) and loss 
avoidance (EQ9), and negatively correlated with profitability (INCR) in all clusters. 
Natural log of net income before extraordinary items (LNNIBE) is positively 
correlated with profitability (PROFIT), profitability (INCR), cash flow from 
operations (CFO) and loss avoidance (EQ9), and negatively correlated with accruals 
quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) in all clusters. Earnings per share 
(EPS) is positively correlated with change in earnings per share (ΓEPS) and 
profitability (PROFIT) in all clusters. Change in earnings per share (ΓEPS) is 
negatively correlated with profitability (INCR) in all clusters. Profitability (PROFIT) 
is positively correlated with profitability (INCR) and negatively correlated with R&D 
expense (RND) in all clusters. Profitability (INCR) is negatively correlated with R&D 
expense (RND) in all clusters. Value relevance (EQ3) is negatively correlated with 
earnings persistence (EQ7) in all clusters. Accruals quality measured by Dechow et al 
(1995) (EQ4) is positively correlated with accruals quality measured by McNichols 
(2002) (EQ5) and negatively correlated with earnings smoothness (EQ10) in all 
clusters. Accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) is negatively 
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correlated with earnings smoothness (EQ10) in all clusters. Accruals quality measured 
by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) is negatively correlated with earnings smoothness 
(EQ10) in all clusters. Earnings predictability (EQ8) is negatively correlated with 
earnings smoothness (EQ10) in all clusters. 
Similarly, concerning the correlation matrix of regression equation 46 in crisis 
period, the results reveal that corporate size (CORPSIZE) is positively correlated with 
natural log of net income before extraordinary items (LNNIBE) and R&D expense 
(RND), and negatively correlated with profitability (INCR) in all clusters. 
Profitability (PROFITABILITY) is positively correlated with natural log of net 
income before extraordinary items (LNNIBE) in all clusters. Interest coverage 
(INTCOV) is positively correlated with natural log of net income before extraordinary 
items (LNNIBE) in all clusters. Natural log of net income before extraordinary items 
(LNNIBE) is positively correlated with profitability (PROFIT), profitability (INCR) 
and R&D expense (RND), and negatively correlated with accruals quality measured 
by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) in all clusters. Change in earnings per share (ΓEPS) is 
positively correlated with earnings predictability (EQ8) and earnings smoothness 
(EQ10) in all clusters. Profitability (PROFIT) is positively correlated with profitability 
(INCR) and loss avoidance (EQ9), and negatively correlated with R&D expense 
(RND) in all clusters. Profitability (INCR) is negatively correlated with R&D expense 
(RND) and earnings smoothness (EQ10) in all clusters. R&D expense (RND) is 
positively correlated with accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) and 
accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) in all clusters. Ex post 
conservatism (EQ1) is positively correlated with accruals quality measured by 
Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4), accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) 
and accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) in all clusters. Accruals 
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quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) is positively correlated with accruals 
quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) and negatively correlated with earnings 
predictability (EQ8) in all clusters. Accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) 
(EQ5) is negatively correlated with earnings persistence (EQ7) and earnings 
predictability (EQ8) in all clusters. 
 
6.4. Regression analysis 
6.4.1. Earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008 
The correlation analysis suggests that earnings quality is affected at times of 
macroeconomic crisis, like financial crisis of 2008. However, the results are mixed as 
ex post conservatism (EQ₁), accruals quality (EQ₄, EQ₅ and EQ₆), and earnings 
predictability (EQ₈) are negatively influenced by financial crisis of 2008 while value 
relevance (EQ₃), earnings persistence (EQ₇), and earnings smoothness (EQ₁₀) are 
positively related to the CRISIS dummy variable. To strengthen the findings in 
previous sections, the paper uses multiple regression analysis to examine the influence 
of financial crisis of 2008 on earnings quality. The results are presented in Table 7 
where Panels A to J refer to each earnings quality attribute. 
 
6.4.1.1. Earnings conservatism under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panel A reports multiple regressions between ex post conservatism 
(EQ₁) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). The results show that the crisis 
period dummy variable (CRISIS) coefficients for all clusters are significant and has 
negative values of -2,081** for cluster 1, -0,851** for cluster 2, and -1,818** for 
cluster 3. It means that consistent with H1, the ex post conservatism (EQ₁) in years of 
financial crisis of 2008 is significantly higher than the degree of conservatism in the 
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years before the financial crisis of 2008. Moreover, these results support the findings 
of Warganegara and Vionita (2010), Francis et al (2013), and Kousenidis et al (2013) 
which implies that in an attempt to cope with bad news, like financial crisis of 2008, 
managers have an incentive to choose more aggressive conservatism during financial 
crisis. Cluster 1 displays lower R
2
, reflecting lower proportion of variance in the ex 
post conservatism (EQ₁) which can be explained by independent variables than the 
other clusters since cluster 1 is characterized by strong investor protection.  
Table 7 Panel B reports multiple regressions between ex ante conservatism 
(EQ₂) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). Inconsistent with H1, the crisis 
period dummy variable (CRISIS) coefficients (0,011 for cluster 1, -16,020 for cluster 
2, -0,005 for cluster 3) for all clusters are not statistically significant with ex ante 
conservatism (EQ₂). In other words, the observed results do not comply with 
theoretical expectations. Despite the fact that there is an increase of ex ante 
conservatism (EQ₂) during the financial crisis of 2008, crisis period dummy variable 
(CRISIS) has no any affection on this. The R
2
 appears to be slightly lower in cluster 1 
than in clusters 2 and 3 due to high level of shareholder protection.  
Examining control variables, consistent with Lev (1983), Lipe (1990), Ali and 
Hwang (2000), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Klein (2002), Ball et al (2003), Doyle et 
al (2007), Cohen (2008), Jiang and Anandarajan (2009), Cahan et al (2009), Gaio 
(2010), Yunos et al (2010), Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), Chen et al (2011), and 
Lee and Swenson (2011), Table 7 Panels A and B indicate that coefficients of sales 
volatility (SV), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV), economic development 
(GDP), financial development (MCAP), market concentration using Herfindahl – 
Hirschman index (HERF) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) are statistically significant 
with ex post conservatism (EQ1) and ex ante conservatism (EQ2) in all clusters. 
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However, the findings are shown more stringent in countries in clusters 2 and 3 since 
they are characterized by low investor protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panels A and B here) 
 
6.4.1.2. Value relevance under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panel C reports multiple regressions between value relevance (EQ₃) 
and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). The results are mixed and consistent with 
the findings from Iatridis (2010) and Kousenidis et al (2013). For cluster 1, which is 
characterized by strong investor protection, it presents lower scope for earnings 
manipulation which in turn it is interpreted by higher earnings quality or higher value 
relevance (-0,158**). On contrary, for clusters 2 and 3, which are characterized by 
weak shareholder protection, the crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) coefficient is 
significant and have positive values of 0,021** for cluster 2, and 0,180** for cluster 
3. Thus, the results from the Table 7 Panel C provide support for H2 for clusters 2 and 
3 and inconsistency for H2 for cluster 1. The R
2
 is higher in clusters 2 and 3 than in 
cluster 1 due to low level of shareholder protection.  
Examining control variables, consistent with Lev (1983), Ali and Hwang 
(2000), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Ball et al (2003), Doyle et al (2007), Cohen 
(2008), Jiang and Anandarajan (2009), Cahan et al (2009), Gaio (2010), Yunos et al 
(2010), Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), Chen et al (2011), Lee and Swenson 
(2011), and Houque et al (2012), Table 7 Panel C shows that coefficients of sales 
volatility (SV), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV), financial distress 
dummy variable (LAGLOSS), market share (MASH), the market beta coefficient 
(BETA), economic development (GDP), financial development (MCAP) and market 
concentration using Herfindahl – Hirschman index (HERF) are statistically significant 
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with value relevance (EQ3) in all clusters. However, the results are shown more 
severe in countries in clusters 2 and 3 since they are characterized by low shareholder 
protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panel C here) 
 
6.4.1.3. Accruals quality under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panels D, E and F reports multiple regressions between accruals 
quality measured by Dechow et al (1995), McNichols (2002) and Kothari et al (2005) 
(EQ₄, EQ₅, and EQ₆ respectively) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). 
Consistent with H3 the results in Table Panels D, E and F indicate that accruals 
quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ₄) (-3,883** for cluster 1, -148,487** 
for cluster 2, -0,190** for cluster 3), accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) 
(EQ₅) (-0,637** for cluster 1, -45,014** for cluster 2, -0,150** for cluster 3), accruals 
quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ₆) (-2,801** for cluster 1, -149,216** 
for cluster 2, -0,192** for cluster 3) is negatively associated with crisis period dummy 
variable (CRISIS). These results support the findings of Ahmed et al (2008), Filip and 
Laffournier (2012), Habib et al (2013) and Lu (2012) which implies that in an attempt 
to cope with the financial crisis period of 2008-2009, firms book more accruals to 
depress earnings so as to improve performance after depression. The R
2
 appears to be 
higher in clusters 2 and 3 than in cluster 1.  
Examining control variables, consistent with Lev (1983), Lipe (1990), Ali and 
Hwang (2000), Klein (2002), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Ball et al (2003), Doyle et 
al (2007), Cohen (2008), Jiang and Anandarajan (2009), Cahan et al (2009), Yunos et 
al (2010), Gaio (2010), Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), Chen et al (2011), and Lee 
and Swenson (2011), Table 7 Panels D, E and F indicate that coefficients of corporate 
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size (CORPSIZE), sales volatility (SV), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV), 
proxy for a bad news dummy variable (DR), economic development (GDP), financial 
development (MCAP) and market concentration using Herfindahl – Hirschman index 
(HERF) are statistically significant with accruals quality measured by Dechow et al 
(1995), McNichols (2002) and Kothari et al (2005) (EQ₄, EQ₅, and EQ₆ 
respectively) in all clusters. However, the findings are shown more rigorous in 
countries in clusters 2 and 3 since they are characterized by low investor protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panels D, E and F here) 
 
6.4.1.4. Earnings persistence under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panel G reports multiple regressions between earnings persistence 
(EQ₇) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS).  The coefficients of crisis period 
dummy variable (CRISIS) 0,014** for cluster 1, 7,898** for cluster 2, and 0,061** 
for cluster 3 are significantly positive, thus it supports H4 in that the value of earnings 
persistence (EQ₇) in years of financial crisis of 2008 is significantly low in all 
clusters. It means that managers have incentives to appear higher values of persistence 
which indicate high levels of earnings persistence and more transitory earnings. The 
R
2
 is higher in cluster 1 than in clusters 2 and 3.  
Examining control variables, consistent with Lev (1983), Lipe (1990), Ali and 
Hwang (2000), Klein (2002), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Ball et al (2003), Doyle et 
al (2007), Jiang and Anandarajan (2009), Cahan et al (2009), Gaio (2010), Yunos et al 
(2010), Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), Chen et al (2011), Lee and Swenson 
(2011), and Houque et al (2012), Table 7 Panel G indicates that coefficients of 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), sales volatility (SV), cash flow from operations volatility 
(CFOV), financial distress dummy variable (LAGLOSS), market share (MASH), 
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proxy for a bad news dummy variable (DR), the market beta coefficient (BETA), 
economic development (GDP) and financial development (MCAP) are statistically 
significant with earnings persistence (EQ₇) in all clusters. However, the results are 
shown more stringent in countries in clusters 2 and 3 since they are characterized by 
low investor protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panel G here) 
 
6.4.1.5. Earnings predictability under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panel H reports multiple regressions between earnings predictability 
(EQ₈) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). The impact of the financial crisis 
of 2008 on earnings predictability (EQ₈) can be assessed through the statistically 
significant coefficients of -40,539** for cluster 1, -205,049** for cluster 2, and -
1,045** for cluster 3. The results confirm the research hypothesis H5 which indicate 
that the high variance of earnings shocks during the financial crisis of 2008 equals to 
low of the earnings predictability (EQ₈). The R2 is lower in cluster 1 than in clusters 2 
and 3.      
Examining control variables, consistent with Lev (1983), Ali and Hwang 
(2000), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Ball et al (2003), Doyle et al (2007), Cohen 
(2008), Jiang and Anandarajan (2009), Cahan et al (2009), Yunos et al (2010), Gaio 
(2010), Lee and Swenson (2011), Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), Chen et al 
(2011), and Houque et al (2012), Table 7 Panel H shows that coefficients of sales 
volatility (SV), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV), financial distress 
dummy variable (LAGLOSS), market share (MASH), proxy for a bad news dummy 
variable (DR), the market beta coefficient (BETA), economic development (GDP), 
financial development (MCAP) and market concentration using Herfindahl – 
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Hirschman index (HERF) are statistically significant with earnings predictability 
(EQ₈) in all clusters. However, the findings are shown more severe in countries in 
clusters 2 and 3 since they are characterized by low shareholder protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panel H here) 
 
6.4.1.6. Loss avoidance analysis under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panel I reports multiple regressions between loss avoidance (EQ₉) and 
crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). Inconsistent with H6, the results indicate that 
loss avoidance is not associated with crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). The R
2
 
is lower in cluster 1 than in clusters 2 and 3.  
On contrary, examining control variables, consistent with Jiang and 
Anandarajan (2009), Prawitt et al (2009), Kim and Qi (2010), Gaio (2010), Lee and 
Swenson (2011), Table 7 Panel I indicates that coefficients of corporate profitability 
(CORPROFIT), the product of annual stock return and the proxy of bad news (R*DR) 
and economic development (GDP) are statistically significant with loss avoidance 
(EQ₉) in all clusters. However, the results are shown more rigorous in countries in 
clusters 2 and 3 since they are characterized by low investor protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panel I here) 
 
6.4.1.7. Earnings smoothness under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panel J reports multiple regressions between earnings smoothness 
(EQ₁₀) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). The results indicate that the 
association between crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) and earnings smoothness 
(EQ₁₀) are mixed. Inconsistent with H7, in cluster 1, earnings smoothness (EQ₁₀) is 
negatively associated with crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS). It means that 
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managers follow real smoothing which achieve more useful earnings number. Thus, 
using real smoothing, earnings quality is increased. On contrary, consistent with the 
prediction, the results reveal a positive and significant association between earnings 
smoothness (EQ₁₀) and crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) (0,305** for cluster 2, 
0,112** for cluster 3). Hence, similarly with Vladu (2013) and Filip and Raffournier 
(2012), H7 is accepted. In other words, in clusters 2 and 3, in an attempt to make 
earnings look less variable over crisis period, managers artificially smooth earnings 
which indicate poor quality of earnings. This result supports the hypothesis of Barth et 
al (2008) that managers responds to a negative cash flow stream by increasing 
accruals. The R
2
 is higher in cluster 1 than in clusters 2 and 3.  
Examining control variables, consistent with Lev (1983), Ali and Hwang 
(2000), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Ball et al (2003), Doyle et al (2007), Jiang and 
Anandarajan (2009), Cahan et al (2009), Gaio (2010), Yunos et al (2010), Lee and 
Swenson (2011), Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), Chen et al (2011), and Houque et 
al (2012), Table 7 Panel J indicates that coefficients of sales volatility (SV), cash flow 
from operations volatility (CFOV), financial distress dummy variable (LAGLOSS), 
market share (MASH), annual stock return (R), the product of annual stock return and 
the proxy of bad news (R*DR), economic development (GDP) and financial 
development (MCAP) are statistically significant with earnings smoothness (EQ₁₀) in 
all clusters. However, the findings are shown more stringent in countries in clusters 2 
and 3 since they are characterized by low investor protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panel J here) 
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6.4.2. The joint effect of global financial crisis of 2008 and investor 
protection on audit quality 
The multiple regression results for the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 
and investor protection on audit quality are reported in Table 7 Panels K, L, M, N, O 
and P. Six regression models are reported in which each audit quality measure is 
tested one at a time for each cluster. All models are significant for each audit quality 
variable and for each cluster. 
First, we evaluate the association between investor protection and audit quality 
and then we evaluate the impact of financial crisis of 2008 on audit quality. Finally, 
after observing these effects, we evaluate the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 
and investor protection on audit quality for each cluster. 
 
6.4.2.1. Investor protection and audit quality  
  Table 3 Panels K, L, M, N, O and P report that there is an ambiguous 
relationship between investor protection (Invprk) and audit quality (AQk) among 
clusters. Particularly, Table 7 Panel K shows that there is no association between 
audit fees (AQ1) and investor protection (Invprk) since the coefficients are 
insignificant. Consequently, H8 is rejected for all clusters.  
Table 7 Panel L reports that there is positive and significant association 
between transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3) (0,395***), efficacy of 
corporate boards (INVPR5) (0,103**) and strength of investor protection (INVPR7) 
(0,018**) for cluster 1, property rights (INVPR1) (0,022***), judicial independence 
(INVPR2) (0,019**), protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) 
(0,025***) and legal rights index (INVPR8) (0,005***) for cluster 2, and judicial 
independence (INVPR2) (0,019***), transparency of government policymaking 
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(INVPR3) (0,030***), strength of investor protection (INVPR7) (0,013**) and legal 
rights index (INVPR8) (0,016*) for cluster 3 and modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable  (AQ2). On contrary, there is negative and significant association 
between property rights (INVPR1) (-0,260***), judicial independence (INVPR2) (-
0,073*), protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) (-0,141***) and legal 
rights index (INVPR8) (-0,020**) for cluster 1, transparency of government 
policymaking (INVPR3) (-0,041***), strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(INVPR4) (-0,027***), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) (-0,031***) and 
strength of investor protection (INVPR7) (-0,006***) for cluster 2 and efficacy of 
corporate boards (INVPR5) (-0,053**) for cluster 3 and modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable  (AQ2). Consequently, the above positive signs of investor protection 
(INVPRk) indicate that firms with strong investor protection and legal enforcement 
are more preferable for qualified audit opinion and therefore H8 is accepted.  
  Table 7 Panel M reports that the positive signs of coefficients of judicial 
independence (INVPR2) (0,070***) and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(INVPR4) (0,065***) for cluster 1, property rights (INVPR1) (0,230***), efficacy of 
corporate boards (INVPR5) (0,152***) and strength of investor protection (INVPR7) 
(0,017***) for cluster 2, and protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) 
(0,236***) and legal rights index (INVPR8) (0,045**) for cluster 3 with auditor switch 
dummy variable (AQ3) implies that lower investor protection may lead to firms’ 
switching to non Big 4 auditors. Hence, H8 is accepted. On contrary, H8 is rejected in 
the case of negative signs of property rights (INVPR1) (-0,039*), transparency of 
government policymaking (INVPR3) (-0,050*), protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (INVPR6) (-0,066***) and strength of investor protection (INVPR7) (-
0,020***) for cluster 1, judicial independence (INVPR2) (-0,018***), transparency of 
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government policymaking (INVPR3) (-0,087***), strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (INVPR4) (-0,094***), protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(INVPR6) (-0,123***) and legal rights index (INVPR8) (-0,003***) for cluster 2 and 
strength of investor protection (INVPR7) (-0,032*) for cluster 3. 
  As shown in Table 7 Panel N, the coefficients of property rights (INVPR1) 
(0,165***), transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3) (0,187***), efficacy 
of corporate boards (INVPR5) (0,150***) and strength of investor protection 
(INVPR7) (0,081***) for cluster 1, judicial independence (INVPR2) (0,249***), 
transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3) (0,200***) and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) (0,246***) for cluster 2, and property 
rights (INVPR1) (0,205***), judicial independence (INVPR2) (0,080*), strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4) (0,369***) and strength of investor 
protection (INVPR7) (0,106***) for cluster 3 are positive and statistically significant 
with status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4). Therefore, consistent with Francis et 
al (2003), H8 is accepted which implies that lower demand for Big 4 auditors is 
related with weaker investor protection. On contrary, inconsistent with H8, the 
coefficients of judicial independence (INVPR2) (-0,276***), strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (INVPR4) (-0,158***), protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (INVPR6) (-0,183***), and legal rights index (INVPR8) (-0,052***) for 
cluster 1, property rights (INVPR1) (-0,386***), strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (INVPR4) (-0,466***), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) (-0,307***), 
strength of investor protection (INVPR7) (-0,013**) and legal rights index (INVPR8) 
(-0,012***) for cluster 2, and protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) 
(-0,462***) and legal rights index (INVPR8) (-0,166***) for cluster 3 are negative 
and significant with modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2). 
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Table 7 Panel O reports that there is positive and significant association 
between judicial independence (INVPR2) (0,078**), transparency of government 
policymaking (INVPR3) (0,344***), strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(INVPR4) (0,058**), efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) (0,081**), strength of 
investor protection (INVPR7) (0,073***) and legal rights index (INVPR8) (0,022***) 
for cluster 1, judicial independence (INVPR2) (0,207***), strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (INVPR4) (0,175***) and efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5) 
(0,098***) for cluster 2, and transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3) 
(0,037*) for cluster 3 and existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5). On 
contrary, there is negative and significant association between property rights 
(INVPR1) (-0,363***) and protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6) (-
0,074*) for cluster 1, property rights (INVPR1) (-0,191***), transparency of 
government policymaking (INVPR3) (-0,059***), protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (INVPR6) (-0,349***), strength of investor protection (INVPR7) (-0,039***) 
and legal rights index (INVPR8) (-0,023***) for cluster 2, and efficacy of corporate 
boards (INVPR5) (-0,141**) and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(INVPR6) (-0,120*) for cluster 3 and existence of audit committee dummy variable 
(AQ5). Consequently, the above positive signs of investor protection (INVPRk) 
indicate that firms with strong investor protection and legal enforcement increase the 
appearance audit committee in firms and therefore H8 is accepted.  
  Table 7 Panel P reports stronger correlations between investor protection 
(INVPRk) and demand for auditing (AQ6). All investor protection indexes for clusters 
1 (property rights (INVPR1): 0,000***, judicial independence (INVPR2): 0,0000*, 
transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3): 0,0000**, strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (INVPR4): 0,0000**, efficacy of corporate boards (INVPR5): 
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0,0000*, protection of minority shareholders' interests (INVPR6): 0,0000***, strength 
of investor protection (INVPR7): 0,0000*** and legal rights index (INVPR8): 
0,0000***) and 2 (property rights (INVPR1): 0,0000***, judicial independence 
(INVPR2): 0,0000***, transparency of government policymaking (INVPR3): 
0,0000***, strength of auditing and reporting standards (INVPR4): 0,000***, efficacy 
of corporate boards (INVPR5): 0,0000***, protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (INVPR6): 0,0000***, strength of investor protection (INVPR7): 0,0000** 
and legal rights index (INVPR8): 0,0000***), and property rights (INVPR1) 
(0,000***), strength of investor protection (INVPR7) (0,000**) and legal rights index 
(INVPR8) (0,000***) in cluster 3 are positively correlated with demand for auditing 
(AQ6). Consequently, H8 is accepted which implies that demand for auditing is lower 
for firms with weak investor protection.  On contrary, inconsistent with H8, the 
coefficients of judicial independence (INVPR2) (-0,000***), transparency of 
government policymaking (INVPR3) (-0,000***) and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6) (-0,000**) for cluster 3 are negative and significant 
with demand for auditing (AQ6). 
 (Insert Table 3 Panels K, L, M, N, O and P here) 
 
6.4.2.2. Audit quality under financial crisis of 2008  
Table 7 Panels K, L, M, N, O and P report multiple regressions between audit 
quality (AQk) and crisis period dummy variable (Crisis). In contrast to our expectation 
and the results from Bell et al (2001), Hudaib and Cooke (2005), Hogan and Wilkins 
(2008) and Lin and Liu (2010), we found that there is negative impact of financial 
crisis of 2008 on audit quality. Specifically, inconsistent with H9, the results indicate 
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that status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) for clusters 1 (-0,037***) and 2 (-
3,703***), and auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) (-0,062***) and demand for 
auditing (AQ6) (-0,000***) for cluster 3 are negatively correlated with crisis period 
dummy variable (CRISIS). The H9 is accepted for positive associations between 
modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2), auditor switch dummy variable 
(AQ3) and demand for auditing (AQ6) for clusters 1 (0,182***, 0,031*** and 
0,0000***) and 2 (0,192**, 1,155*** and 0,000***), status of audit firm dummy 
variable (AQ4) for cluster 3 (1,015***), existence of audit committee dummy variable 
(AQ5) for all clusters (0,058*** for cluster 1, 0,086*** for cluster 2 and 0,048*** for 
cluster 3) with crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS).  Finally, there is no 
association between audit fees (AQ1) in all clusters and modified audit report opinion 
dummy variable (AQ2) for cluster 3 with crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS).  
(Insert Table 7 Panels K, L, M, N, O and P here) 
 
6.4.2.3. The joint effect of global financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection 
on audit quality  
Table 7 Panels K, L, M, N, O and P report the two interaction term 
Crisis*Invprk which tests the audit quality across investor protection regimes during 
the financial crisis of 2008. The results are conflicted among audit quality measures, 
investor protection indexes and clusters.  
Specifically, Table 7 Panel K reports that H10 is rejected since there is no 
association between audit fees (AQ1) and two way interaction term Crisis*Invprk due 
to insignificant coefficients of all interaction terms in all clusters. It means that there 
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is no evidence that audit fees of firms with strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement are affected during financial crisis. 
Table 7 Panel L reports that there is positive and significant association 
between the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (Crisis*Invpr4: 0,024**), the interaction term of crisis period 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: 0,116***) and the 
interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 
0,052**) for cluster 1, the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and 
property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: 0,043***), the interaction term of crisis period dummy 
variable and judicial independence (Crisis*Invpr2: 0,030***), the interaction term of 
crisis period dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(Crisis*Invpr3: 0,016**) and the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: 0,006***) for cluster 2 and the 
interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and transparency of government 
policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: 0,020**) for cluster 3 and modified audit report opinion  
dummy variable (AQ2). On contrary, there is negative and significant association 
between the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and property rights 
(Crisis*Invpr1: -0,276***), the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and 
transparency of government policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: -0,111***) and the 
interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (Crisis*Invpr6: -0,136***) for cluster 1, the interaction term of 
crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: -
0,053***), the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (Crisis*Invpr6: -0,020***) and the interaction term of 
crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: -0,009***) for 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
268 
 
cluster 2 and the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of 
corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: -0,051**) for cluster 3 and modified audit report 
opinion  dummy variable (AQ2). Consequently, the positive signs of interaction terms 
indicate that firms with strong investor protection and legal enforcement are more 
preferable to report a qualified opinion during financial crisis and therefore H10 is 
accepted.  
Table 7 Panel M reports that the interaction terms of crisis period dummy 
variable and property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: 0,301***), crisis period dummy variable 
and transparency of government policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: 0,054***) and crisis 
period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: 0,038***) 
for cluster 2 and the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (Crisis*Invpr6: 0,216***) for cluster 3 are positive 
and significant with auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) except the interaction term 
of crisis period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: -
0,010**) for cluster 1, the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and 
judicial independence (Crisis*Invpr2: -0,055***), crisis period dummy variable and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (Crisis*Invpr4: -0,081***), crisis period 
dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: -0,193***), crisis 
period dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(Crisis*Invpr6: -0,178***) and crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index 
(Crisis*Invpr8: -0,027***) for cluster 2 and the interaction term of crisis period 
dummy variable and property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: -0,094**) for cluster 3 which are 
negative and significant. Thus, the positive signs of interaction terms indicate that 
firms with strong investor protection and legal enforcement switch to another auditor 
during financial crisis and therefore H10 is accepted. 
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Table 7 Panel N reports that there is positive and significant association 
between the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of 
corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: 0,115*) and crisis period dummy variable and legal 
rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 0,042**) for cluster 1, the interaction terms of crisis 
period dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(Crisis*Invpr4: 0,580***), crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate 
boards (Crisis*Invpr5: 0,468***), crisis period dummy variable and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (Crisis*Invpr6: 0,317***) and crisis period dummy 
variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 0,067***) for cluster 2, and the 
interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: 
0,214***) and crisis period dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (Crisis*Invpr4: 0,318**) for cluster 3 and status of audit firm dummy 
variable (AQ4). On contrary, there is negative and significant association between the 
interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and transparency of government 
policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: -0,049***), crisis period dummy variable and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (Crisis*Invpr4: -0,137***), crisis period dummy 
variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Crisis*Invpr6: -0,170***) 
and crisis period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: -
0,045***) for cluster 1, the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and 
property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: -0,429***), crisis period dummy variable and judicial 
independence (Crisis*Invpr2: -0,282***), crisis period dummy variable and 
transparency of government policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: -0,118***) and crisis 
period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: -0,083***) 
for cluster 2, and the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (Crisis*Invpr6: -0,133**) and crisis period dummy 
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variable and strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: -0,101***) for cluster 3 
and status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4). Consequently, the positive signs of 
interaction terms indicate that firms with strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement are more preferable auditing by Big 4 auditors during financial crisis and 
therefore H10 is accepted.  
Table 7 Panel O reports that the interaction terms of crisis period dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (Crisis*Invpr4: 0,049**), 
crisis period dummy variable and strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: 
0,055***) and crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 
0,053***) for cluster 1, the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and 
transparency of government policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: 0,053***), crisis period 
dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (Crisis*Invpr4: 
0,227***), crisis period dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (Crisis*Invpr6: 0,298***) and crisis period dummy variable and legal rights 
index (Crisis*Invpr8: 0,021***) for cluster 2 and the interaction term of crisis period 
dummy variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 0,057**) for cluster 3 are 
positive and significant with existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) 
except the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and property rights 
(Crisis*Invpr1: -0,344***), crisis period dummy variable and transparency of 
government policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: -0,078***) and crisis period dummy 
variable and efficacy of corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: -0,080*) for cluster 1, the 
interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: -
0,060***), crisis period dummy variable and judicial independence (Crisis*Invpr2: -
0,177***), crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(Crisis*Invpr5: -0,122***) and crisis period dummy variable and strength of investor 
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protection (Crisis*Invpr7: -0,041***) for cluster 2, and the interaction terms of crisis 
period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: -0,146**) and 
crisis period dummy variable and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(Crisis*Invpr6: -0,095*) for cluster 3 which are negative and significant. Thus, the 
positive signs of interaction terms indicate that firms with strong investor protection 
and legal enforcement used more audit committees during financial crisis and 
therefore H10 is accepted. 
Table 7 Panel P reports the coefficients of the interaction terms of crisis period 
dummy variable and property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: 0,0000*), crisis period dummy 
variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (Crisis*Invpr4: 0,0000*) and 
crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 0,0000***) for 
cluster 1, the interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and judicial 
independence (Crisis*Invpr2: 0,0000*), crisis period dummy variable and investor 
transparency of government policymaking (Crisis*Invpr3: 0,0000*), crisis period 
dummy variable and strength of auditing and reporting standards (Crisis*Invpr4: 
0,0000***), crisis period dummy variable and efficacy of corporate boards 
(Crisis*Invpr5: 0,0000***), crisis period dummy variable and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (Crisis*Invpr6: 0,0000***), crisis period dummy variable and 
strength of investor protection (Crisis*Invpr7: 0,0000***) and crisis period dummy 
variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 0,0000***) for cluster 2, and the 
interaction terms of crisis period dummy variable and property rights (Crisis*Invpr1: 
0,000**) and crisis period dummy variable and legal rights index (Crisis*Invpr8: 
0,000***) for cluster 3 are positive and significant with demand for auditing (AQ6) 
except the coefficients of the interaction term of crisis period dummy variable and 
efficacy of corporate boards (Crisis*Invpr5: -0,000**) for cluster 1 and the interaction 
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term of crisis period dummy variable and transparency of government policymaking 
(Crisis*Invpr3: -0,000*) for cluster 3 which are negative and significant. The positive 
signs of interaction terms indicate that firms with strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement need more auditing during financial crisis and therefore H10 is accepted.   
 (Insert Table 7 Panels K, L, M, N, O and P here) 
 
6.4.2.4. Regression results of control variables  
The results of control variables are similar to the findings of Kikhia (2015), 
Geiger and Rama (2003), Hassan and Naser (2013), Beattie et al (2001), Gonthier-
Besacier and Schatt (2007), Ireland (2003), Srinidhi and Gul (2007), Nikkinen and 
Sahlstrom (2004), Hay et al (2006) and Chaari et al (2002). Specifically, Table 7 
Panels K, L, M, N, O and P reveals that the coefficients of corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) is statistically significant with audit fees (AQ1) in all clusters, 
profitability (PROFIT), inherent risk (IRISK) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES) 
are statistically significant with modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) 
in all clusters, corporate size (CORPSIZE), industrial classification dummy variable 
(SICODE) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES) are statistically significant with 
auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) in all clusters, corporate size (CORPSIZE), 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), accruals (ACCRUAL), inherent 
risk (IRISK) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES) are statistically significant with 
Status of audit firm (AQ4) in all clusters, corporate size (CORPSIZE), industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE), accruals (ACCRUAL), inherent risk 
(IRISK) and losses dummy variable (LOSSES) are statistically significant with 
existence of audit committee (AQ5) in all clusters, and corporate size (CORPSIZE), 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE), accruals (ACCRUAL) and losses 
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dummy variable (LOSSES) are statistically significant with demand for auditing 
(AQ6) in all clusters.  
(Insert Table 7 Panels K, L, M, N, O and P here) 
 
6.4.3. The joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on 
earnings quality 
The multiple regression results for the joint effect of audit quality and investor 
protection on earnings quality in pre and crisis period are reported in Table 7 Panels Q 
to Z and AA to AK respectively. Ten regression models are reported in which each 
earnings quality measure is tested one at a time for each cluster in each research 
period.  
First, we evaluate the association between investor protection and earnings 
quality and then we evaluate the association between audit quality and earnings 
quality. Finally, after observing these effects, we evaluate the joint effect of audit 
quality and investor protection on earnings quality for each cluster. 
 
6.4.3.1. Investor protection and earnings quality  
Table 7 Panels Q to Z and AA to AK report multiple regressions between 
investor protection (Invprk) and earnings quality (EQk) in pre and crisis period 
respectively. The results indicate that this association is mixed among clusters and 
earnings quality attributes, and between pre and crisis period. 
Consistent with H11, Table 7 Panels Q and AA report that judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -1,075***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 
-1,177***) and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -0,714***) in 
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cluster 2, and transparency of government policymaking (Invpr7: -168,670***) and 
legal rights index (Invpr8: -1,158***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -8,439***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 
-0,956***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -17,203***) and 
legal rights index (Invpr8: -3,843***) in cluster 1, judicial independence (Invpr2: -
0,103***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -0,112***), strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -0,556***), strength of investor protection  
(Invpr7: -0,263***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,005***) in cluster 2 and 
property rights (Invpr1: -2,944***), judicial independence (Invpr2: -0,185**), 
transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -0,726***), strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (Invpr4: -3,557***), strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -
1,030***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -1,897***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
negatively associated with ex post conservatism (EQ1). These results indicate that ex 
post conservatism is higher which implies lower earnings quality in countries with 
weak investor protection, irrespective of the financial crisis. Contrariwise, 
inconsistent with H11, strength of investor protection  (Invpr7: 0,058***) in cluster 1, 
property rights (Invpr1: 2,842***), strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(Invpr4: 1,257***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 1,804***) and legal rights 
index (Invpr8: 0,517***) in cluster 2 and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(Invpr6: 0,729***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and property rights (Invpr1: 
10,718***), strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 4,676***), efficacy 
of corporate boards (Invpr5: 12,378***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 
2,244***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 0,167***), efficacy of corporate 
boards (Invpr5: 0,185***) and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 
0,282***) in cluster 2, and efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 4,201***) and 
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protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 0,283***) in cluster 3 in crisis 
period are positively associated with ex post conservatism (EQ1).  
Similarly, consistent with H11, Table 7 Panels R and AB report that only 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -0,002*) in cluster 3 in pre crisis 
period and judicial independence (Invpr2: -0,021**) in cluster 1, and judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -16.603,518***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -
12.096,693*) in cluster 2 in crisis period are negatively associated with ex ante 
conservatism (EQ2). These results indicate that ex ante conservatism is higher which 
implies lower earnings quality in countries with weak investor protection, irrespective 
of the financial crisis. Contrariwise, inconsistent with H11, strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (Invpr4: 39.248,335**) in cluster 2 and property rights (Invpr1: 
0,044**) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positively associated with ex ante 
conservatism (EQ2).  
Table 7 Panels S and AC report that judicial independence (Invpr2: 0,349***), 
transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 0,531***), strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (Invpr4: 0,452***) and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (Invpr6: 0,654***) in cluster 2 and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (Invpr4: 0,084***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and transparency of 
government policymaking (Invpr3: 2,143***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 
0,877***) and Strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 0,068***) in cluster 1, judicial 
independence (Invpr2: 0,142***), strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 
0,579***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 0,172***) and legal 
rights index (Invpr8: 0,044***) in cluster 2, and judicial independence (Invpr2: 
0,089***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 0,234***) and efficacy 
of corporate boards (Invpr5: 0,892***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positive and 
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significant with value relevance (EQ3). The results provides support for H11, which 
show that value relevance is lower which implies lower earnings quality in countries 
with weak investor protection, irrespective of the financial crisis. Contrariwise, legal 
rights index (Invpr8: -0,174***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: -1,599***), 
transparency of government policymaking (Invpr5: -1,647***), strength of investor 
protection (Invpr7: -0,088***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,012***) in cluster 2 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -0,217***) and legal rights 
index (Invpr8: -0,469***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and property rights (Invpr1: -
0,155***), judicial independence (Invpr2: -2,306***), strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (Invpr4: -0,022**), protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(Invpr6: -1,785***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,011***) in cluster 1, property 
rights (Invpr1: -0,217***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -
0,505***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: -0,126***) and strength of investor 
protection (Invpr7: -0,115***) in cluster 2 and property rights (Invpr1: -1,015***), 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -0,660***), protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -0,056***), strength of investor protection 
(Invpr7: -0,118***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,352***) in cluster 3 in crisis 
period are negative and significant with value relevance (EQ3) and therefore H11 is 
rejected. 
Table 7 Panels T and AD report that judicial independence (Invpr2: -
167,910***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -622,588***) and 
strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -37,788***) in cluster 2, and legal rights index 
(Invpr8: -0,045***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and judicial independence (Invpr2: 
-15,046***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -9,621***), strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -0,294***), protection of minority 
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shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -18,430***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -4,948***) 
in cluster 1, transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -7,520***), strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -44,350***), efficacy of corporate boards 
(Invpr5: -15,683***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -3,587***) in cluster 2, and 
efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: -0,979***), protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (Invpr6: -0,433***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -0,091***) in 
cluster 3 in crisis period are negatively correlated with accruals quality measured by 
Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4). These results indicate that accruals quality is higher 
which implies lower earnings quality in countries with low investor protection, 
irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H11 is accepted. Conversely, 
inconsistent with H11, strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 0,177***) and legal 
rights index (Invpr8: 1,650***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 695,737***), 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 207,502***), efficacy of 
corporate boards (Invpr5: 439,105***), protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(Invpr6: 228,030***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 215,765***) in cluster 2 and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 0,020***) in cluster 3 in pre 
crisis period and property rights (Invpr1: 23,865***), efficacy of corporate boards 
(Invpr5: 23,138***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 1,814***) in cluster 1, 
property rights (Invpr1: 10,971***), judicial independence (Invpr2: 13,434***), 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 18,995***) and strength of 
investor protection (Invpr7: 0,418**) in cluster 2 and property rights (Invpr1: 
0,372***), judicial independence (Invpr2: 0,217***), transparency of government 
policymaking (Invpr3: 0,172***), strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 
0,427***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 0,427***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
positively correlated with accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4).  
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Similarly, Table 7 Panels U and AF report that strength of investor protection 
(Invpr7: -0,189***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: -112,521***), judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -19,595***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: -
144,406***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -14,593***) in cluster 2, and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -0,155***) in cluster 3 in pre 
crisis period and judicial independence (Invpr2: -5,959***), transparency of 
government policymaking (Invpr3: -8,113***), strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (Invpr4: -2,656***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -
4,117***), strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -0,021***) and legal rights index 
(Invpr8: -1,628***) in cluster 1, transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -
2,115***), strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -1,972***), efficacy 
of corporate boards (Invpr5: -0,558***), protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(Invpr6: -4,224***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -1,181***) in cluster 2, and judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -0,175***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 
-0,092***) and strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -0,220***) in 
cluster 3 in crisis period are negatively correlated with accruals quality measured by 
McNichols (2002) (EQ5). These results indicate that accruals quality is higher which 
implies lower earnings quality in countries with low investor protection, irrespective 
of the financial crisis and therefore H11 is accepted. Conversely, inconsistent with 
H11, legal rights index (Invpr8: 0,777***) in cluster 1, and transparency of 
government policymaking (Invpr3: 15,819***), strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (Invpr4: 67,820***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 
187,207***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 24,790***) in cluster 2 in pre crisis period 
and property rights (Invpr1: 13,161***) and efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 
10,095***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 1,930***), judicial independence: 
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Invpr2 (3,812***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 0,495***) in cluster 2 
and property rights (Invpr1: 0,132***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 
0,111***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 0,211***), strength 
of investor protection (Invpr7: 0,091***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 0,029***) in 
cluster 3 in crisis period are positively correlated with accruals quality measured by 
McNichols (2002) (EQ5).  
In the same vein, Table 7 Panels V and AG report that judicial independence 
(Invpr2: -167,515***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -
622,274***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -37,866***) in cluster 2 and 
legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,032***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -11,043***), transparency of government policymaking 
(Invpr3: -1,538***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -
11,560***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -3,655***) in cluster 1, transparency of 
government policymaking (Invpr3: -7,246***), strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (Invpr4: -45,172***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: -29,816***) and 
legal rights index (Invpr8: -3,519***) in cluster 2, and efficacy of corporate boards 
(Invpr5: -0,963***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -0,527***) 
and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -0,094***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
negatively correlated with accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) EQ6. 
These results indicate that accruals quality is higher which implies lower earnings 
quality in countries with low investor protection, irrespective of the financial crisis 
and therefore H11 is accepted. Conversely, inconsistent with H11, legal rights index 
(Invpr8: 1,295***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 694,371***), strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 208,104***), efficacy of corporate boards 
(Invpr5: 438,585***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 
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228,072***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 215,765***) in cluster 2 and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 0,020***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and 
property rights (Invpr1: 10,303***), strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(Invpr4: 0,443***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 15,093***) and strength of 
investor protection (Invpr7: 1,693***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 7,331***), 
judicial independence (Invpr2: 13,324***), protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (Invpr6: 16,679***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 1,186***) in 
cluster 2, and property rights (Invpr1: 0,324***), judicial independence (Invpr2: 
0,219***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 0,185***), strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 0,570***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 
0,444***) in crisis period are positively correlated with accruals quality measured by 
Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6).  
Table 7 Panels W and AH report that coefficients of judicial independence 
(Invpr2: 10,649***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 35,842***) 
and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 1,589***) in cluster 2 in pre crisis period 
and coefficients of property rights (Invpr1: 14,890***) and efficacy of corporate 
boards (Invpr5: 6,642***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 0,298***), 
transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 1,673***), strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (Invpr4: 1,021***), strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 
0,863***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 0,535***) in cluster 2, and efficacy of 
corporate boards (Invpr5: 2,720***), protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(Invpr6: 13,367***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 3,284***) in cluster 3 
in crisis period are positive and significant with earnings persistence (EQ7). 
Consistent with H11, earnings persistence is lower which implies lower earnings 
quality as investor protection becomes weaker, irrespective of the financial crisis. On 
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contrary, inconsistent with H11, the coefficients of strength of investor protection 
(Invpr7: -0,238***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,589***) in cluster 1, property 
rights (Invpr1: -43,845***), strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -
9,244***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: -26,699***), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -11,050***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -
12,411***) in cluster 2, and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -
0,377***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the coefficients of judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -5,626***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 
-9,729***), strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -1,140***), 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -4,213***), strength of investor 
protection (Invpr7: -0,043***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -1,805***) in cluster 1, 
judicial independence (Invpr2: -0,367***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: -
0,577***) and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -2,233***) in 
cluster 2, and property rights (Invpr1: -3,013***), judicial independence (Invpr2: -
2,593***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -1,979***), strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -12,193***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -
1,006***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are negative and significant with earnings 
persistence (EQ7). 
Consistent with H11, Table 7 Panels X and AI report that judicial 
independence (Invpr2: -224,004***), transparency of government policymaking 
(Invpr3: -778,334***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -42,870***) in 
cluster 2 and legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,033***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and 
transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -9,077***), efficacy of corporate 
boards (Invpr5: -3,519***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -
0,600***), strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -2,220***), legal rights index 
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Invpr8: -0,832***) in cluster 1, judicial independence (Invpr2: -0,136***) and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -0,281***) in cluster 2, and property 
rights (Invpr1: -5,691***), judicial independence (Invpr2: -4,256***), transparency of 
government policymaking (Invpr3: -3,470***), strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (Invpr4: -14,934***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -1,704***) in cluster 3 
in crisis period are negatively associated with earnings predictability (EQ8). These 
results indicate that earnings predictability is higher which implies lower earnings 
quality in countries with weak investor protection, irrespective of the financial crisis. 
Antithetically, inconsistent with H11, strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 3,827**) 
and legal rights index (Invpr8: 23,656***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 
914,368***), strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 225,939***), 
efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 560,064***), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 281,880***) and legal rights index (Invpr8; 
265,307***) in cluster 2 and judicial independence (Invpr2: 0,005***) in cluster 3 in 
pre crisis period and property rights (Invpr1: 11,087***), judicial independence 
(Invpr2: 3,039***) and strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 1,748***) 
in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: 0,231***), transparency of government 
policymaking (Invpr3: 0,008**), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 0,293***), 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 0,055***), strength of investor 
protection (Invpr7: 0,035***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 0,019***) in cluster 2, 
and efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 12,152***), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 15,542***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 
3,406***)  in cluster 3 in crisis period are positively associated with earnings 
predictability (EQ8).  
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Table 7 Panels Y and AJ report that property rights (Invpr1: -12,825*) in 
cluster 2 and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -0,024***) in 
cluster 3 in pre crisis period and transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: -
17,181**) in cluster 2, and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -
0,224**) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -0,102***) in cluster 3 in crisis 
period are negatively correlated with loss avoidance (EQ9). These results indicate that 
loss avoidance is higher which implies lower earnings quality in countries with low 
investor protection, irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H11 is accepted. 
Contrariwise, inconsistent with H11, strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 2,236***) 
in cluster 1, protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 17,423*) in cluster 
2, and judicial independence (Invpr2: 0,209*) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 0,150**) 
in cluster 3 in crisis period are positively correlated with loss avoidance (EQ9).  
Finally, Table 7 Panels Z and AK report that the coefficients of strength of 
investor protection (Invpr7: 0,045***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1 (0,951***), 
transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 0,499***), protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 1,151***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: 
0,044***) in cluster 2, and protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 
0,087***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: 0,341***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period 
and the coefficients of property rights (Invpr1: 2,196***) and transparency of 
government policymaking (Invpr3: 0,636*) in cluster 1, strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (Invpr4: 0,032***), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: 
0,633***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: 2,159***) and legal 
rights index (Invpr8: 0,517***) in cluster 2, and judicial independence (Invpr2: 
1,938***), transparency of government policymaking (Invpr3: 2,741***), strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: 0,435***) and legal rights index Invpr8: 
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0,914***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positive and significant with earnings 
smoothness (EQ10). It means that H11 is accepted since earnings smoothness is lower 
which implies lower earnings quality in countries with weak investor protection, 
irrespective of the financial crisis. Contrariwise, the coefficients of legal rights index 
Invpr8: -0,193***) in cluster 1, and judicial independence (Invpr2: -1,236***), 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -0,051***), efficacy of corporate 
boards (Invpr5: -1,283***) and legal rights index (Invpr8: -0,052***) in cluster 2 in 
pre crisis period and the coefficients of judicial independence (Invpr2: -5,860***), 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (Invpr4: -1,142***), efficacy of corporate 
boards (Invpr5: -1,646***), strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -0,188***) and 
legal rights index (Invpr8: -1,302***) in cluster 1, property rights (Invpr1: -0,882***), 
judicial independence (Invpr2: -0,633***), transparency of government policymaking 
Invpr3: -1,922***) and strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -0,717***) in cluster 2, 
and property rights (Invpr1: -0,135*), efficacy of corporate boards (Invpr5: -
2,334***), protection of minority shareholders' interests (Invpr6: -2,639***) and 
strength of investor protection (Invpr7: -0,520***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
negative and significant with earnings smoothness (EQ10) and therefore H11 is 
rejected. 
(Insert Table 7 Panels Q to AK here) 
 
6.4.3.2. Audit quality and earnings quality  
Table 7 Panels Q to Z and AA to AK report multiple regressions between 
audit quality (AQk) and earnings quality (EQk) in pre and crisis period respectively. 
Likewise the results from the association between earnings quality and investor 
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protection, the regression results for the above linkage are mixed in relation to 
different measures of earnings quality.   
Table 7 Panels Q and AA report that inconsistent with H12 there is no 
association between ex post conservatism (EQ1) and audit quality (AQk) in all clusters 
in pre and crisis period. It means that any variance of audit quality has no effect on ex 
post conservatism (EQ1) and therefore no effect on earnings quality. 
On contrary, consistent with H12, Table 7 Panels R and AB report that only 
modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -61,085***) in cluster 2 in pre crisis period and 
existence of audit committee (AQ5: -227.140,773*) in cluster 2 in crisis period are 
negatively associated with ex ante conservatism (EQ2). These results indicate that 
higher audit quality implies higher earnings quality (lower ex ante conservatism). 
Contrariwise, inconsistent with H12, demand for auditing (AQ6: 63.494.947,010**) in 
cluster 2 in crisis period is positively associated with ex ante conservatism (EQ2).  
Table 7 Panels S and AC report that auditor switch (AQ3) in all clusters 
(0,013*** in cluster 1, 0,852*** in cluster 2 and 0,986*** in cluster 3) and demand 
for auditing (AQ6: 2.172,134***) in pre crisis period and modified audit report 
opinion (AQ2: 0,283***), auditor switch (AQ3: 1,358***) and existence of audit 
committee (AQ5: 0,286***) in cluster 1, auditor switch (AQ3: 0,896***), status of 
audit firm (AQ4: 0,236***) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: 0,261***) in 
cluster 2, and status of audit firm (AQ4: 0,091***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
positive and significant with value relevance (EQ3). Therefore, consistent with H12, 
higher audit quality implies higher earnings quality (higher value relevance), 
irrespective of the financial crisis. Contrariwise, inconsistent with H12, existence of 
audit committee (AQ5: -0,041***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -29,291***) in 
cluster 1, modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,454***), status of audit firm (AQ4: -
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0,009***) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: -0,538***) in cluster 2 in pre crisis 
period and status of audit firm (AQ4: -0,016***) in cluster 1, modified audit report 
opinion (AQ2 (-0,421*) in cluster 2, and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -
0,141***) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: -0,052***) in cluster 3 in crisis 
period are negative and significant with value relevance (EQ3). 
Table 7 Panels T and AD report that the coefficients of modified audit report 
opinion (AQ2: -0,983***) and auditor switch (AQ3: -0,587***) in cluster 1, auditor 
switch (AQ3: -0,628***) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: -303,968***) in 
cluster 2, and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,054***), auditor switch (AQ3: -
0,358***), status of audit firm (AQ4: -0,020***) and existence of audit committee 
(AQ5: -0,195***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the coefficients of status of audit 
firm (AQ4: -0,095***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -491,169***) in cluster 1, 
auditor switch (AQ3: -5,896***), status of audit firm (AQ4: -33,927***) and existence 
of audit committee (AQ5: -29,419***) in cluster 2, and status of audit firm (AQ4: -
0,150**) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -230,732*) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
negative and significant with accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4. 
It means that higher audit quality implies higher earnings quality (lower accruals 
quality), irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H12 is accepted. Conversely, 
the coefficients of modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 46,359***), status of audit 
firm (AQ4: 262,836***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: 2.196.439,085***) in cluster 
2 in pre crisis period and the coefficient of modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 
0,116***) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: 1,424**) in cluster 1, and audit 
fees (AQ1: 0,0000***) and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 45,807***) in cluster 
2 in crisis period are positive and significant with accruals quality measured by 
Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4). Therefore, these positive signs reveal that H12 is rejected. 
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Similarly, Table 7 Panels U and AF report that the coefficients of modified 
audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,204***) in cluster 1 and auditor switch (AQ3: -
149,178***) in cluster 2 in pre crisis period and the coefficients of status of audit firm 
(AQ4: -0,083***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -359,410***) in cluster 1, auditor 
switch (AQ3: -0,383***) and status of audit firm (AQ4: -1,075***) in cluster 2, and 
modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,180**), status of audit firm (AQ4: -0,141***) 
and existence of audit committee (AQ5: -0,084**) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
negative and significant with accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5). 
It means that higher audit quality implies higher earnings quality (lower accruals 
quality), irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H12 is accepted. On contrary, 
the coefficients of modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 3,611***), status of audit firm 
(AQ4: 52,485***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: 11.650,810***) in cluster 2 and 
status of audit firm (AQ4: 0,098***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the coefficient 
of audit fees (AQ1: 0,0000*), modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 0,069***) and 
existence of audit committee (AQ5: 1,173***) in cluster 1, and modified audit report 
opinion (AQ2: 0,380***), existence of audit committee (AQ5: 0,195***) and demand 
for auditing (AQ6: 647,363***) in cluster 2 in crisis period are positive and significant 
with accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5). Therefore, these positive 
signs reveal that H12 is rejected. 
In the same vein, Table 7 Panels V and AG report that the coefficients of 
modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,704***) in cluster 1, existence of audit 
committee (AQ5: -303,756***) in cluster 2 and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -
0,048***), status of audit firm (AQ4: -0,018***) and existence of audit committee 
(AQ5: -0,211***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the coefficients of status of audit 
firm (AQ4: -0,097***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -563,742***) in cluster 1, 
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auditor switch (AQ3: -77,354***) and status of audit firm (AQ4: -35,645***) in 
cluster 2, and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,387*) and status of audit firm 
(AQ4: -0,127*) in cluster 3 in crisis period are negative and significant with accruals 
quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6). It means that higher audit quality 
implies higher earnings quality (lower accruals quality), irrespective of the financial 
crisis and therefore H12 is accepted. Contrariwise, the coefficients of modified audit 
report opinion (AQ2: 46,362***), auditor switch (AQ3: 57,218***), status of audit 
firm (AQ4: 262,738***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: 2.194.418,249***) in cluster 
2 in pre crisis period and the coefficient of modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 
1,284**) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: 1,862***) in cluster 1, and audit 
fees (AQ1: 0,0000***) and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 43,002***) in cluster 
2 in crisis period are positive and significant with accruals quality measured by 
Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6). Therefore, these positive signs reveal that H12 is rejected. 
Table 7 Panels W and AH report that modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 
0,398***) and auditor switch (AQ3: 0,158***) in cluster 1, auditor switch (AQ3: 
0,0000***) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: 16,686***) in cluster 2, and 
auditor switch (AQ3: 0,001**) and status of audit firm (AQ4: 0,232***) in cluster 3 in 
pre crisis period and auditor switch (AQ3: 0,888***), status of audit firm (AQ4: 
0,034***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: 63,329*) in cluster 1, auditor switch (AQ3: 
0,963***), status of audit firm (AQ4: 3,989***) and existence of audit committee 
(AQ5: 3,849***) in cluster 2 and auditor switch (AQ3: 1,596***) in cluster 3 in crisis 
period are positively correlated with earnings persistence (EQ7). The results indicate 
that consistent with H12, higher audit quality implies higher earnings quality (higher 
earnings persistence), irrespective of the financial crisis. On contrary, inconsistent 
with H12, existence of audit committee (AQ5: -0,168***) in cluster 1, and modified 
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audit report opinion (AQ2: -2,441***), status of audit firm (AQ4: -15,149***) and 
demand for auditing (AQ6: -119.000,277***) in cluster 2 in pre crisis period and  
modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -2,638***) and existence of audit committee 
(AQ5: -1,358***) in cluster 1, modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,109***)  in 
cluster 2, and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,496**), status of audit firm 
(AQ4: -0,809***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -2.678,143**) in cluster 3 in crisis 
period respectively are negatively correlated with earnings persistence (EQ7). 
Table 7 Panels X and AI report that the coefficients of modified audit report 
opinion (AQ2: -13,274***) in cluster 1, existence of audit committee (AQ5: -
385,098***) in cluster 2 and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,016***), status 
of audit firm (AQ4: -0,006***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -33,574***) in pre 
crisis period and the coefficients of modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -1,192**) in 
cluster 1, modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,652**) in cluster 2 and status of 
audit firm (AQ4: -1,187**) in cluster 3 in crisis period are negative and significant 
with earnings predictability (EQ8). It means that higher audit quality implies higher 
earnings quality (lower earnings predictability), irrespective of the financial crisis and 
therefore H12 is accepted. On contrary, the coefficients of modified audit report 
opinion (AQ2: 56,813***), auditor switch (AQ3: 70,445***), status of audit firm 
(AQ4: 329,972***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: 2.789.845,851***) in cluster 2 
and existence of audit committee (AQ5: 0,116***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and 
the coefficient of auditor switch (AQ3: 0,046**) and existence of audit committee 
(AQ5: 1,038**) in cluster 1, auditor switch (AQ3: 0,386***), status of audit firm 
(AQ4: 0,204***) and existence of audit committee (AQ5: 0,379***) in cluster 2 and 
modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 4,524**) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positive 
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and significant with earnings predictability (EQ8). Therefore, these positive signs 
reveal that H12 is rejected. 
Consistent with H12, Table 7 Panels Y and AJ report that only modified audit 
report opinion (AQ2: -10,057***) in cluster 2 and existence of audit committee (AQ5: 
-0,436*) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and auditor switch (AQ3: -3,758**) in cluster 
2 in crisis period are negatively associated with loss avoidance (EQ9). These results 
indicate that higher audit quality implies higher earnings quality (lower loss 
avoidance). Contrariwise, inconsistent with H12, modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 
0,086*) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 
2,771*) and auditor switch (AQ3: 1,109*) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positively 
associated with loss avoidance (EQ9).  
Finally, Table 7 Panels Z and AK report that auditor switch (AQ3: 0,000***) 
in cluster 1, auditor switch (AQ3: 0,008***) and status of audit firm (AQ4: 0,166***) 
in cluster 2, and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: 0,201***) and demand for 
auditing (AQ6: 358,161***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and modified audit report 
opinion (AQ2: 3,366*), auditor switch (AQ3: 8,963***) and status of audit firm (AQ4: 
0,120***) in cluster 1, auditor switch (AQ3: 1,285***) in cluster 2 and status of audit 
firm (AQ4: 1,519***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positive and significant with 
earnings smoothness (EQ10). The results implies that higher audit quality implies 
higher earnings quality (higher earnings smoothness), irrespective of the financial 
crisis and therefore H12 is accepted. Conversely, modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -
0,033**), existence of audit committee (AQ5: -0,044***) and demand for auditing 
(AQ6: -89,537***) in cluster 2, and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -0,025**) 
and existence of audit committee (AQ5: -1,197***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period 
and existence of audit committee (AQ5: -6,824***) and demand for auditing (AQ6: -
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306,040***) in cluster 1, and modified audit report opinion (AQ2: -5,216***) and 
demand for auditing (AQ6: -124,740**) in cluster 2 in crisis period are negative and 
significant with earnings smoothness (EQ10) and therefore H12 is rejected. 
(Insert Table 7 Panels Q to AK here) 
 
6.4.3.3. The joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings 
quality  
Table 7 Panels Q to Z and AA to AK report the two interaction term 
AQk*Invprk which tests the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on 
earnings quality in pre and crisis period respectively. The results are conflicted among 
earnings quality attributes, investor protection indexes, clusters and research periods.  
Specifically, Table 7 Panels Q and AA report that the interaction term of audit 
quality and investor protection (AQk*Invprk) is insignificant with ex post 
conservatism (EQ1) in all clusters in pre crisis period and the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,655**), 
modified audit report opinion and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ2*Invpr4: -0,304*), modified audit report opinion and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -0,869***), modified audit report opinion and 
legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -0,242***), existence of audit committee and property 
rights (AQ5*Invpr1: -2,058***) and existence of audit committee and legal rights 
index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,484***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -
0,054**), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor protection 
(AQ2*Invpr7: -0,114***), modified audit report opinion and legal rights index 
(AQ2*Invpr8: -0,082***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and 
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reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -0,079***), existence of audit committee and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -0,061***), existence of audit committee 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: -0,174***) and 
existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,075***) in 
cluster 2, and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and judicial 
independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -1,850**), modified audit report opinion and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -2,594***), existence of 
audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,627*) and existence of 
audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -0,784***) in cluster 
3 in crisis period are negative and significant with ex post conservatism (EQ1). It 
means that there is no joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings 
quality in pre crisis period and therefore H13 is rejected. Further, H13 is accepted for 
the negative interactions effects of audit quality and investor protection on earnings 
quality in crisis period. On contrary, inconsistent with H13, the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*Invpr3: 2,727***), modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 1,185***), modified audit report opinion and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,285***), existence of audit committee and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,433***), existence of audit 
committee and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,413*), 
existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,785**) 
and existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 
0,342***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 0,059**), modified audit 
report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,184***), existence of 
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audit committee and property rights (AQ5*Invpr1: 0,168***), existence of audit 
committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,073***), existence of audit 
committee and transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,026***) 
and existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 
0,085***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: 1,608**), modified audit 
report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 5,636**), existence of 
audit committee and transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,152*) 
and existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 0,205**) in 
cluster 3 are positively correlated with ex post conservatism (EQ1) in crisis period. 
Similarly, Table 7 Panels R and AB report that ex ante conservatism (EQ2) is 
associated with the two way interaction term of audit quality and investor protection 
(AQk*Invprk) differently among clusters and between reported periods. Particularly, 
the interaction term of audit quality and investor protection (AQk*Invprk) is 
insignificant with ex ante conservatism (EQ2) in all clusters in pre crisis period and 
the interaction terms of existence of audit committee and judicial independence 
(AQ5*Invpr2: -62.968,925***), existence of audit committee and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: -96.382,380**), existence of audit 
committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -20.507,933*) and 
demand for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -
244.652.460,679***) in cluster 2 in crisis period with ex ante conservatism (EQ2). 
Consequently, it means that lower audit quality implies lower earnings quality (higher 
ex ante conservatism) in countries as investor protection becomes weaker in crisis 
period and therefore H13 is accepted. Conversely, the interaction term of status of 
audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,002***) in cluster 1 in 
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pre crisis period, and the interaction terms of existence of audit committee and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 143.565,768***) and 
demand for auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 
683.679.813,708*) in cluster 1 and the interaction term of status of audit firm and 
property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 0,049**) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positively 
correlated with ex ante conservatism (EQ2), and therefore H13 is rejected. 
Table 7 Panels S and AC report that the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 0,058**), 
auditor switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 0,333***), auditor switch and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: 0,258***), auditor switch 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*Invpr5: 0,897***), status of audit firm and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,164***) and status of audit 
firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,042***) in cluster 1, the 
interaction terms of audit fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*Invpr7: 
0,0000**), audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000**), modified audit 
report opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 
0,104***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor protection 
(AQ2*Invpr7: 0,036**), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*Invpr5: 
68,351***), auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ3*Invpr6: 22,863***), status of audit firm and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,026***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 0,675***), status of audit firm and strength of 
investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,008***), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: 0,010***), existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,135***), existence of audit committee and protection of 
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minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,037**) and demand for auditing and 
legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 58,088***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ2*Invpr6: 0,317**), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,726***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,248***), existence of audit committee and judicial 
independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,105**) and demand for auditing and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*Invpr4: 78,629***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis 
period and the interaction terms of audit fees and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 0,0000***), audit fees and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ1*Invpr4: 0,0000***), modified audit report opinion and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 0,725***), modified audit 
report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,052***), modified 
audit report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,012***), 
status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 
0,016***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 
0,092***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 
0,010***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 0,088***), 
existence of audit committee and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ5*Invpr3: 0,022**), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,022*), existence of audit committee and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,045**), existence of audit committee and strength 
of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,018***), demand for auditing and transparency 
of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 246,405***) and demand for auditing and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 35,628**) in cluster 1, the interaction 
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terms of audit fees and transparency of government policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 
0,0000*), audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000*), modified audit 
report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,237***), modified 
audit report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 
0,044***), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*Invpr5: 0,0000*), 
status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 0,007*), status of audit 
firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,055***), status of 
audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 0,590***), 
status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 
0,014**), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 
0,016***) existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ5*Invpr5: 0,101***), existence of audit committee and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,085***), existence of audit committee and 
legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 0,006**) and demand for auditing and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*Invpr4: 252,222**) in cluster 2, and the 
interaction terms of audit fees and property rights (AQ1*Invpr1: 0,0000*), audit fees 
and strength of investor protection (AQ1*Invpr7: 0,0000*), modified audit report 
opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,364***), modified audit 
report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 
0,575***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor protection 
(AQ2*Invpr7: 0,139***), auditor switch and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: 0,0000**), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 0,188***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,219***), status of audit firm and strength of 
investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,071***), existence of audit committee and 
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property rights (AQ5*Invpr1: 0,082***), existence of audit committee and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,103***), demand for auditing and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 104,195**), demand for 
auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 253,589**), demand for 
auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 130,766***), 
demand for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 66,710***) and 
demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 504,996***) in cluster 3 in 
crisis period are positively correlated with value relevance (EQ3). Consistent with 
H13, the results indicate that lower audit quality implies lower earnings quality (lower 
value relevance) in countries as investor protection becomes weaker, irrespective of 
the financial crisis. Antithetically, inconsistent with H13, the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -0,070**) and 
status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -0,116***) in cluster 1, the 
interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and judicial independence 
(AQ2*Invpr2: -0,063*), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -
0,116***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -0,014**), 
status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -0,390***), status 
of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -
0,382***), existence of audit committee and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -0,037***), existence of audit committee and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -0,088***), existence of audit 
committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,017***), existence of 
audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,018***), demand for auditing 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -208,924***), demand 
for auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: -
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188,280***) and demand for auditing and strength of investor protection 
(AQ6*Invpr7: -99,415***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,440**), auditor switch and 
strength of investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: -25,893***), status of audit firm and 
judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -1,085***), existence of audit committee and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: -0,067*), existence of 
audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,023**) and 
demand for auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -97,037***) in cluster 3 
in pre crisis period and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and 
judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,039***), modified audit report opinion and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -0,020*), modified audit 
report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -
0,040**), modified audit report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -
0,014***), auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: -75,296**), status of 
audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -0,082*), status of audit firm and judicial 
independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -0,050***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -0,060***), status of audit firm and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -1,652***), existence of audit 
committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,108***), existence of audit 
committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,026***), demand for auditing and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -110,918***) and demand for auditing 
and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: -150,606***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,041***), 
modified audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*Invpr3: -0,068***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor 
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protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -0,029***), modified audit report opinion and legal rights 
index (AQ2*Invpr8: -0,103***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 
-0,256***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -
0,098***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -0,010***), 
existence of audit committee and property rights (AQ5*Invpr1: -0,098***), existence 
of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,011***), existence of 
audit committee and transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -
0,042***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -0,021*), existence of audit committee and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,055***), demand for auditing and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -112,800**) and demand for auditing and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: -159,292*) in cluster 2, 
and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and property rights 
(AQ2*Invpr1: -0,287***), modified audit report opinion and judicial independence 
(AQ2*Invpr2: -0,114*), modified audit report opinion and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -0,446***), modified audit report opinion and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -0,522***), auditor switch and judicial 
independence (AQ3*Invpr2: -96,324**), status of audit firm and property rights 
(AQ4*Invpr1: -0,087***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
-0,148***), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: -0,141***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -0,062*), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: -0,080***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -0,204***), existence of audit committee and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -0,245*), existence of audit committee and 
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strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -130,828***), existence of audit 
committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -705,982***) and demand for auditing 
and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -65,005***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
negatively correlated with value relevance (EQ3). 
Table 7 Panels T and AD report that the interaction terms of auditor switch 
and property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: -0,522***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -1,666***), status of audit firm and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -0,308***) and demand for auditing 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -1.255,229**) in cluster 
1, the interaction terms of audit fees and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*Invpr3: -157,322***), audit fees and strength of investor protection 
(AQ2*Invpr7: -41,713**), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*Invpr5: -0,589***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -
359,765***), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: -52,002***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*Invpr5: -487,638***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*Invpr7: -114,837***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -
35,600***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -
116,816***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -94,853***), existence of audit committee and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -71,184**), demand for auditing and judicial 
independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -578.511,950***), demand for auditing and transparency 
of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -307.130,259***) and demand for 
auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -121.988,390***) in cluster 
2, and the interaction terms of auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
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(AQ3*Invpr7: -0,005***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
-0,041***) and demand for auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -
30,093**) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -4,129***), modified audit 
report opinion and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -
0,224***), modified audit report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -0,913***), status of audit firm and judicial independence 
(AQ4*Invpr2: -0,298***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -0,581***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -9,015***), existence of audit committee and 
judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,855***), existence of audit committee and 
legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,143***), demand for auditing and strength of 
investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -224,861**) and demand for auditing and legal 
rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: -604,289***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified 
audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -
3,244***), modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*Invpr5: -8,599***), modified audit report opinion and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -4,427***), modified audit report opinion and 
legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -3,556***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -0,627**), status of audit firm and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -30,543***), status of audit firm and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -1,279***), existence of 
audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: -
7,499***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -
0,334***), demand for auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -
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9.469,813***) and demand for auditing and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ6*Invpr4: -21.762,541***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of 
audit fees and property rights (AQ1*Invpr1: -0,216**), audit fees and judicial 
independence (AQ1*Invpr2: -0,106*), audit fees and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: -0,112**), audit fees and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ1*Invpr4: -0,677***), status of audit firm and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -0,082***), status of audit firm and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -0,173***), status of audit firm and 
strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -0,075***), existence of audit committee 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -0,049***), existence of 
audit committee and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -
0,134***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,044*), 
demand for auditing and property rights (AQ6*Invpr1: -36,583*), demand for auditing 
and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -31,308**) and demand for auditing and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ6*Invpr4: -52,865***) in cluster 3 in 
crisis period are negative and significant with accruals quality measured by Dechow 
et al (1995) (EQ4). It means that lower audit quality implies lower earnings quality 
(higher accruals quality) in countries as investor protection becomes weaker, 
irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H13 is accepted. Contrariwise, the 
interaction terms of auditor switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 
0,896***), auditor switch and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ3*Invpr3: 28,963***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*Invpr7: 1,079***) and demand for auditing and strength of investor protection 
(AQ6*Invpr7: 682,969**) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report 
opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: 116,737***), status of audit firm and 
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judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 73,049***), status of audit firm and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 87,208***), status of audit firm and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 852,337***), existence of 
audit committee and transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 
15,334***), existence of audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 109,030***), existence of audit committee and strength of 
investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 34,222***), existence of audit committee and legal 
rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 33,410***), demand for auditing and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 376.661,839***) and demand for auditing and 
legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 59.768,252***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms 
of auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*Invpr5: 5,693***), status of 
audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,033***), 
existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,076***), 
existence of audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*Invpr6: 0,026**), existence of audit committee and strength of investor 
protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,016**) and demand for auditing and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ6*Invpr4: 32,301***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and 
the interaction terms of audit fees and judicial independence (AQ1*Invpr2: 0,0000*), 
audit fees and transparency of government policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 0,0000***), 
audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000***), modified audit report 
opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 0,109**), 
modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 
1,061***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor protection 
(AQ2*Invpr7: 0,186***), modified audit report opinion and legal rights index 
(AQ2*Invpr8: 0,186***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 
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6,796***), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: 0,070*), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*Invpr5: 0,715***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*Invpr7: 0,070***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 
0,055***), existence of audit committee and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,237***), existence of audit committee and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 2,428***), existence of audit 
committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,454***), existence of 
audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,161***), demand 
for auditing and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 
681,352***), demand for auditing and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ6*Invpr4: 1.227,813***) and demand for auditing and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 486,207***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: 8,728***), modified audit 
report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 1,774***), auditor 
switch and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*Invpr5: 0,000***), auditor switch and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 0,0000**), status of audit 
firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 22,977***), status of audit firm and judicial 
independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 0,653***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 6,688***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 5,900***), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: 0,760***), existence of audit committee and property rights 
(AQ5*Invpr1: 3,208***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence 
(AQ5*Invpr2: 1,985***), existence of audit committee and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,991***), existence of audit committee and 
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strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 4,407***), existence of 
audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 2,571***), demand 
for auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 11.541,786**) and 
demand for auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 
20.002,163***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of audit fees and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ1*Invpr5: 0,511***), audit fees and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ1*Invpr6: 0,596***), audit fees and strength of investor 
protection (AQ1*Invpr7: 0,125***), audit fees and legal rights index AQ1*Invpr8 
(0,125**), auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 0,005*), status of audit 
firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 0,047***), status of audit firm and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 0,179***), status of audit firm and 
legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 0,070***), existence of audit committee and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,189***), demand for auditing and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 72,429***), demand for auditing and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 44,615***) and demand for auditing and 
legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 122,191***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positive 
and significant with accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4), and 
therefore H13 is rejected. 
Similarly, Table 7 Panels U and AF report that the interaction terms of auditor 
switch and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: -0,110***), status 
of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -0,618***) 
and status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -0,338***) 
in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion  and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -4,375*), auditor switch and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: -57,603***), status of audit firm and property rights 
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(AQ4*Invpr1: -102,197***), status of audit firm and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -10,996***), status of audit firm and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -137,825***), status of audit firm and strength of 
investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -3,890***), status of audit firm and legal rights 
index (AQ4*Invpr8: -5,969***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -17,100***) and existence of audit committee 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: -23,047***) in cluster 
2, and the interaction terms of auditor switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 
-0,243***) and status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -
0,254***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion  and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -1,417***), modified audit 
report opinion  and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -
1,107***), modified audit report opinion  and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -0,262***), modified audit report opinion  and legal rights 
index (AQ2*Invpr8: -0,029***), auditor switch and judicial independence 
(AQ3*Invpr2: -1,708***), auditor switch and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ3*Invpr4: -1,217***), auditor switch and legal rights index 
(AQ3*Invpr8: -0,085***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
-0,214***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -0,088***), 
existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,358***), 
existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,073***), demand 
for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -387,637***) and 
demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: -431,369***) in cluster 1, 
the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -1,729***), modified audit report opinion and protection 
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of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -1,336***), modified audit report 
opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -0,483***), modified audit 
report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -0,621***), auditor switch and 
property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: -5,650***), auditor switch and judicial independence 
(AQ3*Invpr2: -0,216***), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*Invpr5: -0,683***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: -1,932***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
-0,125**), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: -0,967***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*Invpr5: -1,196***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -
0,883***), existence of audit committee and property rights (AQ5*Invpr1: -1,554***), 
existence of audit committee and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ5*Invpr3: -0,866***), demand for auditing and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -2.628,289***), demand for auditing and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: -6.786,499***) and demand for auditing and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: -4.467,277***) in cluster 
2, and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and property rights 
(AQ2*Invpr1: -0,090**), modified audit report opinion and judicial independence 
(AQ2*Invpr2: -0,062***), modified audit report opinion and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -0,063***), modified audit report opinion 
and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -0,290***), auditor 
switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: -0,175***), auditor switch and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: -0,106***), auditor switch 
and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: -0,181***), auditor 
switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: -0,038***), status of audit firm and 
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property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -0,076***), status of audit firm and judicial 
independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -0,101***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -0,083***), status of audit firm and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -0,025**), status of audit firm and 
legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -0,071***), existence of audit committee and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -0,022***), existence of 
audit committee and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -
0,067***), demand for auditing and property rights (AQ6*Invpr1: -22,191**), demand 
for auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -20,899***), demand for 
auditing and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -8,772**) and 
demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: -67,029***) in cluster 3 in 
crisis period are negative and significant with accruals quality measured by 
McNichols (2002) (EQ5). It means that lower audit quality implies lower earnings 
quality (higher accruals quality) in countries as investor protection becomes weaker, 
irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H13 is accepted. On contrary, the 
interaction terms of auditor switch and strength of investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7 
(0,077***) and status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 0,567***) in 
cluster 1, the interaction terms of audit fees and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ1*Invpr4: 0,0000*), audit fees and strength of investor protection 
(AQ1*Invpr7: 0,0000**), audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000**), 
modified audit report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: 11,062***), auditor 
switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 22,185**), auditor switch and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: 24,850**), auditor switch 
and strength of investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: 11,300***), auditor switch and legal 
rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 6,386**), status of audit firm and judicial independence 
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(AQ4*Invpr2: 9,984***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 75,249***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 175,534***), existence of audit committee and 
judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 8,330***), existence of audit committee and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 9,757***), existence of audit 
committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 14,128**), existence of 
audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 2,291**), existence 
of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 5,363***) and demand for 
auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 13.759,528*) in cluster 2, and the 
interaction terms of auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ3*Invpr6: 0,137***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: 0,092***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,149***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,090***), existence of audit committee and judicial 
independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,096*), existence of audit committee and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,041*) and existence of audit 
committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 15,243*) in cluster 3 in 
pre crisis period and the interaction terms of audit fees and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 0,0000***), audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000***), modified audit report opinion and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 0,332***), modified audit report opinion and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,343***), modified audit report opinion 
and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,078***), auditor switch and 
property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: 0,700***), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ3*Invpr5: 2,605***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
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(AQ3*Invpr7: 0,117***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 
3,576***), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: 0,036***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 0,330***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 4,635***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,483***), status of audit firm and strength of 
investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,028***), existence of audit committee and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,076**), existence of audit 
committee and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,085**), 
existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 
1,210***), existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*Invpr7: 0,051***), demand for auditing and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 634,586***) and demand for auditing and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 174,812***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of audit 
fees and strength of investor protection (AQ1*Invpr7: 0,0000**), modified audit report 
opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: 1,224***), modified audit report 
opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 3,914***), auditor switch and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: 0,182*), auditor switch and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: 5,226***), auditor switch 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 2,328***), auditor 
switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 0,784***), status of audit firm and 
property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 3,668***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,762***), status of audit firm and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,657***), status of audit firm and 
strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,276***), existence of audit committee 
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and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,433***), existence of audit committee and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,547***), existence of 
audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,536***), existence 
of audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 
0,514***), existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*Invpr7: 0,250***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index 
(AQ5*Invpr8: 0,169***), demand for auditing and judicial independence 
(AQ6*Invpr2: 1.171,019**), demand for auditing and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ6*Invpr4: 6.460,142***), demand for auditing and strength of 
investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 1.933,090***) and demand for auditing and legal 
rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 2.624,086***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 
0,223***), modified audit report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 0,278***), modified audit report opinion and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,061***), auditor switch and property rights 
(AQ3*Invpr1: 0,038***), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*Invpr5: 0,188***), auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 0,175***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: 0,065***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*Invpr5: 0,246***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,095***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,024***), existence of audit committee and property rights 
(AQ5*Invpr1: 0,024**), existence of audit committee and judicial independence 
(AQ5*Invpr2: 0,043***), existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,076***), existence of audit committee and protection of 
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minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,026**), demand for auditing and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 41,913***) and demand 
for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 19,808***) in cluster 3 
in crisis period are positive and significant with accruals quality measured by 
McNichols (2002) (EQ5), and therefore H13 is rejected. 
In the same vein, Table 7 Panels V and AG report that the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*Invpr3: -157,282***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor 
protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -41,729**), auditor switch and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: -244,295***), status of audit firm and property 
rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -360,414***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -51,979***), status of audit firm and efficacy 
of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -487,532***), status of audit firm and strength of 
investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -114,863***), status of audit firm and legal rights 
index (AQ4*Invpr8: -35,584***), existence of audit committee and judicial 
independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -116,516***), existence of audit committee and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*:  -71,144**), existence of audit committee 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -375,109***), demand for auditing and 
judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -577.987,637***), demand for auditing and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -306.839,202***) and 
demand for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -
121.871,278***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of status of audit firm and 
judicial independence (AQ4*:  -0,023**) and demand for auditing and judicial 
independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -28,980**) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the 
interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and judicial independence 
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(AQ2*Invpr2: -0,222**), modified audit report opinion and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -0,121*), modified audit report opinion and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -0,026**), modified audit 
report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -0,078***), auditor switch and 
judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: -5,812***), auditor switch and legal rights index 
(AQ3*Invpr8: -1,460***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
-0,253***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: -0,163**), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -7,047***), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: -2,072***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence 
(AQ5*Invpr2: -0,712***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index 
(AQ5*Invpr8: -0,158***), demand for auditing and strength of investor protection 
(AQ6*Invpr7: -221,920**) and demand for auditing and legal rights index 
(AQ6*Invpr8: -911,051***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report 
opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -4,696***), 
modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: -
6,314***), modified audit report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -5,448***), modified audit report opinion and legal rights 
index (AQ2*Invpr8: -3,591***), auditor switch and judicial independence 
(AQ3*Invpr2: -2,753***), auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ3*Invpr6: -2,997***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -5,354***), status of audit firm and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -31,454***), status of audit firm and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -5,500***), existence of 
audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: -
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6,610***), demand for auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -
9.779,590***) and demand for auditing and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ6*Invpr4: -23.618,556***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and property rights (AQ2*Invpr1: -0,262***), modified 
audit report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,153***), modified 
audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -
0,144***), modified audit report opinion and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -0,768***), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*Invpr5: -0,674***), auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ3*Invpr6: -0,461***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: -0,120***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -
0,264***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -0,177***), 
status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -
0,111***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: -0,080***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -
0,204***), existence of audit committee and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -0,050***), existence of audit committee and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -0,153***), demand for auditing and 
property rights (AQ6*Invpr1: -49,430**) and demand for auditing and judicial 
independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -32,740**) in cluster 3 in crisis period are negative and 
significant with accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6). It means that 
lower audit quality implies lower earnings quality (higher accruals quality) in 
countries as investor protection becomes weaker, irrespective of the financial crisis 
and therefore H13 is accepted. Antithetically, the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: 116,699***), auditor switch and 
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judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 200,167***), auditor switch and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: 91,738*), auditor switch and strength of 
investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: 37,267*), auditor switch and legal rights index 
(AQ3*Invpr8: 27,506**), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
73,009***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: 87,891***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 851,901***), existence of audit committee and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 115,265***), existence of audit committee 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 108,964***), 
existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 
33,395***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 
42,226***), demand for auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ6*Invpr6: 376.223,968***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index 
(AQ6*Invpr8: 59.722,210***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of auditor switch 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 0,017*), status of 
audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,020**), 
existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,079***), 
existence of audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*Invpr6: 0,028***), existence of audit committee and strength of investor 
protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,017***) and demand for auditing and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ6*Invpr4: 29,946**) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and 
the interaction terms of audit fees and property rights (AQ1*Invpr1: 0,0000***), audit 
fees and transparency of government policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 0,0000***), audit 
fees and legal rights index (AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000***), modified audit report opinion 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 2,340***), modified 
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audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,366***), 
modified audit report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 
0,085***), auditor switch and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ3*Invpr3: 2,720***), auditor switch and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ3*Invpr4: 1,465***), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*Invpr5: 4,003***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: 0,794***), status of audit firm and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 1,737***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 0,354***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,040***), existence of audit committee and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,174***), existence of audit committee and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,356***), existence of audit committee 
and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,127***), demand for auditing and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 1.418,100***) and demand 
for auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 296,886***) in cluster 1, 
the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and judicial independence 
(AQ2*Invpr2: 9,286***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor 
protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 1,813***), auditor switch and property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: 
1,768***), auditor switch and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ3*Invpr3: 3,829***), auditor switch and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ3*Invpr4: 1,517*), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*Invpr5: 9,149***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: 3,072***), auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 
3,299***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*:  20,827***), status of audit 
firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 0,460**), status of audit firm and 
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efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 5,516***), status of audit firm and strength 
of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 5,626***), status of audit firm and legal rights 
index (AQ4*Invpr8: 0,843***), existence of audit committee and property rights 
(AQ5*Invpr1: 2,399***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence 
(AQ5*Invpr2: 1,978***), existence of audit committee and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,756**), existence of audit committee and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 3,744***), existence of 
audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 1,071*), existence of 
audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 2,392***), 
existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 0,478***), demand 
for auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 11.570,270**), demand 
for auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 
20.826,074***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 
4.079,123**) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion 
and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,556***), modified audit report 
opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 0,734***), 
modified audit report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 
0,165***), modified audit report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: 0,117*), 
auditor switch and property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: 0,324***), auditor switch and 
judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 0,138***), auditor switch and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: 0,138***), auditor switch and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: 0,448***), auditor switch and legal 
rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 0,307***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 0,646***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,165***), status of audit firm and strength of 
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investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,023***), existence of audit committee and 
property rights (AQ5*Invpr1: 0,043*), existence of audit committee and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,167***), existence of audit committee and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,071**), demand for 
auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 77,116***), 
demand for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 44,003***) and 
demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 130,557***) in cluster 3 in 
crisis period are positive and significant with accruals quality measured by Kothari et 
al (2005) (EQ6), and therefore H13 is rejected. 
Table 7 Panels W and AH report that there is positive association between the 
interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 0,323***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,694***) and demand for auditing and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 402,085***) in cluster 1, the 
interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 8,898**), modified audit report opinion and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 2,350**), status of audit firm and property rights 
(AQ4*Invpr1: 17,198***), status of audit firm and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 2,923***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 26,945***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 6,074***), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: 2,071***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 5,343***), existence of audit committee and 
judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 6,717***), demand for auditing and judicial 
independence (AQ6*Invpr2: 33.663,437***), demand for auditing and transparency of 
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government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 16.698,701***) and demand for auditing and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 6.469,993***) in cluster 2 and the 
interaction terms of auditor switch and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ3*Invpr3: 0,000**), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: 0,217***), auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 
0,0000**), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ4*Invpr6: 0,363***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*Invpr7: 0,218***) and demand for auditing and strength of investor protection 
(AQ6*Invpr7: 36,410**) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the interaction terms of 
audit fees and judicial independence (AQ1*Invpr2: 0,0000***), audit fees and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 0,0000***), audit fees and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ1*Invpr4: 0,0000**), modified audit 
report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: 0,285***), modified audit 
report opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 
0,141***), modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*Invpr5: 0,699***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor 
protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,081***), modified audit report opinion and legal rights 
index (AQ2*Invpr8: 0,054***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: 0,0000**), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*Invpr5: 3,967***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*Invpr7: 0,275***), existence of audit committee and property rights 
(AQ5*Invpr1: 0,062***), existence of audit committee and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,208***), existence of audit committee and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,252***), demand for 
auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 192,015***) and demand 
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for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 711,615***) in cluster 1, the 
interaction terms of audit fees and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ1*Invpr3: 0,0000**), audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000**), 
modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 
2,030***), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: 0,474***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,229***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,169***), existence of audit committee and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,516***), existence of audit 
committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 1,225***), existence of 
audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 
1,086***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 764,922*) in 
cluster 2 and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and property rights 
(AQ2*Invpr1: 3,124***), modified audit report opinion and judicial independence 
(AQ2*Invpr2: 2,279***), modified audit report opinion and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 1,512***), modified audit report opinion and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: 6,988***), status of audit 
firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 0,561***), status of audit firm and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,818***), status of audit 
firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 1,195***), status 
of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 0,852***), existence of 
audit committee and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 
1,705***), existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ5*Invpr5: 0,613**), demand for auditing and property rights (AQ6*Invpr1: 
1.008,300***), demand for auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: 
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356,796***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 470,126**) 
in cluster 3 in crisis period with earnings persistence (EQ7). Consequently, these 
positive signs of interaction terms indicate that lower audit quality implies lower 
earnings quality (higher earnings persistence) in countries with weak investor 
protection, irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H13 is accepted. 
Conversely, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -0,097*), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: -0,342***) and demand for auditing and strength of investor protection 
(AQ6*Invpr7: -228,708***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report 
opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -6,545***), status of audit firm and 
judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -4,153***), status of audit firm and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -47,398***), existence of audit 
committee and transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -6,531***), 
existence of audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*Invpr6: -6,568***), existence of audit committee and strength of investor 
protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -1,869***), existence of audit committee and legal rights 
index (AQ5*Invpr8: -1,945***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index 
(AQ6*Invpr8: -3.334,139**) in cluster 2 and the interaction terms of status of audit 
firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -0,617***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis 
period and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -0,113**), modified audit report 
opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -0,767***), 
auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: -17,167***), status of audit firm 
and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -3,174***), status of audit firm and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -4,183***), status of audit 
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firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -2,197***), status 
of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -0,148*), 
status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -0,524***), existence of audit 
committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,187**), existence of audit 
committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -0,283**), demand for 
auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -1.601,273***) and demand for 
auditing and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -1.397,166***) 
in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and judicial 
independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,434***), modified audit report opinion and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -0,349**), modified audit 
report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -0,341***), auditor 
switch and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: -0,063**), status 
of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -0,173***), status of audit firm and 
judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -0,422***), status of audit firm and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -1,396***), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: -0,101***), existence of audit committee and property rights 
(AQ5*Invpr1: -1,194***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence 
(AQ5*Invpr2: -0,110***), existence of audit committee and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -0,746***), existence of audit committee and 
strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,736***), existence of audit committee 
and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -0,070**) and demand for auditing and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -947,792*) in cluster 2, and 
the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*Invpr5: -3,392***), modified audit report opinion and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -8,736***), modified audit report opinion and 
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strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -2,325***), status of audit firm and 
property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -1,707***), status of audit firm and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -2,046***), status of audit firm and 
strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -0,683***), status of audit firm and legal 
rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -1,258***), existence of audit committee and property 
rights (AQ5*Invpr1: -0,483**), existence of audit committee and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: -1,333***), existence of audit 
committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,335***), demand for 
auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: -2.371,170***), demand for 
auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: -775,087***) 
and demand for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -
293,968***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are negatively correlated with earnings 
persistence (EQ7) and therefore H13 is rejected. 
Table 7 Panels X and AI report that the interaction terms of auditor switch and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: -10,511***), status of audit 
firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -24,312***), status 
of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -3,836***) and demand 
for auditing and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -
24.662,950***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -192,412***), modified 
audit report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -51,667**), 
auditor switch and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: -
301,849***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -412,051***), 
status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: -
65,133***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -
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604,788***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -
44,752***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -
148,275***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -118,557***), existence of audit committee and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -91,044**), demand for auditing and judicial 
independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -735.453,156***), demand for auditing and transparency 
of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -390.063,444***) and demand for 
auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -154.973,535***) in cluster 
2, and the interaction terms of auditor switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 
-0,036***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -0,034***), 
existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,035***), 
existence of audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*Invpr6: -0,017***) and existence of audit committee and strength of investor 
protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,008***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the interaction 
terms of modified audit report opinion and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -0,239***), modified audit report opinion and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -1,190***), modified audit report 
opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: -0,042***), auditor switch and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*: -0,262**), auditor switch and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*Invpr5: -3,307***), auditor switch and strength of 
investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: -0,919***), status of audit firm and property rights 
(AQ4*Invpr1: -2,258***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
-0,505***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: -0,665***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -
0,032***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -
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0,759***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: -
0,119***), demand for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -
359,237***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: -452,204) 
in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and judicial 
independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,043***), modified audit report opinion and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -0,025*), auditor switch and 
property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: -0,036**), auditor switch and judicial independence 
(AQ3*Invpr2: -0,023***), auditor switch and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ3*Invpr4: -0,152***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: -0,023***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
-0,133***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: -0,354***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*Invpr5: -0,084***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -
0,188***), existence of audit committee and property rights (AQ5*Invpr1: -0,139***), 
existence of audit committee and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ5*Invpr3: -0,071***), existence of audit committee and strength of investor 
protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,088***), demand for auditing and judicial independence 
(AQ6*Invpr2: -160,107***), demand for auditing and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ6*Invpr4: -421,133***), demand for auditing and strength of 
investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -63,624**) and demand for auditing and legal rights 
index (AQ6*Invpr8: -99,181***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of modified 
audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: -6,952***), 
modified audit report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ2*Invpr6: -11,186***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor 
protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -2,663***), auditor switch and property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
326 
 
-5,434***), auditor switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: -4,662***), 
auditor switch and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: -
4,447***), auditor switch and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ3*Invpr4: -16,274***), auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: -
3,039***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -
6,091***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ4*Invpr6: -2,668***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*Invpr7: -0,592***), existence of audit committee and property rights 
(AQ5*Invpr1: -0,707***), existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -1,367***), demand for auditing and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ6*Invpr5: -3.064,409***), demand for auditing and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: -1.214,651***) and demand for auditing and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -165,883***) in cluster 3 in crisis period 
are negative and significant with earnings predictability (EQ8). It means that lower 
audit quality implies lower earnings quality (higher earnings predictability) in 
countries as investor protection becomes weaker, irrespective of the financial crisis 
and therefore H13 is accepted. Antithetically, the interaction terms of auditor switch 
and strength of investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: 7,291***), status of audit firm and 
legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 15,266***) and demand for auditing and strength of 
investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 13.510,998***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of 
modified audit report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: 143,366***), 
auditor switch and judicial independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 246,195***), auditor switch 
and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: 114,692*), auditor 
switch and strength of investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: 46,494*), auditor switch and 
legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 34,444*), status of audit firm and judicial 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
327 
 
independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 9,961***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing 
and reporting standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 75,238***), status of audit firm and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 1.068,390***), status of audit firm 
and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 184,814***), existence of audit committee and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 145,489***), existence of 
audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 
140,309***), existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*:  
42,276***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 
42,026***), demand for auditing and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ6*Invpr6: 482.556,405***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index 
(AQ6*Invpr8: 75.726,825***) in cluster 2, the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,009*), auditor 
switch and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 0,027***), 
auditor switch and strength of investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: 0,004***), status of 
audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,025***), 
status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*:  0,004***), demand for 
auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: 5,370***) and demand for auditing 
and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 2,231*) in cluster 3 in pre crisis 
period and the interaction terms of audit fees and judicial independence (AQ1*Invpr2: 
0,0000*), audit fees and transparency of government policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 
0,0000***), audit fees and legal rights index (AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000***), modified 
audit report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: 1,837***), modified 
audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 
0,135***), modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*Invpr5: 1,274***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor 
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protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,221***), auditor switch and judicial independence 
(AQ3*Invpr2: 3,433***), auditor switch and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ3*Invpr4: 0,306*), auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 
0,286***), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: 0,205***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ4*Invpr5: 0,992***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 5,668***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*:  0,128***), existence of audit committee and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,178***), existence of audit committee and 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,173***), existence of 
audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,334***), existence 
of audit committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,141***), 
demand for auditing and transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 
449,194***) and demand for auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 
429,295***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of audit fees and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ1*Invpr3: 0,0000**), audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000**), modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,200***), modified audit report opinion and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 0,034**), modified audit report opinion 
and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,120***), auditor switch and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ3*Invpr5: 0,049***), auditor switch and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 0,119***), auditor switch and legal 
rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 0,009***), status of audit firm and property rights 
(AQ4*Invpr1: 0,119***), status of audit firm and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,031***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
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shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 0,188***), status of audit firm and strength of 
investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,015***), existence of audit committee and judicial 
independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,008**), existence of audit committee and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,084***), existence of audit 
committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: 0,089***), existence of 
audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 
0,115***), demand for auditing and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: 
548,150***) and demand for auditing and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ6*Invpr6: 264,053***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of modified 
audit report opinion and property rights (AQ2*:  4,026***), modified audit report 
opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: 2,459***), modified audit report 
opinion and transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 2,013***), 
modified audit report opinion and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ2*Invpr4: 10,818***), auditor switch and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ3*Invpr5: 15,093***), auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 15,660***), auditor switch and strength of investor protection 
(AQ3*Invpr7: 2,887***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: 
2,528***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 2,133***), 
status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 
1,596***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: 1,294***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 
2,041***), existence of audit committee and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,518***), existence of audit committee and strength of 
auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 2,369***), demand for auditing and 
property rights (AQ6*Invpr1: 1.011,396***), demand for auditing and judicial 
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independence (AQ6*Invpr2: 547,468***) and demand for auditing and legal rights 
index (AQ6*Invpr8: 2.815,886***) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positive and 
significant with earnings predictability (EQ8), and therefore H13 is rejected. 
Table 7 Panels Y and AJ report that the interaction terms of existence of audit 
committee and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,032*) and demand for 
auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -45,277*) in cluster 3 in pre crisis 
period and the interaction term of modified audit report opinion and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: -33,247***) in cluster 1, the interaction 
terms of modified audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*Invpr3: -91,621***), modified audit report opinion and strength of investor 
protection (AQ2*:  -31,477***), auditor switch and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ3*Invpr6: -30,766**) and status of audit firm and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -18,939***) in cluster 2, 
and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and legal rights index 
(AQ2*Invpr8: -0,553*) and auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: -
0,185*) in cluster 3 in crisis period are negative and significant with loss avoidance 
(EQ9). It means that lower audit quality implies lower earnings quality (higher 
earnings loss avoidance) in countries as investor protection becomes weaker, 
irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H13 is accepted. On contrary, the 
interaction terms of auditor switch and strength of investor protection (AQ3*Invpr7: 
0,027*) and existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 
0,147*) in cluster 3 in pre crisis period and the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 34,451***) and 
modified audit report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 
8,111***) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and 
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efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 46,991*), modified audit report opinion 
and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 72,849***), auditor 
switch and transparency of government policymaking (AQ3*Invpr3: 30,759***), 
status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 
18,294***) and status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 
6,647*) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of auditor switch and property rights 
(AQ3*Invpr1: 0,192*) and auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 0,249**) in cluster 3 in crisis period are positive and 
significant with loss avoidance (EQ9), and therefore H13 is rejected. 
Finally, Table 7 Panels Z and AK report that the coefficients of the interaction 
terms of modified audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*Invpr3: 0,062*), auditor switch and property rights (AQ3*Invpr1: 0,0000**), 
status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 
0,154***), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 
0,084***) and demand for auditing and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ6*Invpr3: 97,245**) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of audit fees and strength of 
investor protection (AQ1*Invpr7: 0,0000*), audit fees and legal rights index 
(AQ1*Invpr8: 0,0000*), modified audit report opinion and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: 0,355***), modified audit report opinion and 
strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,090***), modified audit report opinion 
and legal rights index (AQ2*Invpr8: 0,074*), status of audit firm and property rights 
(AQ4*Invpr1: 0,669***), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
0,044*), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: 0,456***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ4*Invpr4: 0,148***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
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shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: 1,409***), existence of audit committee and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: 0,064*), existence of audit 
committee and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,086**) 
and existence of audit committee and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ5*Invpr6: 0,125*) in cluster 2 and the interaction terms of auditor switch and 
protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ3*Invpr6: 0,0000**), status of audit 
firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 0,580***), existence of audit committee 
and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: 0,352***), existence of audit committee and 
strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,187***) and existence of audit 
committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 0,086***) in cluster 3 in pre crisis 
period and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 0,857**), auditor switch and judicial 
independence (AQ3*Invpr2: 3,758*), status of audit firm and property rights 
(AQ4*Invpr1: 3,233***), status of audit firm and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,880***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 0,587**), status of audit firm and strength of investor protection 
(AQ4*Invpr7: 0,188***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence 
(AQ5*Invpr2: 1,167***), existence of audit committee and legal rights index 
(AQ5*Invpr8: 0,354***) and demand for auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 
396,751*) in cluster 1, the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and 
property rights (AQ2*Invpr1: 0,491***), modified audit report opinion and judicial 
independence (AQ2*Invpr2: 0,239***), modified audit report opinion and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 0,525**), modified audit report opinion and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 0,225***), modified audit report 
opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,140**), modified audit 
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report opinion and legal rights index (AQ2*:  0,400***), status of audit firm and 
judicial independence (AQ4*:  0,091***), status of audit firm and transparency of 
government policymaking (AQ4*Invpr3: 0,166***), status of audit firm and strength 
of auditing and reporting standards (AQ4*:  1,007***), status of audit firm and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: 0,228***), status of audit firm and strength 
of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: 0,058***), existence of audit committee and 
property rights (AQ5*Invpr1: 0,169***), existence of audit committee and protection 
of minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,213***), existence of audit 
committee and legal rights index (AQ5*Invpr8: 0,083***), demand for auditing and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: 360,776**) and demand for auditing and 
legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 1.247,950***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms 
of modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ2*Invpr5: 
1,173**), modified audit report opinion and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ2*Invpr6: 2,957***), modified audit report opinion and strength of 
investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: 0,822***), auditor switch and legal rights index 
(AQ3*Invpr8: 0,0000**), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: 
0,462***), status of audit firm and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ4*Invpr3: 0,463***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: 
0,546***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ5*Invpr4: 0,158**), existence of audit committee and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ5*Invpr6: 0,389***), existence of audit committee 
and strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: 0,163***), demand for auditing and 
judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: 149,025**), demand for auditing and 
transparency of government policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: 136,130***) and demand for 
auditing and legal rights index (AQ6*Invpr8: 478,678***) in cluster 3 in crisis period 
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are positive and significant with earnings smoothness (EQ10). It means that lower 
audit quality implies lower earnings quality (lower earnings smoothness) in countries 
with weaker investor protection, irrespective of the financial crisis and therefore H13 
is accepted. On contrary, inconsistent with H13, the interaction terms of modified 
audit report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -0,061*), auditor 
switch and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ3*Invpr4: -0,582***), 
status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -0,141***) and demand for 
auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -54,284**) in cluster 1, the 
interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and judicial independence 
(AQ2*Invpr2: -0,228*), auditor switch and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ3*Invpr6: -0,852***), auditor switch and legal rights index (AQ3*Invpr8: 
-7,589***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -
1,504***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -0,038***), 
existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,082**), 
existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -
0,166**), existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*Invpr7: -0,040***) and demand for auditing and judicial independence 
(AQ6*Invpr2: -620,004**) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms of modified audit 
report opinion and strength of investor protection (AQ2*Invpr7: -0,106*), status of 
audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -0,396***), 
status of audit firm and strength of investor protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -0,122***), 
demand for auditing and judicial independence (AQ6*Invpr2: -50,305**) and demand 
for auditing and strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -27,727*) in cluster 3 in 
pre crisis period and the interaction terms of modified audit report opinion and 
judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,745**), modified audit report opinion and 
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transparency of government policymaking (AQ2*Invpr3: -0,421***), modified audit 
report opinion and strength of auditing and reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -
0,449**), modified audit report opinion and efficacy of corporate boards 
(AQ2*Invpr5: -0,495*), status of audit firm and judicial independence (AQ4*Invpr2: -
0,911***), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(AQ4*Invpr4: -1,080***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' 
interests (AQ4*Invpr6: -0,479*), status of audit firm and legal rights index 
(AQ4*Invpr8: -0,539***), existence of audit committee and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ5*Invpr4: -0,496**), existence of audit committee and 
strength of investor protection (AQ5*Invpr7: -0,496**) and demand for auditing and 
efficacy of corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: -694,937**) in cluster 1, the interaction 
terms of modified audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking 
(AQ2*Invpr3: -0,835***), status of audit firm and property rights (AQ4*Invpr1: -
1,205***), status of audit firm and protection of minority shareholders' interests 
(AQ4*Invpr6: -0,432***), status of audit firm and legal rights index (AQ4*Invpr8: -
0,071***), existence of audit committee and judicial independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -
0,055*), existence of audit committee and efficacy of corporate boards (AQ5*Invpr5: -
0,127**), existence of audit committee and strength of investor protection 
(AQ5*Invpr7: -0,126***), demand for auditing and judicial independence 
(AQ6*Invpr2: -417,143*), demand for auditing and transparency of government 
policymaking (AQ6*Invpr3: -545,023**) and demand for auditing and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: -2.773,647***) in cluster 2, and the interaction terms 
of modified audit report opinion and property rights (AQ2*Invpr1: -1,007**), 
modified audit report opinion and judicial independence (AQ2*Invpr2: -0,923***), 
modified audit report opinion and transparency of government policymaking 
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(AQ2*Invpr3: -0,698***), modified audit report opinion and strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (AQ2*Invpr4: -2,219***), auditor switch and judicial 
independence (AQ3*Invpr2: -7,033**), status of audit firm and property rights 
(AQ4*Invpr1: -0,178**), status of audit firm and strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (AQ4*Invpr4: -0,532***), status of audit firm and efficacy of corporate 
boards (AQ4*Invpr5: -0,365***), status of audit firm and protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (AQ4*:  -1,978***), status of audit firm and strength of investor 
protection (AQ4*Invpr7: -0,074**), existence of audit committee and judicial 
independence (AQ5*Invpr2: -0,153*), existence of audit committee and transparency 
of government policymaking (AQ5*Invpr3: -0,358***), demand for auditing and 
property rights (AQ6*Invpr1: -396,442***), demand for auditing and efficacy of 
corporate boards (AQ6*Invpr5: -401,150*), demand for auditing and protection of 
minority shareholders' interests (AQ6*Invpr6: -176,159*) and demand for auditing and 
strength of investor protection (AQ6*Invpr7: -86,874*) in cluster 3 in crisis period are 
negative and significant with earnings smoothness (EQ10). 
(Insert Table 7 Panels Q to AK here) 
 
6.4.3.4. Regression results of control variables in pre and crisis period 
The results of control variables are similar to the findings of Becker et al 
(1998), Krishnan (2003), Balsam et al (2003), Zhou and Elder (2004), Chen et al 
(2005), Lin et al (2006), Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006), Chia et al (2007), 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008), Baxter and 
Cotter (2009), Prawitt et al (2009), Gerayli et al (2011), Chen et al (2011), Iatridis 
(2012), Hamdan et al (2012), Hamdan et al (2013), Iatridis and Dimitras (2013), 
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Yasar (2013), Soliman and Ragab (2014), Badolato et al (2014), Gajevszky (2014) 
and Salleh and Haat (2014). Specifically, Table 7 Panels Q to  AK reveals that a) 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), cash flow 
from operations volatility (CFOV) and total debt (DEBT) in pre crisis period, and 
current assets (Current), timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV), the market beta 
coefficient (BETA) and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) in crisis 
period are statistically significant with ex post conservatism (EQ1) in all clusters, b) 
net income (NI), current assets (Current), timely loss recognition dummy variable 
(LL), corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and 
the market beta coefficient (BETA) in pre crisis period, and net income (NI), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV), the market beta coefficient (BETA) and industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) in crisis period are statistically significant 
with value relevance (EQ3) in all clusters, c) cash flow from operations volatility 
(CFOV) in pre crisis period, and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), 
corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and the 
market beta coefficient (BETA) in crisis period are statistically significant with 
accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) in all clusters, d) timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size (CORPSIZE) and cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV) in pre crisis period, and small profits dummy variable 
(SP), corporate size (CORPSIZE) and cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) in 
crisis period are statistically significant with accruals quality measured by McNichols 
(2002) (EQ5) in all clusters, e) cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) in pre 
crisis period, and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size 
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(CORPSIZE), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and the market beta 
coefficient (BETA) in crisis period are statistically significant with accruals quality 
measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) in all clusters, f) net income (NI), timely loss 
recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV), total debt (DEBT), the market beta coefficient (BETA), 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) and return on assets (ROA) in pre 
crisis period, and corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from operations volatility 
(CFOV) and the market beta coefficient (BETA) in crisis period are statistically 
significant with earnings persistence (EQ7) in all clusters, g) net income (NI), timely 
loss recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from 
operations volatility (CFOV) and the market beta coefficient (BETA) in pre crisis 
period, and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size 
(CORPSIZE), cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) and the market beta 
coefficient (BETA) in crisis period are statistically significant with earnings 
predictability (EQ8) in all clusters, h) corporate size (CORPSIZE) and total debt 
(DEBT) in pre crisis period and timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL) in crisis 
period are statistically significant with loss avoidance (EQ9) in all clusters and i) 
timely loss recognition dummy variable (LL), corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow 
from operations volatility (CFOV) and the market beta coefficient (BETA) in pre 
crisis period, and corporate size (CORPSIZE), cash flow from operations volatility 
(CFOV) and the market beta coefficient (BETA) in crisis period are statistically 
significant with earnings smoothness (EQ10) in all clusters. 
(Insert Table 7 Panels Q to AK here) 
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6.4.4. Cost of equity capital and audit quality under financial crisis of 
2008 
Table 7 Panel AL shows that H14 holds only for countries of cluster 2 
(2,563*), implying that crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) has positive 
association with cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by 
Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁). Moreover, from Table 7 Panel AM, the results 
show that the crisis period dummy variable (CRISIS) coefficients for all clusters are 
significant and have positive values of 0,022** for cluster 1, 0,008** for cluster 2 and 
0,028** for cluster 3. It means that consistent with H14, cost of equity capital under 
PEG ratio method introduced by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2) is significantly 
higher in years of financial crisis of 2008. All these results support the findings of 
Mokhova (2011) which implies that the fall of global financial market at the end of 
October of 2008, the decrease of firm’s stocks therefore their market capitalization 
and the rapidly increasing risks caused by instability lead to higher cost of equity 
capital.  
The study has also found that there is controversial relationship between cost 
of equity capital and audit quality. Consistent with H15, Table 7 Panel AL reports that 
status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) for clusters 1 (-1,475*) and 2 (-0,740**) is 
negatively associated with cost of equity capital under constant growth model 
introduced by Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁). In parallel, Table 7 Panel AM 
shows that auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) for cluster 2 (-0,034**) and status of 
audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) (-0,062*** for cluster 1, -0,024** for cluster 2 and 
-0,025* for cluster 3) and existence of audit committee dummy variable (AQ5) (-
0,113*** for cluster 1, -0,083*** for cluster 2 and -0,083*** for cluster 3) for all 
clusters are negatively associated with cost of equity capital under PEG ratio method 
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introduced by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2) therefore H15 is accepted. Thus, 
these results support the findings of Easley and O’ Hara (2004), Fernando et al 
(2010), and Chen et al (2011) which implies that the less of audit quality the higher of 
cost of equity capital in crisis period. 
However, unlike the previous findings, modified audit report opinion dummy 
variable (AQ2) for clusters 1 (2,030*) and 3 (4,140*), existence of audit committee 
dummy variable (AQ5) for cluster 2 (0,297**) and audit fees (AQ1) for cluster 1 
(0,0000*) are positively associated with cost of equity capital under constant growth 
model introduced by Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁) and modified audit report 
opinion dummy variable (AQ2) for clusters 1 (0,033***) and 2 (0,255***) are 
positively associated with cost of equity capital under PEG ratio method introduced 
by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2). Consequently, H15 is rejected. Although the 
R
2
 is equal among clusters in the case of cost of equity capital under constant growth 
model introduced by Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁), the R2 is higher in cluster 1 
than in clusters 2 and 3 in the case of cost of equity capital under PEG ratio method 
introduced by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2). 
Examining control variables, consistent with previous literature, Table 7 Panel 
AL shows that corporate size (CORPSIZE) for all clusters, book-to-market ratio (BM) 
and the market beta coefficient (BETA) for cluster 1, corporate natural log of market 
value of equity (LNMV) for cluster 2, natural log of debt to assets ratio (LNLEV) for 
clusters 2 and 3 and corporate dividends (DPO) for cluster 3 are statistically 
significant with cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by 
Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁), and based on results of Table 7 Panel AM, book-
to-market ratio (BM), the market beta coefficient (BETA), natural log of debt to 
assets ratio (LNLEV), natural log of book to market ratio (LNBM), corporate size 
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(CORPSIZE) and classification of firm by market capitalization dummy variable 
(FIRM) for all clusters, natural log of debt to assets ratio (LNLEV) for cluster 1, 
trading volume (VOLUME) for clusters 1 and 2, total debt (DEBT) and cash flow 
from operations (CFO) for cluster 3 are statistically significant with cost of equity 
capital under PEG ratio method introduced by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2). 
However, the results are shown more severe in countries in clusters 2 and 3 since they 
are characterized by low shareholder protection.  
(Insert Table 7 Panels AL and AM here) 
 
6.4.5. Cost of equity capital and earnings quality under financial crisis of 
2008 
As shown by the linear regression results in Tables 7 Panels AN and AO, the 
coefficients on ex post conservatism (EQ1) and earnings smoothness (EQ10) for 
cluster 2 (-0,719** and -0,657** respectively), earnings persistence (EQ7) for cluster 
3 (-5,062***), and value relevance (EQ3) and accruals quality measured by 
McNichols (2002 (EQ5) for cluster 1 (-2,066** and -0,811** respectively), loss 
avoidance (EQ9) for cluster 2 (-0,001**), accruals quality measured by Dechow et al 
(1995) (EQ4) and earnings predictability (EQ8) for cluster 3 (-2.155,287** and -
37,134** respectively) are statistically significant and with a negative sign in pre and 
crisis period respectively. Therefore, consistent with Bhattacharya et al (2003), 
Francis et al (2004; 2005), Chan et al (2009) and McInnis (2010), these results are 
consistent with H16 and imply that cost of equity capital under constant growth model 
introduced by Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁) is negatively associated with 
earnings quality. However, earnings quality, measured by ex post conservatism (EQ1) 
for clusters 1 (0,047*) and 3 (1,688**), value relevance (EQ3) and accruals quality 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
342 
 
measured by McNichols (2002 (EQ5) for clusters 1 (12,132** and 1,389*** 
respectively) and 2 (7,092** and 0,030* respectively), earnings smoothness (EQ10) 
for cluster 1 (1,060*) and accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) for 
cluster 3 (0,522**) in pre crisis period, and ex post conservatism (EQ1) and earnings 
predictability (EQ8) for cluster 1 (16,944*** and 2,323*** respectively) and value 
relevance (EQ3) for cluster 2 (34,433***) in crisis period, is positively associated with 
cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by Palea (2007) 
(COSTOFEQUITY₁) and therefore H16 is rejected. The R
2
 is slightly higher in cluster 
3 than in clusters 1 and 2 in pre crisis period. On contrary, the R
2
 is higher in cluster 1 
than in clusters 2 and 3 due to high level of shareholder protection in crisis period. 
Regarding the control variables, the results in Table 7 Panels AN and AO 
indicate that cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by Palea 
(2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁) is inversely associated with book-to-market ratio (BM) 
and cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) for cluster 2, negative earnings 
realization dummy variable (NER) and collateral value or asset structure of assets 
(COLLATERAL) for cluster 3 in pre crisis period, and with book-to-market ratio 
(BM) for cluster 1 and non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT) for cluster 2 in crisis 
period. On contrary, cost of equity capital under constant growth model introduced by 
Palea (2007) (COSTOFEQUITY₁) is positively associated with corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) for clusters 1 and 2 in pre crisis period, and with the market beta 
coefficient (BETA) and corporate size (CORPSIZE) for cluster 1, sales volatility (SV) 
for cluster 2 and industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) for cluster 3 in 
crisis period. 
In Table 7 Panels AP and AQ, it is reported the results of estimating the 
regression of earnings quality attributes on the cost of equity capital under PEG ratio 
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method introduced by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2) and the control variables 
described in regression equation 44. Consistent with H16, ex post conservatism (EQ1) 
for all clusters (-0,119** for cluster 1, -0,048*** for cluster 2 and -0,055** for cluster 
3), ex ante conservatism (EQ2) and accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002 
(EQ5) for clusters 1 (-0,011* and -0,056*** respectively) and 2 (-0,001*** and -
0,001** respectively), value relevance (EQ3) and loss avoidance (EQ9) for clusters 1 
(-0,215* and -0,002*** respectively) and 3 (-0,102* and -0,147*** respectively), 
accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) for cluster 2 (-0,005***), 
accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) for cluster 3 (-6,235**), 
earnings predictability (EQ8) for cluster 1 (-0,001***) in pre crisis period, and value 
relevance (EQ3) and EQ7 for cluster 3 (-0,168** and -0,083*** respectively), accruals 
quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) and earnings smoothness (EQ10) for 
cluster 1 (-0,075*** and -0,008** respectively), accruals quality measured by 
McNichols (2002 (EQ5) for cluster 2 (-0,009***) and accruals quality measured by 
Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) for clusters 2 (-0,003***) and 3 (-2,470***) in crisis period 
are negatively associated with ex ante conservatism (EQ2). These results enhance the 
findings of Bhattacharya et al (2003), Francis et al (2004; 2005), Chan et al (2009) 
and McInnis (2010) which implies that earnings quality attributes individually have 
negative effect on cost of equity capital. Contrariwise, the results in Table 7 Panels 
AP and AQ show an inconsistency with H16 for value relevance (EQ3) and earnings 
predictability (EQ8) for cluster 2 (0,528*** and 0,005*** respectively), accruals 
quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) for cluster 3 (5,828***) and earnings 
persistence (EQ7) for clusters 2 (0,030***) and 3 (0,178***) in pre crisis period, and 
ex ante conservatism (EQ2), accruals quality measured by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) 
and earnings persistence (EQ7) for cluster 1 (1,355***, 0,065*** and 0,034*** 
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respectively), accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) for clusters 2 
(0,004***) and 3 (2,531***), accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002 (EQ5) 
and loss avoidance (EQ9) for clusters 1 (0,046*** and 0,0000*** respectively) and 3 
(0,549*** and 0,008*** respectively), and earnings predictability (EQ8) (0,019*** 
for cluster 1, 0,037** for cluster 2 and 0,083*** for cluster 3) for all clusters in crisis 
period which are positively associated with cost of equity capital under PEG ratio 
method introduced by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2). Likewise with cost of 
equity capital under constant growth model introduced by Palea (2007) 
(COSTOFEQUITY₁), according to Table 7 Panels AP and AQ, the R2 is lower in 
cluster 1 than in clusters 2 and 3 in pre crisis period and the R
2
 is higher in cluster 1 
than in clusters 2 and 3 in crisis period.  
Moreover, examining the control variables, consistent with previous literature, 
Table 7 Panels AP and AQ indicate that coefficients of book-to-market ratio (BM) for 
all clusters, financial leverage (LEVERAGE), collateral value or asset structure of 
assets (COLLATERAL) and liquidity (LIQUIDITY) for cluster 1, negative earnings 
realization dummy variable (NER) for all clusters, non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT) 
for clusters 1 and 2, the market beta coefficient (BETA), growth (GROWTH) and 
industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) for cluster 2, corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) and cash flow from operations volatility (CFOV) for clusters 2 and 3, 
sales volatility (SV) and profitability (PROFITABILITY) for cluster 3 in pre crisis 
period, and book-to-market ratio (BM), financial leverage (LEVERAGE) and 
collateral value or asset structure of assets (COLLATERAL) for clusters 1 and 3, 
corporate size (CORPSIZE) and negative earnings realization dummy variable (NER) 
for all clusters, non-debt tax shields (NON-DEBT) for clusters 1 and 2, industrial 
classification dummy variable (SICODE) and liquidity (LIQUIDITY) for cluster 1, 
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sales volatility (SV) for clusters 2 and 3, the market beta coefficient (BETA), growth 
(GROWTH) and profitability (PROFITABILITY) for cluster 3 in crisis period are 
statistically significant with cost of equity capital under PEG ratio method introduced 
by Easton (2004) (COSTOFEQUITY2). 
(Insert Table 7 Panels AN, AO, AP and AQ here) 
 
6.4.6. Cost of debt and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008 
Table 7 Panel AR reports multiple regressions between cost of debt, crisis 
period dummy variable and audit quality metrics. First, the impact of the crisis period 
(CRISIS) on cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) can be assessed through the statistically 
significant coefficients of 0,527** for cluster 1 and 0,011** for cluster 2. Thus, 
consistent with Mokhova (2011), these results confirm the research hypothesis H17 
which indicate that the total eventual losses in most economies led to the world 
recession which in turn have an impact on the availability of credit and as a result on 
the cost of debt capital.  
Second, Table 7 Panel AR shows that the association between cost of debt 
(COSTOFDEBT) and audit quality measures can be extracted through the negative 
statistically significant coefficients of status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) and 
audit fees (AQ1) for cluster 1 (-1,173** and -0,0000** respectively), modified audit 
report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) for cluster 2 (-0,004*) and existence of audit 
committee dummy variable (AQ5) for cluster 3 (-0,002***). Consequently, consistent 
with findings from Blackwell et al (1998), Pittman and Fortin (2004), Kim et al 
(2011), Karjalainen (2011) and Causholli and Knechel (2012), the results provides 
support for H18 which show that there is negative association between audit quality 
and cost of debt. On contrary, based on the findings of Dhaliwal et al (2008), there is 
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inconsistency with H18 for modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2) for 
clusters 1 (1,733**) and 3 (0,0000**), auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) for 
cluster 2 (0,015**) and status of audit firm dummy variable (AQ4) for cluster 3 
(0,001***) as a result of positive association between cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) 
and audit quality (expressed by modified audit report opinion dummy variable (AQ2), 
auditor switch dummy variable (AQ3) and status of audit firm dummy variable 
(AQ4)). The R
2
 is slightly higher in cluster 3 than in clusters 1 and 2. 
Third, examining control variables, consistent with Chow and Rice (1982), 
Krishnan (2003), Fortin and Pittman (2007), Francis et al (2005), Dhaliwal et al 
(2008), Karjalainen (2011) and Causholli and Knechel (2012), Table 7 Panel AR 
shows that coefficients of book-to-market ratio (BM) for cluster 1, corporate size 
(CORPSIZE) for all clusters, natural log of market value of equity (LNMVE) for 
clusters 2 and 3, industrial classification dummy variable (SICODE) for cluster 2, 
natural log of net income before extraordinary items (LNNIBE) and collateral value 
or asset structure of assets (COLLATERAL) for cluster 3 are statistically significant 
with cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT).   
(Insert Table 7 Panel AR here) 
 
6.4.7. Cost of debt and earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008 
The results from Table 7 Panels AS and AT indicate that there is ambiguity 
about the relationship between cost of debt and earnings quality. Consistent with 
Francis et al (2005) and Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011), the results from Tables 7 
Panels AS and AT support H19 for ex post conservatism (EQ1) and earnings 
persistence (EQ7) for cluster 2 (-0,0000* and -0,0000* respectively), ex ante 
conservatism (EQ2), accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) and 
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earnings predictability (EQ8) for cluster 1 (-0,055*, -0,635** and -0,025* 
respectively), earnings smoothness (EQ10) for clusters 1 (-2,465***) and 3 (-0,0000*) 
in pre crisis period, and ex post conservatism (EQ1) for cluster 1 (-0,0000**), accruals 
quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) for cluster 3 (-0,023**), earnings 
predictability (EQ8) and earnings smoothness (EQ10) for cluster 2 (-0,002* and -
0,0000* respectively) in crisis period. It means that lower (higher) earnings quality is 
associated with higher (lower) cost of debt. On contrary, consistent with Fung and 
Goodwin (2013) and Rodriguez-Perez and Van Hemmen (2010), the coefficients of 
ex ante conservatism (EQ2) and earnings persistence (EQ7) for cluster 3 (0,001* and 
0,001* respectively), accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) for 
cluster 2 (0,0000*), and loss avoidance (EQ9) for clusters 2 (0,0000*) and 3 
(0,0000**) in pre crisis period, and accruals quality measured by Dechow et al (1995) 
(EQ4) and accruals quality measured by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) for cluster 2 
(0,0000** and 0,0000** respectively), accruals quality measured by Kothari et al 
(2005) (EQ6) and earnings predictability (EQ8) for clusters 1 (0,0000** and 0,0000* 
respectively) and 3 (0,022** and 0,0000** respectively), and earnings persistence 
(EQ7) for cluster 3 (0,0000*) in crisis period are positively associated with cost of 
debt (COSTOFDEBT) as a result of denial of H19. The R
2
 is slightly equal in all 
clusters in pre and crisis period. 
The coefficients on the control variables are consistent with previous literature 
(see Kormedi and Lipe, 1987; Dechow et al, 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Basu, 1997; 
McNichols, 2002; Leuz et al, 2003; Francis et al, 2004; Francis et al, 2005; 
Burgstahler et al, 2006; Kothari et al, 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Jiang, 
2008). Table 7 Panels AS and AT show that there is significant association between 
cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) and financial leverage (LEVERAGE) for all clusters, 
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natural log of net income before extraordinary items (LNNIBE), change in earnings 
per share (ΓEPS) and cash flow from operations (CFO) for cluster 1, profitability 
(PROFITABILITY), change in earnings per share (ΓEPS) and profitability dummy 
variable (INCR) for cluster 2, profitability (PROFIT) for clusters 2 and 3, corporate 
size (CORPSIZE) and interest coverage (INTCOV) for cluster 3 in pre crisis period, 
and corporate size (CORPSIZE) and interest coverage (INTCOV) for cluster 1, 
natural log of net income before extraordinary items (LNNIBE) for clusters 1 and 2, 
profitability dummy variable (PROFIT) for all clusters, profitability dummy variable 
(INCR) for clusters 2 and 3, and change in earnings per share (ΓEPS), cash flow from 
operations (CFO) and R&D expense  (RND) for cluster 3 in crisis period. 
(Insert Table 7 Panels AS and AT here) 
 
6.5. Summary 
Consistent with previous literature, the main findings of this thesis are as 
follows: 
 During the financial crisis of 2008, all clusters display higher conservatism (ex 
post and ex ante), higher accruals quality, lower earnings persistence, lower value 
relevance, higher earnings predictability, higher loss avoidance, and lower 
earnings smoothness. However, these fluctuations of the earnings quality 
attributes among clusters during the financial crisis differentiate due to the level 
of investor protection. 
 The ex post conservatism in all clusters in years of financial crisis of 2008 is 
significantly higher than the degree of conservatism in the years before the 
financial crisis of 2008. 
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 The degree of value relevance in clusters 2 and 3 is significantly lower during the 
financial crisis of 2008 counter to finding in cluster 1 where value relevance is 
significantly higher. 
 Firms book more accruals to depress earnings during financial crisis. It means 
that all clusters appear lower earnings quality (lower accruals quality) during 
financial crisis of 2008. 
 Managers have incentives to appear higher values of persistence during financial 
crisis of 2008 which indicate high levels of earnings persistence and more 
transitory earnings. 
 Earnings predictability appears to be lower during the financial crisis of 2008 in 
all clusters. 
 Earnings smoothness is negatively associated with crisis dummy variable in 
cluster 1 and positively associated in clusters 2 and 3. With other words, on 
cluster 1 managers follow real smoothing (high quality of earnings) and in 
clusters 2 and 3 follow artificial smoothing (low quality of earnings). 
 As for ex ante conservatism, and loss avoidance there is no relationship with 
crisis dummy variable in all clusters. 
 Examining the association between audit quality and investor protection, even 
though the results are mixed among clusters, all measures of audit quality is 
positively associated with most of institutional factors of investor protection in all 
clusters except audit fees which is not correlated with none of investor protection 
indexes. Further, the results show that these correlations are stronger in clusters 1 
and 2 which are characterized by higher level of investor protection in relation 
with cluster 3. 
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 Concerning the impact of financial crisis on audit quality, the results show that 
audit quality is lower during financial crisis in all clusters and in most of audit 
quality measures except from audit fees which is not correlated with crisis 
dummy variable in all clusters. 
 The results show that investor protection and crisis dummy variable have a joint 
role in the production of higher audit quality numbers. With other words, audit 
quality is higher in firms with strong investor protection and legal enforcement 
during financial crisis in all clusters except from audit fees which is not 
correlated with none of the interaction terms. This positive impact is shown 
stronger in clusters 1 and 2, since the investor protection is stricter than in cluster 
3. 
 The results confirm the findings of vast majority of previous literature that there 
is negative association between audit quality and earnings management. Further, 
there is strong positive association between earnings quality and investor 
protection. In detail, earnings quality is weaker in countries with weak investor 
protection in all clusters in pre and crisis period. 
 The results imply that lower audit quality implies lower earnings quality in 
countries with weak investor protection in all clusters, irrespective of the 
financial crisis. The influence of this interaction term is stronger in cluster 2 
which is characterized by medium investor protection. 
 The financial crisis of 2008 lead in a fall of global financial markets, a decrease 
of firm’s stocks and an increase of financial risks which in turn increase the cost 
of equity capital. 
 Examining the relationship between audit quality and cost of equity capital, the 
results are mixed among clusters. However, in general, the results show that cost 
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of equity capital is negatively associated with firms that audited by Big Four 
auditors, and firms that switch auditor and positively associated with firms with a 
modified audit report, and audit fees. 
 The results show a controversial relationship between earnings quality and cost of 
equity capital among clusters, but, in general, ex post conservatism and value 
relevance in pre crisis period and value relevance and accruals quality in crisis 
period are negatively associated with cost of equity. 
 The results indicate a negative impact of financial crisis of 2008 on cost of debt. 
 Firms that audited by Big Four auditors, audit fees, firms with a modified audit 
report and firms that have an audit committee have a negative association with 
cost of debt capital. 
 The results indicate that the association between cost of debt and earnings quality 
are mixed among clusters. Specifically, ex post conservatism, accruals quality, 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness in pre and crisis period is shown 
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This thesis focuses on 18 developed countries which are categorized into 
outsider economies with strong outsider protection and legal enforcement (cluster 1), 
insider economies with better legal enforcement systems (cluster 2) and insider 
economies with weaker legal enforcement systems (cluster 3) based on the country 
classification of Leuz (2010). It aims to ascertain whether the financial crisis of 2008 
affected the earnings quality, its determinants and its consequences of listed firms of 
advanced countries as per investor protection. With other words, first, it investigates 
how this deterioration affected earnings management measured by ten different 
dimensions of earnings quality: ex post and ex ante conservatism, value relevance, 
three accruals quality measures, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, loss 
avoidance analysis and earnings smoothness. Second, the joint effect of financial 
crisis of 2008 and investor protection on audit quality and the joint effect of audit 
quality and investor protection on earnings quality are examined. In the end, it is 
studied how financial crisis of 2008 and the differences in audit quality and earnings 
management in pre and crisis period affect cost of capital, measured by cost of equity 
capital and cost of debt. 
In detail, nineteen hypotheses are developed to examine the research questions 
of this thesis. First, concerning the effect of financial crisis of 2008, it is expected that 
earnings management is increased and therefore earnings quality is decreased. 
Second, concerning how audit quality is influenced from institutional factors of 
investor protection in pre and crisis period jointly, it is hypothesized first, that audit 
quality is positively correlated with investor protection, second, audit quality is higher 
during financial crisis, and third, audit quality is higher in firms with strong investor 
protection and legal enforcement during financial crisis. In the same vein, concerning 
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how earnings quality is influenced from audit quality and investor protection jointly, 
it is hypothesized first, that earnings quality is positively associated with audit quality, 
second, there is positive association between earnings quality and investor protection, 
and third audit quality is higher which implies that earnings quality is greater as 
investor protection becomes stronger, irrespective of the financial crisis. Third, 
regarding the cost of capital in the context of financial crisis of 2008, audit and 
earnings quality, first, it is hypothesized that the financial crisis of 2008 has rise 
equity beta which led to the increase of equity risk premium and therefore an increase 
of cost of equity capital. Moreover, regarding the affect of audit quality on cost of 
equity capital, it is expected a negative association. Further, it is hypothesized that 
there is statistically negatively reliable association between each earnings quality 
attribute considered individually and measures of the cost of equity capital. Third, it is 
expected that the total losses in most economies led to the world recession have an 
impact on the availability of credit as a result on the cost of debt capital. In addition, it 
is expected a negative association between audit quality and cost of debt. In the end, it 
is hypothesized that poorer earnings quality is associated with larger cost of debt. 
 
Most of the findings are consistent with hypotheses. First, concerning the 
effect of financial crisis of 2008 on earnings quality, the main finding is a significant 
decrease of earnings quality in the crisis period. Therefore, in the crisis period, all 
clusters display higher conservatism (ex post and ex ante), higher accruals quality, 
lower earnings persistence, lower value relevance, higher earnings predictability, 
higher loss avoidance, and lower earnings smoothness. However, these fluctuations of 
the earnings quality attributes among clusters during the financial crisis differentiate 
due to the level of investor protection.  
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The results support the findings of Leuz et al (2003), Haw et al (2004), 
Burgstahler et al (2006), and Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) who indicated that 
earnings quality is positively associated with investor protection while earnings 
management is negatively associated. Consequently, countries in cluster 1, which are 
characterized by high level shareholder protection, appears lower conservatism (ex 
ante and ex post), higher value relevance, lower accruals quality, higher earnings 
persistence, lower earnings predictability, lower avoidance analysis and higher 
earnings smoothness rather than in the countries in clusters 2 and 3.  
From regression analysis, examining the relationship between earnings quality 
and CRISIS dummy variable, the results are mixed. Consistent with Warganegara and 
Vionita (2010), Francis et al (2013), and Kousenidis et al (2013), the ex post 
conservatism in all clusters in years of financial crisis of 2008 is significantly higher 
than the degree of conservatism in the years before the financial crisis of 2008. It 
means that in an attempt to cope with bad news, managers have an incentive to choose 
more aggressive conservatism during financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the results are controversial examining the impact of financial 
crisis on value relevance. Consistent with Iatridis (2010) and Kousenidis et al (2013), 
the degree of value relevance in clusters 2 and 3 is significantly lower during the 
financial crisis of 2008 counter to finding in cluster 1 where value relevance is 
significantly higher.  
Examining the accruals quality, the findings  support the findings of Ahmed et 
al (2008), Filip and Laffournier (2012), Habib et al (2013) and Lu (2012) which 
implies that firms book more accruals to depress earnings during financial crisis. It 
means that all clusters appear lower earnings quality (lower accruals quality) during 
the financial crisis of 2008.  
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Similarly with value relevance, there is positive association between earnings 
persistence and CRISIS dummy variable in all clusters. It means that managers have 
incentives to appear higher values of persistence which indicate high levels of 
earnings persistence and more transitory earnings.  
Subsequent, the results confirm the findings of Bikker and Haaf (2002) and 
Albertazzi and Gamabacorta (2009) who claimed that in recession period, profitability 
reduces and firms face higher earnings volatility. Consequently, consistent with 
Dichev and Tang (2009) because of the existence of negative relationship between 
earnings volatility and earnings predictability, earnings predictability appears to be 
lower during the financial crisis in all clusters. 
Earnings smoothness is negatively associated with CRISIS dummy variable in 
cluster 1 and positively associated in clusters 2 and 3. With other words, on cluster 1 
managers follow real smoothing (high quality of earnings) and in clusters 2 and 3 
follow artificial smoothing (low quality of earnings).  
As for ex ante conservatism, and loss avoidance there is no relationship with 
CRISIS dummy variable in all clusters.  
Second, examining the association between audit quality and investor 
protection, even though the results are mixed among clusters, all measures of audit 
quality is positively associated with most of institutional factors of investor protection 
in all clusters except audit fees which is not correlated with none of investor 
protection indexes. Further, the results show that these correlations are stronger in 
clusters 1 and 2 which are characterized by higher level of investor protection in 
relation with cluster 3. In sum, consistent with Jaggi and Low (2011) and Leuz et al 
(2003), we observe that stronger protection of property rights, judiciary independent 
from influences of members government, citizens, or firms, financial auditing and 
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reporting standards regarding financial performance, the supervision of investors and 
boards on management decisions, the protection of interests of minority shareholders, 
the investor protection and the legal rights of investors, and firms are more clearly 
informed by the government of changes in policies and regulations implies higher 
audit quality.             
Further, concerning the impact of financial crisis on audit quality, the results 
again, are opposite from expectations and the findings of previous literature. In 
general, audit quality is lower during financial crisis in all clusters and in most of 
audit quality measures except from audit fees which is not correlated with crisis 
dummy variable in all clusters.  
In addition, overall the evidence is compelling and consistently shows that 
investor protection and crisis dummy variable have a joint role in the production of 
higher audit quality numbers. With other words, audit quality is higher in firms with 
strong investor protection and legal enforcement during financial crisis in all clusters 
except from audit fees which is not correlated with none of the interaction terms. This 
positive impact is shown stronger in clusters 1 and 2, since the investor protection is 
stricter than in cluster 3. In detail, stronger protection of property rights, judiciary 
independent from influences of members government, citizens, or firms, financial 
auditing and reporting standards regarding financial performance, the supervision of 
investors and boards on management decisions, the protection of interests of minority 
shareholders, the investor protection and the legal rights of investors, and firms are 
more clearly informed by the government of changes in policies and regulations 
increase the appearance of modified audit opinion, the level of switching to Big 4 
auditor, more preferable use of Big 4 auditor, the existence of audit committees and 
higher demand for auditing during financial crisis in all clusters.    
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Examining the joint effect of investor protection and audit quality on earnings 
quality, we also consider that the results are mixed among clusters and research 
periods. First, consistent with Guenther and Young (2000), Bushman and Smith 
(2001), Leuz et al (2003), Shen and Chih (2005), Burgstahler et al (2006), Nabar and 
Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), Cahan et al (2008) and Houque et al (2012), the findings 
indicate that there is strong positive association between earnings quality and investor 
protection. In detail, earnings quality is weaker in countries with weak investor 
protection in all clusters in pre and crisis period. 
Subsequent, the results confirm the findings of vast majority of previous 
literature that there is negative association between audit quality and earnings 
management. Hence, consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976), Watts and 
Zimmerman (1983), Teoh and Wong (1993), Becker et al (1998), DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998), Francis et al (1999), Francis and Krishnan (1999), Frankel et al 
(2002), Krishnan (2003), Balsam et al (2003), Chung et al (2003), Butler et al (2004), 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006), Caramanis and Lennox (2008), Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008), Hussainey (2009), Chia et al (2011), Hajizadeh and Rahimi 
(2012), Iatridis (2012), Hamdan et al (2012) and Iatridis and Dimitras (2013), lower 
audit quality implies lower earnings quality  in all clusters, irrespective of the 
financial crisis. 
Finally, the results show that investor protection and auditing have a joint role 
in the production of higher quality earnings numbers. However, the results are mixed 
among clusters and between research periods. Consistent with previous findings 
(Francis et al, 2003; Francis and Wang, 2008; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008), 
lower audit quality implies lower earnings quality in countries with weak investor 
protection in all clusters, irrespective of the financial crisis. The influence of this 
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interaction term is stronger in cluster 2 which is characterized by medium investor 
protection. 
Third, concerning the impact of financial crisis of 2008 on cost of capital, the 
findings support the results of Mokhova (2011) which implies that the financial crisis 
of 2008 lead in a fall of global financial markets, a decrease of firm’s stocks and an 
increase of financial risks which in turn increase the cost of equity capital. 
Further, examining the relationship between audit quality and cost of equity 
capital, the results are mixed among clusters. However, in general, the results show 
that cost of equity capital is negatively associated with firms that audited by Big Four 
auditors, and firms that switch auditor and positively associated with firms with a 
modified audit report, and audit fees. Consequently, consistent with Easley and O’ 
Hara (2004), Fernando et al (2010), and Chen et al (2011), these negative associations 
implies that the less of audit quality the higher of cost of equity capital in crisis period 
and vice versa. 
Subsequent, the results show a controversial relationship between earnings 
quality and cost of equity capital among clusters, but, in general, consistent with the 
findings of Bhattacharya et al (2003), Francis et al (2004; 2005), Chan et al (2009) 
and McInnis (2010), ex post conservatism and value relevance in pre crisis period and 
value relevance and accruals quality in crisis period are negatively associated with 
cost of equity. 
In addition, the findings indicate a negative impact of global financial crisis of 
2008 on cost of debt. With other words, consistent with expectation, the total losses in 
most economies led to the world recession have an impact on the availability of credit 
as a result on the cost of debt capital.  
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Consistent with the findings from Blackwell et al (1998), Pittman and Fortin 
(2004), Kim et al (2011), Karjalainen (2011) and Causholli and Knechel (2012), firms 
that audited by Big Four auditors, audit fees, firms with a modified audit report and 
firms that have an audit committee have a negative association with cost of debt 
capital, as expected.    
Finally, the results indicate that the association between cost of debt and 
earnings quality are mixed among clusters. Consistent with previous literature 
(Francis et al, 2005; Valipour and Moradbeygi, 2011), ex post conservatism, accruals 
quality, earnings predictability and earnings smoothness in pre and crisis period is 
shown to be inversely associated with cost of debt as hypothesized.  
 
7.1. Implications 
Previous literature argued that regulators and standard setters do not fully 
understand the reasons for and consequences of earnings quality during bad 
conditions (i.e. Watts, 2003a, 2003b; Francis et al, 2003). Hence, this thesis has 
implications for regulators and accounting standards setters when they face financial 
crisis and prepare defense mechanisms. With other words, the findings of this 
research give insights to policy makers and accounting regulators to understand the 
effects of economic recession on the earnings quality of advanced countries 
worldwide as per investor protection which in turn help them to prepare accounting 
rules which reduce earnings manipulation and in parallel increase earnings quality 
during a negative economic period. Thus, it gives insights them to stabilize investors’ 
confidence in  financial crisis period by posing stricter regulations and more 
transparent financial reporting that reduces information asymmetry and investors’ 
awareness of management manipulation. Consequently, by protecting the market 
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during financial recession, investors have the opportunity to manage their investments 
in a manner to identify and choose portfolios which are lucrative for them even 
though they face bad economic periods, like financial crisis.  
Moreover, examining the effect of financial crisis of 2008 on cost of capital, 
findings of this research may be useful to managers, stock market authorities, 
accounting standard setters and auditors. Particularly, the negative effect of financial 
crisis of 2008 on cost of capital shows that investors’ required rate of return decreases 
in order to save their firms or to get rid of their firms even at lower rate of return. 
Thus, the results may be of interest to post crisis financial management and auditors 
to define the impact of the crisis on cost of equity capital and cost of debt determining 
the factors which influence the cost of capital and how they have changed due to the 
financial crisis and by the means of that knowledge make the optimal financial 
decision to develop the firm and to make the appropriate auditing due to reduce the 
likelihood of opportunism and earnings manipulation and to report number’s validity. 
Moreover, examining several aspects of audit quality due to financial crisis, the 
findings will help auditors to reestimate how auditing is developed in order to 
increase the audit quality which in turn will lower risks and as a result decrease cost 
of capital.      
Finally, examining the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor 
protection on audit quality and the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection 
on earnings quality, there are several implications of this research for audit quality, 
investor protection and earnings management literature. Specifically, whether there is 
previous studies which provide evidence of how investor protection influence audit 
quality (Choi et al, 2008; Leuz et al, 2003) and of how an economic downturn, like 
financial crisis of 2008, influence audit quality (Houston et al, 1999; Be’dard and 
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Johnstone, 2004; Hudaib and Cooke, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2010; Xu et al, 2011; 
Aldamen et al, 2012), there is no evidence of how these two factors also have an 
impact on audit quality jointly. Thus, this research gives insights in auditing literature 
of whether audit quality is higher in firms with strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement during financial crisis. In the same vein, several papers examined the 
investor protection as a determinant of earnings quality. For instance, Nabar and 
Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), Cahan et al (2008) and Houque et al (2012) found that there 
is a positive impact of investor protection. Further, most of previous literature 
indicates that there is a positive association between earnings quality and auditing 
(Becker et al, 1998; Francis et al, 1999; Balsam et al 2003; Caramanis and Lennox, 
2008). Hence, this thesis adds and enlightens previous literature, whether these two 
factors influence earnings quality jointly. 
 
7.2. Contributions 
This research offers several contributions in the accounting and financial 
literature. First, it enhances the limited previous literature (i.e. Kousenidis et al, 2013; 
Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013) examining the effects of a bad economic condition, like 
the recently financial crisis, on earnings quality, audit quality and cost of capital. 
Second, it the first study that uses a large number of countries as a sample which 
provides stronger evidence. It uses 18 largest economies of the world which covered 
the 55% of the global market capitalization. Thus, the results are much closer to the 
reality in relation with other studies that used a representative sample which makes 
the findings questionable. Third, it is the first paper that categorizes the countries into 
clusters as per level of shareholder protection and give a targeted and specific findings 
that should be of interest to investors (cluster 1 with strong shareholder protection and 
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legal enforcement, cluster 2 with better legal enforcement systems and cluster 3 with 
weak investor protection and legal enforcement systems). Fourth, it is the first study 
that faces earnings quality, audit quality, investor protection and cost of capital by 
different perspective. With other words, earnings management is measured by using 
10 different dimensions of earnings quality:  ex post and ex ante conservatism, value 
relevance, three accrual quality measures, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, loss avoidance analysis and earnings smoothness. Audit quality is 
measured by 6 different proxies: the status of audit firm, the existence of audit 
committee, the demand for auditing, audit fees, the modified audit opinion and auditor 
switch. After the paper of Houque et al (2012), this research escapes the stereotype of 
previous papers of using the legal protection database compiled by La Porta et al 
(1997, 1998) since Spamann (2010) found significant differences between common 
law and code law countries with respect of the “The Antidirector Right Index”. For 
this reason, 8 updated investor protection measures from World Economic Forum 
database are used: property rights, judicial independence, transparency of government 
policymaking, strength of auditing and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate 
boards, protection of minority shareholders’ interests, strength of investor protection 
and legal rights index. Finally, cost of equity capital is measured by 2 different 
indexes: the constant growth Gordon model introduced by Palea (2007) and the PEG 
approach introduced by Easton (2004).  
 
7.3. Limitations and future research 
This study has certain limitations, which are commonly associated with 
empirical studies which use data across countries. Particularly, an extension of the 
present thesis would be an examination of the determinants and consequences of 
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earnings quality attributes that are not tested here during the financial crisis. Hence, 
taking into account the review of Dechow et al (2010), future research should give 
insights that have received relatively little attention, how the following earnings 
quality determinants are affected during the financial crisis of 2008: a) specific firm 
operation characteristics (i.e. firm performance; debt; growth and investment; size; 
debt covenants), b) financial reporting practices (i.e. accounting methods; other 
financial reporting practices including financial statement classification and interim 
reporting), c) governance and controls (i.e. equity compensation; managerial change; 
board characteristics; earnings-based components), d) capital market incentives (i.e. 
incentives when firms raise capitals; incentives provided by earnings-based targets), 
broadly defined, are associated with the earnings quality attributes during the financial 
crisis. Moreover, except of testing cost of capital, plenty of consequences of earnings 
quality during the financial crisis are largely unexplored. Consequently, based on 
Dechow et al (2010), there are several categories of consequences of earnings quality 
(i.e. litigation propensity; audit opinion; market evaluations; real activities including 
disclosure; executive compensation; labor market outcomes; analyst forecast 
accuracy) which should need for further research during the financial crisis of 2008.    
Further, this thesis has no captured all the effects of other important 
institutional factors which are mentioned and analyzed in The Global Competitiveness 
and The Financial Development Reports of World Economic Forum on earnings 
quality and auditing. Hence, future papers should extend this research by examining 
several others institutional and governance factors which may affect audit quality and 
earnings management.  
In addition, this research may suffer for the problem of omitted countries that 
are excluded from the sample since they have no applied International Accounting 
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Standards until 2005. Thus, future research shall use the omitted countries and then 
juxtaposes their results with the findings of this thesis. 
Finally, another potential area for future research is to examine earnings 
quality, its determinants, its consequences and possibly their reversals after the firms 
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Appendix A: List of previous researches that use different earnings quality attributes which have a relationship with investor protection, audit quality and cost of capital 
(Chronological order) 





Earnings quality proxy 
Lev, B. 
Some economic determinants of time-




n/a n/a Earnings persistence 
Kormedi, R. and 
Lipe, R. 
Earnings innovations, earnings persistence 
and stock returns 
1987 145 firms n/a 1947-1980 Earnings persistence 
Teoh, S. H. and 
Wong, T. J. 
Perceived auditor quality and the earnings 
response coefficien 
1993 








1973-1988 Earnings response coefficient 
Krishnan, J. Auditor switching and conservatism 1994 
2.989 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1986-1988 Earnings conservatism 
DeAngelo, H., 
DeAngelo, L. and 
Skinner, D. J. 
Accounting choice in troubled companies 1994 76 firms USA 1980-1985 Accruals 
DeFond, M. L. and 
Jiambalvo, J. 
Debt covenant violation and manipulation 
of accruals 
1994 n/a n/a n/a Abnormal accruals 
Ohlson, J. A. 
Earnings, book value, and dividends in 
equity valuation 
1995 n/a n/a n/a Value relevance 
Dechow, P. M., 
Sloan, R. G. and 
Sweeney, A. P. 
Detecting earnings management 1995 
168.771 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1950-1991 Accruals quality 
Wild, J. J. The audit committee and earnings quality 1996 n/a n/a n/a Discretionary accruals 
Basu, S. 
The conservatism principle and the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
1997 
25.531 firm year 
observations 
USA 1963-1990 Ex post conservatism 
Han, J. C. and Wang, 
S.-W. 
Political costs and earnings management 
of oil companies during the 1990 Persian 
Gulf crisis 
1998 76 firms 
Persian Gulf 
countries 
1984-1990 Discretionary accruals 
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DeFond, M. L. and 
Subramanyam, K. R. 
Auditor changes and discretionary accruals 1998 n/a n/a n/a Discretionary accruals 
Becker, C. L., 
DeFond, M. L., 
Jiambalvo, J. and 
Subramanyam, K. R. 
The effect of audit quality on earnings 
management 
1998 
12.576 firm year 
observations 
USA 1989-1992 
Discretionary accruals, absolute value 
of discretionary accruals 
Francis, J. R., 
Maydew, E. L. and 
Sparks, H. C. 
The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible 
reporting of accruals 
1999 
74.390 firm year 
observations 
NASDAQ firms 1975-1994 
Discretionary accruals, absolute value 
of discretionary accruals 
Francis, J. R. and 
Krishnan, J. 
Do accounting accruals lead to auditor 
reporting conservatism? 
1999 
2.792 firm year 
observations 
USA n/a Accruals quality 
Graham, R. and King, 
R. D. 
Accounting practices and the market 
valuation of accounting numbers: 
Evidences from Indonesia, Korea, 










Value relevance of earnings and value 
relevance of the book value 
Beaver, W. and Ryan, 
S. 
Biases and lags in book value and their 
effects on the ability of the book-to-market 
ratio to predict book return on equity 
2000 
37.599 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1974-1993 Ex ante conservatism 
Graham, R., King, R. 
and Bailes, J. 
The value relevance of accounting 
information during a financial crisis: 
Thailand and the 1997 decline in the value 
of the Baht 
2000 n/a Thailand 1997 Value relevance  
Guenther, D. A. and 
Young, D. 
The association between financial 
accounting measures and real economic 





n/a Value relevance 
Hung, M. 
Accounting standards and value relevance 
of financial statements: An international 
analysis 
2000 
17.743 firm year 
observations 
21 countries 1991-1997 Value relevance and accruals quality 
Morck, R., Yeung, B. 
and Yu, W. 
The information content of stock markets: 
Why do emerging markets have 
synchronous stock price movements? 
2000 
3.752 firm year 
observations 
7 countries 1991-1995 Value relevance 
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Ali, A. and Hwang, 
L. - S. 
Country-specific factors related to 
financial reporting and the value relevance 




16 countries 1986-1995 Value relevance by Alford et al (1993) 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. 
P. and Robin, A.  
The effect of international institutional 
factors on properties of accounting 
earnings 
2000 40.359 observations 7 countries 1985-1995 
Timeliness loss recognition and 
conservatism by Basu (1997) 
Ho, L.-C. J., Liu C.-
S. and Sohn, P. S. 
The value relevance of accounting 
information around the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis - the case of South Korea 
2001 n/a Korea 1995-1998 Value relevance 
Chen, C. J. P., Chen, 
S. and Su, X. 
Profitability regulation, earnings 
management, and modified audit opinions: 
Evidence from China 
2001 n/a China 1997-1997 Discretionary accruals 
Chan, K., Chan, L. K. 
C., Jegadeesh, N. and 
Lakonishok, J.  
Earnings quality and stock returns: The 
evidence from accruals 
2001 
All firms listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ 
USA 1971 - 1995 Sloan's (1996) accrual model 
Affleck-Graves, J., 
Callahan, C. and 
Chipalkatti, N. 
Earnings predictability, information 
asymmetry, and market liquidity 
2002 
2.945 firm year 
observations 
USA 1985-1990 Earnings predictability 
McNichols, M. F. 
Discussion of the quality of accruals and 
earnings: The role of accrual estimation 
errors 
2002 
15.015 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1988-1998 Accruals quality 
Johnson, E., Khurana, 
I. K. and Reynolds, J. 
K. 
Audit-firm tenure and the quality of 
financial reports 
2002 
2.463 firm year 
observations (unexpected 




Absolute value of unexpected accruals, 
persistence of accrual component of 
earnings (relationship between current 
accruals and future income) 
Fan, J. P. H. and 
Wong, T. J. 
Corporate ownership structure and the 





7 countries 1991-1995 Value relevance by Alford et al (1993) 
Riahi-Belkaoui, A.  






Earnings response coefficients by 
Collins and Kothari (1989) 
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Dechow, P. M. and 
Dichev, I. D. 
The quality of accruals and earnings: The 





Accrual quality by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) 
Klein, A. 
Audit committee, board of director 
characteristics and earnings statement 
2002 
687 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1991-1993 Discretionary accruals 
Frankel, R. M., 
Johnson, M. F. and 
Nelson, K. K. 
The relation between auditors’ fees for 
nonaudit services and earnings 
management 
2002 3.074 firms USA 2001 
Absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, income-increasing 
discretionary accruals, income-
decreasing discretionary accruals, 
likelihood of reporting a small earnings 
surprise, likelihood of reporting a small 
earnings increase, abnormal returns 
Chung, R., Firth, M. 
and Kim, J.-B. 
Auditor conservatism and reported 
earnings 
2003 n/a n/a n/a Earnings conservatism 
Francis, J. R., 
Khurana, I. K. and 
Pereira, R. 
Investor protection laws, accounting and 
auditing around the world 
2003 n/a 31 countries 1990 Accruals quality 
Bhattacharya, U., 
Daouk, H. and 
Welker, M. 
The world price of earnings opacity 2003 
58.653 firm year 
observations 
34 countries 1984-1998 
Earnings aggresiveness, loss avoidance 
and earnings smoothing 
Asbaugh, H., 
LaFond, R. and 
Meyhew, B. W. 
Do nonaudit services compromise auditor 
independence? 
2003 3.170 firms USA 2000 
Performance-adjusted current accruals, 
absolute value of performance-adjusted 
discretionary current accruals, income-
increasing discretionary accruals, 
income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals, likelihood of firms reporting 
small earnings increases, likelihood of 
firms meeting or beating analyst 
earnings forecasts, abnormal accruals 
Chung, H. and 
Kallapur, S. 
Client importance, nonaudit services, and 
abnormal accruals 
2003 1.871 firms USA 2001 Absolute value of abnormal accruals 
Myers, J. N., Myers, 
L. A. and Omer, T. C. 
Exploring the term of the auditor-client 
relationship and the quality of the quality 
of earnings: A case for mandatory auditor 
rotation? 
2003 
42.302 firm year 
observations 
USA 1988-2000 
Raw (umsigned) values of 
discretionary accruals, absolute values 
of discretionary and current accruals, 
signed values of discretionary and 
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Balsam, S., Krishnan, 
J. and Yang, J. S. 
Auditor industry specialization and 
earnings quality 
2003 
50.116 firm year 
observations(discretionary 
accruals sample), 19.091 




Absolute level of discretionary 
accruals, earnings response coefficients 
Ball, R., Robin, A. 
and Wu J. S.  
Incentives versus standards: Properties of 
accounting income in four East Asian 
countries 






Timeliness loss recognition by Basu 
(1997) 
Mikhail, M. B., 
Walther, B. R. and 
Willis, R. H.  
Reactions to dividend changes conditional 





Earnings response coefficients by 
Collins and Kothari (1989) 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D. 
and Wysocki, P. D.  
Earnings management and investor 




31 countries 1990-1999 
Earnings smoothness, eanrings 
discretion, loss avoidance and 
aggregate measure 
Krishnan, G. V. 
Audit quality and the pricing of 
discretionary accruals 
2003 





increasing discretionary accruals, 
income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals, absolute value of 
discretionary accruals 
Mitchell, J. W., Zahn, 
V. D. and Tower, G. 
Audit committee features and earnings 
statement: Further evidence from 
Singapore 
2003 
485 firm year 
observations 
Singapore 2000-2001 Abnormal accruals 
Xie, B., Davidson III, 
W. N. and DaDalt, P. 
J. 
Earnings management and corporate 
governance: The role of the board and the 
audit committee 
2003 
282 firm year 
observations 
USA 
1992, 1994 and 
1996 
Discretionary current accruals 
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Bauwhede, H. V., 
Willekens, m. and 
Gaeremynck, A. 
Audit firm size, public ownership, and 
firms' discretionary accruals management 
2003 
136 firm year 
observations 
Belgium 1991-1997 Discretionary accruals 
Shrieves, R. E. and 
Dahl, D. 
Discretionary accounting and the behavior 
of Japanese banks under financial distress 
2003 
607 pooled time series 
and cross-sectional 
observations 
Japan n/a Discretionary accruals 
Butler, M., Leone, A. 
J. and Willenborg, M. 
An empirical analysis of auditor reporting 
and its association with abnormal accruals 
2004 
147.926 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1980-1999 Abnormal accruals 
Carcello, J. V. and 
Nagy, A. L. 
Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial 
reporting 
2004 109 firms USA 1990-2001 
Accounting and auditing enforcement 
release 
Kang, T.  
Quality of earnings inferred from the 





Profitability of EP trading rules by 
Kang (2004) 
Wysocki, P. 
Discussion of ultimate ownership, income 
management, and legal and extra-legal 
institutions 
2004 28 observations 28 countries n/a 
Aggregate earnings management score 
from Leuz et al (2003) 
Francis, J., LaFond, 
R., Olsson, P. and 
Schipper, K. 
Costs of capital and earnings attributes 2004 3.917 firms n/a 1975-2001 
Accruals quality, persistence, 
predictability, smoothness, value 
relevance, timeliness and conservatism 
Choi, J., Jeon, K. and 
Park, J. 
The role of audit committees in decreasing 
earnings management: Korean evidence 
2004 n/a Korea 2000-2001 Discretionary accruals 
Ferguson, M. J., 
Seow, G. S. and 
Young, D. 
Nonaudit services and earnings 
management: UK evidence 
2004 610 firms UK 1996-1998 
The likelihood that the client firm's 
accounting practices are subject to 
public criticism or regulatory 
investigation, the likelihood that firms 
restated prior financial statements or 
adjusted current-period results upon 
adoption of Financial Reporting 
Standard 12, the absolute value of 
discretionary working capital accruals 
scaled by lagged assets 
Zhou, J. and Elder, R. 
Audit quality and earnings management by 
seasoned equity offering firms 
2004 
2.453 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1991-1999 Discretionary current accruals 
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Haw, I.-M., Hu, B., 
Hwang, L.-S., Wu, 
W. 
Ultimate ownership, income management, 
and legal and extralegal institutions 
2004 
25.210 firm year 
observations 























1996-1999 Discretionary accruals 
Van Der Zahn, J.-L. 
W. M. and Tower G. 
Audit committee features and earnings 
management: Further evidence from 
Singapore 
2004 
485 firm year 
observations 
Singapore 2000-2001 Discretionary accruals 
Khurana, I. K. and 
Raman, K. K. 
Litigation risk and the financial reporting 
credibility of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
audits: Evidence from Aglo-American 
countries 
2004 
19.517 firm year 
observations 
USA, Australia, 
Canada and UK 
1990-1999 Discretionary accruals 
Gosh, A. and Moon, 
D. 
Auditor tenure and perceptions of audit 
quality 
2005 
38.794 firm year 
observations  
USA 1990-2000 Earnings response coefficients 
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Eng, L. L., Nabar S., 
Chang, C. K. 
The predictive value of earnings, cash 
flows and accruals in the period 
surrounding the Asian financial crisis: 
Evidence from Hong Kong, Malaysia, 






1994-2001 Predictive value of earnings 
Davis-Friday, P. Y. 
and Gordon, E. A. 
Relative valuation roles of equity book 
value, net income, and cash flows during a 
macroeconomic shock: The case of 
Mexico and the 1994 currency crisis 
2005 n/a Mexico 1992-1997 Value relevance 
Aboody, D., Hughes, 
J. and Liu, J. 
Earnings quality, insider trading and cost 
of capital 
2005 989.530 observations n/a 1985-2003 
Abnormal accruals by Dechow et al 
(1995) and abnormal current  accruals 
by Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
Saleh, N. M. and 
Ahmed, K. 
Earnings management of distressed firms 
during debt renegotiations 
2005 n/a n/a n/a Discretionary accruals 
Abdelghany, K. E.  Measuring the quality of earnings 2005 90 firms USA 1999-2003 
Leuz et al (2003) approach, Barton and 
Simko (2002) approach and Penman 
(2001) approach 
Shen, C.-H. and Chih, 
H.-L.  
Investor protection, prospect theory, and 
earnings management: An international 
comparison of the banking industry 
2005 70.955 observations 48 countries 1993-1999 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), 
Degeorge et al (1999) and Leuz et al 
(2003) accrual models 
Li, J. and Lin, J. W. 
The relation between earnings 
management and audit quality 
2005 351 firms n/a 2000 Earnings restatements 
Chen, K. Y., Lin, K.-
L. and Zhou, J.  
Audit quality and earnings management 




Taiwan 1999-2002 Accrual quality by Dechow et al (1995) 
Yang, J. S. and 
Krishnan, J. 
Audit committees and quarterly earnings 
management 
2005 
896 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1996-2000 Discretionary accruals 
Vafeas, N. 
Audit committees, boards, and the quality 
of reported earnings 
2005 252 firms USA 1994-2000 Discretionary accruals 
Koh, P.-S. 
Institutional ownership and income 
smoothing: Australian evidence 
2005 
107 firm year 
observations 
Australia 1993-1997 Income smoothing 
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Francis, J., LaFond, 
R., Olsson, P. and 
Schipper, K. 
The market pricing of earnings quality 2005 33.770 observations n/a 1988-1999 
Eight proxies for earnings quality 
(EQ1=unsigned abnormal accruals 
estimated from the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002), EQ2=unsigned abnormal 
current accruals estimated following 
Teoh et al (1998), EQ3=performance-
matched of EQ1, EQ4=performance-
matched of EQ2, EQ5=absolute 
residuals from cross-sectional 
estimations of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, EQ6=standard deviation 
of residuals from cross-sectional 
estimations of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, EQ7=standard deviation 
od residulas of firm-specific time series 
estimations of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, EQ8=the common factor 
identified from principal factor analysis 
of EQ1-EQ7) 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, 
A. J. and Wasley, C. 
E.  
Performance matched discretionary 
accrual measures 
2005 94.045 observations n/a 1959-1998 Accruals quality 
Lin, J. W., Li, J. F. 
and Yang, J. S. 
The effect of audit committee performance 
on earnings quality 
2006 212 firms USA 2000 
Earnings restatement by Lin et al 
(2006) 
Boonlert-U-Thai, K., 
Meek, G. K. and 
Nabar, S.  
Earnings attributes and investor-




31 countries 1994-2003 
Accruals quality by McNichols (2002), 
Eanrings persistence by Kormedi and 
Lipe (1987), earnings predictability by 
Lipe (1990), Earnings smoothness by 
Bowen et al (2003) 
Burgstahler, D. C., 
Hail, L. and Leuz, C. 
The importance of reporting incentives: 
Earnings management in European private 
and public firms 
2006 





 (1) loss avoidance analysis, 
(2) the magnitude of total accruals, (3) 
the smoothness of earnings relative to 
cash flows 
and (4) the correlation of accounting 
accruals and operating cash flows 
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Davidson III, W. N., 
Jiraporn, P. and 
DaDalt, P. 
Causes and consequences of audit 
shopping: An analysis of auditor opinions, 
earnings management, and auditor changes 
2006 n/a n/a 1993-1997 Discretionary accruals 
Ecker, F., Francis, J., 
Kim, I., Olsson, P. 
and Schipper, K. 
A returns-based representation of earnings 
quality 
2006 72.992 observations n/a 1970-2003 E-loadings by Ecker et al (2006) 
Antle, R., Gordon, E., 
Narayanamoorthy, G, 
and Zhou, L. 
The joint determination of audit fees, non-
audit fees, and abnormal accruals 
2006 
2.294 firm year 
observations   
UK 1994-2000 
Abnormal accruals 
1.570 firms USA 2000 
Lee, P., Taylor, S. J. 
and Taylor, S. L. 
Auditor conservatism and audit quality: 
Evidence from IPO earnings forecasts 
2006 220 firms Australia 1991-1998 Earnings forecasts 
Maijoor, S. J. and 
Vanstraelen, A. 
Earnings management within Europe: The 
effects of member state audit environment, 
audit firm quality and international capital 
markets 
2006 





1992-2000 Abnormal working capital accruals 
Davis-Friday, P. Y., 
Eng, L. L. and Liu, 
C.-S. 
The effects of the Asian crisis, corporate 
governance and accounting system on the 
valuation of book value and earnings 
2006 
158 firms form Indonesia, 
217 firms from Korea, 
271 firms from Malaysia 




1996-1197 Value relevance 
Chia, Y. M., Lapsley, 
I. and Lee, H.-W. L. 
Choice of auditors and earnings 
management during the Asian financial 
crisis 
2007 
383 firm year 
observations 
Indonesia 1976-1998 Discretionary accruals 
Srinidhi, B. N. and 
Gul, F. A. 
The differential effects of auditors’ 
nonaudit and audit fees on accrual quality 
2007 
4.282 firm year 
observations 
US 2000-2001 Accrual quality 
Johl, S., Jubb, C. A. 
and Houghton, K. A. 
Earnings management the audit opinion: 
Evidence from Malaysia 
2007 
1.512 firm year 
observations 
Malaysia 1994-1999 Abnormal accruals 
DeFond, M., Hung, 
M. and Trezevant, R.  
Investor protection and the information 
content of annual earnings 
announcements: International evidence 
2007 53.197 observations 26 countries 1995-2002 
Aggregate earnings management score 
from Leuz et al (2003) multiplied by -1 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
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Piot, C. and Janin, R. 
External auditors, audit committees and 
earnings management in France 
2007 102 firms France 1999-2001 
Signed discretionary accruals, absolute 
value of discretionary accruals 
Doyle, J., Ge, W. and 
McVay, S.  






Accrual quality by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002), modified McNichols (2002) 
and Francis et al (2005) 
Jaggi, B. and Leung, 
S. 
Impact of family dominance on 
monitoring of earnings management by 
audit committees: Evidence from Hong 
Kong 
2007 
253 firm year 
observations 
Hong Kong 1999-2000 Discretionary accruals 
Nabar, S. and 
Boonlert-U-Thai, K. 
K. 
Earnings management, investor protection, 
and national culture 
2007 n/a 30 countries n/a 
Earnings smoothness, eanrings 
discretion, loss avoidance and 
aggregate measure 
Qin, B. 
The influence of audit committee financial 
expertise on earnings quality: U.S. 
evidence 
2007 460 observations USA 1998-2002 
Earnings response coefficients by 
Collins and Kothari (1989) 
Roychowdhury, S. 
and Watts, R. L.  
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, 





n/a 1972-1999 Conservatism by Basu (1997) 
Cahan, S. F., Liu, G. 
and Sun, J. 
Investor protection, income smoothing, 
and earnings informativeness 
2008 n/a 44 countries 1993-2002 Earnings informativeness 
Cheng, F.-F., 
Shamsher, M. and 
Annuar, N.  
Earnings announcements: The impact of 








Earnings response coefficients by 
Collins and Kothari (1989) 
Chen, C.-Y., Lin, C.-
J. and Lin, Y.-C. 
Audit partner tenure, audit firm tenure, and 
discretionary accruals: Does long auditor 
tenure impair earnings quality? 
2008 




discretionary accruals, positive 
performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals, negative performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals 
Herrmann, D. R., 
Pornupatham, S. and 
Vichitsarawong, T. 
The impact of the Asian financial crisis on 
auditors' conservatism 
2008 n/a Thailand n/a Conservatism 
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Ahmed, K., Godfrey, 
J. M. and Saleh, N. 
M. 
Market perceptions of discretionary 
accruals by debt renegotiating firms during 
economic downturn 
2008 139 firms Malaysia 1998-1999 Discretionary accruals 
Jayaraman, S. 
Earnings volatility, cash flow volatility, 
and informed trading 
2008 
69.518 firm year 
observations 
n/a 1988-2005 Earnings smoothness 
Chih, H. - L., Shen, 
C. - H. and Kang, F.-
C.  
Corporate social responsibility, investor 
protection, and earnings management: 
Some international evidence 
2008 1.653 firms 46 countries 1993-2002 
Earnings smoothing, earnings 
aggressiveness and loss avoidance by 
Leuz et al (2003), Bhattacharya et al 
(2003) and Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) 
Francis, J. R. and 
Wang, D.  
The joint effect of investor protection and 






Abnormal accruals by DeFond and 
Park (2001) 
85.193 observations 1995-2004 
Loss avoidance analysis by Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al 
(1999) and Brown and Caylor (2005) 
68.167 observations 1995-2004 
Earnings conservatism by Ball et al 
(2000) 
Van Tendeloo, B. and 
Vanstraelen, A. 
Earnings management and audit quality in 
Europe: Evidence from the private client 
segment market 
2008 





Spain, and UK 
1998-2002 
Aggregate earnings management 
measure based on the magnitude of 
total accruals relative to operational 
cash flow, the tendency of firms to 
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Fig. 1. Real GDP (%) of developed countries worldwide. 
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Fig. 2. Real GDP (%) of examining developed countries. 
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Fig. 3. Total consumption (%) of developed countries worldwide. 
 
Note: This figure shows the annual change of total consumption (the sum of household final consumption expenditure (private consumption) and general government final 
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Fig. 4. Total consumption (%) of examining developed countries. 
 
Note: This figure shows the annual change of total consumption (the sum of household final consumption expenditure (private consumption) and general government final 
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Fig. 5. Unemployment (% of total labour force) of developed countries worldwide. 
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Fig. 6. Unemployment (% of total labour force) of examining developed countries. 
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Fig. 7. Central government debt (% of GDP) of developed countries worldwide. 
 
Note: This figure shows the central government debt (the entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular date. It 
includes domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans. It is the gross amount of government liabilities reduced 
by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government. Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is measured as of a given date, usually the last day of 
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Fig. 8. Central government debt (% of GDP) of examining developed countries. 
 
Note: This figure shows the central government debt (the entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular date. It 
includes domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans. It is the gross amount of government liabilities reduced 
by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government. Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is measured as of a given date, usually the last day of 
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Fig. 9. Stock Exchange Indexes of examining developed countries. 
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Fig. 10. Foreign currencies of examining developed countries. 
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Table 1: Descriptions of variables 
Panel A: Regression equation 40 (Earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
Variable Measure Description Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Earnings quality  Ex post conservatism (EQ1) Basu (1997) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Ex ante conservatism (EQ2) Beaver and Ryan (2000) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Value relevance (EQ3) Ohlson (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ4) Dechow et al (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ5) McNichols (2002) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ6) Kothari et al (2005) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings persistence (EQ7) Kormedi and Lipe (1987) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings predictability (EQ8) Francis et al (2004) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Loss avoidance analysis (EQ9) Burgstahler et al (2006) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings smoothness (EQ10) Leuz et al (2003) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Independent variables 
Crisis period Crisis period (CRISIS) Dummy variable takes 0 if an observation falls in the pre 




Financial leverage Financial leverage (LEVER) Percentage of long term debt divided by percentage of 
common equity 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
TOBIN's Q TOBIN's Q (TOBINQ) Market capitalization plus total debt scaled by total 
assets (McConnel and Servaes, 1990) 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate size Corporate size (CORPSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Sales volatility Sales volatility (SV) Standard deviation of sales revenues scaled by total 
assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Cash flow from operations 
volatility 
Cash flow from operations 
volatility (CFOV) 
Standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled 
by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Length of operating cycle Length of operating cycle (LOC) The sum of days inventory outstanding plus days sales 
outstanding minus days payable outstanding 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Corporate profitability Corporate profitability 
(CORPROFIT) 
Net income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate performance Corporate performance 
(CORPERFOR) Operating cash flow divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Financial distress Financial distress (LAGLOSS) Dummy variable that takes 1 if firm reports negative 
income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Market share Market share (MASH) Sales divided by total industry sales DataStream (2005-2012) 
Capital intensity Capital intensity (CAPINT) Depreciation, depletion and amortization expenses 
divided by sales 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate efficiency Corporate efficiency 
(CORPEFFIC) Sales divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Marginal corporate tax rate Marginal corporate tax rate 
(MCTR) Corporate receipts minus deductions for labor costs, 
materials and depreciation of capital assets (called 
income taxes). MCTR is multiplied by 0 if the firm has 
neither current income tax expense nor positive pre-tax 
income; 0.5 if the firm has either current income tax 
expense or positive pre-tax income; and 1 if the firm has 
current income tax expense and positive pre-tax income 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate multinationality Corporate multinationality 
(MULTIN) Foreign profits divided by total profits 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Dividend yield Dividend yield (DIVIDYIELD) Dividend yield obtained from DataStream DataStream (2005-2012) 
Total debt Total debt (DEBT) Total debt divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Annual stock return Annual stock return (R) Annual stock return DataStream (2005-2012) 
Proxy for a bad news Proxy for a bad news (DR) Dummy variable that takes 1 for negative returns and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
The product of annual stock 
return and the proxy of bad news 
The product of annual stock 
return and the proxy of bad news 
(R*DR) 
The product of annual stock return and the proxy of bad 
news 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
The market beta coefficient The market beta coefficient 
(BETA) The market beta coefficient obtained from DataStream 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
The change in net income The change in net income (ΓNI) 
Change in net income before extraordinary items 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Industrial classification Industrial classification 
(SICODE) 
Dummy variable that takes 1 for the most frequent four 
digit SIC industrial code for each cluster and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Economic development Economic development (GDP) 
Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita 
Eurostat, WorldBank, World 
Economic Forum (2005-2012) 
Financial development Financial development (MCAP) Stock market capitalization divided by gross domestic 
product 
Eurostat, WorldBank, World 
Economic Forum (2005-2012) 
Market concentration using 
Herfindahl – Hirschman index 
Market concentration using 
Herfindahl – Hirschman index 
(HERF) 
Squaring the industry share of each firm competing in a 
market, and then summing the resulting numbers for 
each country 
Eurostat, WorldBank, World 
Economic Forum (2005-2012) 
              Panel B: Regression equation 41 (The joint effect of global financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on audit quality) 
Variable Measure Description Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Audit quality  Audit fees (AQ1) The amount of audit fees DataStream (2005-2012) 
Modified audit report opinion  
(AQ2) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the audit opinion is qualified 
and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Auditor switch (AQ3) Dummy variable takes 1 if firm switch auditor and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Status of audit firm (AQ4) Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm is a Big Four 
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PriceWaterHouseCooper, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG) and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Existence of audit committee 
(AQ5) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm has an audit 
committee and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Demand for auditing (AQ6) 
Sum of square root of total assets of each Big Four and 
non-Big Four audit client, divided by the sum of square 
root of total assets of all firms. A higher Big Four or 
non-Big Four market share indicates greater demand for 
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Crisis period Crisis period (CRISIS) Dummy variable takes 0 if an observation falls in the pre 
crisis period (2005-2007) and 1 if it falls in crisis period 
(2008-2012) 
  
Investor protection Property rights (INVPR1) Measure of how strong is the protection of property 
rights and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies poorly 
defined and not protected by law and 7 signifies clearly 
defined and well protected by law 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Judicial independence (INVPR2) Measure to what extent is the judiciary independent from 
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms 
and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies heavily 
influenced and 7 signifies entirely independent 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Transparency of government 
policymaking (INVPR3) 
Measure to what extent firms are clearly informed by the 
government of changes in policies and regulations and 
ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies never informed and 
7 signifies always informed 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (INVPR4) 
Measure how strong is financial auditing and reporting 
standards regarding financial performance and ranges 
from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies extremely weak and 7 
signifies extremely strong 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Efficacy of corporate boards 
(INVPR5) 
Measure who strong is the supervision of investors and 
boards on management decisions and ranges from 1 to 7, 
where 1 signifies that management has little 
accountability and 7 signifies that investors and boards 
exert strong supervision of management decisions 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6) 
Measure how strong is the protection of interests of 
minority shareholders and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 
signifies not protected by law and 7 signifies protected 
by law and actively enforced 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Strength of investor protection 
(INVPR7) 
Measure how strong is the investor protection and ranges 
from 1 to 10, where 1 signifies that investor protection is 
weak and 10 signifies that investor protection is high 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
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Legal rights index (INVPR8) 
Measure how strong is the legal rights of investors and 
ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 signifies that the legal 
rights of investors is low protected and 10 signifies that 
the legal rights of investors is highly protected 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
The interaction effect of 
financial crisis of 2008 and 
investor protection on audit 
quality 
The interaction effect of 
financial crisis of 2008 and 





Corporate size Corporate size (CORPSIZE) Natural of logarithm of total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Risk Risk (RISK) Total liabilities divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Industrial classification Industrial classification 
(SICODE) 
Dummy variable takes 1 for the most frequent four digit 
SIC industrial code for each cluster and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Profitability Profitability (PROFIT) Net income divided by sales DataStream (2005-2012) 
Solvency Solvency (SOLV) Equity divided by total liabilities DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate complexity  Corporate complexity 
(COMPLEX) 
Sum of inventory and accounts receivable divided by 
total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals Accruals (ACCRUAL) 
Change in non-assets less the change in non-debt 
liabilities where non-assets is defined as total assets less 
cash and short time investments and non-debt liabilities 
is defined as total liabilities less debt 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Free cash flow Free cash flow (FCF) Income less total accruals divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Inherent risk Inherent risk (IRISK) Receivables divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Financial leverage Financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE) Total debt divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Book-to-market ratio Book-to-market ratio (BM) Book value of equity divided by market value of equity DataStream (2005-2012) 
Losses Losses (LOSSES) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when net 
earnings are negative and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Panel C: Regression equation 42 (The joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings quality) 
Variable Measure Description Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Earnings quality  Ex post conservatism (EQ1) Basu (1997) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Ex ante conservatism (EQ2) Beaver and Ryan (2000) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Value relevance (EQ3) Ohlson (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ4) Dechow et al (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ5) McNichols (2002) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ6) Kothari et al (2005) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings persistence (EQ7) Kormedi and Lipe (1987) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings predictability (EQ8) Francis et al (2004) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Loss avoidance analysis (EQ9) Burgstahler et al (2006) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings smoothness (EQ10) Leuz et al (2003) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Independent variables 
Audit quality  Audit fees (AQ1) The amount of audit fees DataStream (2005-2012) 
Modified audit report opinion  
(AQ2) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the audit opinion is qualified 
and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Auditor switch (AQ3) Dummy variable takes 1 if firm switch auditor and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Status of audit firm (AQ4) Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm is a Big Four 
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PriceWaterHouseCooper, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG) and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Existence of audit committee 
(AQ5) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm has an audit 
committee and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Demand for auditing (AQ6) Sum of square root of total assets of each Big Four and 
non-Big Four audit client, divided by the sum of square 
root of total assets of all firms. A higher Big Four or 
non-Big Four market share indicates greater demand for 
high quality auditing within a country (Francis et al, 
2003) 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Investor protection Property rights (INVPR1) Measure of how strong is the protection of property 
rights and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies poorly 
defined and not protected by law and 7 signifies clearly 
defined and well protected by law 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Judicial independence (INVPR2) Measure to what extent is the judiciary independent from 
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms 
and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies heavily 
influenced and 7 signifies entirely independent 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Transparency of government 
policymaking (INVPR3) 
Measure to what extent firms are clearly informed by the 
government of changes in policies and regulations and 
ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies never informed and 
7 signifies always informed 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Strength of auditing and 
reporting standards (INVPR4) 
Measure how strong is financial auditing and reporting 
standards regarding financial performance and ranges 
from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies extremely weak and 7 
signifies extremely strong 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Efficacy of corporate boards 
(INVPR5) 
Measure who strong is the supervision of investors and 
boards on management decisions and ranges from 1 to 7, 
where 1 signifies that management has little 
accountability and 7 signifies that investors and boards 
exert strong supervision of management decisions 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders' interests (INVPR6) 
Measure how strong is the protection of interests of 
minority shareholders and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 
signifies not protected by law and 7 signifies protected 
by law and actively enforced 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
Strength of investor protection 
(INVPR7) 
Measure how strong is the investor protection and ranges 
from 1 to 10, where 1 signifies that investor protection is 
weak and 10 signifies that investor protection is high 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
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Legal rights index (INVPR8) 
Measure how strong is the legal rights of investors and 
ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 signifies that the legal 
rights of investors is low protected and 10 signifies that 
the legal rights of investors is highly protected 
World Economic Forum (2005-
2012) 
The interaction effect of audit 
quality and investor protection 
on earnings quality 
The interaction effect of audit 
quality and investor protection 





Change in receivables  Change in receivables (ΓRAV) Change in receivables scaled by total assets in previous 
year  
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Property, plant, and equipment Property, plant, and equipment 
(PPE) 
Gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by total 
assets in previous year 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Net income Net income (NI) Net income DataStream (2005-2012) 
Total accruals  Total accruals (TA) Income before extraordinary items minus operating cash 
flows 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Current assets  Current assets (Current) Current assets divided by current liabilities DataStream (2005-2012) 
Small profits Small profits (SP) Dummy variable takes 1 if net profit scaled by total 
assets is between 0 and 0.01 and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Timely loss recognition Timely loss recognition (LL) Dummy variable takes 1 if net profit scaled by total 
assets is less than -0.20 and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate size Corporate size (CORPSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Cash flow from operations 
volatility 
Cash flow from operations 
volatility (CFOV) 
Standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled 
by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Total debt Total debt (DEBT) Total debt divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
The market beta coefficient The market beta coefficient 
(BETA) The market beta coefficient obtained from DataStream 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Industrial classification Industrial classification 
(SICODE) 
Dummy variable that takes 1 for the most frequent four 
digit SIC industrial code for each cluster and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Leverage Leverage (LEVER) Total liabilities divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Return on assets  Return on assets (ROA) Net income divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Change in revenue Change in revenue (ΓREV) Change in revenue (sale) scaled by total assets in 
previous year 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
              Panel D: Regression equation 43 (Cost of equity capital and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
Variable Measure Description Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Cost of equity capital Cost of equity capital 
(COSTOFEQUITY1) 
Constant growth Gordon model introduced by Palea 
(2007) 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Cost of equity capital 
(COSTOFEQUITY2) PEG approach introduced by Easton (2004) 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Independent variables 
Audit quality  Audit fees (AQ1) The amount of audit fees DataStream (2005-2012) 
Modified audit report opinion  
(AQ2) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the audit opinion is qualified 
and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Auditor switch (AQ3) Dummy variable takes 1 if firm switch auditor and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Status of audit firm (AQ4) Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm is a Big Four 
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PriceWaterHouseCooper, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG) and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Existence of audit committee 
(AQ5) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm has an audit 
committee and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Crisis period Crisis period (CRISIS) 
Dummy variable takes 0 if an observation falls in the pre 




Corporate annual earnings 
growth per share 
Corporate annual earnings 
growth per share (EG) Corporate annual earnings growth per share 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate dividends Corporate dividends (DPO) Corporate dividends announced for the year scaled by 
earnings for the year available for dividends 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Total debt Total debt (DEBT) Total debt divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
497 
 
Corporate natural log of market 
value of equity 
Corporate natural log of market 
value of equity (LNMV) Corporate natural log of market value of equity 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Book-to-market ratio Book-to-market ratio (BM) Book value of equity divided by market value of equity DataStream (2005-2012) 
Trading volume Trading volume (VOLUME) Trading volume divided by total shares outstanding DataStream (2005-2012) 
The market beta coefficient The market beta coefficient 
(BETA) The market beta coefficient obtained from DataStream 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Cash flow from operations  Cash flow from operations 
(CFO) Cash flow from operations divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Natural log of debt to assets ratio Natural log of debt to assets ratio 
(LNLEV) Natural log of debt to assets ratio 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Natural log of book to market 
ratio 
Natural log of book to market 
ratio (LNBM) Natural log of book to market ratio 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate size Corporate size (CORPSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Classification of firm by market 
capitalization 
Classification of firm by market 
capitalization (FIRM) Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm is classified as small 
(market value of equity of firm is lower than the median 
market value of equity) and 0 if the firm is classified as 
large (market value of equity of firm is larger than the 
median market value of equity) 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Industrial classification Industrial classification 
(SICODE) 
Dummy variable that takes 1 for the most frequent four 
digit SIC industrial code for each cluster and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
              Panel E: Regression equation 44 (Cost of equity capital and earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
Variable Measure Description Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Cost of equity capital Cost of equity capital 
(COSTOFEQUITY1) 
Constant growth Gordon model introduced by Palea 
(2007) 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Cost of equity capital 
(COSTOFEQUITY2) PEG approach introduced by Easton (2004) 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Independent variables 
Earnings quality  Ex post conservatism (EQ1) Basu (1997) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Ex ante conservatism (EQ2) Beaver and Ryan (2000) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Value relevance (EQ3) Ohlson (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ4) Dechow et al (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ5) McNichols (2002) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ6) Kothari et al (2005) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings persistence (EQ7) Kormedi and Lipe (1987) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings predictability (EQ8) Francis et al (2004) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Loss avoidance analysis (EQ9) Burgstahler et al (2006) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings smoothness (EQ10) Leuz et al (2003) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Control variables 
The market beta coefficient The market beta coefficient 
(BETA) The market beta coefficient obtained from DataStream 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate size Corporate size (CORPSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Book-to-market ratio Book-to-market ratio (BM) Book value of equity divided by market value of equity DataStream (2005-2012) 
Financial leverage Financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE) Total debt divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Cash flow from operations 
volatility 
Cash flow from operations 
volatility (CFOV) 
Standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled 
by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Sales volatility Sales volatility (SV) Standard deviation of sales revenues scaled by total 
assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Negative earnings realization Negative earnings realization 
(NER) 
Dummy variable that takes 1 if firm reports negative 
income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Collateral value or asset 
structure of assets 
Collateral value or asset 
structure of assets 
(COLLATERAL) Ratio of intangible assets  divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Non-debt tax shields  Non-debt tax shields (NON-
DEBT) Ratio of depreciation divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Growth  Growth (GROWTH) Ratio of capital expenditures divided by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Uniqueness  Uniqueness (UNIQUENESS) Ratio of R&D divided by sales DataStream (2005-2012) 
Industrial classification Industrial classification 
(SICODE) 
Dummy variable that takes 1 for the most frequent four 
digit SIC industrial code for each cluster and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Profitability  Profitability (PROFITABILITY)  Return on assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Liquidity  Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) Quick ratio DataStream (2005-2012) 
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              Panel F: Regression equation 45 (Cost of debt and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
Variable Measure Description Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Cost of debt Cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) Ratio of interest expense in year t+1 to average interest 
bearing debt outstanding during years t and t+1 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Independent variables 
Audit quality  Audit fees (AQ1) The amount of audit fees DataStream (2005-2012) 
Modified audit report opinion  
(AQ2) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the audit opinion is qualified 
and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Auditor switch (AQ3) Dummy variable takes 1 if firm switch auditor and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Status of audit firm (AQ4) Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm is a Big Four 
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PriceWaterHouseCooper, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG) and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Existence of audit committee 
(AQ5) 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the firm has an audit 
committee and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Crisis period Crisis period (CRISIS) Dummy variable takes 0 if an observation falls in the pre 




Profitability  Profitability (PROFITABILITY)  Return on assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Book-to-market ratio Book-to-market ratio (BM) Book value of equity divided by market value of equity DataStream (2005-2012) 
Financial leverage Financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE) Total debt divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Corporate size Corporate size (CORPSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Interest coverage  Interest coverage (INTCOV) Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by the interest expenses 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Natural log of net income before 
extraordinary items 
Natural log of net income before 
extraordinary items (LNNIBE) Natural log of net income before extraordinary items 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Natural log of market value of 
equity 
Natural log of market value of 
equity (LNMVE) Natural log of market value of equity 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Collateral value or asset 
structure of assets 
Collateral value or asset 
structure of assets 
(COLLATERAL) Ratio of intangible assets  divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Negative book equity  Negative book equity (NEGEQ) Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the book 
value of equity is negative and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Industrial classification Industrial classification 
(SICODE) 
Dummy variable that takes 1 for the most frequent four 
digit SIC industrial code for each cluster and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Credit risk  Credit risk (CRISK) Ratio of standard deviation of cash flow from operations 
to average of total assets during years t-1 and t 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
              Panel G: Regression equation 46 (Cost of debt and earnings quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
Variable Measure Description Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Cost of debt Cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) Ratio of interest expense in year t+1 to average interest 
bearing debt outstanding during years t and t+1 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Independent variables 
Earnings quality  Ex post conservatism (EQ1) Basu (1997) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Ex ante conservatism (EQ2) Beaver and Ryan (2000) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Value relevance (EQ3) Ohlson (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ4) Dechow et al (1995) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ5) McNichols (2002) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Accruals quality (EQ6) Kothari et al (2005) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings persistence (EQ7) Kormedi and Lipe (1987) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings predictability (EQ8) Francis et al (2004) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Loss avoidance analysis (EQ9) Burgstahler et al (2006) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings smoothness (EQ10) Leuz et al (2003) model DataStream (2005-2012) 
Control variables 
Financial leverage Financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE) Total debt divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Corporate size Corporate size (CORPSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Profitability  Profitability (PROFITABILITY)  Return on assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
Interest coverage  Interest coverage (INTCOV) Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by the interest expenses 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Natural log of net income before 
extraordinary items 
Natural log of net income before 
extraordinary items (LNNIBE) Natural log of net income before extraordinary items 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Earnings per share Earnings per share (EPS) Earnings per share before extraordinary items DataStream (2005-2012) 
Change in earnings per share Change in earnings per share 
(ΓEPS) 
Change in earnings per share before extraordinary items 
between year t and t-1 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Profitability  Profitability (PROFIT)  Dummy variable that takes 1 if firm’s earnings per share 
before extraordinary items is greater than or equal to 0 
and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Profitability  Profitability (INCR)  Dummy variable that takes 1 if firm’s earnings per share 
before extraordinary items in year t is greater than or 
equal to that of year t-1 and 0 otherwise 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
Cash flow from operations  Cash flow from operations 
(CFO) Cash flow from operations divided by total assets 
DataStream (2005-2012) 
R&D expense  R&D expense  (RND) R&D expense deflated by total assets DataStream (2005-2012) 
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Table 2: The sample 
Panel A: Data collection process 
  
Firm - year 
observations 
 
Listed firms in advanced countries for the fiscal years 2005-2012 652.512 
minus Firms that has no applied International Accounting Standards 260.936 
minus Banks and financial institutions 108.800 
minus Observations with missing data 136.380 
minus Countries that are not classified in clusters defined by Leuz (2010) 9.305 
 
Final number of firm-year observations 137.091 
         Panel B: Firm-year observations per cluster and per country 
                    Cluster 1 
 
Pre-crisis period  Crisis period 
Australia 3.927 8.040 
Ireland 264 395 
UK 8.199 12.975 
Final number 
of observations 12.390 21.410 
                                Cluster 2 
 
Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
Austria 294 475 
Belgium 594 920 
Denmark 588 1.015 
Finland 576 905 
France 2.925 4.740 
Germany 24.207 44.085 
Netherlands 879 1.295 
Norway 723 1.390 
Spain 789 1.315 
Sweden 1.938 4.160 




                                   Cluster 3 
 
Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
Greece 972 1.495 
Italy 1.008 1.605 




         
Final firms - 
observations 
included in the 
sample 
137.091 
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Panel C: Firm-year observations per SIC industrial code 
 


















1300 42 80 164 264 0 0 550 
1600 84 125 287 450 78 95 1.119 
1900 129 200 509 870 57 95 1.860 
2200 165 245 388 630 15 25 1.468 
2500 303 465 1.212 2.070 99 140 4.289 
2800 570 905 1.412 2.380 234 335 5.836 
3100 210 345 662 1.070 45 70 2.402 
3400 705 1.160 2.799 4.535 66 105 9.370 
3700 156 290 737 1.330 57 70 2.640 
4000 1.650 2.540 5.755 8.820 201 330 19.296 
4600 282 465 878 1.580 138 205 3.548 
4900 300 500 1.722 2.985 75 130 5.712 
5200 1.389 2.515 2.213 3.720 57 85 9.979 
5500 120 180 535 910 69 105 1.919 
5800 1.338 3.715 2.529 5.446 30 50 13.108 
6100 105 155 486 825 54 90 1.715 
6400 207 275 440 680 72 120 1.794 
6700 717 1.000 1.356 2.155 99 160 5.487 
7000 504 735 1.272 1.960 81 115 4.667 
7300 72 110 273 445 120 170 1.190 
7600 24 35 84 140 9 5 297 
7900 240 350 1.061 1.780 57 105 3.593 
8200 597 930 1.924 3.175 177 270 7.073 
8500 2.481 4.090 6.306 14.375 342 585 28.179 
TOTAL 12.390 21.410 35.004 62.595 2.232 3.460 137.091 
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Table 3: Tests for normal distribution for the continuous variables by using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
Panel A: Regression equation 40 (Earnings earnings under financial crisis of 2008) 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
EQ1 0,324 0,000 0,448 0,063 0,381 0,693 
EQ2 0,499 0,000 0,502 0,000 0,486 0,000 
EQ3 0,223 0,053 0,298 0,325 0,189 0,000 
EQ4 0,232 0,000 0,335 0,000 0,172 0,037 
EQ5 0,293 0,000 0,416 0,000 0,171 0,000 
EQ6 0,155 0,000 0,276 0,000 0,243 0,000 
EQ7 0,323 0,000 0,495 0,000 0,296 0,890 
EQ8 0,407 0,000 0,412 0,369 0,470 0,000 
EQ9 0,481 0,063 0,493 0,000 0,468 0,000 
EQ10 0,341 0,000 0,230 0,000 0,157 0,982 
LEVER 0,462 0,000 0,487 0,000 0,382 0,000 
TOBINQ 0,487 0,062 0,496 0,035 0,237 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,131 0,000 0,115 0,000 0,209 0,000 
SV 0,451 0,000 0,437 0,000 0,232 0,000 
CFOV 0,520 0,098 0,511 0,037 0,231 0,693 
LOC 0,474 0,000 0,467 0,000 0,397 0,000 
CORPROFIT 0,495 0,000 0,493 0,000 0,468 0,000 
CORPERFOR 0,495 0,000 0,496 0,000 0,168 0,000 
MASH 0,465 0,087 0,476 0,000 0,373 0,085 
CAPINT 0,496 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,469 0,000 
CORPEFFIC 0,481 0,000 0,468 0,000 0,161 0,000 
MCTR 0,473 0,063 0,476 0,037 0,419 0,962 
MULTIN 0,466 0,000 0,481 0,000 0,494 0,000 
DIVIDYIELD 0,493 0,000 0,488 0,000 0,504 0,000 
DEBT 0,494 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,361 0,000 
R 0,247 0,000 0,485 0,000 0,168 0,000 
R*DR 0,335 0,000 0,490 0,000 0,300 0,036 
BETA 0,149 0,000 0,392 0,318 0,061 0,000 
ΓNI 0,472 0,000 0,468 0,000 0,387 0,000 
GDP 0,182 0,036 0,209 0,000 0,138 0,000 
MCAP 0,214 0,000 0,275 0,000 0,231 0,000 
HERF 0,231 0,000 0,450 0,369 0,234 0,368 
 
        
Panel B: Regression equation 41 (The joint effect of global financial crisis of 2008 and investor 
protection on audit quality) 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
AQ1 0,492 0,000 0,495 0,697 0,481 0,587 
AQ6 0,425 0,000 0,394 0,000 0,295 0,000 
INVPR1 0,207 0,037 0,166 0,000 0,143 0,000 
INVPR2 0,212 0,000 0,282 0,000 0,150 0,000 
INVPR3 0,231 0,000 0,334 0,364 0,156 0,000 
INVPR4 0,187 0,000 0,196 0,000 0,191 0,654 
INVPR5 0,203 0,000 0,211 0,000 0,240 0,000 
INVPR6 0,272 0,000 0,196 0,325 0,204 0,000 
INVPR7 0,414 0,000 0,373 0,000 0,346 0,000 
INVPR8 0,350 0,000 0,283 0,000 0,513 0,258 
CRISIS*INVPR1 0,334 0,367 0,362 0,000 0,318 0,000 
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CRISIS*INVPR2 0,362 0,000 0,325 0,036 0,306 0,000 
CRISIS*INVPR3 0,325 0,000 0,330 0,000 0,282 0,000 
CRISIS*INVPR4 0,377 0,000 0,364 0,000 0,342 0,035 
CRISIS*INVPR5 0,367 0,000 0,368 0,058 0,356 0,000 
CRISIS*INVPR6 0,370 0,000 0,325 0,069 0,279 0,000 
CRISIS*INVPR7 0,265 0,000 0,356 0,000 0,270 0,037 
CRISIS*INVPR8 0,381 0,697 0,359 0,000 0,359 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,131 0,000 0,115 0,000 0,209 0,000 
RISK 0,491 0,000 0,498 0,000 0,487 0,000 
PROFIT 0,455 0,000 0,479 0,000 0,474 0,059 
SOLV 0,488 0,000 0,497 0,257 0,507 0,000 
COMPLEX 0,499 0,000 0,498 0,000 0,434 0,000 
ACCRUAL 0,490 0,038 0,469 0,000 0,410 0,000 
FCF 0,490 0,000 0,500 0,367 0,421 0,000 
IRISK 0,201 0,000 0,470 0,000 0,086 0,257 
LEVERAGE 0,494 0,000 0,494 0,000 0,361 0,000 
BM 0,456 0,369 0,502 0,357 0,400 0,000 
         Panel C: Regression equation 42 (The joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on 
earnings quality) 
                                                  Pre crisis period 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
EQ1 0,207 0,000 0,377 0,065 0,286 0,325 
EQ2 0,501 0,000 0,501 0,000 0,494 0,000 
EQ3 0,172 0,000 0,347 0,000 0,247 0,000 
EQ4 0,328 0,000 0,408 0,000 0,190 0,000 
EQ5 0,324 0,035 0,408 0,000 0,193 0,000 
EQ6 0,237 0,000 0,239 0,000 0,198 0,000 
EQ7 0,343 0,000 0,455 0,257 0,248 0,000 
EQ8 0,321 0,000 0,411 0,000 0,246 0,000 
EQ9 0,447 0,000 0,491 0,000 0,298 0,000 
EQ10 0,228 0,000 0,227 0,037 0,211 0,033 
AQ1 0,493 0,326 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
AQ3 0,431 0,000 0,385 0,000 0,289 0,000 
INVPR1 0,424 0,000 0,449 0,000 0,263 0,000 
INVPR2 0,423 0,000 0,488 0,000 0,305 0,000 
INVPR3 0,424 0,000 0,386 0,000 0,324 0,000 
INVPR4 0,422 0,000 0,455 0,036 0,308 0,000 
INVPR5 0,420 0,327 0,373 0,000 0,526 0,000 
INVPR6 0,424 0,000 0,434 0,000 0,366 0,328 
INVPR7 0,432 0,000 0,382 0,000 0,362 0,000 
INVPR8 0,416 0,000 0,442 0,033 0,526 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR1 0,493 0,000 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR2 0,493 0,000 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR3 0,493 0,387 0,497 0,033 0,482 0,265 
AQ1*INVPR4 0,493 0,000 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR5 0,493 0,000 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR6 0,493 0,000 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
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AQ1*INVPR7 0,493 0,025 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR8 0,493 0,000 0,497 0,000 0,482 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR1 0,540 0,000 0,540 0,033 0,528 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR2 0,540 0,068 0,540 0,000 0,528 0,268 
AQ2*INVPR3 0,540 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,528 0,328 
AQ2*INVPR4 0,540 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,528 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR5 0,540 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,528 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR6 0,540 0,980 0,540 0,159 0,528 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR7 0,539 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,528 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR8 0,540 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,528 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR1 0,541 0,000 0,537 0,000 0,478 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR2 0,541 0,000 0,537 0,000 0,477 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR3 0,541 0,069 0,537 0,022 0,478 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR4 0,541 0,000 0,537 0,000 0,478 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR5 0,541 0,000 0,537 0,000 0,478 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR6 0,541 0,000 0,537 0,000 0,477 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR7 0,540 0,000 0,537 0,000 0,466 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR8 0,541 0,000 0,537 0,260 0,477 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR1 0,387 0,066 0,396 0,000 0,349 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR2 0,396 0,000 0,382 0,000 0,321 0,258 
AQ4*INVPR3 0,383 0,000 0,394 0,000 0,346 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR4 0,409 0,000 0,431 0,000 0,340 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR5 0,406 0,066 0,409 0,000 0,355 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR6 0,412 0,000 0,374 0,000 0,312 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR7 0,286 0,000 0,386 0,059 0,308 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR8 0,350 0,000 0,293 0,000 0,341 0,323 
AQ5*INVPR1 0,492 0,000 0,487 0,000 0,524 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR2 0,492 0,258 0,487 0,000 0,522 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR3 0,492 0,000 0,487 0,000 0,523 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR4 0,492 0,000 0,487 0,327 0,523 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR5 0,492 0,000 0,487 0,000 0,524 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR6 0,492 0,000 0,487 0,000 0,523 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR7 0,491 0,698 0,485 0,000 0,522 0,265 
AQ5*INVPR8 0,492 0,000 0,486 0,000 0,523 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR1 0,429 0,000 0,385 0,000 0,285 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR2 0,430 0,000 0,386 0,000 0,284 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR3 0,429 0,000 0,384 0,000 0,285 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR4 0,430 0,587 0,385 0,000 0,284 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR5 0,430 0,000 0,385 0,259 0,286 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR6 0,430 0,000 0,385 0,000 0,280 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR7 0,432 0,000 0,384 0,000 0,302 0,027 
AQ6*INVPR8 0,431 0,000 0,388 0,000 0,285 0,000 
ΓRAV 0,469 0,000 0,500 0,000 0,260 0,000 
PPE 0,494 0,070 0,496 0,000 0,429 0,000 
NI 0,397 0,000 0,382 0,000 0,404 0,000 
TA 0,485 0,000 0,470 0,000 0,409 0,000 
CURRENT 0,408 0,000 0,374 0,258 0,359 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,122 0,000 0,116 0,000 0,205 0,000 
CFOV 0,427 0,068 0,292 0,000 0,360 0,255 
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DEBT 0,350 0,000 0,495 0,000 0,172 0,000 
BETA 0,165 0,000 0,387 0,000 0,058 0,000 
LEVER 0,492 0,000 0,498 0,056 0,152 0,000 
ROA 0,501 0,000 0,488 0,000 0,217 0,000 
ΓREV 0,475 0,000 0,454 0,000 0,390 0,000 
                                                        Crisis period 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
EQ1 0,338 0,000 0,347 0,266 0,469 0,089 
EQ2 0,488 0,265 0,502 0,000 0,492 0,000 
EQ3 0,326 0,000 0,242 0,000 0,198 0,000 
EQ4 0,166 0,000 0,418 0,000 0,317 0,000 
EQ5 0,243 0,000 0,216 0,000 0,311 0,000 
EQ6 0,130 0,000 0,464 0,000 0,317 0,000 
EQ7 0,393 0,000 0,335 0,000 0,323 0,000 
EQ8 0,461 0,063 0,364 0,000 0,428 0,000 
EQ9 0,482 0,000 0,494 0,000 0,470 0,000 
EQ10 0,344 0,000 0,255 0,000 0,222 0,000 
AQ1 0,477 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,480 0,000 
AQ3 0,393 0,000 0,397 0,000 0,293 0,000 
INVPR1 0,186 0,000 0,215 0,000 0,207 0,000 
INVPR2 0,262 0,000 0,303 0,000 0,127 0,000 
INVPR3 0,246 0,000 0,304 0,000 0,201 0,000 
INVPR4 0,251 0,000 0,190 0,000 0,166 0,000 
INVPR5 0,218 0,000 0,324 0,000 0,216 0,000 
INVPR6 0,278 0,000 0,235 0,000 0,193 0,000 
INVPR7 0,403 0,000 0,369 0,000 0,337 0,000 
INVPR8 0,419 0,000 0,439 0,000 0,503 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR1 0,477 0,000 0,489 0,027 0,480 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR2 0,477 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,481 0,263 
AQ1*INVPR3 0,477 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,480 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR4 0,477 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,480 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR5 0,477 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,480 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR6 0,477 0,065 0,489 0,000 0,481 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR7 0,477 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,480 0,000 
AQ1*INVPR8 0,478 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,480 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR1 0,457 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,530 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR2 0,458 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,530 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR3 0,457 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,530 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR4 0,458 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,530 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR5 0,458 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,530 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR6 0,458 0,000 0,540 0,030 0,529 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR7 0,455 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,529 0,000 
AQ2*INVPR8 0,457 0,000 0,540 0,000 0,530 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR1 0,536 0,000 0,517 0,000 0,496 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR2 0,536 0,000 0,517 0,000 0,496 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR3 0,536 0,616 0,517 0,000 0,496 0,067 
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AQ3*INVPR4 0,536 0,000 0,517 0,000 0,496 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR5 0,536 0,000 0,517 0,000 0,497 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR6 0,536 0,000 0,517 0,000 0,496 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR7 0,534 0,000 0,517 0,000 0,490 0,000 
AQ3*INVPR8 0,536 0,000 0,517 0,000 0,495 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR1 0,313 0,000 0,388 0,000 0,330 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR2 0,340 0,000 0,357 0,000 0,305 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR3 0,306 0,000 0,356 0,000 0,304 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR4 0,350 0,000 0,390 0,000 0,339 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR5 0,344 0,000 0,396 0,000 0,339 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR6 0,344 0,000 0,347 0,000 0,303 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR7 0,292 0,000 0,371 0,000 0,305 0,000 
AQ4*INVPR8 0,355 0,000 0,377 0,096 0,362 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR1 0,480 0,285 0,465 0,696 0,511 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR2 0,480 0,000 0,464 0,000 0,510 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR3 0,480 0,000 0,464 0,000 0,510 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR4 0,480 0,000 0,465 0,000 0,510 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR5 0,480 0,000 0,465 0,000 0,511 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR6 0,480 0,000 0,464 0,000 0,509 0,460 
AQ5*INVPR7 0,479 0,000 0,463 0,000 0,509 0,000 
AQ5*INVPR8 0,480 0,000 0,464 0,000 0,510 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR1 0,394 0,000 0,397 0,000 0,290 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR2 0,393 0,000 0,398 0,000 0,294 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR3 0,393 0,000 0,396 0,000 0,285 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR4 0,393 0,297 0,396 0,000 0,287 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR5 0,392 0,000 0,396 0,000 0,291 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR6 0,393 0,000 0,396 0,000 0,280 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR7 0,396 0,000 0,396 0,000 0,304 0,000 
AQ6*INVPR8 0,394 0,000 0,397 0,000 0,289 0,000 
ΓRAV 0,448 0,000 0,478 0,000 0,308 0,000 
PPE 0,494 0,000 0,497 0,000 0,289 0,000 
NI 0,400 0,000 0,417 0,000 0,407 0,000 
TA 0,467 0,000 0,473 0,562 0,398 0,263 
CURRENT 0,386 0,000 0,437 0,000 0,400 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,141 0,000 0,125 0,000 0,210 0,000 
CFOV 0,522 0,000 0,500 0,000 0,207 0,000 
DEBT 0,493 0,000 0,488 0,000 0,380 0,000 
BETA 0,140 0,862 0,399 0,000 0,064 0,000 
LEVER 0,492 0,000 0,492 0,000 0,488 0,000 
ROA 0,424 0,000 0,501 0,000 0,213 0,000 
ΓREV 0,418 0,000 0,459 0,000 0,396 0,000 
 
        Panel D: Regression equation 43 (Cost of equity capital and audit quality under financial crisis of 
2008) 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
COSTOFEQUITY1 0,484 0,066 0,492 0,000 0,494 0,000 
COSTOFEQUITY2 0,383 0,000 0,432 0,596 0,334 0,000 
EG 0,498 0,000 0,498 0,000 0,410 0,099 
DPO 0,501 0,055 0,491 0,000 0,488 0,000 
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DEBT 0,494 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,361 0,000 
LNMV 0,145 0,000 0,133 0,000 0,172 0,000 
BM 0,456 0,369 0,502 0,357 0,400 0,000 
VOLUME 0,482 0,000 0,481 0,070 0,440 0,000 
BETA 0,149 0,000 0,392 0,318 0,061 0,000 
CFO 0,495 0,000 0,496 0,000 0,168 0,263 
LNLEV 0,208 0,000 0,176 0,000 0,134 0,000 
LNBM 0,115 0,295 0,106 0,293 0,091 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,131 0,000 0,115 0,000 0,209 0,000 
AQ1 0,324 0,000 0,448 0,063 0,381 0,693 
         Panel E: Regression equation 44 (Cost of equity capital and earnings quality under financial 
crisis of 2008) 
                                              Pre crisis period 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
COSTOFEQUITY1 0,489 0,061 0,493 0,562 0,480 0,000 
COSTOFEQUITY2 0,371 0,000 0,414 0,000 0,331 0,000 
BETA 0,165 0,000 0,387 0,000 0,058 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,122 0,000 0,116 0,000 0,205 0,082 
BM 0,440 0,000 0,465 0,000 0,312 0,000 
LEVERAGE 0,350 0,000 0,495 0,000 0,172 0,000 
CFOV 0,427 0,000 0,292 0,052 0,360 0,000 
SV 0,521 0,063 0,449 0,000 0,263 0,000 
COLLATERAL 0,073 0,000 0,046 0,000 0,062 0,000 
NON-DEBT 0,377 0,000 0,314 0,000 0,145 0,018 
GROWTH 0,292 0,000 0,487 0,000 0,229 0,000 
UNIQUENESS 0,479 0,000 0,489 0,055 0,387 0,000 
PROFITABILITY 0,501 0,000 0,488 0,000 0,217 0,000 
LIQUIDITY 0,410 0,000 0,493 0,000 0,383 0,000 
EQ1 0,207 0,000 0,377 0,000 0,286 0,000 
EQ2 0,501 0,000 0,501 0,000 0,494 0,000 
EQ3 0,172 0,000 0,347 0,000 0,247 0,058 
EQ4 0,328 0,066 0,408 0,000 0,190 0,000 
EQ5 0,324 0,000 0,408 0,000 0,193 0,000 
EQ6 0,237 0,000 0,239 0,000 0,198 0,000 
EQ7 0,343 0,000 0,455 0,000 0,248 0,000 
EQ8 0,321 0,184 0,411 0,000 0,246 0,000 
EQ9 0,447 0,000 0,491 0,000 0,298 0,000 
EQ10 0,228 0,000 0,227 0,000 0,211 0,051 
 
        
                                               Crisis period 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
COSTOFEQUITY1 0,474 0,066 0,494 0,000 0,495 0,085 
COSTOFEQUITY2 0,388 0,000 0,439 0,000 0,333 0,000 
BETA 0,140 0,000 0,399 0,000 0,064 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,141 0,000 0,125 0,000 0,210 0,000 
BM 0,458 0,000 0,502 0,000 0,392 0,000 
LEVERAGE 0,493 0,000 0,493 0,052 0,380 0,000 
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CFOV 0,522 0,015 0,500 0,000 0,207 0,085 
SV 0,416 0,000 0,418 0,000 0,236 0,000 
COLLATERAL 0,108 0,000 0,463 0,000 0,076 0,000 
NON-DEBT 0,464 0,000 0,447 0,000 0,154 0,000 
GROWTH 0,493 0,000 0,493 0,012 0,254 0,000 
UNIQUENESS 0,480 0,000 0,489 0,000 0,477 0,000 
PROFITABILITY 0,424 0,000 0,501 0,000 0,213 0,000 
LIQUIDITY 0,400 0,000 0,488 0,000 0,506 0,000 
EQ1 0,338 0,065 0,347 0,000 0,469 0,146 
EQ2 0,488 0,000 0,502 0,000 0,492 0,000 
EQ3 0,326 0,000 0,242 0,015 0,198 0,000 
EQ4 0,166 0,000 0,418 0,000 0,317 0,000 
EQ5 0,243 0,000 0,216 0,000 0,311 0,000 
EQ6 0,130 0,000 0,464 0,000 0,317 0,000 
EQ7 0,393 0,000 0,335 0,000 0,323 0,000 
EQ8 0,461 0,000 0,364 0,000 0,428 0,000 
EQ9 0,482 0,000 0,494 0,085 0,470 0,086 
EQ10 0,344 0,000 0,255 0,000 0,222 0,000 
 
        
Panel F: Regression equation 45 (Cost of debt and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
COSTOFDEBT 0,500 0,000 0,498 0,000 0,516 0,000 
PROFITABILITY 0,498 0,000 0,500 0,217 0,215 0,066 
BM 0,456 0,815 0,502 0,000 0,400 0,000 
LEVERAGE 0,494 0,000 0,494 0,000 0,361 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,131 0,000 0,123 0,000 0,209 0,000 
INTCOV 0,501 0,000 0,498 0,058 0,498 0,015 
LNNIBE 0,346 0,096 0,283 0,000 0,291 0,000 
LNMVE 0,100 0,000 0,075 0,000 0,076 0,000 
COLLATERAL 0,095 0,000 0,453 0,000 0,071 0,000 
CRISK 0,298 0,085 0,467 0,058 0,142 0,418 
AQ1 0,492 0,000 0,495 0,000 0,481 0,000 
         Panel G: Regression equation 46 (Cost of debt and earnings quality under financial crisis of 
2008) 
                                              Pre crisis period 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
COSTOFDEBT 0,502 0,000 0,497 0,098 0,520 0,000 
LEVERAGE 0,350 0,000 0,495 0,000 0,172 0,966 
CORPSIZE 0,122 0,000 0,116 0,000 0,205 0,513 
PROFITABILITY 0,501 0,000 0,488 0,515 0,217 0,000 
INTCOV 0,502 0,000 0,498 0,000 0,497 0,000 
LNNIBE 0,311 0,000 0,241 0,000 0,225 0,000 
EPS 0,485 0,081 0,494 0,616 0,486 0,000 
ΓEPS 0,172 0,000 0,408 0,000 0,247 0,051 
CFO 0,449 0,000 0,458 0,000 0,146 0,000 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
511 
 
RND 0,175 0,000 0,377 0,000 0,088 0,000 
EQ1 0,100 0,000 0,495 0,000 0,076 0,000 
EQ2 0,207 0,049 0,501 0,058 0,286 0,085 
EQ3 0,501 0,000 0,347 0,000 0,494 0,000 
EQ4 0,328 0,000 0,408 0,000 0,190 0,000 
EQ5 0,324 0,000 0,408 0,000 0,193 0,084 
EQ6 0,237 0,000 0,239 0,000 0,198 0,000 
EQ7 0,343 0,000 0,455 0,051 0,248 0,000 
EQ8 0,321 0,585 0,411 0,000 0,246 0,086 
EQ9 0,447 0,000 0,491 0,000 0,298 0,000 
EQ10 0,228 0,000 0,227 0,000 0,211 0,000 
                                                        Crisis period 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Variables KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. KS Test Prob. 
COSTOFDEBT 0,513 0,000 0,499 0,000 0,514 0,000 
LEVERAGE 0,493 0,000 0,493 0,000 0,380 0,000 
CORPSIZE 0,141 0,048 0,125 0,000 0,210 0,000 
PROFITABILITY 0,424 0,000 0,501 0,000 0,213 0,095 
INTCOV 0,504 0,054 0,501 0,000 0,497 0,000 
LNNIBE 0,367 0,000 0,307 0,092 0,334 0,000 
EPS 0,487 0,000 0,472 0,000 0,499 0,000 
ΓEPS 0,326 0,000 0,242 0,000 0,198 0,000 
CFO 0,495 0,084 0,496 0,052 0,185 0,051 
RND 0,195 0,058 0,272 0,000 0,113 0,000 
EQ1 0,411 0,000 0,228 0,000 0,246 0,000 
EQ2 0,338 0,000 0,347 0,000 0,469 0,000 
EQ3 0,488 0,000 0,502 0,000 0,492 0,000 
EQ4 0,166 0,000 0,418 0,000 0,317 0,052 
EQ5 0,243 0,000 0,216 0,016 0,311 0,000 
EQ6 0,130 0,000 0,464 0,000 0,317 0,000 
EQ7 0,393 0,000 0,335 0,000 0,323 0,051 
EQ8 0,461 0,081 0,364 0,000 0,428 0,000 
EQ9 0,482 0,912 0,494 0,058 0,470 0,000 
EQ10 0,344 0,000 0,255 0,000 0,222 0,000 
Note: This table presents the normal distribution test of all examining continous variables in pre and 
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Table 4: Tests for homodcedasticity in all regression models 
Panel A: Regression equation 40 (Earnings earnings under financial crisis of 2008) 
Dependent variable 










Ex post conservatism (EQ1) 0,894 0,201 0,015 0,266 0,159 0,056 
Ex ante conservatism (EQ2) 0,968 0,157 0,265 0,219 0,198 0,159 
Value relevance (EQ3) 0,152 0,299 0,089 0,166 0,190 0,166 
Accruals quality (EQ4) 0,198 0,517 0,065 0,189 0,097 0,119 
Accruals quality (EQ5) 0,165 0,189 0,270 0,490 0,159 0,197 
Accruals quality (EQ6) 0,165 0,169 0,220 0,499 0,122 0,895 
Earnings persistence (EQ7) 0,165 0,197 0,127 0,995 0,892 0,559 
Earnings predictability (EQ8) 0,016 0,165 0,165 0,165 0,166 0,189 
Loss avoidance analysis (EQ9) 0,017 0,212 0,057 0,168 0,686 0,160 
Earnings smoothness (EQ10) 0,199 0,490 0,009 0,157 0,166 0,196 




 Panel B: Regression equation 41 (The joint effect of global financial crisis of 2008 and investor 
protection on audit quality) 
Dependent variable 










Audit fees (AQ1) 0,159 0,166 0,894 0,918 0,885 0,165 
Modified audit report opinion  
(AQ2) 
0,894 0,162 0,157 0,166 0,117 0,152 
Auditor switch (AQ3) 0,891 0,116 0,942 0,166 0,166 0,169 
Status of audit firm (AQ4) 0,190 0,817 0,156 0,152 0,166 0,895 
Existence of audit 
committee (AQ5) 
0,166 0,559 0,126 0,122 0,126 0,684 
Demand for auditing (AQ6) 0,162 0,894 0,512 0,127 0,017 0,162 
        
 
Panel C: Regression equation 42 (The joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on 
earnings quality) 
                                                   Pre crisis period 
Dependent variable 










Ex post conservatism (EQ1) 0,166 0,166 0,842 0,842 0,198 0,981 
Ex ante conservatism (EQ2) 0,066 0,166 0,162 0,882 0,159 0,218 
Value relevance (EQ3) 0,199 0,156 0,166 0,168 0,157 0,187 
Accruals quality (EQ4) 0,227 0,157 0,155 0,659 0,159 0,166 
Accruals quality (EQ5) 0,166 0,166 0,166 0,148 0,321 0,168 
Accruals quality (EQ6) 0,159 0,166 0,157 0,842 0,214 0,169 
Earnings persistence (EQ7) 0,190 0,165 0,156 0,156 0,217 0,169 
Earnings predictability (EQ8) 0,156 0,165 0,152 0,157 0,642 0,187 
Loss avoidance analysis (EQ9) 0,199 0,165 0,682 0,188 0,190 0,816 
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                                                Crisis period 
Dependent variable 










Ex post conservatism (EQ1) 0,894 0,190 0,159 0,092 0,489 0,185 
Ex ante conservatism (EQ2) 0,189 0,159 0,159 0,197 0,984 0,166 
Value relevance (EQ3) 0,166 0,190 0,552 0,982 0,146 0,157 
Accruals quality (EQ4) 0,220 0,816 0,657 0,849 0,982 0,217 
Accruals quality (EQ5) 0,199 0,198 0,198 0,892 0,157 0,220 
Accruals quality (EQ6) 0,189 0,452 0,159 0,127 0,168 0,157 
Earnings persistence (EQ7) 0,915 0,227 0,815 0,126 0,159 0,168 
Earnings predictability (EQ8) 0,813 0,156 0,915 0,157 0,117 0,166 
Loss avoidance analysis (EQ9) 0,190 0,121 0,889 0,157 0,159 0,166 
Earnings smoothness (EQ10) 0,189 0,156 0,849 0,851 0,166 0,815 
         Panel D: Regression equation 43 (Cost of equity capital and audit quality under financial crisis 
of 2008) 
Dependent variable 










Cost of equity 
(COSTOFEQUITY1) 
0,198 0,151 0,216 0,660 0,519 0,486 
Cost of equity 
(COSTOFEQUITY2) 
0,013 0,166 0,159 0,152 0,190 0,159 
         Panel E: Regression equation 44 (Cost of equity capital and earnings quality under financial 
crisis of 2008) 
                                             Pre crisis period 
Dependent variable 










Cost of equity 
(COSTOFEQUITY1) 
0,019 0,982 0,842 0,520 0,892 0,190 
Cost of equity 
(COSTOFEQUITY2) 
0,490 0,951 0,166 0,166 0,198 0,082 
                                                      Crisis period 
Dependent variable 










Cost of equity 
(COSTOFEQUITY1) 
0,189 0,152 0,157 0,219 0,189 0,013 
Cost of equity 
(COSTOFEQUITY2) 
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Panel F: Regression equation 45 (Cost of debt and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
Dependent variable 










Cost of debt 
(COSTOFDEBT) 
0,199 0,126 0,815 0,482 0,415 0,416 
         Panel G: Regression equation 46 (Cost of debt and earnings quality under financial crisis of 
2008) 
                                                  Pre crisis period 
Dependent variable 










Cost of debt 
(COSTOFDEBT) 
0,017 0,162 0,128 0,182 0,186 0,816 
                                                         Crisis period 
Dependent variable 










Cost of debt 
(COSTOFDEBT) 
0,198 0,199 0,190 0,785 0,952 0,150 
Note: This table presents the test of homogeneity of variances in all regression equations in pre and 
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Table 5: Tests for multicollinearity in all regression models 
Panel A: Regression equation 40 (Earnings earnings under financial crisis of 2008) 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
LEVER 0,996 1,004 1,000 1,000 0,052 61,043 
TOBINQ 0,065 82,053 0,981 1,019 0,642 22,651 
CORPSIZE 0,872 1,147 0,017 111,144 0,082 21,609 
SV 0,090 91,185 0,717 1,395 0,065 42,373 
CFOV 0,656 1,523 0,747 1,338 0,087 21,406 
LOC 0,492 2,031 0,065 63,144 0,368 2,716 
CORPROFIT 0,013 79,084 0,428 2,339 0,350 2,854 
CORPERFOR 0,012 82,892 0,433 2,311 0,089 31,180 
LAGLOSS 0,804 1,243 0,953 1,049 0,792 1,263 
MASH 0,787 1,270 0,099 631,066 0,620 1,613 
CAPINT 0,986 21,000 0,998 1,002 0,064 61,061 
CORPEFFIC 0,253 3,945 0,941 1,062 0,872 1,147 
MCTR 0,417 2,396 0,426 2,349 0,480 2,083 
MULTIN 0,033 11,001 0,947 1,056 0,996 1,004 
DIVIDYIELD 0,998 1,002 0,939 1,065 0,069 71,020 
DEBT 0,351 2,845 0,559 1,789 0,219 4,568 
R 0,007 11,165 0,130 7,682 0,069 91,524 
DR 0,069 12,632 0,062 31,717 0,424 2,357 
R*DR 0,365 2,738 0,082 77,714 0,373 2,684 
BETA 0,065 211,132 0,069 91,130 0,890 1,124 
ΔNI 0,760 1,316 0,098 31,064 0,097 111,020 
SICODE 0,979 1,021 0,085 21,028 0,971 1,030 
GDP 0,062 11,691 0,097 31,740 0,161 6,195 
MCAP 0,380 2,630 0,619 1,615 0,062 26,014 
HERF 0,089 11,833 0,905 1,106 0,214 4,664 
CRISIS 0,657 1,523 0,427 2,344 0,065 36,875 
         
Panel B: Regression equation 41 (The joint effect of global financial crisis of 2008 and investor 
protection on audit quality) 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
CRISIS 0,012 82,892 0,000 5.963,780 0,001 1.084,040 
INVPR1 0,015 67,521 0,046 21,552 0,040 24,826 
INVPR2 0,034 29,268 0,015 64,542 0,050 19,906 
INVPR3 0,019 53,496 0,064 15,681 0,166 6,012 
INVPR4 0,092 10,861 0,011 87,976 0,012 80,731 
INVPR5 0,025 39,341 0,017 58,823 0,078 12,778 
INVPR6 0,026 38,793 0,005 209,334 0,008 129,677 
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INVPR7 0,042 23,921 0,125 7,972 0,021 47,423 
INVPR8 0,150 6,673 0,173 5,771 0,128 7,817 
CRISIS*INVPR1 0,575 1,740 0,996 1,004 0,166 6,014 
CRISIS*INVPR2 0,844 1,185 0,000 2.265,545 0,959 1,043 
CRISIS*INVPR3 0,003 372,236 0,001 1.051,008 0,844 1,185 
CRISIS*INVPR4 0,657 1,523 0,000 7.768,391 0,575 1,740 
CRISIS*INVPR5 0,166 6,014 0,000 6.625,547 0,941 1,062 
CRISIS*INVPR6 0,996 1,004 0,000 6.244,057 0,002 510,519 
CRISIS*INVPR7 0,003 299,330 0,005 216,199 0,007 146,312 
CRISIS*INVPR8 0,001 1.008,149 0,005 197,113 0,657 1,523 
CORPSIZE 0,904 1,107 0,968 1,033 0,804 1,244 
RISK 0,458 2,184 0,876 1,142 0,039 25,583 
SICODE 0,906 1,104 0,991 1,009 0,936 1,069 
PROFIT 0,983 1,018 0,997 1,003 0,985 1,016 
SOLV 0,999 1,001 1,000 1,000 0,960 1,042 
COMPLEX 0,999 1,001 1,000 1,000 0,944 1,059 
ACCRUAL 0,016 31,001 0,065 621,015 0,931 1,074 
FCF 0,087 62,050 0,873 1,145 0,044 22,578 
IRISK 0,892 1,121 0,007 65,052 0,810 1,235 
LEVERAGE 0,883 1,132 0,999 1,001 0,495 2,021 
BM 0,069 61,001 0,085 25,054 0,967 1,034 
LOSSES 0,898 1,113 0,964 1,037 0,893 1,120 
         Panel C: Regression equation 42 (The joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on 
earnings quality) 
                                           Pre crisis period 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
AQ1 0,047 21,142 0,000 4.501,855 0,978 1,023 
AQ2 0,042 23,664 0,000 4.375,075 0,003 350,245 
AQ3 0,066 15,236 0,000 2.700,400 0,002 576,731 
AQ4 0,004 238,023 0,000 2.438,403 0,002 646,866 
AQ5 0,005 202,173 0,000 5.589,920 0,003 353,721 
AQ6 0,001 784,437 0,018 56,948 0,002 564,319 
INVPR1 0,054 18,680 0,020 49,870 0,074 13,485 
INVPR2 0,054 18,488 0,025 39,734 0,124 8,069 
INVPR3 0,004 285,111 0,130 7,698 0,003 289,070 
INVPR4 0,002 455,504 0,017 58,439 0,014 73,257 
INVPR5 0,001 1.311,050 0,018 56,019 0,003 399,150 
INVPR6 0,559 1,789 0,068 14,658 0,027 36,731 
INVPR7 0,006 176,765 0,058 17,292 0,003 317,708 
INVPR8 0,003 300,355 0,000 2.842,617 0,011 92,119 
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AQ1*INVPR1 0,747 1,338 0,000 2.842,542 0,007 141,088 
AQ1*INVPR2 0,318 3,144 0,000 6.330,162 0,011 91,814 
AQ1*INVPR3 0,002 608,685 0,000 5.505,461 0,004 250,326 
AQ1*INVPR4 0,885 1,130 0,001 802,427 0,003 319,755 
AQ1*INVPR5 0,940 1,064 0,001 1.133,412 0,492 2,031 
AQ1*INVPR6 0,972 1,028 0,000 2.937,950 0,013 79,084 
AQ1*INVPR7 0,575 1,740 0,000 2.960,369 0,012 82,892 
AQ1*INVPR8 0,619 1,615 0,002 427,578 0,804 1,243 
AQ2*INVPR1 0,905 1,106 0,002 554,366 0,787 1,270 
AQ2*INVPR2 0,747 1,338 0,001 1.385,854 0,065 11,000 
AQ2*INVPR3 0,001 1.522,695 0,001 1.294,059 0,253 3,945 
AQ2*INVPR4 0,980 1,020 0,000 7.761,217 0,417 2,396 
AQ2*INVPR5 0,971 1,030 0,006 173,550 0,999 2,000 
AQ2*INVPR6 0,161 6,195 0,004 271,617 0,998 1,002 
AQ2*INVPR7 0,166 6,014 0,000 2.778,849 0,351 2,845 
AQ2*INVPR8 0,046 21,663 0,001 1.555,901 0,065 31,165 
AQ3*INVPR1 1,000 1,000 0,000 9.805,800 0,380 2,632 
AQ3*INVPR2 0,985 1,015 0,000 9.074,706 0,365 2,738 
AQ3*INVPR3 0,021 47,081 0,006 166,087 0,883 1,132 
AQ3*INVPR4 0,999 1,001 0,004 258,612 0,065 61,316 
AQ3*INVPR5 1,000 1,000 0,000 2.808,705 0,979 1,021 
AQ3*INVPR6 0,964 1,037 0,000 5.600,733 0,592 1,691 
AQ3*INVPR7 0,831 1,203 0,002 432,273 0,065 42,630 
AQ3*INVPR8 0,005 197,113 0,001 686,503 0,065 61,144 
AQ4*INVPR1 0,968 1,033 1,000 1,000 0,717 1,395 
AQ4*INVPR2 0,876 1,142 0,981 1,019 0,747 1,338 
AQ4*INVPR3 0,967 1,034 0,874 1,144 0,318 3,144 
AQ4*INVPR4 0,999 1,001 0,717 1,395 0,065 52,339 
AQ4*INVPR5 1,000 1,000 0,747 1,338 0,433 2,311 
AQ4*INVPR6 0,964 1,037 0,318 3,144 0,953 1,049 
AQ4*INVPR7 0,956 1,046 0,428 2,339 0,065 91,066 
AQ4*INVPR8 0,756 1,323 0,051 22,311 0,065 81,002 
AQ5*INVPR1 0,089 65,065 0,953 1,049 0,941 1,062 
AQ5*INVPR2 0,082 95,157 0,938 1,066 0,426 2,349 
AQ5*INVPR3 0,084 15,652 0,064 31,002 0,947 1,056 
AQ5*INVPR4 0,999 1,001 0,941 1,062 0,065 81,065 
AQ5*INVPR5 1,000 1,000 0,426 2,349 0,559 1,789 
AQ5*INVPR6 0,964 1,037 0,086 61,056 0,130 7,682 
AQ5*INVPR7 0,082 15,132 0,939 1,065 0,065 91,717 
AQ5*INVPR8 0,964 1,037 0,559 1,789 0,130 7,714 
AQ6*INVPR1 0,082 32,165 0,069 87,682 0,885 1,130 
AQ6*INVPR2 0,941 1,062 0,582 1,717 0,940 1,064 
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AQ6*INVPR3 0,906 1,103 0,130 7,714 0,065 71,028 
AQ6*INVPR4 0,089 65,137 0,001 1.555,901 0,575 1,740 
AQ6*INVPR5 1,000 1,000 0,000 9.805,800 0,619 1,615 
AQ6*INVPR6 0,090 652,159 0,000 9.074,706 0,065 81,106 
AQ6*INVPR7 0,974 1,027 1,000 1,000 0,130 7,682 
AQ6*INVPR8 0,087 3.658,146 0,082 11,037 0,582 1,717 
ΔRAV 0,998 1,002 0,105 9,551 0,310 3,228 
PPE 0,997 1,003 0,108 9,264 0,065 91,058 
NI 0,993 1,007 0,069 11,186 0,351 2,850 
TA 0,066 365,157 0,740 1,351 0,968 1,034 
CURRENT 0,318 3,144 0,965 1,036 0,874 1,144 
SP 0,090 955,159 0,069 11,096 0,065 81,618 
LL 0,433 2,311 0,062 31,287 0,040 32,603 
CORPSIZE 0,953 1,049 0,634 1,578 0,084 21,339 
CFOV 0,089 328,166 0,602 1,661 0,021 64,163 
DEBT 0,998 1,002 0,726 1,378 0,017 91,147 
BETA 0,941 1,062 0,782 1,279 0,037 21,056 
SICODE 0,426 2,349 0,068 11,017 0,203 4,932 
LEVER 0,085 3.265,497 0,999 1,001 0,610 1,640 
ROA 0,166 6,014 0,724 1,381 0,941 1,063 
ΔREV 0,996 1,004 0,062 11,188 0,082 11,339 
                                                    Crisis period 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
AQ1 0,000 9.895,972 0,000 8.658,477 0,001 991,230 
AQ2 0,000 9.261,776 0,000 3.588,844 0,000 2.167,251 
AQ3 0,004 276,090 0,000 4.241,373 0,000 2.624,462 
AQ4 0,047 21,172 0,001 1.399,829 0,000 2.795,283 
AQ5 0,007 137,472 0,052 19,127 0,000 9.320,961 
AQ6 0,043 23,206 0,039 25,888 0,014 69,408 
INVPR1 0,012 82,625 0,028 36,081 0,015 65,790 
INVPR2 0,061 16,381 0,047 21,491 0,026 38,723 
INVPR3 0,039 25,406 0,023 43,689 0,006 154,250 
INVPR4 0,065 15,434 0,014 69,402 0,027 36,760 
INVPR5 0,000 3.655,018 0,032 31,199 0,006 165,448 
INVPR6 0,000 3.381,804 0,056 17,779 0,012 83,972 
INVPR7 0,000 5.322,799 0,000 5.714,904 0,030 33,837 
INVPR8 0,000 2.837,991 0,001 1.141,547 0,000 9.304,014 
AQ1*INVPR1 0,000 2.651,163 0,000 6.109,487 0,001 1.877,538 
AQ1*INVPR2 0,000 8.556,240 0,001 1.517,374 0,001 755,123 
AQ1*INVPR3 0,000 2.029,985 0,001 953,983 0,000 4.876,808 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
12/02/2018 11:16:11 EET - 137.108.70.6
519 
 
AQ1*INVPR4 0,000 3.863,964 0,000 8.671,170 0,000 6.935,697 
AQ1*INVPR5 0,000 8.539,430 0,001 838,545 0,000 3.860,216 
AQ1*INVPR6 0,000 9.941,750 0,002 448,915 0,001 905,379 
AQ1*INVPR7 0,002 460,712 0,001 1.582,172 0,001 683,834 
AQ1*INVPR8 0,001 804,624 0,000 4.861,168 0,000 8.578,807 
AQ2*INVPR1 0,000 3.217,799 0,001 721,108 0,000 5.446,400 
AQ2*INVPR2 0,001 1.116,469 0,001 1.185,578 0,000 7.266,886 
AQ2*INVPR3 0,000 5.115,925 0,000 5.739,043 0,001 756,206 
AQ2*INVPR4 0,000 4.842,337 0,000 5.085,506 0,003 374,845 
AQ2*INVPR5 0,005 191,867 0,000 3.853,259 0,000 2.943,527 
AQ2*INVPR6 0,002 556,709 0,001 694,016 0,001 1.786,968 
AQ2*INVPR7 0,000 3.917,574 0,001 696,293 0,001 818,551 
AQ2*INVPR8 0,001 1.315,612 0,001 805,263 0,000 4.586,450 
AQ3*INVPR1 0,000 5.391,353 0,001 1.339,231 0,001 1.614,420 
AQ3*INVPR2 0,000 5.707,246 0,000 5.649,996 0,003 358,949 
AQ3*INVPR3 0,004 273,510 0,001 1.441,843 0,001 712,402 
AQ3*INVPR4 0,002 651,691 0,003 390,951 0,000 3.879,150 
AQ3*INVPR5 0,000 9.456,282 0,002 592,478 0,001 1.984,110 
AQ3*INVPR6 0,000 2.051,241 0,000 4.217,777 0,001 899,058 
AQ3*INVPR7 0,000 4.691,123 0,002 498,049 0,000 9.190,822 
AQ3*INVPR8 0,000 8.628,277 0,001 850,640 0,000 5.090,878 
AQ4*INVPR1 0,002 506,308 0,000 5.376,920 0,000 3.300,098 
AQ4*INVPR2 0,001 936,895 0,000 3.203,753 0,001 798,098 
AQ4*INVPR3 0,001 1.844,547 0,000 3.373,184 0,001 767,591 
AQ4*INVPR4 0,001 1.305,734 0,002 403,692 0,000 3.357,430 
AQ4*INVPR5 0,002 590,184 0,003 380,254 0,001 1.417,943 
AQ4*INVPR6 0,001 1.796,670 0,001 1.121,368 0,001 1.018,921 
AQ4*INVPR7 0,000 5.589,920 0,001 1.165,337 0,000 7.611,651 
AQ4*INVPR8 0,018 56,948 0,000 9.337,555 0,000 4.067,888 
AQ5*INVPR1 0,020 49,870 0,000 7.389,681 0,000 4.282,376 
AQ5*INVPR2 0,025 39,734 0,000 3.503,165 0,001 896,563 
AQ5*INVPR3 0,130 7,698 0,003 339,923 0,001 871,400 
AQ5*INVPR4 0,017 58,439 0,001 1.295,949 0,000 5.518,772 
AQ5*INVPR5 0,018 56,019 0,747 1,338 0,001 1.637,434 
AQ5*INVPR6 0,068 14,658 0,082 693,144 0,001 764,523 
AQ5*INVPR7 0,058 17,292 0,428 2,339 0,000 3.389,156 
AQ5*INVPR8 0,000 2.842,617 0,433 2,311 0,000 2.181,929 
AQ6*INVPR1 0,000 2.842,542 0,098 621,049 0,000 3.168,232 
AQ6*INVPR2 0,000 6.330,162 0,037 961,066 0,964 1,037 
AQ6*INVPR3 0,000 5.505,461 0,998 1,002 0,674 1,483 
AQ6*INVPR4 0,001 802,427 0,941 11,062 0,964 1,037 
AQ6*INVPR5 0,001 1.133,412 0,426 2,349 0,575 1,740 
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AQ6*INVPR6 0,000 2.937,950 0,089 27,682 0,941 1,062 
AQ6*INVPR7 0,000 2.960,369 0,582 1,717 0,906 1,103 
AQ6*INVPR8 0,002 427,578 0,098 37,714 0,000 7.389,681 
ΔRAV 0,778 1,286 0,440 2,273 0,370 2,702 
PPE 0,777 1,286 0,440 42,272 0,347 2,884 
NI 0,767 1,304 0,234 4,265 0,405 2,467 
TA 0,296 3,377 0,089 51,247 0,382 2,618 
CURRENT 0,928 1,078 0,990 1,010 0,976 1,025 
SP 0,964 1,037 0,082 61,093 0,913 1,096 
LL 0,696 1,436 0,798 1,253 0,571 1,750 
CORPSIZE 0,224 4,460 0,098 71,703 0,446 2,242 
CFOV 0,056 18,006 0,161 6,218 0,075 13,264 
DEBT 0,904 1,106 0,098 81,641 0,517 1,933 
BETA 0,801 1,248 0,813 1,230 0,799 1,252 
SICODE 0,804 1,243 0,089 91,016 0,943 1,061 
LEVER 0,896 1,116 0,994 1,006 0,513 1,949 
ROA 0,974 1,027 0,098 14,102 0,574 1,743 
ΔREV 0,996 1,004 0,999 1,001 0,988 1,012 
         Panel D: Regression equation 43 (Cost of equity capital and audit quality under financial crisis of 
2008) 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
EG 0,089 11,000 0,099 11,000 0,089 11,003 
DPO 1,000 1,000 0,090 11,006 0,085 11,003 
DEBT 0,351 2,850 0,087 11,008 0,984 11,113 
LNMV 0,096 10,438 0,062 17,109 0,147 1,806 
BM 0,069 11,008 0,062 11,029 0,929 1,077 
VOLUME 0,992 1,008 0,065 11,006 0,940 1,064 
BETA 0,958 1,044 0,977 1,023 0,932 1,072 
CFO 0,061 12,842 0,999 1,001 0,881 1,135 
LNLEV 0,873 1,146 0,891 1,122 0,098 11,290 
LNBM 0,715 1,399 0,087 11,316 0,089 11,542 
CORPSIZE 0,100 10,026 0,074 16,662 0,091 51,968 
FIRM 0,090 12,042 0,085 11,677 0,607 1,647 
SICODE 0,961 1,041 0,098 11,010 0,098 11,044 
AQ1 0,991 1,009 0,013 11,000 0,989 1,011 
AQ2 0,592 1,689 0,651 11,052 0,091 11,024 
AQ3 0,062 11,134 0,031 11,458 0,660 1,514 
AQ4 0,740 1,352 0,020 11,576 0,592 1,688 
AQ5 0,574 1,743 0,709 1,411 0,092 11,428 
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Panel E: Regression equation 44 (Cost of equity capital and earnings quality under financial 
crisis of 2008) 
                                              Pre crisis period 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
BETA 0,098 11,089 0,089 31,246 0,099 11,100 
CORPSIZE 0,090 11,196 0,894 1,119 0,550 1,818 
BM 0,068 13,366 0,999 1,001 0,098 11,458 
LEVERAGE 0,198 1,103 0,098 10,255 0,098 11,586 
CFOV 0,893 1,120 0,128 7,835 0,053 18,748 
SV 0,010 95,801 0,015 68,134 0,162 6,167 
NER 0,089 11,166 0,897 1,115 0,017 11,396 
COLLATERAL 0,066 11,158 0,089 31,115 0,016 11,365 
NON-DEBT 0,068 11,221 0,874 1,144 0,082 11,293 
GROWTH 0,069 11,091 0,893 1,120 0,088 11,178 
UNIQUENESS 0,068 11,010 0,090 31,002 0,089 11,195 
SICODE 0,012 11,026 0,068 31,009 0,098 11,065 
PROFITABILITY 0,999 1,001 0,089 31,911 0,087 12,780 
LIQUIDITY 0,956 1,046 0,999 1,001 0,017 11,034 
EQ1 0,093 10,737 0,019 53,938 0,123 8,114 
EQ2 0,298 3,352 0,999 1,001 0,995 1,005 
EQ3 0,022 46,414 0,805 1,243 0,235 4,248 
EQ4 0,088 11,293 0,000 5.033,707 0,012 80,701 
EQ5 0,078 11,178 0,098 37,644 0,312 3,208 
EQ6 0,686 1,458 0,999 1,001 0,056 13,084 
EQ7 0,012 80,701 0,001 1.672,155 0,089 13,515 
EQ8 0,008 127,031 0,000 5.991,103 0,078 11,103 
EQ9 0,884 1,132 0,123 8,146 0,481 2,077 
EQ10 0,007 149,214 0,336 2,972 0,096 10,471 
                                                       Crisis period 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
BETA 0,837 1,195 0,815 1,227 0,846 1,182 
CORPSIZE 0,839 1,192 0,984 1,016 0,562 1,780 
BM 0,952 1,050 0,000 5.581,553 0,921 1,086 
LEVERAGE 0,858 1,166 0,908 1,101 0,509 1,965 
CFOV 0,000 2.468,761 0,000 4.138,039 0,130 7,675 
SV 0,006 174,184 0,356 2,809 0,078 12,876 
NER 0,802 1,248 0,976 1,024 0,667 1,498 
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COLLATERAL 0,782 1,279 0,995 1,005 0,734 1,363 
NON-DEBT 0,985 1,015 0,992 1,009 0,752 1,329 
GROWTH 0,298 3,360 0,983 1,017 0,823 1,215 
UNIQUENESS 0,989 1,011 0,999 1,001 0,992 1,008 
SICODE 0,819 1,221 0,992 1,008 0,940 1,064 
PROFITABILITY 0,946 1,057 0,001 1.997,833 0,605 1,652 
LIQUIDITY 0,917 1,091 0,999 1,001 0,923 1,084 
EQ1 0,024 42,507 0,750 1,333 0,124 8,032 
EQ2 0,953 1,049 0,001 1.080,009 0,996 1,004 
EQ3 0,303 3,297 0,227 4,399 0,097 10,325 
EQ4 0,019 52,643 0,000 5.644,832 0,004 237,279 
EQ5 0,017 58,628 0,004 238,911 0,005 198,691 
EQ6 0,039 25,445 0,005 191,810 0,291 3,439 
EQ7 0,030 33,380 0,447 2,238 0,032 31,346 
EQ8 0,000 2.252,065 0,403 2,482 0,024 41,490 
EQ9 0,304 3,286 0,957 1,045 0,498 2,010 
EQ10 0,539 1,854 0,733 1,364 0,520 1,924 
         Panel F: Regression equation 45 (Cost of debt and audit quality under financial crisis of 2008) 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
PROFITABILITY 0,089 11,001 0,051 19,430 0,515 1,943 
BM 0,050 11,018 0,051 19,438 0,089 11,121 
LEVERAGE 0,069 11,035 0,604 1,657 0,089 11,129 
CORPSIZE 0,075 12,968 0,440 2,274 0,050 12,193 
INTCOV 0,082 11,000 1,000 1,000 0,062 11,003 
LNNIBE 0,098 12,581 0,449 2,229 0,089 12,448 
LNMVE 0,081 11,995 0,090 11,874 0,599 1,671 
COLLATERAL 0,051 11,307 0,089 11,001 0,052 11,451 
NEGEQ 0,051 11,095 0,065 11,118 0,089 11,355 
SICODE 0,069 11,045 0,056 11,007 0,015 11,051 
CRISK 0,052 11,130 0,053 11,659 0,069 11,337 
AQ1 0,996 1,004 0,082 11,000 0,092 11,012 
AQ2 0,573 1,745 0,065 11,132 0,019 11,033 
AQ3 0,882 1,133 0,017 11,459 0,075 11,500 
AQ4 0,709 1,410 0,089 11,585 0,098 11,691 
AQ5 0,495 2,019 0,068 11,435 0,634 1,577 
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Panel G: Regression equation 46 (Cost of debt and earnings quality under financial crisis of 
2008) 
                                               Pre crisis period 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
LEVERAGE 0,914 1,094 0,098 10,252 0,813 1,230 
CORPSIZE 0,142 7,057 0,173 5,783 0,118 8,467 
PROFITABILITY 0,997 1,003 0,523 1,913 0,336 2,976 
INTCOV 0,999 1,001 1,000 1,000 0,992 1,009 
LNNIBE 0,073 13,696 0,080 12,515 0,058 17,309 
EPS 0,164 6,097 0,995 1,005 0,040 25,248 
ΔEPS 0,035 28,368 0,089 11,039 0,064 15,566 
PROFIT 0,143 6,993 0,099 16,358 0,104 9,643 
INCR 0,912 11,096 0,072 11,078 0,910 1,099 
CFO 0,090 11,102 0,989 1,011 0,754 1,326 
RND 0,017 11,210 0,059 17,028 0,726 1,378 
EQ1 0,052 17,561 0,974 1,026 0,146 6,864 
EQ2 0,022 13,233 0,853 1,172 0,058 17,377 
EQ3 0,765 1,307 0,697 1,435 0,968 1,033 
EQ4 0,005 214,955 0,000 3.266,905 0,002 401,759 
EQ5 0,012 83,823 0,214 4,668 0,002 590,034 
EQ6 0,697 1,435 0,214 4,668 0,020 50,135 
EQ7 0,020 50,274 0,001 1.310,515 0,100 10,015 
EQ8 0,101 9,944 0,000 4.639,189 0,007 134,807 
EQ9 0,965 1,036 0,123 8,136 0,482 2,075 
EQ10 0,021 47,762 0,511 1,956 0,013 78,131 
                                                        Crisis period 
   
Collinearity Statistics 
   




Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
LEVERAGE 0,350 2,856 0,395 2,530 0,493 2,027 
CORPSIZE 0,127 7,887 0,160 6,242 0,137 7,297 
PROFITABILITY 0,967 1,034 0,266 3,762 0,589 1,697 
INTCOV 0,999 1,001 0,998 1,002 0,990 1,010 
LNNIBE 0,083 12,079 0,085 11,698 0,071 14,122 
EPS 0,576 1,736 0,963 1,038 0,129 7,743 
ΔEPS 0,098 12,663 0,234 4,272 0,158 6,321 
PROFIT 0,092 16,879 0,154 6,507 0,095 10,482 
INCR 0,072 11,246 0,833 1,201 0,770 1,298 
CFO 0,099 12,846 0,059 17,062 0,804 1,243 
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RND 0,099 11,304 0,902 1,108 0,724 1,381 
EQ1 0,099 14,016 0,778 1,285 0,179 5,591 
EQ2 0,089 11,036 0,266 3,762 0,160 6,254 
EQ3 0,303 3,297 0,227 4,399 0,097 10,325 
EQ4 0,034 29,771 0,005 198,936 0,008 130,176 
EQ5 0,036 27,409 0,129 7,759 0,008 120,905 
EQ6 0,354 2,822 0,007 144,575 0,776 1,288 
EQ7 0,094 10,605 0,458 2,185 0,060 16,585 
EQ8 0,109 9,190 0,453 2,208 0,075 13,332 
EQ9 0,981 1,019 0,071 14,099 0,509 1,964 
EQ10 0,596 1,679 0,797 1,254 0,599 1,669 
Note: This table presents multicollinearity of all regression equations in pre and crisis period for all 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Continous variables 
 
                         CLUSTER 1 
Variable (s) Pre crisis period Crisis period Regression Equation 
EQ₁ 0,06526 (0,27200) 1,52752 (2,03959) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₂ -0,00896 (0,78357) -0,00027 (0,05346) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₃ 0,98406 (0,27897) 0,93111 (0,36641) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₄ 4,80592 (4,25499) 1,84581 (1,48268) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₅ 4,05460 (3,16579) 1,76553 (1,32841) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₆ 1,95610 (1,22312) 1,68369 (0,66995) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₇ 0,13481 (0,73938) 0,07507 (1,19639) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₈ 0,61437 (53,36920) 1,13903 (2,96714) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₉ -0,28699 (6,55433) -0,71969 (45,98632) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₁₀ 2,48379 (0,31461) 2,39597 (1,82404) 40, 42, 44, 46 
COSTOFEQUITY1 -1,87481 (162,56313) -0,52436 (25,70534) 43, 44 
COSTOFEQUITY₂ 0,17239 (0,52555) 0,18398 (0,64631) 43, 44 
COSTOFDEBT 0,47487 (49,74353) 0,50014 (0,00369) 45, 46 
AQ1 20.734,65916 (1.134.574,47745) 9.056,81467 (158.385,13877) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ6 0,00008 (0,00046) 0,00005 (0,00017) 41, 42 
INVPR1 5,77274 (0,38175) 5,85375 (0,30939) 41, 42 
INVPR2 5,99869 (0,27935) 6,15217 (0,17412) 41, 42 
INVPR3 4,86634 (0,37362) 5,02282 (0,29099) 41, 42 
INVPR4 6,06552 (0,09273) 5,79376 (0,20380) 41, 42 
INVPR5 5,59722 (0,13889) 5,35311 (0,22490) 41, 42 
INVPR6 5,63383 (0,04731) 5,14363 (0,11453) 41, 42 
INVPR7 7,27741 (1,07542) 7,14183 (1,11883) 41, 42 
INVPR8 9,64044 (0,52241) 9,30645 (0,48444) 41, 42 
LEVER 42,09309 (615,17678) 38,46495 (410,05881) 40 
TOBINQ 2,33488 (27,85506) 2,75565 (94,99301) 40 
CORPSIZE 4,50698 (2,02029) 4,19305 (2,30732) 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46  
SV 4,78684 (10,48824) 8,54860 (19,60734) 40, 44 
CFOV 2,07190 (4,19526) 97,49202 (326,29953) 40, 42, 44 
LOC 36.903,83852 (992.453,04728) 37.734,37014 (665.388,52550) 40 
CORPROFIT -0,18699 (6,55434) 0,57275 (175,27637) 40 
CORPERFOR -0,08162 (4,67890) -2,50837 (340,54630) 40 
MASH 0,00073 (0,00776) 0,00070 (0,00846) 40 
CAPINT 0,37131 (5,10564) 1,20159 (115,94725) 40 
CORPEFFIC 0,90928 (11,53052) 0,81090 (21,38870) 40 
MCTR 612.659,23261 (15.177.677,41001) 422.878,73774 (7.680.455,53939) 40 
MULTIN 0,08909 (3,53596) 0,06129 (1,51956) 40 
DIVIDYIELD 46,80134 (1.692,74809) 42,19289 (1.651,03265) 40 
DEBT 0,18171 (0,47320) 0,88402 (50,39115) 40, 42, 43 
R 0,21715 (1,68054) 0,05511 (1,06861) 40 
R*DR -0,09889 (0,19328) -0,18510 (0,26446) 40 
BETA 0,54720 (0,54062) 0,59177 (0,51268) 40, 42, 43, 44 
ΔNI 223.373,30105 (47.792.740,61520) -200.687,79622 (37.825.087,78012) 40 
GDP 4,60721 (0,04682) 4,64491 (0,08531) 40 
MCAP 1,38883 (0,16561) 1,08296 (0,28030) 40 
HERF 0,06552 (0,01925) 0,06516 (0,01850) 40 
CRISK -0,03842 (0,40992) -0,05879 (0,84259) 45 
EG 10.567,40464 (1.137.686,16743) 55,22456 (2.261,58408) 43 
DPO -0,85418 (68,72426) -5,92867 (870,63728) 43 
LNMV 10,20606 (5,02279) 9,38127 (5,30120) 43 
BM 0,30644 (5,55192) 0,38220 (14,41335) 41, 43, 44, 45 
VOLUME 17,82673 (415,20934) 8,65882 (90,66876) 43 
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CFO -0,08162 (4,67890) -2,50837 (340,54630) 43, 46 
LNLEV -1,37359 (1,61861) -1,16633 (1,61388) 43 
LNBM -0,76019 (0,86648) -0,34815 (0,89073) 43 
LEVERAGE 0,18171 (0,47320) 0,88402 (50,39115) 41, 44, 45, 46 
COLLATERAL 0,42216 (0,28983) 0,36304 (0,29403) 44, 45 
NON-DEBT 0,03910 (0,12552) 0,03627 (0,40570) 44 
GROWTH 0,06271 (0,11428) 0,12942 (8,09853) 44 
UNIQUENESS 11,27077 (215,33137) 23,51380 (465,81727) 44 
PROFITABILITY 378,09607 (42.549,49852) -12,54456 (293,28788) 44, 45, 46 
LIQUIDITY 3,09581 (13,54184) 3,34898 (13,25813) 44 
INTCOV 10,40589 (909,48639) -0,14412 (11,68408) 45, 46 
LNNIBE 5,29430 (5,53341) 4,34640 (5,49077) 45, 46 
LNMVE 0,42885 (2,08088) -0,23086 (2,28710) 45 
EPS -3,64029 (290,55099) -3,42023 (278,40231) 46 
ΔEPS 0,02480 (301,37957) 0,26804 (337,97890) 46 
RND 0,24550 (0,26229) 0,23650 (0,27511) 46 
ΔRAV 0,14416 (7,76057) 0,04673 (2,47664) 42 
PPE 1,71540 (117,66985) 0,76659 (50,41140) 42 
NI 318.484,39855 (1.871.971,96134) 298.114,78389 (1.832.782,36215) 42 
TA -1.495.648,80557 (91.894.390,89840) 
-10.643.535,15483 
(22.665.571,12842) 42 
CURRENT 3,85572 (16,65469) 4,05507 (13,94852) 42 
LEVER 3,34826 (185,60427) 4,77345 (204,59659) 42 
ROA 378,09607 (42.549,49852) -12,54456 (293,28788) 42 
ΔREV -45,99885 (5.415,40090) 0,35141 (1.362,87742) 42 
RISK 0,37921 (185,60427) 0,25723 (204,59659) 41 
PROFIT 0,00463 (128,56460) 0,00000 (149,49673) 41 
SOLV 0,93292 (306,30066) 0,92237 (2.643,83442) 41 
COMPLEX 0,00230 (7,90543) 0,00010 (2.947,32786) 41 
ACCRUAL 883,00000 (2.785.058.240,00000) 0,00000 (17.299.709,39357) 41 
FCF -0,00843 (148,51485) 0,00000 (290,09445) 41 
IRISK 0,09493 (0,14827) 0,05466 (0,13583) 41 
 
   
 
                         CLUSTER 2 
Variable (s) Pre crisis period Crisis period Regression Equation 
EQ₁ 1,20480 (1,79400) 1,94221 (0,23383) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₂ 1,98117 (366,13579) 2,15694 (3,62458) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₃ 0,69830 (0,12550) 0,06288 (0,24588) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₄ 189,04120 (294,67424) 37,06603 (63,75815) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₅ 189,05010 (294,66818) 14,91213 (13,74274) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₆ 42,72452 (34,18607) 11,56243 (19,58890) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₇ 9,07381 (17,73054) 0,46587 (1,21752) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₈ 0,72947 (362,15035) 1,64340 (0,12208) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₉ -0,19944 (107,55657) -0,27808 (106,88760) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₁₀ 0,57332 (0,46190) 0,56297 (0,76872) 40, 42, 44, 46 
COSTOFEQUITY1 -4,55275 (420,01292) -1,94485 (372,23817) 43, 44 
COSTOFEQUITY₂ 0,18669 (0,86378) 0,19549 (1,14327) 43, 44 
COSTOFDEBT 0,00070 (1,31658) 0,00094 (0,09459) 45, 46 
AQ1 50.931,66192 (5.893.825,16176) 37.331,20995 (1.399.095,20763) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ6 0,00030 (0,00010) 0,00002 (0,00006) 41, 42 
INVPR1 6,43725 (0,21004) 5,93722 (0,29381) 41, 42 
INVPR2 6,33212 (0,46634) 6,10527 (0,52468) 41, 42 
INVPR3 5,05533 (0,34729) 5,10790 (0,35794) 41, 42 
INVPR4 6,05250 (0,13471) 5,58823 (0,26966) 41, 42 
INVPR5 5,58364 (0,17132) 5,25543 (0,22122) 41, 42 
INVPR6 5,72227 (0,24405) 5,06205 (0,38223) 41, 42 
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INVPR7 5,06511 (0,61277) 5,10590 (0,62295) 41, 42 
INVPR8 7,41644 (0,93680) 6,95934 (0,57230) 41, 42 
LEVER 61,56498 (1.101,07909) 6.850,75093 (1.691.124,87449) 40 
TOBINQ 12,27360 (1.085,26383) 5,12217 (378,05107) 40 
CORPSIZE 5,36687 (2,03850) 5,06704 (2,37773) 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46  
SV 1,53326 (1,30569) 6,69628 (10,57870) 40, 44 
CFOV 4,23362 (4,25239) 77,54710 (183,58835) 40, 42, 44 
LOC 243.399,40388 (3.219.091,70690) 323.525,72515 (5.030.586,72545) 40 
CORPROFIT -0,99944 (107,55657) -0,27808 (106,88760) 40 
CORPERFOR -0,09219 (6,00118) -0,91617 (199,29393) 40 
MASH 0,00094 (0,01284) 0,00115 (0,02453) 40 
CAPINT 0,23810 (6,69032) 9,98219 (1,22128) 40 
CORPEFFIC 0,87710 (2,01625) 0,83387 (12,52082) 40 
MCTR 3.472.898,70392 (78.760.665,16869) 3.119.620,27412 (799.433.520,15184) 40 
MULTIN 0,04741 (8,00300) -4,45177 (982,79220) 40 
DIVIDYIELD 5,63477 (496,20142) -4,30224 (52,51090) 40 
DEBT 0,81415 (65,93634) 8,04714 (4,85607) 40, 42, 43 
R 0,37937 (14,30238) -8,44943 (1.041,09472) 40 
R*DR 0,37937 (14,30238) -14,90653 (967,04341) 40 
BETA 0,23106 (0,38718) 0,21583 (0,37301) 40, 42, 43, 44 
ΔNI -1.712.866,05359 (64.870.466,17031) -95.775,13984 (130.953.771,72464) 40 
GDP 4,58355 (0,07337) 4,64785 (0,07675) 40 
MCAP 0,79482 (0,51034) 0,53039 (0,33485) 40 
HERF 0,05411 (0,10086) 0,17966 (1,38968) 40 
CRISK -0,09076 (8,30296) -0,05990 (7,10137) 45 
EG 7815,38887 (958009,04701) 847,11731 (85266,61796) 43 
DPO 0,96989 (77,76151) 0,99434 (101,03503) 43 
LNMV 2,45912 (2,23901) 1,75475 (2,39302) 43 
BM 0,27096 (13,12886) 3,61345 (6,28408) 41, 43, 44, 45 
VOLUME 189,11333 (3969,28895) 90,59559 (1611,22006) 43 
CFO -0,09219 (6,00118) -0,91617 (199,29393) 43, 46 
LNLEV -1,52023 (1,59706) -1,31931 (1,57836) 43 
LNBM -0,81168 (0,88675) -0,38547 (0,93312) 43 
LEVERAGE 0,81415 (65,93634) 1,02373 (56,46808) 41, 44, 45, 46 
COLLATERAL 0,46614 (0,27638) 0,42507 (4,60523) 44, 45 
NON-DEBT 0,03989 (0,08246) 0,04249 (0,32194) 44 
GROWTH 0,07533 (2,39147) 0,08396 (4,89553) 44 
UNIQUENESS 3,78024 (136,49393) 8,01891 (312,65593) 44 
PROFITABILITY -82,74952 (7.062,06122) 2.291,75379 (508.111,82962) 44, 45, 46 
LIQUIDITY 3,51975 (197,05728) 3,10182 (106,71092) 44 
INTCOV 0,08296 (118,92356) 0,69796 (82,65696) 45, 46 
LNNIBE 7,50321 (5,91370) 6,21970 (6,14999) 45, 46 
LNMVE 2,45912 (2,23901) 1,75475 (2,39302) 45 
EPS -63,58824 (9.097,39406) -0,78805 (745,29085) 46 
ΔEPS 19,69606 (2.131,27075) 4,88898 (950,79099) 46 
RND 0,25959 (2,44253) 0,25579 (0,42256) 46 
ΔRAV 9,18127 (1.246,55057) 0,09685 (8,81249) 42 
PPE 5,87031 (608,68144) 1,29075 (197,13450) 42 







CURRENT 2,89389 (9,03515) 3,19339 (20,07915) 42 
LEVER 387,46151 (48.937,03957) 2,20603 (130,19654) 42 
ROA -82,74952 (7.062,06122) 2.291,75379 (508.111,82962) 42 
ΔREV 4,02684 (1.159,71836) -17,35539 (3.513,85735) 42 
RISK 0,47574 (48.937,03957) 0,44121 (130,19654) 41 
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PROFIT 0,01440 (216,09933) 0,00065 (110,52824) 41 
SOLV 0,58580 (30.165,04422) 0,56141 (96,20383) 41 
COMPLEX 0,00027 (3,37438) 0,00002 (355,05686) 41 
ACCRUAL 0,00000 (637.289.664,38307) 0,00000 (325.557.758,16044) 41 
FCF 0,00000 (100.115,43948) 0,00000 (73.174,05769) 41 
IRISK 0,13316 (3,35895) 0,13870 (0,10033) 41 
 
   
 
                         CLUSTER 3 
Variable (s) Pre crisis period Crisis period Regression Equation 
EQ₁ 1,00224 (0,86711) 1,81918 (1,22759) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₂ 0,00124 (0,03245) 0,00141 (0,11605) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₃ 0,79142 (0,25238) 0,71751 (0,24811) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₄ 5,33738 (0,06318) 2,27862 (0,10122) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₅ 5,33112 (0,06247) 2,27062 (0,09517) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₆ 2,32850 (0,16726) 1,14606 (0,06326) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₇ 1,35409 (0,30865) 1,17300 (1,42998) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₈ 0,99962 (0,01807) 1,14289 (1,99891) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₉ 0,01183 (0,30431) -0,17650 (7,94656) 40, 42, 44, 46 
EQ₁₀ 1,19262 (0,27774) 1,09653 (0,52522) 40, 42, 44, 46 
COSTOFEQUITY1 -30,47627 (0,14711) -15,72832 (887,71247) 43, 44 
COSTOFEQUITY₂ 24,50089 (0,33654) 30,18324 (0,42556) 43, 44 
COSTOFDEBT 0,00039 (0,00552) 0,00047 (0,00549) 45, 46 
AQ1 16.334,14023 (35.857,68002) 14.963,75347 (305.149,25599) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ6 0,00045 (0,00079) 0,00029 (0,00053) 41, 42 
INVPR1 5,02097 (0,25031) 4,43364 (0,31781) 41, 42 
INVPR2 3,99839 (0,48918) 3,58529 (0,35299) 41, 42 
INVPR3 3,56613 (0,21252) 3,61896 (0,37379) 41, 42 
INVPR4 4,76290 (0,34144) 4,37064 (0,32898) 41, 42 
INVPR5 4,16774 (0,18993) 3,95827 (0,17632) 41, 42 
INVPR6 4,51290 (0,64709 ) 4,05246 (0,59754) 41, 42 
INVPR7 4,55806 (1,37174) 4,84303 (1,16669) 41, 42 
INVPR8 3,11290 (0,31655) 3,17283 (0,37816) 41, 42 
LEVER 73,88291 (300,50875) 76,32135 (248,61250) 40 
TOBINQ 0,94736 (0,94180) 0,68954 (1,18724) 40 
CORPSIZE 5,03811 (1,77750) 4,90369 (2,02437) 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46  
SV 0,56908 (0,12963) 0,58360 (0,14247) 40, 44 
CFOV 0,11181 (0,02848) 0,10970 (0,02679) 40, 42, 44 
LOC 8.272,17401 (33.329,82779) 9.970,97227 (39.776,82193) 40 
CORPROFIT 0,01183 (0,30431) -0,17650 (7,94657) 40 
CORPERFOR 0,03726 (0,11587) 0,03463 (0,12510) 40 
MASH 0,00403 (0,01217) 0,00434 (0,01369) 40 
CAPINT 0,11643 (1,89071) 0,10850 (1,05901) 40 
CORPEFFIC 0,71368 (0,58293) 0,65166 (0,74279) 40 
MCTR 98.838,26254 (656.244,24990) 99.405,45867 (660.839,54789) 40 
MULTIN 0,02737 (0,48357) -0,15411 (7,58280) 40 
DIVIDYIELD 1,69409 (3,33794) 2,32957 (2,98451) 40 
DEBT 0,28193 (0,29762) 0,34494 (1,12881) 40, 42, 43 
R 0,18589 (0,69237) -0,08001 (0,55785) 40 
R*DR -0,05561 (0,12083) -0,19821 (0,25082) 40 
BETA 0,62248 (0,39571) 0,59286 (0,38858) 40, 42, 43, 44 
ΔNI -37.885,00000 (375.331,28917) 20.946,95838 (600.017,45803) 40 
GDP 4,43366 (0,08262) 4,46842 (0,08770) 40 
MCAP 0,60887 (0,15448) 0,20808 (0,06182) 40 
HERF 0,03373 (0,01053) 0,03929 (0,01422) 40 
CRISK 0,03998 (0,10020) 0,03526 (0,10913) 45 
EG 64,92345 (581,09952) 30,05844 (661,70716) 43 
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DPO 2,05389 (63,39625) 0,92619 (29,21749) 43 
LNMV 10,59599 (4,58488) 10,00623 (4,42277) 43 
BM 0,57091 (1,39613) 1,05934 (7,74974) 41, 43, 44, 45 
VOLUME 5,23308 (36,63784) 2,49146 (6,20867) 43 
CFO 0,03726 (0,11587) 0,03463 (0,12510) 43, 46 
LNLEV -1,28069 (1,01709) -1,10143 (1,01078) 43 
LNBM -0,45312 (0,73443) 0,13996 (0,86856) 43 
LEVERAGE 0,28193 (0,29762) 0,34494 (1,12881) 41, 44, 45, 46 
COLLATERAL 0,45116 (0,24150) 0,40221 (0,24799) 44, 45 
NON-DEBT 0,03377 (0,03185) 0,03456 (0,03385) 44 
GROWTH 0,04285 (0,05771) 0,03371 (0,05092) 44 
UNIQUENESS 0,79320 (2,75549) 1,55076 (27,45551) 44 
PROFITABILITY 2,95363 (10,21219) -0,36699 (11,91367) 44, 45, 46 
LIQUIDITY 1,11804 (3,75996) 158,71792 (3.222,84557) 44 
INTCOV 0,02327 (3,82871) 80,18846 (3.652,26538) 45, 46 
LNNIBE 6,46701 (4,92801) 4,66094 (5,19500) 45, 46 
LNMVE 1,21306 (1,32240) 0,44763 (1,47560) 45 
EPS 3,67835 (163,62847) -25,98813 (1.172,18447) 46 
ΔEPS -1,76424 (69,72024) -0,49253 (1365,96069) 46 
RND 0,29892 (0,22139) 0,27465 (0,22733) 46 
ΔRAV 0,02892 (0,20384) 0,00095 (0,22252) 42 
PPE 0,40022 (2,24288) 0,28940 (0,52068) 42 
NI 271.202,89292 (1.238.356,55774) 208.223,32486 (1.331.052,24084) 
42 
TA -213.761,82213 (1.106.417,82794) -286.283,59538 (1.419.293,58157) 
42 
CURRENT 1,49938 (4,14564) 1,37697 (5,42298) 42 
LEVER 0,57371 (0,40064) 1,36862 (43,10612) 42 
ROA 2,95363 (10,21219) -0,36699 (11,91367) 42 
ΔREV 4,79854 (247,71507) -16,16154 (511,46812) 42 
RISK 0,60123 (0,40064) 0,60898 (43,10612) 41 
PROFIT 0,03252 (42,67497) 0,00000 (21,17049) 41 
SOLV 0,68552 (4,02143) 0,56600 (228.288,60771) 41 
COMPLEX 0,00132 (0,15112) 0,00028 (0,31669) 41 
ACCRUAL 95,50000 (5.001.435,91215) 0,00000 (2.281.300,22128) 41 
FCF 0,00000 (0,44323) 0,00000 (2,66521) 41 
IRISK 0,22495 (0,16460) 0,19561 (0,16206) 41 
Note: This panel presents the means of examining continuous variables in pre and crisis period for all clusters. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1. Standard deviation appears in the parentheses.          
   
 Panel B: Discrete variables 
 
                         CLUSTER 1 
Variable (s) Pre crisis period Crisis period Regression Equation 
AQ2 (=1) 665 (5,37%) 5.808 (27,13%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ3 (=1) 534 (4,31%) 1.710 (7,99%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ4 (=1) 7.980 (64,41%) 12.505 (58,41%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ5 (=1) 2.463 (19,88%) 4.796 (22,40%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
SICODE (=1) 1.314 (10,61%) 2.485 (11,61%) 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 
FIRM (=1) 6.199 (50,03%) 10.708 (50,01%) 43 
NER (=1) 4.603 (37,15%) 8.687 (40,57%) 44 
NEGEQ (=1) 605 (4,88%) 910 (4,25%) 45 
INCR (=1) 8.296 (66,96%) 13.720 (64,08%) 46 
PROFIT (=1) 7862 (63,45%) 12.906 (60,28%) 46 
SP (=1) 179 (1,44%) 286 (1,34%) 42 
LL (=1) 4.853 (36,99%) 8.607 (40,20%) 42 
LOSSES (=1) 4.589 (37,04%) 8.625 (40,28%) 41 
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LAGLOSS (=1) 4.603 (37,15%) 8.687 (40,57%) 40 
DR (=1) 3.922 (31,65%) 9.589 (44,79%) 40 
    
 
                         CLUSTER 2 
Variable (s) Pre crisis period Crisis period Regression Equation 
AQ2 (=1) 1.130 (3,23%) 1.832 (2,93%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ3 (=1) 693 (1,98%) 8.610 (13,76%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ4 (=1) 26.307 (75,15%) 44.564 (71,19%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ5 (=1) 7.314 (20,89%) 16.067 (25,67%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
SICODE (=1) 2.931 (8,37%) 4.985 (7,96%) 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 
FIRM (=1) 17.503 (50,01%) 31.300 (50,01%) 43 
NER (=1) 9.278 (26,51%) 20.826 (33,27%) 44 
NEGEQ (=1) 1.459 (4,17%) 2.577 (4,12%) 45 
INCR (=1) 23.543 (67,26%) 37.844 (60,46%) 46 
PROFIT (=1) 25.879 (73,93%) 42.055 (67,19%) 46 
SP (=1) 805 (2,30%) 1.867 (2,98%) 42 
LL (=1) 9.174 (26,21%) 20.625 (32,95%) 42 
LOSSES (=1) 9.202 (26,29%) 20.694 (33,06%) 41 
LAGLOSS (=1) 9.278 (26,51%) 20.826 (33,27%) 40 
DR (=1) 35.003 (99,99%) 29.514 (47,15%) 40 
    
 
                         CLUSTER 3 
Variable (s) Pre crisis period Crisis period Regression Equation 
AQ2 (=1) 18 (0,81%) 34 (0,98%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ3 (=1) 510 (22,85%) 650 (18,79%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ4 (=1) 1.221 (54,70%) 1.955 (56,50%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
AQ5 (=1) 269 (12,05%) 535 (15,46%) 41, 42, 43, 45 
SICODE (=1) 108 (4,84%) 175 (5,06%) 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 
FIRM (=1) 1.116  (50,00%) 1.730 (50,00%) 43 
NER (=1) 520 (23,30%) 1.388 (40,12%) 44 
NEGEQ (=1) 67 (3%) 188 (5,43%) 45 
INCR (=1) 1.496 (67,03%) 1.714 (49,54%) 46 
PROFIT (=1) 1.712 (76,70%) 2.076 (60,00%) 46 
SP (=1) 62 (2,78%) 97 (2,80%) 42 
LL (=1) 509 (22,80%) 1.381 (39,91%) 42 
LOSSES (=1) 509 (22,80%) 1.383 (39,97%) 41 
LAGLOSS (=1) 520 (23,30%) 1.388 (40,12%) 40 
DR (=1) 653 (29,26%) 1.851 (53,50%) 40 
Note: This panel presents the firm-year observations of each examining discrete variable that takes 1 in pre and crisis period for 
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Table 7: Regression analysis 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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CRISIS -2,081** R² 0,254 R² 0,807 
 






F test 791,28**     
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in ex post conservatism (EQ1) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.    
**, * indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 































































SICODE 0,005** MCAP 10,648** ΔNI 0,0000** 
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R² 0,012 R² 0,035 CRISIS -0,005 
F test 16,161** F test 0,631** 
 
(0,007) 
   
 
R² 0,020 
      F test 0,458** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in ex ante conservatism (EQ2) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
      







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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R² 0,259 MCAP -0,045** HERF -10,256** 














CRISIS 0,021** R² 0,660 
  
(0,001) F test 423,461** 
  
R² 0,696 
      F test 7.117,249**     
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in value relevance (EQ3) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
** indicate statistical significance at 5% level (two-tailed) and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
  







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 














CFOV -0,002** CFOV 0,243** CFOV -0,547** 
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(1,904) F test 936,254** 



































F test 711,939** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in accruals quality (EQ4) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
** indicate statistical significance at 5% level (two-tailed) and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
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Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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R² 0,192 CRISIS -45,014** R² 0,534 
F test 308,153** 
 






F test 4.007,593** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in accruals quality (EQ5) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
** indicate statistical significance at 5% level (two-tailed) and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
      







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 































































R*DR 1,038** GDP -427,978** CRISIS -0,192** 
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(1,899) F test 730,185** 



























F test 553,028** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in accruals quality (EQ6) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
** indicate statistical significance at 5% level (two-tailed) and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
      







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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(0,692) F test 76,948** 








R² 0,723 HERF -0,460** 
 
 


















F test 745,099** 
 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in earnings persistence (EQ7) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
** indicate statistical significance at 5% level (two-tailed) and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
  
    







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 







CORPSIZE 0,726** SV -2,912** TOBINQ -0,002** 
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CRISIS -40,539** R² 0,260 R² 0,297 
 
(0,437) F test 1.090,928** F test 91,986** 
R² 0,258 
    F test 451,630** 
    Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in earnings predictability (EQ8) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
** indicate statistical significance at 5% level (two-tailed) and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
  
  







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 































































HERF 3,210** HERF -0,0000** BETA 0,0000** 
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R² 0,739 R² 1,000 GDP -0,0000** 








   
(0,000) 





F test 1.830,473** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in loss avoidance (EQ9) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  
  







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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R² 0,491 HERF 0,040** CRISIS 0,112** 







CRISIS 0,305** R² 0,159 
  
(0,007) F test 41,192** 
  
R² 0,189 
      F test 724,129**     
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in earnings smoothness (EQ10) for all clusters in pre and crisis period. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
** indicate statistical significance at 5% level (two-tailed) and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses.  







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 







ACCRUAL 0,000***  ACCRUAL 0,000***  IRISK -70.802,058**  
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 (0,000)  (0,0000)  (29.231,274) 
LOSSES -5.023,572**  R² 0,000 LOSSES -20.160,77**  




F test 16.452,782*** 
 
F test 1,929** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on audit fees (AQ1) for all clusters. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1.  
****, ** indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5%  levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
CRISIS 0,182***  CRISIS 0,192**  INVPR2 0,019***  
 (0,003)  (0,086) 
 
0,006 














































(0,001)  0,005 
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(0,001)  0,0000 




(0,006)  0,008 











(0,007) F test 8,309*** 






























COMPLEX 0,0000**  RISK 0,0000***  
  
 (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
  
ACCRUAL 0,0000**  PROFIT 0,0000***   
 
 (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
 
IRISK -0,187***  ACCRUAL 0,0000**  
   (0,012)  (0,0000) 
  LEVERAGE 0,000**  IRISK 0,001***  
   (0,0000)  (0,000) 
  LOSSES -0,031***  LEVERAGE 0,000***  
 
 (0,003)  (0,0000)  
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R² 0,406 LOSSES 0,069***   
 
F test 1.007,198***  (0,001)  
 
  
R² 0,058  
 
  
F test 215,382***  
 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on audit report opinion (AQ2) for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
CRISIS 0,031***  CRISIS 1,155***  CRISIS -0,062***  
 (0,003)  (0,143)  (0,011) 














































(0,004)  (0,000) 
CORPSIZE -0,017***  INVPR8 -0,003***  SICODE 0,042*  
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(0,001)  (0,023) 
RISK 0,0000**  CRISIS*INVPR1 0,301***  PROFIT -0,000***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,010)  (0,000) 
SICODE 0,012***  CRISIS*INVPR2 -0,055***  FCF 0,038***  
 (0,004) 
 
(0,014)  (0,011) 
PROFIT 0,0000*  CRISIS*INVPR3 0,054***  IRISK 0,101***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,011)  (0,033) 
IRISK 0,051***  CRISIS*INVPR4 -0,081***  LEVERAGE -0,015**  
 (0,010) 
 
(0,013)  (0,007) 




(0,028)  (0,000) 
R² 0,037 CRISIS*INVPR6 -0,178***  LOSSES 0,067***  






CRISIS*INVPR7 0,038***  R² 0,153 
   
(0,005) F test 45,841*** 
  
CRISIS*INVPR8 -0,027***  
  





































R² 0,114  
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F test 447,528***  
 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on auditor switch (AQ3) for all clusters. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
CRISIS -0,037***  CRISIS -3,703***  CRISIS 1,015***  
 (0,005)  (0,210)  (0,319) 
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(0,042)  (0,022) 




(0,042)  (0,000) 




(0,014)  (0,018) 




(0,007)  (0,0000) 
SICODE -0,072***  CRISIS*INVPR8 0,067***  IRISK -0,459***  
 (0,008) 
 
(0,005)  (0,032) 
ACCRUAL 0,0000**  CORPSIZE 0,061***  LEVERAGE -0,028***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,000)  (0,009) 
IRISK -0,333***  RISK 0,0000**  BM -0,002**  
 (0,017)  (0,0000)  (0,001) 
BM -0,000**  SICODE -0,026***  LOSSES -0,106***  
 (0,000)  (0,004)  (0,010) 
LOSSES -0,261***  ACCRUAL 0,0000***  R² 0,482 
 (0,005)  (0,0000) F test 230,991*** 
R² 0,189 IRISK -0,001**  
  F test 343,371***  (0,000) 
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R² 0,163  
 
  
F test 677,566*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on status of audit firm (AQ4) for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
CRISIS 0,058***  CRISIS 0,086***  CRISIS 0,048***  
 (0,003)  (0,002)  (0,008) 





















































(0,003)  (0,000) 
CRISIS*INVPR1 -0,344***  CRISIS*INVPR1 -0,060***  SICODE 0,035**  
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(0,013)  (0,018) 




(0,018)  (0,0000) 




(0,015)  (0,0000) 




(0,017)  (0,008) 




(0,036)  (0,025) 




(0,037)  (0,006) 




(0,006)  (0,000) 
SICODE -0,031***  CRISIS*INVPR8 0,021***  LOSSES -0,090***  
 (0,005) 
 
(0,004)  (0,008) 
ACCRUAL 0,0000***  CORPSIZE 0,090***  R² 0,331 
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,000) F test 123,444*** 
IRISK -0,364***  SICODE -0,034***  
   (0,012)  (0,004) 
  
LOSSES -0,216***  SOLV 0,0000**  
   (0,003)  (0,000) 
  R² 0,444 ACCRUAL 0,0000***  
 
F test 1.175,039***  (0,0000)  
 
  




   
 




 (0,0000)  
 
  
LOSSES -0,172***  
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F test 1.464,505*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on audit committee existence (AQ5) for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
CRISIS 0,0000***  CRISIS 0,000***  CRISIS -0,000***  
 (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
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(0,0000)  (0,0000) 




(0,0000)  (0,0000) 




(0,0000)  (0,0000) 
SICODE 0,0000***  CRISIS*INVPR7 0,0000***  ACCRUAL 0,0000***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,0000)  (0,0000) 
ACCRUAL 0,0000***  CRISIS*INVPR8 0,0000***  FCF 0,000***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,0000)  (0,0000) 
IRISK -0,000***  CORPSIZE 0,0000***  IRISK -0,000***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,0000)  (0,0000) 
LOSSES -0,000***  RISK 0,0000***  LEVERAGE 0,0000*  
 (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
R² 0,608 SICODE 0,0000***  BM 0,0000**  
F test 2.279,319***  (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
  
ACCRUAL 0,0000***  LOSSES -0,000***  
  
 (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
 
 
FCF 0,0000***  R² 0,531 
 
 
 (0,0000) F test 281,597*** 
 
 
LEVERAGE 0,0000**  










 (0,0000)  
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F test 1.533,806*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of financial crisis of 2008 and investor protection on demand for auditing (AQ6) for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
            







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 



















CORPSIZE 0,005***  INVPR4 1,257***  ΔRAV -0,004**  
 (0,000) 
 
(0,184)  (0,001) 
CFOV -0,008***  INVPR5 1,804***  PPE 0,020***  
 (0,000) 
 
(0,399)  (0,007) 
DEBT 0,012***  INVPR6 -0,714***  LL -0,111**  
 (0,004) 
 
(0,274)  (0,047) 
BETA -0,029***  INVPR8 0,517***  CORPSIZE 0,045***  
 (0,003) 
 
(0,039)  (0,014) 
SICODE -0,000**  NI 0,0000**  CFOV 5,397***  
 (0,000)  (0,0000)  (0,632) 
LEVER 0,325***  CURRENT 0,002**  DEBT 0,296**  
 (0,004)  (0,001)  (0,116) 
R² 0,752 SP -0,173***  LEVER -0,178*  
F test 1213,546***  (0,062)  (0,094) 
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LL 0,130***  ROA -0,004**  
  
 (0,023)  (0,002) 
  
CORPSIZE 0,056***  R² 0,281 
  
 (0,005) F test 24,436*** 
  







































F test 98,730*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on ex post conservatism (EQ1) in pre crisis period for all clusters. 
For variable defintions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
R² 0,341 AQ2 -61,085***  INVPR6 -0,002*  
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BETA -24,877***  BETA -0,003*  
  
 (5,716)  (0,001) 
  
R² 0,0000 R² -0,009 
  
F test 0,989 F test 0,428 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on ex ante conservatism (EQ2) in pre crisis period for all clusters. 
For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
























































AQ3*INVPR5 0,897***  INVPR4 0,452***  AQ4*INVPR6 0,726***  
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CORPSIZE 0,008***  AQ2*INVPR2 -0,063*  PPE -0,002**  
 (0,001) 
 
(0,035)  (0,000) 
CFOV 0,021***  AQ2*INVPR3 0,104***  NI 0,0000*  
 (0,000) 
 
(0,037)  (0,0000) 
BETA 0,014***  AQ2*INVPR7 0,036**  CURRENT 0,002*  
 (0,004) 
 
(0,014)  (0,001) 
ΔREV 0,0000*  AQ3* INVPR5 68,351***  SP -0,030**  
 (0,0000) 
 
(7,589)  (0,015) 
R² 0,334 AQ3*INVPR6 22,863*** LL 0,029**  
F test 200,974*** 
 
 (2,222)  (0,014) 
  
AQ4*INVPR1 -0,116***  CORPSIZE -0,004**  
   
(0,012)  (0,001) 
  
AQ4*INVPR2 -0,014**  CFOV 2,183***  
   
(0,006)  (0,173) 
  
AQ4*INVPR3 0,026***  DEBT -0,180***  
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(0,007)  (0,031) 
  
AQ4*INVPR4 0,675***  BETA 0,093***  
   
(0,012)  (0,012) 
  
AQ4*INVPR5 -0,390***  SICODE 0,053**  
   
(0,010)  (0,022) 
  
AQ4*INVPR6 -0,382***  LEVER 0,062**  
   
(0,014)  (0,025) 
  
AQ4*INVPR7 0,008***  ROA 0,000*  
   
(0,002)  (0,000) 
  
AQ4*INVPR8 0,010***  ΔREV 0,0000*  
   
(0,002)  (0,0000) 
  
AQ5*INVPR3 -0,037***  R² 0,887 
   
(0,008) F test 531,653*** 
  
AQ5*INVPR4 -0,088***  
  




AQ5*INVPR5 0,135***  
  




AQ5*INVPR6 0,037**  
  




AQ5*INVPR7 -0,017***    




AQ5*INVPR8 -0,018***    




AQ6*INVPR3 -208,924***    




AQ6*INVPR6 -188,280***    




AQ6*INVPR7 -99,415***    
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AQ6*INVPR8 58,088***    























































F test 835,446*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on value relevance (EQ3) in pre crisis period for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
AQ2 -0,983***  AQ2 46,359***  AQ2 -0,054***  
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly


































































































NI 0,0000**  AQ2*INVPR7 -41,713**  AQ6*INVPR4 32,301***  
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly








SP -0,437*  AQ2*INVPR8 116,737***  PPE 0,001**  
 (0,258) 
 
(20,531)  (0,0000) 
LL 0,300***  AQ3*INVPR5 -0,589*** CFOV -0,595***  
 (0,071) 
 
(0,001)  (0,048) 
CORPSIZE 0,164***  AQ4*INVPR1 -359,765***  R² 0,201 
 (0,019) 
 
(22,758) F test 18,036*** 




















R² 0,378 AQ4*INVPR6 852,337***    





AQ4*INVPR7 -114,837***    




AQ4*INVPR8 -35,600***    




AQ5*INVPR2 -116,816***    




AQ5*INVPR3 15,334***    




AQ5*INVPR4 -94,853***    




AQ5*INVPR5 -71,184**    
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AQ5*INVPR6 109,030***    




AQ5*INVPR7 34,222***    




AQ5*INVPR8 33,410***    




AQ6*INVPR2 -578.511,950***    




AQ6*INVPR3 -307.130,259***    




AQ6*INVPR6 376.661,839***    




AQ6*INVPR7 -121.988,390***    




AQ6*INVPR8 59.768,252***    


































CFOV -72,260***  
  
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly














































F test 3.241,411*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on accruals quality by Dehow et al (1995) (EQ4) in pre crisis 
period for all clusters. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 





















AQ3*INVPR3 -0,110***  AQ6 11.650,810***  AQ3*INVPR6 0,137***  
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SP -0,142*  INVPR8 24,790***  ΔRAV 0,000*  
 (0,086) 
 
(0,580)  (0,000) 
LL 0,081***  AQ1*INVPR4 0,0000*  PPE -0,003**  
 (0,023) 
 
(0,0000)  (0,001) 
CORPSIZE 0,043***  AQ1*INVPR7 0,0000**  LL 0,020**  
 (0,006) 
 
(0,0000)  (0,008) 
CFOV 0,115***  AQ1*INVPR8 0,0000**  CORPSIZE -0,004*  
 (0,002) 
 
(0,0000)  (0,002) 
DEBT 0,068***  AQ2*INVPR7 -4,375*  CFOV -3,762***  
 (0,021) 
 
(2,515)  (0,112) 
R² 0,167 AQ2*INVPR8 11,062***  DEBT -0,084***  
F test 81,217*** 
 
(3,109)  (0,021) 
  
AQ3*INVPR2 22,185**  BETA 0,021***  
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(9,477)  (0,008) 
  
AQ3*INVPR3 24,850**  SICODE 0,026*  
   
(10,235)  (0,014) 
  
AQ3*INVPR4 -57,603***  LEVER 0,043**  
   
(13,156)  (0,017) 
  
AQ3*INVPR7 11,300***  ROA 0,000**  
   
(3,845)  (0,000) 
  
AQ3*INVPR8 6,386**  ΔREV 0,0000*  
   
(2,811)  (0,0000) 
  
AQ4*INVPR1 -102,197***  R² 0,387 
   
(3,446) F test 43,599*** 
  
AQ4*INVPR2 9,984***  
  




AQ4*INVPR3 -10,996***    




AQ4*INVPR4 75,249***    




AQ4*INVPR5 -137,825***    




AQ4*INVPR6 175,534***    




AQ4*INVPR7 -3,890***    




AQ4*INVPR8 -5,969***    




AQ5*INVPR2 8,330***    




AQ5*INVPR3 9,757***    
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AQ5*INVPR4 -17,100***    




AQ5*INVPR5 14,128**    




AQ5*INVPR6 -23,047***    




AQ5*INVPR7 2,291**    




AQ5*INVPR8 5,363***    




AQ6*INVPR8 13.759,528*    














































LEVER 0,0000**  
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F test 629,996*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on accruals quality by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) in pre crisis period 
for all clusters. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 














ΔRAV 0,0000** AQ4  262,738***  AQ5  -0,211***  

















SP -0,355* INVPR1 694,371***  AQ3*INVPR6 0,017*  











CORPSIZE 0,130*** INVPR3 -622,274***  AQ4*INVPR6 0,020**  
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CFOV 0,423*** INVPR4 208,104***  AQ5*INVPR2 0,079*** 

















R² 0,262 INVPR7 -37,866*** AQ6*INVPR2 -28,980** 






INVPR8 215,765***  AQ6*INVPR4 29,946** 





AQ2*INVPR3 -157,282***  PPE 0,000*  
  
 
(56,863)  (0,000) 
  
AQ2*INVPR7 -41,729**  CFOV -0,599***  
  
 
(16,608)  (0,048) 
  
AQ2*INVPR8 116,699***  R² 0,186 
  
 
(20,529) F test 16,483*** 
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  (0,155) 
  
  







































  (5,030) 
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  (0,0000) 
  
  















F test 3.241,794*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on accruals quality by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) in pre crisis 
period for all clusters. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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 (1,442)  (0,000) 
PPE 0,000*  INVPR7 1,589***  NI 0,0000** 
 (0,000) 
 
(0,294)   (0,0000) 
NI 0,0000*  INVPR8 -12,411***  LL -0,029** 
 (0,0000) 
 
(0,208)   (0,013) 
CURRENT 0,001***  AQ2*INVPR3 8,898**  CORPSIZE 0,008*  
 (0,000) 
 
(3,637)  (0,004) 
LL -0,031** AQ2*INVPR7 2,350**  CFOV -6,834***  
  (0,012) 
 
(1,062)  (0,184) 
CORPSIZE -0,012*** AQ2*INVPR8 -6,545***  DEBT -0,130*** 
  (0,003) 
 
(1,313)   (0,038) 
CFOV -0,067***  AQ4*INVPR1 17,198*** BETA 0,056*** 
 (0,001) 
 
 (1,455)   (0,015) 
DEBT -0,031***  AQ4*INVPR2 -4,153*** SICODE 0,072***  
 (0,011) 
 
 (0,631)  (0,027) 
BETA 0,065***  AQ4*INVPR3 2,923***  LEVER 0,074** 
 (0,012) 
 
(0,763)   (0,031) 
SICODE -0,088*** AQ4*INVPR5 26,945***  ROA -0,001**  
  (0,021) 
 
(1,229)  (0,000) 
ROA 0,0000**  AQ4*INVPR6 -47,398***  R² 0,518 
 (0,0000) 
 
(1,698) F test 73,574*** 
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R² 0,384 AQ4*INVPR7 6,074***  




























































































  (0,0000) 
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  (0,009) 
  
  















  (0,029) 
  
  









  (0,000) 
  
  

































F test 2.020,214*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection onearnings persistence (EQ7) in pre crisis period for all clusters. 
For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
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Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 






































































ΔRAV 0,0000** INVPR6 281,880*** AQ4*INVPR2 -0,034*** 











NI 0,0000***  INVPR8 265,307*** AQ4*INVPR7 0,004***  
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DEBT 3,220*** AQ3*INVPR3 114,692* AQ6*INVPR7 2,231* 





BETA -2,201**  AQ3*INVPR4 -301,849*** NI 0,0000* 
 (0,914) 
 
 (108,027)   (0,0000) 
SICODE 3,424**  AQ3*INVPR7 46,494*  LL -0,001* 
 (1,552) 
 
(23,993)   (0,001) 
R² 0,087 AQ3*INVPR8 34,444* CORPSIZE 0,000***  
F test 39,121*** 
 
 (17,545)  (0,000) 
  
AQ4*INVPR1 -412,051***  CFOV 0,075*** 
   
(28,298)   (0,013) 
  
AQ4*INVPR2 9,961***  BETA 0,003***  
  
 
(10,955)  (0,001) 
  
AQ4*INVPR3 -65,133***  ROA -0,000* 
  
 
(13,236)   (0,0000) 
  
AQ4*INVPR4 75,238***  ΔREV 0,0000** 
  
 
(27,803)   (0,0000) 
  
AQ4*INVPR5 -604,788*** R² 0,253 
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  (11,929) 
  
  













































  (0,000) 
  
  









F test 3.057,250*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings predictability (EQ8) in pre crisis period for all clusters. 
For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
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***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 






CORPSIZE 0,153*** INVPR1 -12,825*  AQ5  -0,436* 





DEBT -0,832***  CORPSIZE 0,344***  INVPR6 -0,024*** 
 (0,126)  (0,124) 
 
 (0,008) 
R² 0,009 DEBT -1,703*** AQ3*INVPR7 0,027*  




SICODE -1,254* AQ5*INVPRr2 0,147* 
  
















R² 0,877 ΔRAV 0,020*** 
  
F test 4719,904***   (0,000) 




  (0,013) 
    
CORPSIZE 0,011*** 
    
  (0,004) 
    
DEBT 0,382*** 
    
  (0,029) 
    
LEVER -0,387***  
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 (0,024) 
    
ROA 0,020***  
    
 (0,000) 
    
ΔREV 0,0000*  
    
 (0,0000) 
    
R² 0,542 
    
F test 81,016*** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on loss avoidance (EQ9) in pre crisis period for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
*** and * indicate statistical significance at 1% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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NI 0,0000** INVPR8 -0,052*** AQ5*INVPR7 0,187***  











LL -0,013** AQ1*INVPR8 0,0000* AQ6*INVPR2 -50,305** 











CFOV -0,028*** AQ2*INVPR3 0,355***  ΔRAV 0,000*  
  (0,000) 
 
(0,113)  (0,000) 
BETA 0,011**  AQ2*INVPR7 0,090***  PPE -0,003*  
 (0,005) 
 
(0,033)  (0,001) 
R² 0,149 AQ2*INVPR8 0,074*  LL 0,023**  
F test 70,716*** 
 
(0,043)  (0,011) 
  
AQ3*INVPR6 -0,852*** CORPSIZE -0,013***  
  
 
(0,011)  (0,003) 
  
AQ3*INVPR8 -7,589*** CFOV 7,481***  
  
 
(0,189)  (0,155) 
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AQ4*INVPR1 0,669***  DEBT 0,066**  
  
 
(0,045)  (0,030) 
  
AQ4*INVPR2 0,044* BETA -0,056***  
  
 
 (0,024)  (0,011) 
  
AQ4*INVPR3 0,456***  ROA 0,000*  
  
 
(0,020)  (0,000) 
  
AQ4*INVPR4 0,148***  ΔREV 0,0000**  
  
 
(0,044)  (0,0000) 
  
AQ4*INVPR5 -1,504***  R² 0,575 
  
 
(0,038) F test 92,447*** 
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F test 578,744*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on earnings smoothness (EQ10) in pre crisis period for all clusters. 
For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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 (0,024)  (0,0000) 




 (0,018)  (0,0000) 




(0,020)  (0,003) 




(0,006)  (0,009) 




(0,004)   (0,013) 
ΔRAV 0,0000**  NI 0,0000***  CFOV 14,590***  
 (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,457) 
NI 0,0000***  CURRENT 0,000*  DEBT -0,058**  
 (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,023) 
CURRENT 0,0000**  SP -0,034***  BETA 0,574***  
 (0,0000)  (0,005)  (0,051) 
LL -0,042**  LL 0,011***  SICODE 0,160*  
 (0,018)  (0,001)  (0,087) 
CORPSIZE -0,023*** CORPSIZE -0,003***  LEVER 0,001*  
  (0,006)  (0,000)  (0,000) 
CFOV -0,003***  CFOV 0,000***  R² 0,974 
 (0,000)  (0,0000) F test 1.849,630*** 
DEBT -0,000*** BETA -0,061***  
    (0,000)  (0,002) 
  BETA 0,029*  SICODE 0,010***  
   (0,016)  (0,002) 
  SICODE -0,0369*** ROA 0,0000***  
    (0,027)  (0,0000) 
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LEVER 0,000***  R² 0,345 
   (0,0000) F test 507,066*** 
  ΔREV 0,0000*  
    
 (0,0000) 
    
R² 0,704 
    
F test 863,393*** 
    
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on ex post conservatism (EQ1) in crisis period for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 













R² -0,002 INVPR2 -16.603,518***  R² -0,003 
F test 0,282 
 
(5.061,487) F test 0,614 
  
INVPR4 39.248,335**  
  




INVPR7 -12.096,693*   




AQ5*INVPR2 -62.968,925***    




AQ5*INVPR4 143.565,768***  
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AQ5*INVPR7 -20.507,933*   




AQ6*INVPR5 683.679.813,708*    




AQ6*INVPR7 -244.652.460,679***   







  (0,000) 
  
  



























F test 2.790,105*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on ex ante conservatism (EQ2) in crisis period for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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NI 0,0000***  ΔRAV 0,000**  AQ6*INVPR8 504,996***  
 (0,0000)  (0,000) 
 
(55,110) 
TA 0,0000*  PPE 0,0000*  ΔRAV 0,0000***  
 (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
CURRENT 0,000**  NI 0,0000**  PPE -0,022* 
 (0,000)  (0,0000)   (0,012) 
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LL -0,003***  CURRENT -0,000**  NI 0,0000***  
 (0,001)  (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
CORPSIZE -0,001***  SP 0,016***  LL -0,006*** 
 (0,000)  (0,002)   (0,002) 
CFOV 0,000***  LL -0,003***  CORPSIZE 0,001**  
 (0,0000)  (0,001)  (0,000) 
BETA 0,002**  CORPSIZE 0,000***  CFOV 5,015***  
 (0,000)  (0,000)  (0,099) 
SICODE 0,107***  CFOV -0,001***  DEBT -0,013***  
 (0,008)  (0,0000)  (0,004) 
LEVER 0,0000***  DEBT 0,0000***  BETA -0,003* 
 (0,0000)  (0,0000)   (0,002) 
ΔREV 0,0000**  BETA 0,017***  SICODE -0,039**  
 (0,0000)  (0,001)  (0,018) 
R² 0,970 SICODE -0,003**  LEVER 0,000*  
F test 11.698,319***  (0,001)  (0,000) 
  
ROA 0,0000***  ROA -0,000* 
  
 (0,0000)   (0,000) 
  
R² 0,817 R² 0,970 
  
F test 4.299,941*** F test 1.592,295*** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on value relevance (EQ3) in crisis period for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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(0,120)  (0,005) 




 (1.672,311)  (0,004) 




 (5.383,625)  (0,000) 




(5.086,030)  (0,099) 




(3661,591)  (0,001) 
AQ6*INVPR8 -604,289***  NI 0,0000**  BETA -0,007*  
 
(67,168)  (0,0000)  (0,004) 
ΔRAV 0,0000***  CURRENT 0,001*  LEVER -0,000*  
 (0,0000)  (0,001)  (0,0000) 
NI 0,0000***  SP -0,815***  R² 0,844 
 (0,0000)  (0,115) F test 267,855*** 
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CURRENT 0,001**  LL 0,136***  
   (0,000)  (0,043) 
  LL -0,097*** CORPSIZE 0,086***  
    (0,024)  (0,010) 
  CORPSIZE -0,004*  CFOV 0,332***  
   (0,002)  (0,000) 
  CFOV -0,004***  DEBT 0,0000***  
   (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
  BETA 0,019***  BETA -6,703***  
   (0,005)  (0,091) 
  SICODE 0,229***  SICODE 0,351***  
   (0,033)  (0,070) 
  LEVER 0,0000***  ROA 0,0000***  
   (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
  R² 0,936 R² 0,995 
  F test 5.285,553*** F test 175.197,705*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on  accruals quality by Dechow et al (1995) (EQ4) in crisis period 
for all clusters. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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ΔRAV 0,0000***  AQ6*INVPR4 6.460,142***  NI 0,0000*  
 (0,0000) 
 
(1.515,667)  (0,0000) 
PPE -0,000*  AQ6*INVPR5 -6.786,499*** SP -0,011** 
 (0,0000) 
 
 (1.431,884)   (0,005) 
CURRENT 0,001***  AQ6*INVPR6 -4.467,277***  CORPSIZE 0,000***  
 (0,000) 
 
(1.030,858)  (0,000) 
SP -0,105***  AQ6*INVPR7 1.933,090***  CFOV 1,449***  
 (0,038) 
 
(323,306)  (0,037) 
LL 0,101***  AQ6*INVPR8 2.624,086***  ROA 0,000*  
 (0,010) 
 
(447,030)  (0,0000) 
CORPSIZE 0,020***  ΔRAV 0,001*  R² 0,935 
 (0,003)  (0,000) F test 714,402*** 
CFOV -0,002***  NI 0,0000***  
   (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
  
BETA 0,045***  CURRENT 0,000*  
   (0,008)  (0,000) 
  SICODE 0,352***  SP -0,246***  
   (0,014)  (0,046) 
  LEVER 0,0000***  LL -0,022*  
   (0,0000)  (0,012) 
  R² 0,898 CORPSIZE 0,014***  
  F test 3.187,785***  (0,002) 
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  (0,015) 
  
  















F test 208.833,957*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on  accruals quality by McNichols (2002) (EQ5) in crisis period for 
all clusters. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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ΔRAV 0,0000***  AQ6*INVPR5 11.570,270**  PPE 0,018***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(5.292,802)  (0,004) 
NI 0,0000**  AQ6*INVPR6 20.826,074***  LL 0,014***  
 (0,0000) 
 
(3.810,452)  (0,004) 
CURRENT 0,002***  AQ6*INVPR8 4.079,123**  CORPSIZE 0,001**  
 (0,000) 
 
(1.652,398)  (0,000) 
LL -0,015**  NI 0,0000*  CFOV 1,771***  
 (0,006)  (0,0000)  (0,085) 
CORPSIZE -0,008*** TA 0,0000*  DEBT 0,002**  
  (0,002)  (0,0000)  (0,001) 
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CFOV -0,002*** CURRENT 0,001*  BETA -0,009** 
  (0,0000)  (0,001)   (0,004) 
BETA -0,124*** SP -0,826*** R² 0,849 
  (0,018)   (0,120) F test 278,983*** 
SICODE 0,291***  LL 0,114**  
   (0,030)  (0,045) 
  
LEVER 0,000***  CORPSIZE 0,089***  
  
 (0,0000)  (0,010) 
  
ΔREV 0,0000*  CFOV 0,049***  
  
 (0,0000)  (0,000) 
  
R² 0,916 DEBT 0,0000***  
  
F test 3.962,711***  (0,0000) 
  
  





















F test 6.595,349*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on  accruals quality by Kothari et al (2005) (EQ6) in crisis period 
for all clusters. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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AQ5*INVPR4 0,252***  NI 0,0000**  AQ6*INVPR7 -293,968*** 
 
(0,081)  (0,0000) 
 
 (96,917) 
AQ5*INVPR5 -0,283** SP 0,191***  AQ6*INVPR8 470,126**  
 
 (0,112)  (0,027) 
 
(225,987) 
AQ6*INVPR2 -1.601,273***  CORPSIZE 0,004**  PPE 0,312***  
 
(142,278)  (0,002)  (0,070) 
AQ6*INVPR3 -1.397,166***  CFOV 0,002***  CORPSIZE -0,013*** 
 
(99,316)  (0,000)   (0,004) 
AQ6*INVPR7 192,015***  BETA 0,120***  CFOV -6,610*** 
 
(50,878)  (0,013)   (0,867) 
AQ6*INVPR8 711,615***  SICODE -0,033**  BETA 0,131***  
 
(52,685)  (0,016)  (0,018) 
ΔRAV 0,0000**  ROA 0,0000***  R² 0,931 
 (0,0000)  (0,0000) F test 669,520*** 
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CURRENT -0,000*** R² 0,137 
    (0,000) F test 153,787*** 
  LL -0,055*** 
      (0,008) 
    CORPSIZE 0,002***  
     (0,001) 
    CFOV -0,005*** 
      (0,0000) 
    BETA 0,017***  
     (0,004) 
    SICODE -0,170*** 
      (0,011) 
    LEVER 0,0000***  
     (0,0000) 
    R² 0,939 
    F test 5.614,784*** 
  
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on  accruals quality by  earnings persistence (EQ7)  in crisis period 
for all clusters. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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(83,631)  (0,094) 
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CURRENT 0,001**  AQ6*INVPR7 -63,624**  LL 0,217***  
 (0,000) 
 
(26,229)  (0,079) 
LL 0,137***  AQ6*INVPR8 -99,181***  CORPSIZE -0,010**  
 (0,013) 
 
(36,266)  (0,005) 
CORPSIZE 0,015***  NI 0,0000***  CFOV -17,279***  
 (0,004)  (0,0000)  (0,958) 
CFOV 0,004***  CURRENT -0,000*** BETA 0,066***  
 (0,0000)   (0,0000)  (0,020) 
BETA 0,033***  SP 0,011***  LEVER 0,002**  
 (0,004)  (0,002)  (0,001) 
SICODE 0,182***  LL -0,002** ROA 0,006**  
 (0,019)   (0,001)  (0,003) 
LEVER 0,0000***  CORPSIZE 0,000***  R² 0,957 
 (0,0000)  (0,000) F test 1.099,419*** 
R² 0,988 CFOV 0,0000***  
  F test 29.792,186***  (0,0000) 
  
  









  (0,001) 
  
  















F test 276,140*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on  earnings predictability (EQ8)  in crisis period for all clusters. 
For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 








































LL -1,400** AQ2*INVPR7 -31,477***  AQ2*INVPRr8 -0,553* 























R² 0,247 AQ4*INVPR6 -18,939***  ΔRAV 0,396***  
F test 120,006*** 
 
(6,964)  (0,036) 
  
AQ4*INVPR7 6,647*  PPE -0,134*** 
   
(3,541)   (0,015) 
  
CURRENT 0,159***  CURRENT -0,001* 
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 (0,021)   (0,000) 
  
LL -4,088*** SP -0,054* 
  
  (1,013)   (0,031) 
  
CFOV 0,010**  LL 0,084***  
  
 (0,004)  (0,013) 
  
LEVER -0,024*** CORPSIZE 0,216***  
  
  (0,003)  (0,003) 
  
R² 0,003 CFOV -0,687** 
  




    
  (0,006) 
    
LEVER -0,018***  
    
 (0,000) 
    
ROA 0,019***  
    
 (0,000) 
    
R² 0,999 
    
F test 37.728,507*** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on  loss avoidance (EQ9)  in crisis period for all clusters. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 














AQ4  0,120***  AQ6 -124,740**  INVPR2 1,938***  
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AQ2*INVPR6 0,857**  AQ2*INVPR7 0,140**  AQ3*INVPR2 -7,033** 
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AQ6*INVPR5 -694,937**  AQ5*INVPR7 -0,126*** AQ5*INVPR7 0,163***  
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CFOV 0,004***  NI 0,0000***  AQ6*INVPR8 478,678***  
 (0,000)  (0,0000) 
 
(105,902) 
BETA 0,080***  CURRENT -0,000**  PPE -0,033**  
 (0,018)  (0,000)  (0,015) 
SICODE -0,141***  SP 0,031**  SP -0,137** 
 (0,031)  (0,015)   (0,054) 
ΔREV 0,0000*  LL 0,017***  CORPSIZE 0,019***  
 (0,0000)  (0,005)  (0,006) 
R² 0,527 CORPSIZE 0,013***  CFOV 16,683***  
F test 405,599***  (0,001)  (0,413) 
  
CFOV -0,002*** BETA -0,067*** 
  
  (0,0000)   (0,008) 
  
DEBT 0,0000**  R² 0,884 
  
 (0,0000) F test 378,463*** 
  
BETA 0,057***  
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F test 534,385*** 
  Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the joint effect of audit quality and investor protection on  earnings smoothness (EQ10)  in crisis period for all clusters. 
For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 



































R² 0,001 CRISIS 2,563*  R² 0,001 
F test 2,463*** 
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F test 0,644* 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in cost of equity capital (COSTOFEQUITY1) for all clusters in pre and crisis period and the effect of audit 
quality on cost of capital. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
      







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 






































































AQ5 -0,113***  AQ5 -0,083***  CRISIS 0,028**  
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(0,007) F test 22,901*** 
R² 0,220 R² 0,009 
  F test 502,907*** F test 48,522*** 
  
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in cost of equity capital (COSTOFEQUITY2) for all clusters in pre and crisis period and the effect of audit 
quality on cost of capital. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 



































R² 0,001 EQ₅ 0,030*  R² 0,008 
F test 0,595* 
 











F test 1,647* 
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Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the effect of earnings quality on cost of equity capital (COSTOFEQUITY1) for all clusters in pre crisis period. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 







Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 

























(0,014) F test 0,391* 
EQ₃ -2,066**  R² 0,001 
  
 
(0,859) F test 3,311*** 
  





    
EQ₈ 2,323***  
    
 
(2,772) 
    
R² 0,028 
    
F test 25,786*** 
    
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the effect of earnings quality on cost of equity capital (COSTOFEQUITY1) for all clusters in crisis period. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1.  
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R² 0,080 EQ₅ -0,001**  R² 0,156 
F test 51,316*** 
 
(0,0000) F test 18,576*** 
  
EQ₇ 0,030***  
  













    F test 325,891***     
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the effect of earnings quality on cost of equity capital (COSTOFEQUITY2) for all clusters in pre crisis period. For 
variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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EQ₂ 1,355***  R² 0,021 PROFITABILITY -0,014***  
 
(0,068) F test 55,386*** 
 
(0,001) 
EQ₄ -0,075***  
  
EQ₃ -0,168**  
 
(0,016) 
   
(0,081) 
EQ₅ 0,046***  
  
EQ₄ 2,531***  
 
(0,011) 
   
(0,949) 
EQ₆ 0,065***  
  
EQ₅ 0,549***  
 
(0,017) 
   
(0,183) 
EQ₇ 0,034***  
  
EQ₆ -2,470***  
 
(0,012) 
   
(0,924) 
EQ₈ 0,019***  
  
EQ₇ -0,083***  
 
(0,004) 
   
(0,024) 
EQ₉ 0,0000***  
  
EQ₈ 0,083***  
 
(0,0000) 
   
(0,020) 
EQ₁₀ -0,008**  
  
EQ₉ 0,008***  
 
(0,003) 





F test 495,518***     F test 50,752*** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the effect of earnings quality on cost of equity capital (COSTOFEQUITY2) for all clusters in crisis period. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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R² 0,001 R² 0,001 AQ2 0,0000**  
F test 2,895*** F test 18,939*** 
 
(0,001) 
    
R² 0,034 
        F test 11,681*** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the change in cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) for all clusters in pre and crisis period and the effect of audit quality on cost 
of debt. For variable definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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R² 0,001 EQ₉ 0,0000*  R² 0,014 
F test 0,640*** 
 
(0,0000) F test 1,514*** 
  
R² 0,0000 
      F test 0,342*     
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the effect of earnings quality on cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) for all clusters in pre crisis period. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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R² 0,005 R² 0,0000 EQ₇ 0,0000*  
F test 5,507*** F test 0,662* 
 
(0,0000) 
    
EQ₈ 0,0000**  
     
(0,0000) 
    
R² 0,014 
        F test 2,294*** 
Note: This panel shows the reults of OLS regression analysis to explain the effect of earnings quality on cost of debt (COSTOFDEBT) for all clusters in crisis period. For variable definitions, 
see Table 1.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively and the standard errors may be found in the parentheses. 
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